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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the Australian resources equity market reaction to the 2010 
resource tax announcements. These taxes were explicitly designed to meet tax neutrality 
conditions. Tax neutrality implies that taxes should not incur substitution effects that 
result in economic inefficiency. These taxes were intended to generate revenue (i.e., an 
income effect) while not distorting economic incentives. 
First, this thesis analyses the neutrality conditions from a theoretical point of view. It 
then examines the design of the proposed resource taxes and assesses whether the 
neutrality conditions were met and investigates the equity market reaction to the 
proposed tax reforms.  
Using an event study (price-based) methodology, evidence of the existence of a sizeable 
and statistically significant negative abnormal return is found, demonstrating the 
existence of a negative income effect. A cross-sectional analysis, however, also reveals 
a substitution effect; that is, differential effects across firm size, maturity levels, 
operational focus and other variables. 
These findings thus reject the hypothesis (and stated benefit) that the 2010 resource 
taxes were tax neutral.  
These results provide valuable information on the impact of these sorts of taxes to assist 
current and/or future governments throughout the world in developing taxation policies 
in relation to the resource sector.  
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1 
 General Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Following the Australia 2020 Summit in April 2008, which proposed a complete review of 
the federal and states tax systems, the Australian Government announced the Australia’s 
Future Tax System Review (informally, the Henry Tax Review). As a result of the 
recommendations made within this review’s consultation paper, the federal government 
announced the reform of the taxation of natural non-renewable resources. On 2 May 2010, 
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd introduced the proposed Resource Super Profit Tax (RSPT). 
The RSPT was a profit-based tax to be imposed on the extraction of all-natural non-
renewable resources in Australia and would have had affected approximately 2,500 
companies (Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Australian Government the 
Treasury 2008, 2010, 2011; Henry 2009). The announcement of the RSPT has been argued 
to have brought about the fall of Rudd (Shanahan & Franklin 2010). 
On 2 July 2010, reacting to concerns from the Australian community and pressure from the 
mining sector,1 the Australian Government (under Julia Gillard) introduced the Minerals 
Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) to replace the RSPT (Gillard et al. 2010). The MRRT became 
effective on 1 July 2012. 
The MRRT was also a profit-based tax but imposed only on a narrow range of minerals, 
iron ore and coal—only approximately 320 firms were to be subject to the MRRT. 
Although several design features of the RSPT were maintained, the MRRT differed in 
many ways, including in the effective tax rate, threshold rate, extraction allowance and 
uplift rate. The MRRT was scaled down compared with the RSPT in terms of these features 
(Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Australian Government the Treasury 2008, 
2010, 2011; Henry 2009). 
                                                 
1 Figures disclosed by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) show that nearly A$22 million was spent 
by mining companies on television advertisements to campaign against the RSPT (AEC 2010; Davis 2011a, 
2011b; Richardson & Denniss 2011). 
2 
In the lead up to the 2013 election, Leader of the Opposition Tony Abbott promised that if 
the Coalition were elected, they would repeal the MRRT. The Abbot Government was 
sworn in on 18 September 2013 and the MRRT repealed on 2 September 2014 (Australian 
Government the Treasury 2014). 
Onshore and oil projects would have been subject to the RSPT tax arrangement; 
conversely, the MRRT did not cover these petroleum companies. Instead, these were to be 
made subject to the existing Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) which was extended to 
all onshore oil and gas projects, including coal seam gas. The PRRT is a profit-based tax 
levied on all offshore petroleum projects (passed by the Parliament of Australia in 1987 and 
effective from 15 January 1988). 
Although tax revenues from the PRRT have been falling for more than a decade (from 
about A$2 billion dollar per annum in the early 2000s to an average of less than A$1 billion 
per annum in 2017), the PRRT has raised over A$30 billion dollars in tax revenue since tax 
payments first started (Australian Government 2017) In contrast, the MRRT was short 
lived, being repealed less than two years after its introduction and raising only a few 
hundred million dollars in revenue (McLarren & Passant 2015; Murray 2016; Valle de 
Souza, Dollery & Kortt 2017; Australian Government the Senate 2013). 
Both the RSPT and MRRT were acknowledged in the Henry review to meet the tax 
neutrality condition and were promoted by the Australian Government as being tax neutral 
(Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Australian Government the Treasury 2008, 
2010, 2011; Henry 2009). 
Tax neutrality refers to tax revenue that is collected without distorting or altering 
production, trade or investment decisions, implying that these taxes were intended to 
generate revenue (i.e., income effect, as funds are transferred from the private to the public 
sector in the form of taxation revenue) while not creating economic inefficiency (i.e., no 
substitution effect or deadweight loss) (Brown 1948; Groves 1948; Garnaut & Clunies-
Ross 1979, 1983; Kahn 1990; Niemann & Sureth 2004; Lang et al. 2009; Garnaut 2010, 
2013; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Tresh 2015). A neutral tax 
system is important as deviation can impede the productive capacity of the economy. 
3 
1.2 The Taxation of Economic Rent 
The primary objective of any taxation policy is to collect revenue in the most economically 
efficient way possible by maintaining the principle of tax neutrality (Auerbach & Hines 
2002; Furman 2008; Kaplow 2008; Golub 2011; Aure 2012; Fiscal Commission Working 
Group 2013; OECD 2014). The Taxation of economic rent is the holy grail of public 
finance (Mills 1981; Sørensen 2007; Heferen 2012; Bowler-Smith 2015). In theory, such a 
tax would generate vast amounts of revenue without incurring deadweight losses (Kittrell 
1957; Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1988; Garnaut 2010; Davidson 2010; Mclaren 2011; 
Passant 2012; Auerbach et al. 2007, 2008; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010). There are three 
benefits to the taxation of rent: 
1. The incidence of the tax is known; it is also the case that economic and legal 
incidence are identical. 
2. It has no deadweight loss (i.e., it is tax neutral). 
3. It has favourable fiscal illusion characteristics—that is, it leads taxpayers to 
perceive increases in the level of expenditure on public goods and social benefits 
without increase in the overall level of taxation (Musgrave & Musgrave 1989; 
Mueller 1989; Dollery & Worthington 1996; Banzhaf & Oates 2012). 
Rent in this context refers to profits over and above the level required to retain a resource in 
its current usage (Alchian 1991; Davidson 2010; Guj 2012; Henry 2010; Hogan 2012; 
Passant 2014; Freebairns 2015; Murray 2016). Historically, this has been associated with 
the return to natural resources and those resources with inelastic supply curves (Davidson 
2010; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Passant 2012; Hogan 2012; McLaren & Passant 2015; 
Murray 2016). While perhaps not the sole source of economic rent, resource rent 
constitutes the main source of economic rent in the non-renewable industry (Davidson 
2010; Hogan 2007, 2012; Garnaut 2010; Daniel et al. 2010; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; 
Passant 2012). It is the presence of such resource rent that provides the main economic 
justification for imposing a special tax on mining companies (Baunsgaard 2001; Henry 
2010; Garnaut 2010; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Hogan 2012; Passant 2012). 
4 
1.3 The Resource Sector and Taxation of Non-Renewable Energy in 
Australia 
Australia is endowed with abundant reserves of petroleum and mineral resources. For 
example, as of the 2015–2016 period, Australia has the world’s largest economic resources 
of industrial diamond, gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, mineral sands, zinc and uranium; the 
second largest of silver, copper, bauxite and brown coal; and fourth largest of black coal 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] 2017a, 2017b; Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics [ABARES] 2017; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
[DFAT] 2016). Australia is also the world leader in the production of mineral sands; the 
world’s second largest producer of gold, iron ore, lead and zinc; and among the top five 
producers of industrial diamond, nickel, silver uranium and black coal (ABS 2017a, 2017b; 
ABARES 2017; DFAT 2016). Not only these resources play an important part in the 
development and consolidation of Australia’s role as a world leader in the supply of global 
energy needs, they also play a major role for the Australian economy. 
Trade figures for the 2015–2016 period show that the bulk of such resource production is 
exported and represent around 45% of Australia total export earnings (ABS 2017a, 2017b; 
ABARES 2017; DFAT 2016). In addition, output and employment figures for this period 
indicate that the mining industry accounts for almost 7% of the Australian gross domestic 
product (GDP) and almost 2% of the total Australian workforce (ABS 2017a, 2017b; 
ABARES 2017; DFAT 2016). The metals and mining sector is the largest industry sector 
by number of listed companies, representing greater than 15% of the total capitalisation of 
the Australian stock exchange. It is also one of the biggest contributors to Australian 
earnings, representing more than 15 % of Australian total market earnings (Australian 
Securities Exchange [ASX] 2017; ABS 2017a, 2017b). 
From the above, it is evident that the Australian economy is highly dependent on 
commodity exports and that the resource sector not only contributes significantly to GDP 
but to employment, new infrastructure investment, exports and the development of rural 
and regional Australia. 
5 
Under Australian law, petroleum and mineral resources belong to the Crown and ownership 
of exhaustible resources is vested in state and territory governments (although the private 
sector extracts the resource) (Blainey 1993; Fitzgerald 2001; Smith 1993; Industry 
Commission 1991a; Industry Commission 1991b; Hogan 2003, 2007; Australian 
Government the Treasury 2008; Australian Government 2008; Hogan & McCallum 2010). 
Consequently, federal, state and territory governments have traditionally been heavily 
involved in the resource industry (i.e., management and control of natural resources), with 
taxes; subsidies; and granting of leases, license fees, mining and exploration rights (Harris 
1980; Industry Commission 1991a; Industry Commission 1991b; Hogan 2003, 2007; 
Australian Government the Treasury 2008; Australian Government 2010a, 2010b, 2017; 
Hogan & McCallum 2010). As discussed in the previous section, the natural resource sector 
can generally be expected to generate economic rent. As a result, taxation of natural 
resources is seen as an appropriate method to transfer part of the rent generated by 
extraction from the private sector to the owner of these natural resources. This economic 
rent has been a considerable source of income to the Australian Government (Australian 
Government the Treasury 2008; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Henry 2010; Australian 
Government 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Bullen et al. 2014; Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics [BREE] 2014; Hogan & McCallum 2010). 
Thus, the effect that taxation has on this sector is expected to have a significant effect on 
the performance of the whole economy and substitution effects could reduce GDP which 
could result in less resource tax being collected, impeding government revenues.  
1.4 Motivation and Importance of the Research 
Although a profit-based tax (the PRRT) has been imposed on offshore oil and gas resources 
since the end of the 1980s, Australia’s current fiscal settings are heavily reliant on output-
based taxes (mostly ad valorem royalties) in the taxation of onshore mineral resources 
(Hogan 2003, 2007; Henry et al. 2009; Henry 2010; Australian Government 2010a, 2010b, 
2017). However, there is strong evidence from the literature on the taxation of non-
renewable energy that output-based taxes are significantly more inefficient than profit-
based taxes (Daniel et al. 2010; Hogan 2007, 2012; Garnaut 2010; Henry 2010; Henry et al. 
6 
2009; Boadway & Keen 2010). Unsurprisingly, a shift towards profit-based taxes appears 
to be a global trend in mineral and petroleum resource taxation arrangements, particularly 
in developed countries. For instance, profit-based taxes have been adopted in Canada, 
several European countries (such as Denmark and Norway) and some parts of the United 
States (US) (Kemp 1987; Otto et al. 2006; Daniel et al. 2010; Guj 2018; Hogan & 
Goldsworthy 2010; Hogan 2012). They have also recently been adopted in developing 
counties such as Kazakhstan and Liberia and may well be considered elsewhere (Otto et al. 
2006; Daniel et al. 2010; Guj 2018; Hogan & Goldsworthy 2010; Hogan 2012). 
Given this, it is important that Australia remains competitive and efficient in the taxation of 
its mineral resources and, therefore, contemplates reform of the taxation of its natural non-
renewable resources by replacing the current output-based tax system with a profit-based 
tax setting. Such reform was announced by the Australian Government with the 
introduction of a uniform profit-based tax—the proposed RSPT and later MRRT—which 
became effective on 1 July 2012 but was repealed on 2 September 2014. 
Although the application of a profit-based tax to onshore mineral resources was abandoned 
with the repeal of the MRRT, the current federal government has not abolished the PRRT. 
Not only is the PRRT still in effect but, from 1 July 2012, its coverage has been extended to 
include onshore oil and gas projects (Australian Government 2010a, 2010b; Gillard et al. 
2010; Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2011). On 30 November 2016, the Australian Government 
announced an independent review of the PRRT (the Callaghan review) to assess whether 
changes needed to be made to the taxation of petroleum resources (i.e., the PRRT). The 
review was commissioned amid concerns over the PRRT’s decreasing revenues over the 
last few decades and fear of the PRRT failing to capture and collect an appropriate and fair 
share of the revenues generated presently and from the forecasted liquefied natural gas 
exports boom (Australian Government 2017). The review’s findings were delivered on 13 
April 2017 and included ways to enhance the PRRT. For instance, the review’s main 
recommendations were to reduce the uplift rates applied to carried forward deduction 
allowances and their transferability and order of claim. These findings were accepted in 
principle by the Australian Government, but the status of their practical implementation and 
development is yet to be confirmed or announced (Australian Government 2017). 
7 
The Callaghan review rejected the view that the PRRT fails to collect a fair and reasonable 
share of resource rent but also the arguments that the PRRT did not need overhauling and 
remained the preferred means of taxing petroleum resources efficiently (i.e., without 
distorting effect on investment decisions in oil and gas exploration, development and 
production) (Australian Government 2017). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the imposition of some sort of profit-based tax 
may be contemplated by the Australian Government on the profit generated from the 
extraction of natural resources other than petroleum. In fact, it is reasonable to assert that 
these types of mineral tax reforms (switching from output-based resource taxes to profit-
based resource taxes) are very likely to be considered in the future, not just in Australia but 
in other countries endowed with large natural resource assets. 
Natural resources represent a large share of the wealth of many nations and the manner in 
which their prospective contribution to government revenues is managed can greatly affect 
their economic development and prosperity. For instance, governments can use revenues 
from resource taxation to fund tax reduction or government expenditures or a combination 
of both. Government expenditures typically range from services such as healthcare, 
libraries, museums, schools and universities but also the construction and maintenance of 
community infrastructures and other essential public amenities (Kaplow 2008; Golub 2011; 
Tresch 2015). This is particularly true for Australia, not only given the importance of its 
mining sector but the fact that the Australian Government relies on revenues from the 
proposed resource tax reforms. For instance, a number of tax expenses measures were 
directly linked to the expected revenue windfall from the proposed RSPT and the MRRT. 
Some of the most important measures included an increase in the compulsory employer 
superannuation guarantee contribution, a reduction in the corporate income tax rate2 and 
infrastructure investment fund and the introduction of tax breaks for small businesses3 
(Passant 2012; Australian Government 2010a, 2010b; Henry 2010; Kompo-Harms & 
                                                 
2 This measure was to make Australian corporate tax internationally competitive in a bid to attract foreign 
investment, but also to address the imbalance created in the economy as a result of the mining boom (i.e., 
two-speed economy) (Passant 2012; Australian Government 2010a, 2010b; Henry 2010; Kompo-Harms & 
Sanyal 2011). 
3 For instance, earlier start date phase in period for the proposed reduction in the corporate tax rate (one year). 
Other tax break measures included more a generous and preferential regime with regards to the depreciation 
and allowances of capital expenditures (Australian Government 2010a, 2010b; Gillard et al. 2010). 
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Sanyal 2011; Gillard et al. 2010; Henry et al. 2009). Thus, the effect that taxation has on 
this sector is expected to have a significant effect on the performance of the whole 
economy and substitution effects could reduce GDP which could result in less resource tax 
being collected, impeding government revenues. Finally, it is important to note that the 
exploration and development phases in the exploitation of mineral resources are typically 
majority funded by equity markets (Bird et al. 2013; Metal Economics Group 2009).  
Hence, given all aforementioned, it essential for policymakers, governments and equity 
market participants to identify, understand and gain a better appreciation of the likely 
effects and the actual tax incidence of these kinds of taxes and resource tax reforms, not 
only at the industry and sector levels but at the individual firm level. 
Australia’s practical experience of these proposed resource taxes offers an ideal natural 
experiment that allows for not only the effect but, most importantly, the neutrality or 
otherwise of these forms of taxes to be studied and tested, both theoretically and 
empirically. This thesis provides valuable information on the effect and, more importantly, 
the neutrality or otherwise of these resource tax reforms. It also provides information on the 
extent to which these types of resource tax reforms can encourage or discourage investment 
in the resources sector—that is, whether these are value destructive or constructive. This 
thesis can assist current and future governments in reviewing and developing their taxation 
policies in relation to the resource sector, not only in Australia but in countries endowed 
with considerable non-renewable natural resources. 
1.5 Key Research Questions 
This thesis studies the impact of the Australian 2010 resource tax reforms on the Australian 
resources sector. More specifically, it examines the equity market reaction to these 
announced resource tax reforms on the industrial metal and mining, mining and oil and gas 
production sectors—that is, it investigates the income effect associated with the announced 
RSPT and MRRT. Most importantly, this thesis investigates whether these proposed tax 
regimes were neutral (as claimed in the Henry Tax Review and promoted by the Australian 
Government)—that is, whether the announced resource tax reforms caused both an income 
and a substitution effect or just an income effect. 
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The following questions guide the research. Addressing these will enable the identification 
of income and substitution effects resulting from the announced tax reforms (RSPT and 
MRRT) in terms of magnitude and direction: 
4. What are the general conditions for a tax system to be investment neutral? This will 
provide a theoretical framework by which to evaluate the proposed RSPT and 
MRRT designs and features. 
5. Did the proposed RSPT and MRRT meet these neutrality conditions? This will 
allow the formulation of hypothesis to empirically investigate whether the proposed 
RSPT and MRRT created a substitution effect. 
6. How did the equity market react to the respective tax reform announcements for 
these companies that were directly affected as a result of these proposed resource 
tax reforms? This will empirically examine the income effect and quantify its size, 
magnitude and persistence. 
7. Was there a differential effect across sectors, subsectors and firm individual 
characteristics affected by these resource taxes? This will investigate the existence 
of the substitution effect, that is, the neutrality or otherwise of the proposed RSPT 
and MRRT 
1.6 Main Empirical Finding: Income Effect 
Using an event study–based methodology, analysis of daily abnormal performances over 
the 41 days surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT reveals 
sizeable and statistically significant negative average abnormal returns around the day of 
the proposed RSPT announcement. It further indicates that while there was a slight 
statistically significant positive pre-MRRT announcement effect, the average combined 
effect of the announcement of the RSPT and MRRT on mineral and petroleum resources 
stocks was statistically significantly negative. 
These results convincingly demonstrate that the announcement of the proposed profit-based 
resource taxes had a significant negative impact on the common stock return of the 
companies involved in all subsectors investigated and further confirms that the proposed 
switch from a resource output-based tax to a resource profit-based tax was largely viewed 
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by investors as value destructive for most subsectors subject to the new profit-based tax. 
These findings support the public economic taxation theory that any tax reducing taxpayer 
disposable income generates a negative income effect. 
1.7 Main Empirical Finding: Substitution Effect 
A cross-sectional analysis of average abnormal cumulative returns around the 
announcement of the RSPT and MRRT reveals the presence of a substitution effect across 
firm-specific characteristics. For instance, the analysis shows that, on average, the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT was seen by equity market participants as more value 
destructive for oil and gas producing companies; smaller or younger firms, or companies 
with higher revenue exposure to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue 
derive from Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) or a higher WACC 
level relative to the RSPT threshold level or more financial constraints. 
Analysis further reveals that, on average, the announcement of the proposed MRRT was 
perceived by equity market participants as less value destructive for larger companies, or 
firms with relatively less exploration and development operations, or companies with less 
exposure to riskier mineral/mining projects and/or activities. These results indicate the 
claim that the RSPT and MRRT were neutral can be rejected.  
1.8 Contribution 
This thesis establishes and demonstrates the link and relationship between mining in 
Australia, mining legislation in Australia, ownership of minerals in Australia and economic 
rent; resources rent and the taxation of economic rent; and the taxation of resource rent and 
tax neutrality. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to use a 
short-term event study methodology to investigate and provide an exhaustive test of a 
short-term income and substitution effect around the announcement of the proposed RSPT 
and MRRT on the Australian resources sector. 
This thesis provides a unique interdisciplinary study that brings together and links separate 
streams of literature, which allows the direct test of the short-term effects of the 
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announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT on the Australian resources sector and, 
therefore, the income effect and the neutrality or otherwise associated with these proposed 
resource tax reforms. That is, this thesis first combines the public finance and public 
economics literatures to theorise the economic effect of the proposed RSPT and that of 
MRRT (i.e., income and substitution effects), then utilises finance theories to posit the 
mechanism by which these economic effects can directly affect equity markets (i.e., one-off 
adjustment in the share price of these companies affected by proposed RSPT and MRRT). 
Finally, this thesis draws on the event study methodology literature and statistical and 
cross-sectional econometric analysis to observe, measure, quantify and draw inferences 
about the significance of the effect of the RSPT and MRRT on the Australian resources 
sector. 
This thesis provides empirical evidence that, on average, the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT and MRRT generated substantial and statistically significant short-term average 
abnormal returns on mineral and petroleum resources stocks. This confirms that the RSPT 
and MRRT created an income effect. 
This thesis reveals that, on average, the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT 
created a short-term sizeable and statistically significant tax differential effect on mineral 
and petroleum resources stocks. This result shows that the RSPT and MRRT created a 
substitution effect, rejecting the Australian Government–stated tax neutrality designs of 
these resource taxes. Further, this thesis shows that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the short-term substitution effect and firm individual characteristics 
such as size, maturity levels, operational focus and other variables. These results can assist 
governments in the design and features of a less distortionary profit-based resource tax 
regimes. 
This thesis provides new empirical evidences on the short-term shareholder wealth effect of 
a proposed and actual switch from a resource output-based tax regime to a resource profit-
based tax regime on mineral and petroleum resources stocks. That is, on average, such a 
proposal is perceived as value destructive by the shareholders of resources companies 
affected by such proposal. By investigating the effect of the RSPT and MRRT on equity 
market, this thesis contributes to the finance, public finance and public economics literature 
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on the short-term impact of mineral resource taxation reforms (specifically, a switch from 
an output to a profit-based resource tax) on equity market. 
Tax neutrality properties of profit-based resources rent taxations have mostly been 
examined in theoretical frameworks (Garnaut 1978, 2010; Ganaut & Clunies-Ross 1975, 
1979, 1983; Hausman 2010; Heaps & Helliwell 1985; Hogan 2012; Hogan & McCallum 
2010; Boadway & Keen 2010; Daneil et al. 2010; Ergas et al. 2010; Freebairn & Quiggin 
2010; Guj 2012). By analysing the short-term cross-sectional effect of the RSPT and 
MRRT on equity market, this thesis contributes to the literature by providing an empirical 
investigation of the neutrality properties of different profit-based resource rent tax designs 
(i.e., RSPT and MRRT). 
A variety of statistical tests both parametric and non-parametric are investigated, analysed 
and employed. Given the unique nature and context of the analysis undertaken in this thesis 
(i.e., clustered in calendar time, country and industry), such an approach, in addition to 
using a short-term event study methodology—which is more reliable and accurate than 
long-term event studies (Kothari & Warner 2007; Barakat & Terry 2013; Ahern 2009; 
Kolari & Pynnönen 2010; McWilliams & Siegel 1997)—allows the development of robust 
and precise assessments of the short-term effect of the RSPT and MRRT on the Australian 
resources sector. 
1.9 Thesis Structure 
This remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a discussion on 
the concept of rent and its historical development. The chapter begins with a discussion of 
the origin of the term ‘rent’, examining various economists who discussed early elements of 
the concept. It then briefly considers the historical context in which the law of rent emerged 
before deliberating the law of rent by examining its development, formulation and 
criticisms and, using a supply–demand framework, providing a graphical explanation. 
Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion on the application of the law of rent to the mining 
industry. 
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Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the concept and importance of tax neutrality, how to 
observe and measure tax neutrality and, more importantly, what happens when there is a 
departure from tax neutrality and how to observe and measure this. It discusses the main 
corporate cash flow taxation designs and their effect on tax neutrality, ending with a 
conversation on the relationship between the taxation of economic rent, tax neutrality and 
cash flow taxation. 
Chapter 4 considers the application of the concept of tax neutrality to mineral and 
petroleum resources. It discusses the principal groups of resource taxation arrangements 
and the different criteria against which these are evaluated or ranked and analyses the effect 
of these main groups of resource taxation on tax neutrality. This chapter applies the main 
cash flow taxation schemes to hypothetical resource projects and discusses their tax 
neutrality properties. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the principal issues to 
consider in the imposition of profit-based taxation to non-renewable resources. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the history of Australian mining and resource taxation. It begins with 
a brief discussion on the European discovery and colonisation of Australia, followed by a 
discussion on the development and evolution of mining legislation with a particular focus 
on mining acts. This chapter elaborates on resource taxation arrangements in Australia, 
discussing early resource taxation arrangements, the first resource tax reform with the 
implementation of the PRRT and their rational and economic justifications. It also 
describes the current resource taxation arrangement in Australian prior to the proposed 
2010 resource tax reforms. The chapter then discusses the reasons, motivations and 
economic justifications of these proposed reforms, their design and features and repeal. 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the rationale and motivation for using an event study 
methodology for the investigation of the equity market reaction to—and, therefore, the 
effect of—the 2010 resource tax announcements and describes and explains the data and 
the different models and statistical tests to be used in the investigation. Chapters 7 and 8 
provide detailed result descriptions and discussion of the empirical analysis conducted to 
examine the equity market reaction to the 2010 resource tax reform announcement—the 
income effect in Chapter 7 and substitution effect in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 9 concludes this thesis, providing a summary of the findings of each thesis chapter, 
the overall findings, contributions and limitations of this thesis and avenues for future 
research.  
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 Rent: History and Concept 
2.1 Introduction 
While the objective of this thesis is to investigate the mining and energy sectors equity 
market reaction to the proposed resource rent tax, it is essential to first discuss the concept 
of rent, the existence of which is a key element and policy basis of the proposed resource 
tax reforms. This chapter begins with a discussion on the origin of the term rent and 
examines various economists who discussed early elements of the notion. It then briefly 
considers the historical context in which the law of rent emerged—the Corn Laws in the 
UK. Thereafter, it examines the development of the law of rent, its formulation and 
associated criticisms, and provides a graphical explanation. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the application of the law of rent to the mining industry. 
2.2 Early Elements of the Notion and Concept of Rent 
The origin of the term rent can be associated with the classical school of economic thought 
and was conceptualised as the return/income derived from land, one of the three factors of 
production (Ricardo 1817; Smith 1828; Fetter 1901; Gray 1914; Kittrell 1957; Wessel 
1967; Alchian 1991; Davidson 2010; Passant 2012, 2014) 
In modern economics, economic rent is generally defined as the total return to a factor of 
production in excess of the minimum return required to induce the use of that factor or to 
retain its current employment4 (Alchian 1991; Davidson 2010; Henry 2010; Hogan 2012; 
Passant 2012, 2014; Murray 2016) 
Although there is no clear consensus concerning the nature and principles that establish 
rent, the following sections discuss the early development of some elements of the notion 
and concept of rent. 
William Petty could be argued to be the first classical economist to expound the concept of 
rent (Schneider 2013). In his book Treatise of taxes and contributions (1662), Petty 
                                                 
4 The factors of production include labour, capital and land (Davidson 2010). 
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attributed the existence of rent to heterogeneity in transportation costs from lands to the 
main marketplace where commodities were traded. He asserted that lands located closer to 
marketplaces yield higher rent as a result of lower transportation costs relative to those 
situated in remote locations. 
Turgot can also be credited as discussing early elements of the concept and notion of rent. 
In 1767, he commented on an assumption made by Saint-Pèravy5 about the law of returns 
that presumed that ‘the proportion between the annual advances in agricultural production 
and its total product is as two to five’ (Turgot 1967, p. 109). While Turgot recognised the 
empirical validity of such an assumption, he postulated that advances6 applied to 
heterogeneous quality lands would produce very different results, and further argued that 
one should not assume a proportional relationship between products and advances. He 
illustrated that while applying additional advances to the same land would initially yield 
increasing returns, beyond a certain point, returns would start falling, until eventually 
becoming negative (Turgot 1977; Groenewegen 1977; Schneider 2013). 
James Anderson is also recognised as having discussed early elements of the concept of 
rent. In 1777, he observed that soils on the east coast of Scotland were more fertile that on 
the west coast, and concluded that it is the differences in fertility of various types of soils 
that constitute rent. Anderson contended that rent was a premium paid for the use of more 
fertile and productive land relative to less fertile and productive land, which simply covered 
the production cost and generated no rents. It is, however, important to note that Anderson 
maintained that the productivity of the least fertile soil could be increased by repeated 
amelioration of the soil, to the point where it would become comparable to that of the most 
productive land (Anderson 1777). 
2.3 The Corn Laws 
Although this section is not intended to provide a history of the Corn Laws, a brief 
discussion is nevertheless essential to comprehend the context in which the law of rent 
emerged. Indeed, several intellectual discussions about the concept and notion of rent first 
                                                 
5 Saint-Peravy was a French physiocrat of the 18th century. 
6 Turgot asserted that advances can only be of the form of expenditures (Turgot 1767). 
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took place in the early to mid-1800s, and these can be perceived as a by-product of political 
conflicts between manufacturers and landowners caused by the UK Corn Laws (Schneider 
2013).  
The Corn Laws, which intended to establish a well-defined system for the regulation of 
grain trade, were tariffs imposed on imported and exported wheat and other grains, aimed at 
ensuring adequate supply to meet domestic needs and maintaining reasonable and 
profitable grain price levels. First issued in 1436 and abolished in 1846, they were 
consistently adjusted, mostly to reflect changing domestic and international market 
conditions but also due to conflicting groups (landowners and manufacturers) being 
successful in pressuring for modifications to protect their own interests (Barnes 2013; 
Fairlie 1965; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; Williamson 1990). 
Although both groups shared the common objective of profit maximisation, the course of 
action in achieving this goal differed. Landowners, a long-established class overly 
represented in parliament, desired to maintain high grain prices, whereas manufacturers, an 
under-represented group, sought to reduce factory worker wages. Political disputes arose 
as, for workers to be willing and able to work in factories, wages had to be sufficient to 
enable them to nourish themselves and their families, while in practice, excessive grain 
prices tended to maintain pressure for high wages, with manufacturers viewing these tariffs 
as causing wages to be greater than they would otherwise be (Barnes 2013; Fairlie 1965; 
Schneider 2013; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; Williamson 1990). 
Since the price of grain played a fundamental role in the determination of most essential 
goods (e.g., bread and other food), with workers habitually spending most of their income 
on such goods, its price became an economic issue. In general, the Corn Laws were 
perceived as protectionist tariffs intended to protect landowners from foreign competition, 
maintain high grain prices and enhance their power and profits. Their repeal stimulated free 
trade (Barnes 2013; Fairlie 1965; Schneider 2013; Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; Williamson 
1990). 
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2.4 The Law of Rent 
2.4.1 Emergence of the law of rent 
A period (1805–1814) of exceptionally high corn prices,7 combined with impending 
parliamentary debates resulting from an 1813 Lower House Committee Report 
recommending an increase on the corn tariff and followed by the passage of the Corn Laws 
of 1815,8 can be seen as the root/trigger of the publications and essay writing on the subject 
of rent (Schneider 2013). 
For instance, Malthus published several pamphlets9 between 1814 and 1815 discussing the 
benefits and disadvantages of the proposed Corn Laws. Although Malthus initially 
appeared to oppose tariffs or restrictions on the import of grains, his opinion changed the 
following year, and he argued that these would induce domestic production and permit 
Great Britain to become more self-sufficient.10 Another argument brought forward against 
free trade was the fact that Malthus believed that importation would lead to lower prices, 
reducing workers’ wages and the conditions for the lower classes. He further alleged that 
manufacturers could suffer due to a reduction of landlord and farmer purchasing power 
(Malthus 1814, 1815). 
Malthus claimed that it is the increase in the unit cost of production resulting from the 
extension of cultivation to less productive land than those currently being cultivated that 
caused a rise in the price of corn, and contended that the existence of rent results from the 
excess of price above cost of production (Malthus 1814, 1815). Malthus inferred that rent 
was a result of ‘the most inestimable quality in their soil, which god has bestowed on man-
                                                 
7 A depreciation of the shilling coupled with a deficient crop caused prices to reach 112s per quarter (Lalor 
1899). 
8 The Corn Laws 1815 prohibited nearly all foreign-grown grain until the average price of numerous 
domestically grown grains had reached certain levels: 80 shilling per quarter for viz and wheat, 53 shillings 
for rye, peas and beans, and so on (Lalor 1899). 
9 These were ‘Observations on the effects of the Corn Laws, and of rise or fall in the price of corns on the 
agriculture and general wealth of the country’ in 1814, and ‘The grounds of an opinion on the policy of 
restricting the importation of foreign corn: intended as an appendix to “Observations on the corn law”’ and 
‘An inquiry into the nature and progress of rent, and the principles by which it is regulated’, both published 
in 1815.  
10 It should be noted that Malthus considered food production sufficiency key to a country’s defence (Malthus 
1814, 1815). 
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the quality of being able to maintain more persons than are necessary to work it’ (Malthus 
1815, p. 122).  
Malthus noted that a reduction in the cost of production would result in further land being 
taken into cultivation only after new opportunities for profit had been entirely captured by 
further intensive cultivation of lands being already cultivated, and explained that one of the 
conditions of the increase of rent was ‘the comparative scarcity of the most fertile land’ 
(Malthus 1815, p. 8). 
With these pamphlets, Malthus contributed to the debate on the rise in the price of corn by 
examining the origin and nature of rent, rejecting the view that high rent was the cause of 
high grain prices, an argument advanced by Smith (1776) in ‘An inquiry into the nature and 
causes of the wealth of nations’. Malthus emphasised the importance of the fundamental 
distinction between surpluses of price above cost of production generated by rent on the 
one hand and as a result of a natural monopoly where high prices are due to surplus of 
demand above limited supply on the other. 
West (1815) also discussed the notion and concept of rent, in a pamphlet that aimed to avert 
the adoption of the coming Corn Law, under which he judged the price to be ‘immoderately 
high protective’ (Cannan 1892).11 West commenced his essay by stating that its purpose 
was motivated by the desired to promulgate a principle in political economy that he had 
contemplated some years earlier and which, according to him, had been reaffirmed in 
recent parliamentary committee reports on the Corn Laws (West 1815)—diminishing 
returns and its importance in agricultural production.  
Using as an example the first inhabitants of a new settlement cultivating the best quality 
land first, then the second in quality, and so forth, West stated that ‘every additional 
quantity of capital laid out produces a less proportionate return’ (1815, p. 2). Unlike in 
manufacturing, an increase in the rate of profit in the agricultural industry resulting from 
advancement and improvement in practices, methods and techniques would generally be 
outweighed by diminishing returns and ultimately fall (West 1815). He further discussed 
the consequences of tariffs on corn on British agriculture and rent, arguing that such 
                                                 
11 West published his essay anonymously under ‘a fellow of University College, Oxford’.  
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policies did not decrease the price of grains but rather recognised that it is the law of 
diminishing return in agriculture that regulates prices and causes them to be high, which in 
turn, permits land to yield excessive rent (West 1815).  
Further, West concluded that a surge in the demand for corn would not induce an extension 
of cultivation to additional land as long as further profit opportunities existed on land 
already being cultivated (Schneider 2013; West 1815). West expounded on the 
consequences of further intensive cultivation and deduced that ‘the rent of the landlord 
would … be all that was made on the whole capital above what the last least profitable 
portion of that capital was produced’ (1815, p. 53). 
Robert Torres is yet another political economist who discussed the notion and concept of 
rent. In Torres’s book ‘An essay on the external corn trade’ (1815), among discussion of 
other thoughts and concepts,12 he disputed the view of a select committee of the House of 
Commons13 that restricting the importation of corn would decrease its price, arguing that 
instead of nourishing a growing population and satisfying the rising demand for corn (the 
projected effect from such importation policy), it would ‘force into cultivation lands which 
could not under free competition be profitably tilled’ (1815, p. 211), resulting in rents rising 
on superior quality lands, which would produce a surge in the price of corn.14 
2.4.2 Formulation of the law of rent 
While the theory of rent can rather be thought of as a case of a multiple discovery,15 it is 
Ricardo who formulated and presented the law of rent in its most elaborated form, in ‘The 
principles of political economy and taxation’ (1817). The law of rent, also known as 
Ricardian rent, defines rent as ‘the portion of the produce of earth which is paid to the 
landlord for the use of the original and indestructible power of soil’ (Ricardo 1817). 
Ricardo argued that rent emerges as a result of population surge, heterogeneous factors of 
                                                 
12 Profit, wages and comparative costs, among others (Torres 1815). 
13 Selected to inquire into the matter of corn trade (Cannan 1892). 
14 It should be noted that Torrens adhered to the Smithian view that rent, wages and profits do form parts of 
the price of a commodity, and that an increase in rents is generally subsidised by a rise in price rather than 
diminished profits (Smith 1776; Torrens 1815). 
15 A similar idea or concept contemplated by more than one individual independently (Scheider 2013; Stigler 
1952). 
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production16 (differential rent) and the fact that one of the factors of production is available 
in limited quantity (scarcity rent). Tracts of land differ in quality, varying with respect to 
fertility and location; hence, with a given quantity of capital and labour, some land yields 
greater output than other plots, and these differences create differences in production costs 
(Ricardo 1817). 
Therefore, in classical economics, rent is thought to be an unearned return or income 
derived from land resulting from its particular characteristics (inelastic supply and 
heterogeneous quality).  
2.4.3 Criticism of the law of rent 
Since most of the core assumptions and justifications underpinning the proposed resource 
tax reforms are based on the classical theory of rent (see Chapter 5), the discussion above 
focuses on the classical economists. Nonetheless, it is important to address their critics. 
While many economists partially acknowledge and recognise the notion and concept of 
rent, others reject the idea. 
For instance, by introducing the notion of quasi rent, Alfred Marshall (1890) accepted to 
some extent the existence of a certain type of rent. Like Ricardo, he asserted that rent can 
exist because of the inelasticity of supply in some factors of production. However, unlike 
the classical school of thought, he argued that such phenomenon can only occur temporally 
(i.e., in the short run), as under standard perfectly competitive market conditions, long-run 
equilibrium bids away any rent.17 This view is advocated by Stigler (1952), who explained 
that any factor of production may have an inelastic supply in the short run, and as such, 
may generate some measure of rent. Hence, these economists agreed, at least to a certain 
extent, with the classical concept of rent as some kind of ‘unearned profit’ that results from 
inelastic supply of factors of production (scarcity rent). 
Conversely, other economists rejected not only the idea of inelastic supply in some factors 
of production at any time, but the entire concept and existence of classical rent (i.e., 
unearned profit). For instance, Knight (1921, 1933) and Rothbard (1962) rejected the 
                                                 
16 In this case, land. 
17 Assuming that rents do not arise as a result of monopolistic or oligopolistic market structure. 
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notion of elastic supply at any time. Further, Schumpeter (1954), Mises (1949)18 and 
Davidson (2010) argued that there is no such thing as unearned returns but rather an earned 
return derived from entrepreneurial ability. In other words, in the context of land for 
instance, these authors asserted that although land may have some value on its own, it is 
entrepreneurial ability that generates economic value. Therefore, any return to land is not 
an unearned return to land due its nature and characteristics but a return to entrepreneurial 
function and ability to combine factors of production to create economic value. As 
Davidson (2010) stated, ‘what the Classical economists call “rent” was really differencing 
productivity and entrepreneurial skill’ (p. 6) 
2.5 The Law of Rent: Graphical Illustration 
The law of rent can be graphically depicted using a supply- demand framework. Figure 2.1 
depicts three grades of land—A, B and C—and their marginal and average total cost 
curves. It is assumed that grade A land is superior to both other lands, with grade C the 
poorest quality land. It can be seen that any economic units exploiting grade A land will 
incur a lower marginal and average total cost than those exploiting grade B and C land, 
with land C incurring the highest production costs.  
As Ricardo assumed a perfect competitive market structure, the profit maximisation rule 
dictates the long-run equilibrium price of corn must equal the lowest point of the long-term 
average total cost, where the marginal revenue, average revenue, marginal average total 
cost and price are all equal (i.e., normal return). It is further assumed that lands are 
gradually taken for production, starting with the most fertile to the poorest quality. Hence, 
grade A is taken up first, and so long as part of it is still idle (that is, up to point L where the 
supply of land is not scarce in relation to demand) then rent cannot arise. As the population 
continues to grow, demand for corn increases, such that the whole available grade A land is 
brought under cultivation. At this stage, farmers are operating at the lowest point of the 
average total cost at point L. Further growth in the population beyond this point causes 
demand for corn to increase, which will bring the price level above the minimum average 
total cost of production.  
                                                 
18 Though Mises believed in the notion of differential rent (Mises 1949). 
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As a result, two courses of actions can be adopted: intensive and/or extensive cultivation. 
Extensive cultivation involves bringing land of inferior quality into cultivation (i.e., grade 
B) by applying equal use of capital and labour to that employed on grade A land. For grade 
B land to be brought into cultivation, the price of corn must rise sufficiently to cover its 
minimum average cost of production. It is evident from Figure 2.1 that price must increase 
to P2 if grade B land is to be worthwhile cultivating, as anything below this will not cover 
the capital and labour costs incurred. Thus, at a price of P2 margin of cultivation is 
extended to grade B land and farmers cultivating this inferior quality plot of land will be 
operating on the lowest point of the average total cost curve. Since the new equilibrium 
price P2 is equal to the total average cost on grade B land, no rent is earned on it (Figure 
2.1). However, because P2 is higher than the minimum average capital and labour cost per 
unit of output produced on grade A land, landlords of grade A land will earn rent.  
It is the surplus of price over the cost of production that constitutes rent (i.e., above normal 
return) per output produced—the difference between P2 and L at output M in Figure 2.1a. 
In other words, rent occurs as the employment of additional units of a heterogeneous factor 
of production (i.e., land)19 yields less productive units or production than those previously 
used (i.e., the more fertile land), resulting in a rise in the per unit cost of production. Hence, 
it is the difference in the productive power of the better land over the less fertile that 
constitutes rent. This rent is constantly measured from the marginal land upwards, with 
marginal land just covering expenses, yielding no surplus; therefore, being just worth 
cultivating.20 
It should be noted that while the margin of cultivation can be extended to grade B land, 
more intensive cultivation of grade A land can also be undertaken, by applying more capital 
and labour; in other words, the margin of intensive cultivation is extended to grade A land. 
By extending the margin of intensive cultivation, farmers of grade A land will not be 
producing at the minimum of their average total cost as the expansion in output in response 
to the increased demand will raise the marginal cost of cultivation on grade A land. Once 
again, the per unit cost of production increases, but in this case, because of additional units 
                                                 
19 Assuming all other factors of production are identical. Further, it should be noted that the most fertile land 
is cultivated first and the poorest quality last (Ricardo 1817). 
20 Ricardo (1817) defines margin land as the most unfavourable to obtain produce from. 
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of factors of production applied to a fixed amount of a homogenous factor of production 
(i.e., grade A land), which results in a successive diminishment of output per unit of factors. 
The new equilibrium position will then be at point X, where the new higher price P2 and 
the marginal cost are equal (Figure 2.1a). It is important to note that even without intensive 
cultivation and output being restricted to M on grade A land, rent is earned, since OP2 is 
above ML, the lowest average total cost on grade A land. Hence, rent on intra-marginal 
land (in this case, grade A land) emerges as a result of both extensive and/or intensive 
cultivation and grade B land becomes the marginal land, earning no rent. 
Additional growth in the population further increases the demand of corn, causing its price 
to rise further (P3 in Figure 2.1c). Consequently, the margin of extensive cultivation is 
extended to grade C land, while margin of intensive cultivation is pushed forward on grade 
A and B land. As a result, grade C land now becomes the marginal land, with no surplus 
over the cost of production earned since the price and the average total cost are equal; in 
other words, no rent is earned on it. Further, as grade A and B land are more intensively 
cultivated, output levels on both expand to the point where marginal cost is equal to the 
new higher equilibrium price P3; that is, M1 and N1 for grade A and B respectively (Figure 
2.1a and b).  
As a result of the rise in price to P3, rent emerges on grade B land with an excess of total 
revenue earned over the total cost of capital and labour equal to the shaded area HGFK 
(Figure 2.1b), and rent increases on grade A land to the shaded area SQER (Figure 2.1a). 
Hence, at a price level of P3 grade C land becomes the marginal land and both grade A and 
B land earn rent, with the higher quality land (grade A) earning the higher rent.  
If the population grows further and all available land is brought under both extensive and 
intensive cultivation, equilibrium prices will rise above P3 (Figure 2.1c). Scarcity rent will 
arise on grade C land as it begins to earn a surplus above its cost of production, and 
superior quality lands (grade A and B land) will receive this surplus in excess of the 
differential rent. Hence, according to Ricardo, it is the differences in land quality combined 
with its scarcity that give rise to rent. In other words, rent arises as diminishing returns set 
in, be they caused by poorer quality soils being brought into cultivation or additional units 
of capital and labour being added to the soil initially under cultivation. 
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Figure 2.1: The Law of Rent (Supriya Guru, 2014.) 
2.6 Economic Rent and the Mining Industry 
As discussed in previous sections, the law of rent is an important concept in classical 
economics explaining return/income derived from land. This concept can be applied to any 
natural resource, including mines/mineral deposits (Davidson 2010; Kompo-Harms & 
Sanyal 2011; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Passant 2012; Murray 2016; Mclaren & Passant 
2015).21 
That is, although nature produces metals, it is human labour that permits recovery from the 
earth, as well as processing and transport. Like land, deposits/mines are of various grades 
and generally produce rent, collected by the owner (Ricardo 1817). While the poorest 
quality deposit does not yield any rent, the value of the metals produced from it must at 
least cover not only the explicit cost but the implicit cost incurred in recovering the 
minerals from the mine and bringing them to the market. The return on capital from this 
mine yielding no rent determines the rent of the other (superior) mines. That is, all that the 
more productive deposits yield in excess of normal profit constitutes rent to be paid to its 
owner (Ricardo 1817).22 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that this concept is one of the key elements of the proposed resource tax reforms (see 
chapter 5). 
22 This rent, as Ricardo asserted, ‘is the effect and never the cause of the high value of their produce’ (1817, p. 
51), and like any manufactured commodity and raw produce, the value of any metals while subject to 
variation is determined by the amount of labour needed to extract the metal and to bring it to the marketplace 
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Hence, within a perfect competitive market structure, the rent generated from the 
exploration, development and extraction of natural resources is the excess of revenue over a 
normal rate of return on capital. This normal profit is the minimum rate of return required 
for investors to hold capital in the activity (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1979; Henry 2010; 
Garnaut 2010; Hogan 2007, 2012; Daniel et al. 2010; Passant 2012, 2014; Freebairn & 
Quiggin 2010, Davidson 2010). For a risk-neutral investor, the normal profit is equal to a 
risk-free rate, and for a risk-averse investor, a risk premium is added to the risk-free rate to 
compensate for the risk incurred in a mining activity (Hinchy et al. 1989; Hogan 2007, 
2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010, Daniel et al. 2010). 
In other words, the resource rent represents the value of production of a natural resource 
after all necessary costs have been deducted (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1979, 1983; Hinchly 
et al. 1989; Henry 2010; Garnaut 2010; Hogan 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Daniel et al. 2010; Passant 2012, 2014; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010, Davidson 2010); it 
exists and persists in the long run due to the quality and scarcity value of different mining 
deposits (Ricardian rent). Typically, in the non-renewable resources industry, resource rent 
is assumed to be equivalent to the economic rent. It is, however, important to note that 
while a major source of economic rent, resource rent may not be the lone source. In fact, 
economic rent may be greater than resource rent in the presence of Schumpeterian rent (i.e., 
managerial/entrepreneur skills) (Davidson 2010. Daniel et al. 2010, Kompo-Harms & 
Sanyal 2011; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; McLaren & Passant 2015; Garnaut 2010; Kellow 
2016; Parmenter et al. 2010). 
The concept of resource rent can be illustrated using a supply–demand framework for both 
risk-neutral (Figure 2.2) and risk-averse investors (Figure 2.3). In both cases, price is 
assumed to be determined on the world market and set to 𝑝𝑤. 𝑆𝑅𝑁 (Figure 2.2) represents 
the long-run industry supply curve faced by risk-neutral investors and 𝑆𝑅𝐴 (Figure 2.3) that 
of a risk-averse investor.23 The industry equilibrium position occurs at point B for risk-
                                                                                                                                                    
(Ricardo 1817). For example, improvement in the methods of mining and discovery of new and better grade 
mines would result in the value of a mineral declining. Conversely, any complications in recovering the metal 
(e.g., greater depth at which the deposit must be mined or removal of waste materials) will raise the value of 
the metal (Ricardo 1817). 
23 The supply curve represents the total cost of producing the natural resource, which includes capital and 
exploration costs and development and production costs, including abandonment. 
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neutral investors, corresponding to an output level of 𝑞𝑅𝑁
∗  (Figure 2.2), and point A for risk-
averse investors, with 𝑞𝑅𝐴
∗  the corresponding output level (Figure 2.3). The resource rent is 
equal to 𝑝𝑤𝐷𝐵 for risk-neutral investors and 𝑝𝑤𝐶𝐴 for risk-averse investors. It is important 
to note that the industry risk premium for risk-averse investors is equal to the difference 
between the two supply curves (𝑆𝑅𝐴 and 𝑆𝑅𝑁) up to the industry output 𝑞𝑅𝐴
∗  (Figure 2.3). 
Hence, it can be asserted that in the presence of risk and risk-averse investors, the industry 
level of quantity produced is lower than if investors were risk neutral, as some marginal 
mining projects would be judged too risky to be undertaken. 
 
Figure 2.2: Risk-Neutral Investors and Resource Rent 
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Figure 2.3: Risk-Averse Investors and Resource Rent 
2.7 Conclusion 
Since an implicit assumption made in the Henry Tax Review was the existence of resource 
rent (see Chapters 1 and 5), the principle objective of this chapter was to discuss the notion 
and concept of rent.  
While the term rent originated in classical economics as a return derived from land, modern 
economics defines economic rent as the total return to a factor of production in excess of 
the minimum required to induce the use of that factor of production or to retain its current 
employment. 
Various economists contributing to the development, formulation and criticism and 
rejection of the notion and concept of rent have been discussed. Petty introduced the idea of 
diminishing returns resulting from increasing unit costs due to the rise in transportation 
costs; Anderson, Turgot, Malthus, West and Torrent explored the notion of diminishing 
fertility across various types of soils.  
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It is however Ricardo (1817) who is acknowledged as presenting the law of rent (Ricardian 
rent) in its most elaborated form. For Ricardo, rent exists because of heterogeneous factors 
of production (differential rent) and the fact that one of the factors of production is limited 
in quantity (scarcity rent). In other words, rent represents an unearned return arising from 
the inelastic supply and heterogeneous quality of factors of production, particularly land.  
Criticisms of the Ricardian theory of rent have also arisen. For instance, Marshall (1890) 
and Stigler (1952) accept that scarcity rent may exist but only in the short term (i.e., quasi 
rent). In contrast, Knight (1921) and Rothbard (1962) rejected the notion of elastic supply 
at any time. Schumpeter (1954), Mises (1949) and Davidson (2010) reject the entire 
existence of rent or unearned income; rather, these authors argue that return to land is not 
an unearned return due to its nature and characteristics, but rather, the return to 
entrepreneurial function and ability to combine all factors of production to create economic 
value. 
This chapter concluded by applying the concept of economic rent to the mining industry, 
with resource rent representing the value of production of a natural resource after all 
necessary costs have been deducted. It exists and persists in the long run because of the 
quality and scarcity value of different mining deposits (Ricardian rent). It was however 
noted that while being a major source, resource rent may not be the lone source of 
economic rent. In fact, economic rent may be greater than resource rent in the presence of 
Schumpeterian rent (i.e., managerial/entrepreneur skills). 
The concept of economic rent and the view that rent may constitute unearned income 
derived from a factor of production is important in public finance. For instance, as asserted 
by Davidson (2010), because of its nature, the taxation of economic rent offers desirable 
theoretical characteristics; not only is the burden of the tax known, more importantly, it can 
achieve tax neutrality (as discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4).   
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 Tax Neutrality, Cash Flow Taxation and Economic 
Rent 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters noted that, because of its nature, the taxation of economic rent offers 
desirable theoretical characteristics—not only is the incidence of the taxation of economic 
rent known but it allows tax neutrality to be achieved.  
But what is tax neutrality and how is it related to the concept and presence of economic 
rent? Why is the achievement of tax neutrality important and sought by government? What 
is a tax neutral outcome and how is tax neutrality achieved and measured? But also, how is 
deviation from a tax neutral outcome identified and measured? The goal of this chapter is to 
address these questions. 
To do so, this chapter begins with a general discussion on the principle and importance of 
neutral taxation and a neutral tax system in public finance theory. It then discusses the 
effect of taxation on economic units and the economy by discussing the concept of tax 
incidence and applying this concept to graphically demonstrate the effect of both neutral 
taxation and deviation from it, and show its importance in public economic taxation theory. 
The chapter then focuses on corporate cash flow taxation to provide a theoretical 
framework analyses on the effect of the main cash flow tax design on tax neutrality. This 
allows the formulation of the neutrality condition that must be met to achieve cash flow tax 
neutrality. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on the relationship between the taxation of 
economic rent, cash flow taxation and tax neutrality. 
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3.2 Tax Neutrality: General Concept 
3.2.1 Principle and importance 
An economically efficient tax system is one in which resources are allocated to their most 
productive use to produce the mix of goods and services that society desires the most and at 
the lowest possible cost (Musgrave & Musgrave 1989; Feldstein 1999; Auerbach & Hines 
2002; Furman 2008, Kaplow 2008; Golub 2011, Aure 2012). 
In public finance theory, the main purpose of taxation is to enable governments to raise the 
necessary revenue to support their activities.24 In doing so, the primary goal is to preserve 
the principle of tax neutrality,25 so that the efficient allocation of resources is not impeded 
(Auerbach & Hines 2002; Furman 2008, Kaplow 2008; Golub 2011; Aure 2012; Fiscal 
Commision Working Group 2013; OECD 2014). In this general context, tax neutrality 
therefore ensures that the same mix of goods and services occurs whether a tax is in place 
or not. 
A simpler, less technical and more intuitive way to define a neutral tax is to describe it as a 
situation/state where decisions by companies or individuals (i.e., production, investment 
and consumption decisions) are based purely on economic reasons rather than influenced 
by tax considerations; that is, economic units should not be discouraged or encouraged to 
choose a particular course of action because of disadvantages or advantages procured by a 
tax (Groves 1948; Garnaut & Ross 1975, 1979, 1983; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & 
Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Kahn 1990; Auerbach & Hines 2002; Niemann & 
Sureth 2004; Furman 2008; Kaplow 2008; Garnaut 2010; Golub 2011; Aure 2012). 
In the absence of government intervention (i.e., a free market), market forces ensure that all 
resources are allocated to maximise returns. Hence, an unimpeded free market maximises 
the output of an economy (i.e., GDP) and contributes to economic growth and a strong 
                                                 
24 These include but are not limited to the funding of expenditure programmes for public building, national 
parks, public welfare and the military. Activities also include redistribution of income and wealth (i.e., equity 
and redistribution), macroeconomic stabilisation and economic growth and competitiveness (Kaplow 2008; 
Golub 2011; Tresch 2015). 
25 The principle of neutrality is also referred to as efficiency (Groves 1948; Kahn 1990; Auerbach & Hines 
2002; Niemann & Sureth 2004). 
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economy (Gordon 2003; Mankiw 2007, 2014, 2015; Cowen & Tabarrock 2015; Baumol & 
Blinder 2015; Gans et al.2015). Neutrality is important,26 as deviation can lead to.an 
inefficient tax system27 where resources are misallocated. An inefficient tax system has 
negative economic consequences as it may not only result in a loss of income but reduce 
production, discourage investment and/or lead to wasteful investment, all of which can 
impede the productive capacity of the economy (Auerbach & Hines 2002; Kaplow 2008; 
Golub 2011; Fiscal Commission Working Group 2013; Mankiw 2014; Cowen & Tabarrok 
2015; Gans et al. 2015). 
3.2.2 Tax incidence analysis: Deadweight loss, income and substitution effect 
Tax incidence is an economic term used in the analysis of the effect of taxation. As 
discussed, a non-neutral tax generates inefficiencies (Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Kotlikoff 
& Summers 1987; Gans et al. 2015; Cowen & Tabarrok 2015). In public economic taxation 
theory, all taxation creates a negative income effect; that is, a transfer of income from the 
private sector to the government (Auerbach & Hines 2002; Kaplow 2008; Golub 2011; 
Aure 2012; Mankiw 2014; Gans et al. 2015; Cowen & Tabarrok 2015). A non-neutral tax 
not only creates a negative income effect, but a substitution effect,28 which creates 
economic inefficiency. Deadweight loss (i.e., excess burden) measures the magnitude of the 
inefficiency by capturing the substitution effect caused by the tax. (Groves 1948; Auerbach 
1985; Kotlikoff & Summers 1987; Kahn 1990; Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Niemann & 
Sureth 2004; Lang et al. 2009; Aure 2012; Tresch 2015). Tax incidence therefore provides 
an analysis of the excess burden of taxation. 
3.2.2.1 Income effect 
As previously asserted, all taxation creates a negative income effect. This is straightforward 
and can be explained as follows: as a tax is implemented or increased, market participants 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that, in some instances, deviation from neutrality may be desired by policy makers to 
discourage or encourage certain behaviours. For instance, a tax system could be designed to encourage home 
ownership, higher education or health insurance. It could also be designed to correct for negative externalities, 
for instance, to discourage alcohol consumption and/or smoking (Furman 2008). 
27 It should be noted that taxation becomes inefficient when a taxed activity can be avoided (tax avoidance). 
28 In this context, a substitution effect simply means that economic activity is reduced by more than the 
transfer amount. In other words, the gain in revenue to government is not sufficient to offset losses in 
investment, production and economic growth. 
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observe their real income and hence real purchasing power decrease. In other words, they 
become worse off or poorer, and behave accordingly (Kotlikoff & Summer 1987; Auerbach 
1985; Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Lang et al. 2009; Aure 2012; Tresch 2015) All taxes 
reduce taxpayer disposable income by a certain quantity and therefore result in a negative 
income effect arising on the side of the taxpayer. It is, however, important to note that 
while a negative income effect leads to a reduction in the demand for all goods and 
services, it does not create a deadweight loss (Kotlikoff & Summer 1987; Auerbach 1985; 
Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Auerbach & Hines 2002; Lang et al. 2009; Aure 2012; Tresch 
2015). 
An example of a neutral tax is a lump sum tax. Such a tax is imposed at a fixed amount 
independent of the number of goods and services that a consumer decides to buy. A lump 
sum tax does not change the price of the good or service but rather reduces taxpayers’ 
revenue. It is a neutral tax because while an income effect arises, no substitution effect is 
created—all economic units must pay the tax independently of their income level, wealth 
situation or consumption of goods and services. In other words, such a tax is constant (i.e., 
does not vary with economic unit characteristics) and is subject to nothing that a taxpayer 
can change. An example of a lump sum tax is a poll tax (Groves 1948; Auerbach 1985; 
Kotlikoff & Summers 1987; Kahn 1990; Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Auerbach & Hines 
2002; Niemann & Sureth 2004; Lang et al. 2009; Aure 2012; Tresch 2015; Gans et al.2015; 
Cowen & Tabarrok 2015). 
3.2.2.2 Substitution effect 
In contrast to an income effect, a substitution effect is due only to a change in relative 
prices of goods or services. It results in a reduction in the quantity demanded of the taxed 
good or service relative to other goods and services. This arises as taxpayers alter their 
activities in a bid to minimise their tax burden. A deadweight loss arises as economic units 
substitute consumption away from a particular good or service (i.e., the substitution effect). 
An example is a per unit tax where the tax base is typically specified as a percentage of the 
value, price or quantity of a good or service; for instance, an ad valorem tax. A per unit tax 
creates a price distortion as it alters the relative price of goods and services. It therefore not 
only induces an income effect but a substitution effect. Hence, unlike a tax neutral lump 
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sum tax, a per unit tax creates a substitution effect, violating the neutrality condition 
(Groves 1948; Auerbach 1985; Kotlikoff & Summers 1987; Kahn 1990; Fullerton & 
Metcalf 2002; Auerbach & Hines 2002; Niemann & Sureth 2004; Lang et al. 2009; Aure 
2012; Tresch 2015; Gans et al.2015; Cowen & Tabarrok 2015). 
3.2.2.3 Graphical analysis 
The graphical representation of the income effect and substitution effect and associated 
deadweight loss is illustrated Figure 3.1. The initial equilibrium quantity (before the 
introduction of the tax) given the initial budget constraint 𝐵∗ and utility curve 𝑈1 is at point 
𝐸∗, representing the combination  𝑋∗𝑌∗. The introduction of a per unit tax on 𝑋 alters price 
paid of each unit purchased. This in turn changes the slope of the budget constraint (i.e., 
rotates inwards) and causes a utility loss. It is the change in relative prices that generates 
the substitution effect, while the change in purchasing power causes the income effect. The 
total effect of the per unit tax is depicted by the new equilibrium point 𝐸𝑈 with a new 
combination 𝑋𝑈𝑌𝑈. The new budget constraint is 𝐵𝑈 and the new indifference curve 𝑈2. 
𝐴𝐸𝑈 represents the revenue generated from the per unit tax. The total effect can be broken 
into the income effect from 𝐸∗ to 𝐸𝑈′ or 𝑋
∗ to 𝑋𝑈′ and the substitution effect from 𝑋𝑈′ to 
𝑋𝑈 or 𝐸
∗ to 𝐸𝑈. 
What is important to note is that 𝐸𝑈𝐶 represents the deadweight loss arising from imposing 
a per unit tax instead of a lump sum tax. Indeed, from the graph, it can be seen that a lump 
sum tax could have been implemented instead, raising 𝐴𝐶and leaving the consumer on the 
same utility curve 𝑈2 at point 𝐸𝑈′. Alternatively, the same tax revenue could be generated 
by raising 𝐴𝐸𝑈 but leaving the consumer on a higher utility (𝑈3) curve at point 𝐸𝐿.  
Hence, while a lump sum tax does not create any distortion as relative prices remain 
unchanged (no substitution effect), a per unit tax generates a substitution effect that 
undermines tax neutrality and hinders economy efficiency via a deadweight loss. It can 
therefore be asserted that it is the substitution effect that entirely determines the deadweight 
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loss. Regardless of the extent of the income effect, a tax that alters income only without 
altering relative prices does not cause a deadweight loss.29  
To conclude this section and re-join the unimpeded free market situation described at the 
beginning of this chapter where resources are allocated to maximise returns, the following 
can be asserted: neutral taxation permits efficient allocation of resources, and if taxation 
changes the relative return to resources, these are allocated in a less than efficient way, 
reducing and preventing the maximisation of the economic outputs of an economy (GDP). 
 
Figure 3.1: Income and Substitution Effect 
                                                 
29 Although it is important to note that in the presence of perfect complement goods, a tax policy that alters 
relative prices will not cause a deadweight loss as no substitution effect will be observed (Auerbach 1985; 
Kotlikoff & Summers 1987; Fullerton & Metcalf 2002; Lang et al.2009; Tresch 2015). 
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3.3 Tax Neutrality and Cash Flow Taxation in a Discounted Cash Flow 
Analysis: Theoretical Framework  
As discussed, any taxation involves the transfer of funds from the private to the public 
sector, and the tax payer will always suffer a negative income effect. A neutral tax is one 
that reduces disposable income (i.e., negative income effect) without altering the decision-
making process in relation to trade, production or consumption (i.e., absence of substitution 
effect).  
In practice, to assess the profitability of a mining project, the two most widely used 
measures of profitability are the discounted net present value (NPV) and internal rate of 
return (IRR) (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & 
Bowers 1983; Boadway et al 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & 
McCallum 2010; Baurens 2010; Garnaut 2010). 
Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, a neutral tax is defined as one that does not affect the 
screening of prospective investments nor alters their ordering with respect to expected 
profitability. In other words, a tax is neutral if it maintains the pre-tax ranking of 
investments’ net discounted values.  
As discussed noted in chapter 1, the proposed RSPT and later MRRT are cash flow taxes or 
cash flow equivalent taxes. Hence, this thesis focuses on corporate cash flow taxation and 
their investment neutrality properties. The following discussion begins by considering the 
effect of a pure cash flow tax on the mining investment decisions making criteria just stated 
(i.e., NPV and IRR). This will provide a theoretical framework by which to evaluate the 
neutrality properties of other cash flow tax designs. 
3.3.1 Pure Cash Flow Tax (i.e., Brown Tax) 
3.3.1.1 Net present value and internal rate of return 
Brown (1948) showed that tax neutrality can be achieved by designing a tax scheme that 
incorporates immediate expensing of all costs (i.e., capital expenditure and operating cost) 
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and immediate cash payment for tax losses (i.e., immediate full loss offset) and that applies 
to the same stream of capital expenditure and revenue. 
Using Mayo (1979, 2013), the neutral impact of a Brown tax can be demonstrated by using 
the following equality: 
𝐶 = 𝑅 (1) 
Where: 
𝐶 = Sum of discounted capital expenditures each year. 
𝑅 = Sum discounted net receipts30 each year. 
Equation 1 represents the standard pre-tax present value31 of the stream of expected capital 
expenditures (C) and net receipts (R) of any project or venture. 
A Brown tax, more commonly known as a pure cash flow tax (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 
1975; 1979, 1981; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Fane & Smith 1986; 
Boadway & Bruce 1984; King 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; 
Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Boadway & Keen 2014; 
Australian Government 2017) produces the following equality: 
𝐶(1 − 𝑡) = 𝑅(1 − 𝑡) (2) 
Where  
𝑡 = tax rate. 
That is, under a Brown tax, investors are impost a tax at a specific rate (t) on positive cash 
flows and obtain an immediate cash rebate at this same rate (t) on negative cash flows. For 
tax purposes, positive cash flows arise when gross revenue earned in a year exceeds the 
associated amount of allowable deductible capital and recurrent expenditures32 in that same 
                                                 
30 Net receipt represents gross revenue less deductible operating costs. 
31 At the internal rate of return. 
32 That is operating costs. 
38 
year. The reverse is true for negative cash flows. In such a tax scheme, all negative and 
positive cash flows are reduced by the same proportion (t). The annual cash flows 
generated by the investment are split between the government and the investor at a pro rate 
share established by the tax rate (t). As a result, in the absence of risk,33 the return to 
investors both pre- and post-tax remains unchanged, because the immediate expensing of 
all capital expenditures and immediate cash rebates for tax loses (full loss offset) at the tax 
rate maintain the identity in Equation 2. In each period, through immediate write off of 
capital expenditure, the tax rate reduces the post-tax cost of capital by the same magnitude 
as the net receipts are by the tax payments. If the investment generates negative cash flows, 
a cash rebate equal to the loss incurred times the tax rate is provided. Hence, the post 
Brown tax IRR is equal to that of the pre-tax, and investment decisions made using the IRR 
criteria remain unchanged after the impost of the tax (Brown 1948; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 
1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 
1983; Boadway et al 1987; King 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; 
Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 
2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
A Brown tax will display the same neutrality property even if investment screening is based 
on the discounted NPV criterion (Brown 1948; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; 
Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway et al 1987; 
Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 
2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & 
Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017).To see that, Equation 1 can be written using 
NPV. The before-tax NPV can be expressed as: 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑅 − 𝐶 (3) 
Where R and C are defined as previously. Similarly, Equation 1 can be written to show the 
NPV after the cash flow tax: 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡 = (𝑅 − 𝐶)(1 − 𝑡) (4) 
                                                 
33 This issue will be addressed later in this chapter. 
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It can be seen from Equation 4 that a cash flow tax decreases the absolute value of the NPV 
of all probable investments by the same magnitude, that is, the tax rate (t). The IRR, 
however, remains constant after the impost of a cash flow tax (see Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2 depicts the relationship between the pre- and post-cash flow tax discounted NPV 
curves. While for each level of discount rate, the post-tax NPV of the investment is reduced 
by half, its IRR remains unaffected.   
 
Figure 3.2: Pre-Brown and post-Brown NPV (Mayo 1979) 
3.3.1.2 Probability distribution, risk and discount rate 
Before examining the different variants of a corporate cash flow tax, it is important to 
discuss the effect of a Brown tax on the risk perceived by investors around the future cash 
flows associated with a potential investment project; that is, how the shape of the 
probability distributions of the NPVs and the IRR of the investment project are affected. 
This is of major importance as, when assessing the viability of a potential investment 
project, investors are not only concerned with a project’s NPV and IRR but the project’s 
risk, which is reflected by the shape of the probability distributions of the NPVs or IRR 
(Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; 
Boadway et al 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 
2010; Baurens 2010; Garnaut 2010). As Brown (1948) showed, a pure cash flow tax 
Internal rate of 
return (IRR) 
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applied to the whole economy does not affect investment decisions when consideration of a 
project is based on the NPV probability function, because it does not affect the pre-tax rate 
of return probability distribution. Indeed, at any given probability, a Brown tax reduces the 
value of the profit, as well as that of the loss, by a magnitude equivalent to the tax rate. 
Therefore, the expected value and standard deviation of the distribution are cut by the same 
proportion (Brown 1948; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Sandmo 
1979; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway et al 1987; Shome & 
Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & 
Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). In other words, a Brown tax acts even-
handedly on both loss-making and profitable possibilities, and therefore, has a symmetrical 
effect on both ends of a project’s risk continuum. Hence, the pre-tax balance perceived by 
an investor between expected NPV and spread of possible NPV outcomes remains 
unchanged after the tax. Further, once again, it should be noted that when applied to the 
whole economy, while such a tax reduces the expected NPV as well as the uncertainty 
associated with any potential investment, it does so by the same proportion for all 
investments (Brown 1948; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Sandmo 
1979; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway et al 1987; Shome & 
Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & 
Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
Further, it is important to note that a Brown tax does not affect the discount rate used by 
investors in the estimation of an investment project’s probability distribution (Brown 1948; 
Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Sandmo 1979; Mayo 1979, 1984, 
2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Fane & Smith 1986; Boadway et al 1987; Shome & Schutte 
1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 
2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & Devereux 
2015; Australian Government 2017). That is, the pre-tax and post-tax discount rate remain 
the same when investors estimate the project’s NPV. In other words, the post-tax discount 
rate is independent of the corporate tax rate and is equal to the investor’s attitude towards 
risk, the time preference rate of money and the opportunity cost for the particular project. 
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These components of the discount rate remain unaffected by pure cash flow taxation 
(Brown 1948; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Sandmo 1979; Mayo 
1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Fane & Smith 1986; Boadway et al 1987; Shome 
& Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & 
Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
Finally, it is also important to note that the neutrality of the Brown tax depends on 
investors’ beliefs regarding the certainty of the government cash payment for net losses. 
Any uncertainty as to the ability of the government to provide cash refunds/rebate for losses 
will impede the neutrality property of the Brown tax (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 
1981; Swan 1976; Sandmo 1979; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Fane & 
Smith 1986; Boadway et al 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel 
et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; 
Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
3.3.2 Other Cash Flow Tax Schemes 
3.3.2.1 Full loss offset  
Cash flow taxation does not have to include immediate expensing of expenditure or 
immediate cash payments for tax losses (i.e., immediate full loss offset) as described above. 
Tax cash flow schemes that do not include these features may be designed in a way that is 
financially equivalent to the aforementioned cash flow tax. For instance, rather than 
providing immediate full loss offset, these could be carried forward to be offset against 
later positive cash flows (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 
1979, 1984, 2013; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway 
et al 1987; King 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; 
Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & 
Keen 2014; Auerbach & Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). In the case where 
no positive cash flows are generated from the investment, the losses would attract a cash 
rebate after a defined number of years.  
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To achieve an outcome equivalent to that of an immediate full loss offset, these can be 
uplifted to preserve their value. With the government guaranteeing to provide cash rebates 
for losses carried forward, the only risk of not recouping losses from an investor’s 
perspective arises if and only if the government defaults on its liabilities. Hence, the uplift 
rate is typically set at the long-term government rate (LTBR)34 to reflect the appropriate 
level of risk. It should be noted that the uplift rate does not determine the rate at which the 
tax becomes applicable, but rather serves to maintain the value of the compounded forward 
losses that are being delayed. It is set at the LTBR because the risk of not recouping these 
losses only arises from the government not being able to meet its liabilities (government 
cash rebate). Such a tax scheme is generally described as a cash flow tax with delayed full 
loss offset (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 
2013; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; 
King 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & 
McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; 
Auerbach & Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
Different designs can be employed with regards to a full loss offset tax scheme to maintain 
financial equivalency consistent with a Brown tax. Variants include delayed expensing of 
capital expenditure (i.e., delayed write off) and immediate full offset of tax losses and/or 
delayed write off and delayed full loss offset (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 
1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 
1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; Fane 1987; King 1987; Shome & 
Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & 
Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
Hence, as discussed above, whether the design of a cash flow tax includes immediate 
expense of capital expenditure with immediate full loss offset, delayed loss offset, delayed 
write off of capital expenditure or a combination of the latter, the exact same financial 
outcome can be achieved; that is, neutral taxation. The only difference is their respective 
                                                 
34 Generally, 10–15-year government bond (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 
1979, 1984, 2013; Garnaut 2010, Fane 1987; Henry 2010; Henry et al.2009). 
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associated budgetary implication. For instance, a cash flow tax scheme incorporating an 
immediate full loss offset design could produce substantial unanticipated diminutions in 
budget revenue in particular years. For instance, a mining boom or circumstances where 
few investments in very large mining projects were being undertaken at the same time 
could result in very large negative cash flows, as is often the case in the initial phases of a 
mining project. These large negative cash flows would attract government cash rebates 
equal to the tax rate times the losses, creating pressure and uncertainty over government 
budget planning. Conversely, uncertainty or budgetary planning concerns could be 
addressed by applying delayed full loss offset and delayed write off. Rather than having to 
pay cash rebates immediately, these are delayed and foreseeable, to reduce budget worries 
(Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 
1984, 2013; Sandmo 1979; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 
1987; Fane 1987; King 1987; Shome & Schutte 1993; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Daniel et 
al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kanniainen & Panteghini 2013; 
Boadway & Keen 2014; Auerbach & Devereux 2015; Australian Government 2017). 
3.3.2.2 Loss offset 
Another design that can address government concerns with respect to budgetary 
implications is a cash flow tax incorporating immediate write off of capital expenditure and 
delayed loss offset. As in the previously discussed Brown tax, immediate expensing of all 
costs applies, negative cash flows create tax losses and positive cash flows are taxed. 
Further, as with cash flow tax designs that incorporate delayed full loss offset, losses are 
carried forward and attract an uplift rate. However, one key point that distinguishes this 
from other types of cash flow taxes is that its design does not incorporate full loss offset 
(Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 
1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; Fane 
1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry et. Al. 2009; Henry 2010; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan 
& McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 2009; Valle de Souza et 
al. 2017; Australian Government 2017). That is, cash flow losses can only be offset against 
future positive cash flows. In other words, unutilised losses do not attract a government 
cash rebate. This design ensures that the government does not have to provide any cash 
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rebates for tax losses. Hence, in the absence of sufficient positive cash flow, this design 
entertains the possibility of eventual complete loss of these carried forward losses 
(unrecouped losses). To compensate the risk of potential unrecouped losses, the uplift rate 
(or threshold rate) is set above the LTBR. This threshold rate means that an investment (for 
instance a mining project) subject to such tax scheme only pays taxes when the particular 
investment generates returns higher than the tax threshold rate. While the loading above the 
LTBR is applied in an attempt to compensate for the possibility of unrecouped loss, 
distortive effects imposed by such tax scheme are unavoidable.35. The distortionary effect 
associated with a cash flow tax incorporating anything less than full loss offset can be 
shown by demonstrating their effect on investments’ spread of possible rate of return rate 
and NPV probability distributions pre- and post-tax. 
That is, while under a Brown tax (i.e., full loss offset), the pre-tax return would remain 
unchanged across all possible outcomes36, a cash flow tax incorporating anything less than 
full loss offset creates an asymmetric effect on the spread of probable rate of return 
outcomes. More specifically, this arises when the post-tax rate of return is higher than the 
tax threshold rate, as tax losses are compounded forward at a lower rate than that of the 
investment pre-tax rate of return, in other word, the post-tax rates of return are reduced 
towards the tax threshold rate. In contrast, the pre-tax rate of return remains unchanged 
when its rate is lower37 or equal38 to the tax threshold rate. It can therefore be concluded 
that a cash flow tax, failing to incorporate a full loss offset design, imposes an 
asymmetrical effect on the IRR probability distribution of a project, by skewing negatively 
the distribution (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; 
Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 
1987; Fane 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry et. Al. 2009; Henry 2010; Daniel et al 
2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 2009; Valle 
de Souza et al. 2017; Australian Government 2017). 
                                                 
35 Excluding the special circumstances when the threshold rate is set equal to the investor discount rate and no 
unrecouped losses arise. Further, the threshold rate should be set equal to the investment pre-tax IRR 
(Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & 
Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; Fane 1987). 
36 That is, post-Brown tax return equals pre-Brown tax return. 
37 Because no taxes are paid, nor any cash rebate provided for unutilised or unrecouped losses. 
38 As no taxes are paid and compounded forward, losses are entirely absorbed in the terminal period of the 
investment’s life. 
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The distortionary effect associated with cash flow taxation failing to incorporate a full loss 
offset design can be further demonstrated by considering investments’ NPV probability 
distribution of an above margin investment with a tax threshold rate set to the investor’s 
discount rate. Under such condition, each pre-tax positive NPV (i.e., no unrecouped losses 
involved since the project is above margin) is reduced in proportion to the tax rate. On the 
contrary, each pre-tax negative NPV value is unchanged by the tax as no tax is paid nor any 
cash rebate received for unrecouped losses. Similarly, a zero NPV remains unchanged as no 
tax is paid and losses are entirely absorbed in the last period of the project/investment39. 
Therefore, in contrast to the symmetrical narrowing effect on the before-tax spread of the 
NPV outcomes that would arise under a Brown tax, a cash flow tax failing to incorporate 
full loss offset in its design, creates an asymmetrical effect. This asymmetry occurs as a 
result of the tax reducing the positive NPVs in equal proportion to the tax rate while leaving 
unchanged the negative NPVs (unrecouped tax losses) (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & 
Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; 
Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; Fane 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry 
et. Al. 2009; Henry 2010; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; 
Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 2009; Valle de Souza et al. 2017; Australian Government 
2017). 
Hence, it can be concluded that with respect to the NPV and IRR of an investment, a cash 
flow tax with no full loss offset scheme is consistent with a Brown tax design only in very 
restrictive conditions; that is, in the absence of unrecouped loss and with the threshold rate 
matching the investor’s discount rate, IRR and pre-tax rate of return. However, regardless 
of whether unrecouped losses arise, such cash flow tax imposes an asymmetrical effect on 
the NPV and rate of return probability distributions, negatively skewing both. This in turn 
might reduce or increase a project’s expected IRR as well as its NPV 
From the discussion above, it is clear that investor discount rates, tax threshold rate and the 
possibility of unrecouped losses play a major role in the distortive effect arising from cash 
flow taxation failing to provide full loss offset. The nature of these distortions is to a large 
                                                 
39 This is the case as the up-front capital expenditures in the early non-revenue stage of a mining project are 
compounded forward at the same rate as the investor’s discount rate. This same discount rate is applied to the 
project’s later period net receipts. 
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extent predictable, suggesting that under certain conditions, some of the tax parameters and 
designs might be adjusted in an attempt to reduce these distortive effects. However, most 
will create distortion relative to a cash flow tax scheme providing full loss offset. For 
instance, to achieve consistency with a cash flow tax scheme providing full loss offset, the 
tax could involve in its design matching the threshold rate against the investor discount 
rate. In this case and assuming no possibility of unrecouped losses, projects judged by 
investors as both marginal and above margin will be consistent with cash flow taxation. 
This would nevertheless be practically very challenging to implement, as discount rates not 
only differ between investors but among investments (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies 
Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; 
Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; Fane 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry 
et. al. 2009; Henry 2010; Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; 
Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 2009; Valle de Souza et al. 2017; Australian Government 
2017). Further, even if such a design were achieved, a distortion would still arise; that is, 
investments judged submarginal before tax (i.e., investment pre-tax return lower than the 
discount rate) would be worse off post-tax assessment under such scheme, relative to a cash 
flow taxation scheme providing full loss offset. This is because, while not required to pay 
any tax, no compensation is received for tax losses (i.e., unrecouped losses). 
Another way to minimise the distortions is to increase the threshold rate. However, this 
would reduce the range of investment plausible outcomes that would pay taxes.40 It should 
be further noted that this would eliminate tax payments,41 which in turn would affect NPV 
or rate of return probability distributions. Finally, this would raise an investment’s expected 
NPV and IRR.42 Hence, an increase in the tax threshold rate is likely to not only reduce tax 
revenues but create further distortionary effects.  
Moreover, it important to note that neither an increase of the tax threshold rate above the 
LTBR nor a matching of the threshold rate against investors’ discount rates compensates 
for the possibility of unrecouped losses faced by certain projects. As a result, for such cash 
                                                 
40 Those investments that have a before- tax return lower than the new higher tax threshold rate. 
41 If the increase is sufficient. 
42 As it increases the investment post-tax return of outcomes that have investment pre-tax rates of return 
higher than the new increased threshold rate. Likewise, it raises the post-tax NPV of outcomes that had 
positive post-NPV value. 
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flow tax scheme to be a closer substitute for a cash flow tax incorporating full loss offset, it 
must be designed so that the prospect of achieving a full loss offset is augmented. The 
higher this possibility, the lower the need to increase the threshold rate above that of the 
LTBR (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Swan 1976; Mayo 
1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Boadway et al 1987; 
Fane 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry et. Al. 2009; Henry 2010; Daniel et al 2010; 
Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 2009; Valle de 
Souza et al. 2017; Australian Government 2017). This can be done, for instance, by 
modifying the scope of the tax application; that is, company based rather than investment 
based. This way, losses from unsuccessful investments43 could be offset against revenue 
generated from successful projects within the company. It should, however, be noted that 
for smaller companies with no revenue from which to offset losses, such a scheme would 
be disadvantageous and would create distortion with respect to the screening of prospective 
investment decision making (Samuelson 1964; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; 
Swan 1976; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013; Ball & Bowers 1983; Boadway & Bruce 1984; 
Boadway et al 1987; Fane 1987; Hogan 2003, 2007; 2012; Henry et. Al. 2009; Henry 2010; 
Daniel et al 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 2010; Boadway & Keen 2014; Lund 
2009; Valle de Souza et al. 2017; Australian Government 2017). For investment in mineral 
projects, some authors further suggested that government cash rebates could be provided 
for exploration expenditure or closing down expenses or both for instance (Garnaut & 
Clunies Ross 1975; 1979, 1981; Henry et. Al. 2009; Boadway & keen 2008, 2010, 2014; 
Henry 2010; Garnaut 2010; Mayo 2013). 
3.4 Tax Neutrality, Taxation of Economic Rent and Cash Flow Taxation 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, normal return is defined as the minimum level of return 
required to induce the use of factors of production (i.e., capital and labour). It was further 
asserted that in classical economics, rent (i.e., above normal return) exists because of 
heterogeneous factors of production (differential rent) and the fact that one of the factors of 
production is available in limited quantities (scarcity rent). The theoretical concept of the 
taxation of rent was originally developed by Ricardo and Smith, both pioneers of classical 
                                                 
43 Or losses from closure and rehabilitation phases of successful projects. 
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economics. These authors contended that because minerals and land generate rent, which 
they consider unearned income, the taxation of rent (i.e., above normal return) and 
therefore unearned gain would have a neutral effect. However, while a complex and 
difficult exercise, Ricardo noted the necessity to accurately disassociate unearned income 
from earned income in order to achieve neutral taxation outcome (Ricardo 1817; Thompson 
1826; Smith 1828; Sraffa 1951a, 1951b, 1955; Krrtrell 1957). 
In the framework of classical economics, the presence of rent therefore provides the 
opportunity for non-distorting tax, that is, tax neutrality. Consequently, unlike the taxation 
of normal return (i.e., mobile factor of production) which is believed to distort investment 
decisions, economic theory widely suggests that above normal return (i.e., immobile factor 
of production) can be taxed at a level close to 100 percent without distorting investment 
decisions (Krrtrell 1957; Przeworski, & Wallerstein 1988; Devereux & Freeman 1991; 
Bond & Devereux 1995; Sørensen 2005; Auerbach et al. 2007, 2008; McLaren 2011; 
Passant 2012; Garnaut 2010; Davidson 2010; Freebairn &Quiggin 2010). 
In essence, the cash flow taxes discussed in the previous section concentrate on the taxation 
of economic rent or above normal return. To see that, the imposition of a Brown tax on a 
two-period investment, yielding a pre-tax return of r, as in Shome and Schutte (1993). The 
discounted value of the Brown tax payments arising from such investment is given by the 
following equation: 
𝑇𝑐 = −𝑡𝑐 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑡𝑐(1 + 𝑖)
−1 = (𝑟 − 𝑖)𝑡𝑐(1 + 𝑖)
−1 (5) 
As is the case under a Brown tax, -𝑡𝑐 represents the tax benefit (i.e., tax loss) that arises 
from the immediate expensing of capital outlays in period 1 (i.e., cash outflows) and (1 +
𝑟) represents the cash inflows in period 2 while (1 + 𝑖) represents the discount factor. 
Equation (5) shows that tax revenue is collected on (𝑟 − 𝑖) hence, demonstrating that a 
Brown tax theoretically falls only on economic rent or above -normal rate of return while 
leaving normal rate of return (i.e., marginal investment) effectively untaxed, in other words 
paying no taxes in discounted term. 
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The operation of a cash flow tax design incorporating delay loss offset would produce 
similar result with regards to the taxation of economic rent. That is, as discussed in the 
previous section, under such design, costs and receipts are accumulated at a threshold rate, 
a specified interest rate, with the tax revenue being collected when the net accumulated 
value becomes positive. The total effect of such tax design is to tax investment return in 
excess of the threshold tax rate (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975), which, as discussed in the 
previous section, if set equal to the appropriate discount rate level would represent a tax on 
the above normal return only. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the general concept of tax neutrality—that decisions taken by 
companies or individuals should be purely based on economic reasons rather than 
influenced by tax considerations. It showed that a neutral tax is one that while creating an 
income effect, does not generate a substitution effect. Tax neutrality is important in taxation 
policy as deviations can lead to inefficiency in the allocation of resources and therefore an 
excess burden (i.e., deadweight loss). Whether the design of a cash flow tax includes 
immediate expense of capital expenditure with immediate full loss offset, delayed full loss 
offset, delayed write off of capital expenditure or a combination of the latter, the same 
financial outcome can be achieved; that is neutral taxation. A cash flow tax incorporating 
immediate write off and delayed loss offset may achieve tax neutrality, but only under a set 
of restrictive conditions; that is, a project with a threshold rate set to the investor’s discount 
rate and with no probability of unrecouped losses arising. Finally, it was shown that the 
investment neutrality benefit of cash flow taxes is due to the fact that such tax design 
theoretically falls only on investments’ above normal rate of return, asserting that in theory, 
the more the taxation can be concentrated on immobile factors of production, the greater 
tax revenue can be generated without incurring deadweight losses; that is, it can achieve tax 
neutrality.  
The application of these principles will be used in the investigation of the substitution effect 
in Chapter 8.  
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 Mineral Resource Taxation and Tax Neutrality 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 argued that non-renewable natural resources generate economic rent or above 
normal return to investment (i.e., resource rent). Chapter 3 demonstrated that the concept of 
economic rent is key in taxation in public finance, as its presence may allow tax neutrality 
to be achieved, and further, that tax neutrality is important as neutral taxation permits 
efficient allocation of resources and results in the maximisation of economic output. In 
addition, Chapter 3 established that, with the use of corporate cash flow taxation 
incorporating various combinations of capital expenditure expensing and loss offset 
designs, it is possible to achieve tax neutrality by taxing economic rent. Chapter 4 follows 
from Chapter 3 by considering the application of the concept and principle of tax neutrality 
to mineral resources.  
Hence, the chapter begins with a discussion on the principal groups of mineral resource 
taxation arrangements. It then discusses the different criteria against which these are 
evaluated or ranked, and uses the supply–demand framework of Chapter 3 to discuss and 
analyse the neutrality of these main groups of mineral resource taxation. Following that, it 
considers the various cash flow tax designs discussed in Chapter 3, and, using hypothetical 
mineral resource projects, investigates their application and neutrality using the discounted 
cash analysis framework described in Chapter 3.  
This chapter concludes with a discussion on the principal issues to consider in the taxation 
of non-renewable resources, with a particular focus on profit-based taxes. 
4.2 Resource Taxation Arrangements 
In general, resource taxation arrangements can be broadly categorised into either a profit-
based tax or an output-based tax. The following discusses the main differences within and 
between these forms of resource taxation. 
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4.2.1 Profit-based taxes 
Profit-based taxes are typically levied at a constant rate, and consist of rent-based taxes and 
income-based taxes. The former is generally imposed on some measure of a resource 
project’s net cash flow and the latter on some measure of a resource project’s accounting 
profit. Although various forms of profit-based taxes can be found in the resource taxation 
literature, this thesis focuses on profit rent-based taxes, such as the Brown tax, the 
allowance for corporate capital resource rent tax (ACCRRT) and the Garnaut and Clunies 
Ross resource rent tax (GCRRT). The reason for the emphasis on these three taxes is that 
not only does economic rent theory form the basis for these taxes,44 but they were the 
alternative forms of resource taxation described in the Henry Tax Review and underpin the 
proposed RSPT, the MRRT and the current PRRT.45 It is important to note that these are 
also the main profit rent-based resource taxes, and that any other forms of profit rent-based 
tax options are either modifications or hybrids of these three (Daniel, Keen & McPherson 
2010; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Guj 2012, 2018; Hogan 2012; Hogan & 
Goldsworthy 2010). 
4.2.1.1 Brown tax 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, a Brown tax is a tax levied at a flat percentage of a 
project’s net cash flow; in years of negative cash flow, cash payments are made to private 
investors. While initially proposed as a surrogate to standard profit tax, such taxation 
scheme can be applied to the resource industry as a special impost on petroleum and 
mineral resources revenue (Garnaut 1978, 1979, 2010; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Hogan 
2012). An important feature of a Brown tax is that both the government and investors share 
the risk involved in mineral projects as full loss offset is provided (see Chapter 3). It is 
important to note that most profit-based taxes exhibit a risk-sharing characteristic. The 
extent of the risk sharing, however, depends on the loss offset provision provided by the tax 
design. That is, while anything less than full loss offset will not provide ‘full’ risk sharing, 
                                                 
44 It is important to recall from the previous chapter that economic rent theory is important in the design of 
neutral taxation Further, as it will be discussed in Chapter 5, the aim of the proposed resource tax reform is to 
efficiently collect an appropriate share of the rent (i.e., resource rent) generated by exhaustible resources. 
45 The Henry Tax Review, RSPT, MRRT and PRRT are briefly discussed in Chapter 1, while the design and 
features of each option are provided in Chapter 5 and 8. 
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risk to investors will be reduced if a scheme incorporates some loss offset provision (i.e., 
some of the risk will be transferred/shifted from investors to the government). As discussed 
in Chapter 3, such a tax is neutral because it taxes economic rent only.  
4.2.1.2 Allowance for corporate capital resource rent tax 
As discussed in Chapter 3, while due to its budgetary implications for government, a pure 
Brown tax design is rarely used in public finance, such a tax scheme can be approximated; 
for instance, via a cash flow tax incorporating various combinations of delayed and 
immediate write off of capital expenditure full loss offset (see Chapter 3). Such is the 
design underpinning the ACCRRT (i.e., RSPT)46 (Boadway & Bruce 1984; Freebairn & 
Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Henry 2009). 
The ACCRRT is a cash flow tax equivalent incorporating a delayed full loss offset design. 
Under such a tax scheme, immediate expensing of a mineral project’s capital expenditure 
(i.e., full depreciation of capital expenditure at the time of the expense) is replaced by 
depreciation of capital expenditure over a number of years (i.e., delayed write off), as under 
the standard income tax. At the same time, as is the case under an allowance for corporate 
capital design, an extra deduction is allowed from corporate taxable earnings for an 
imputed return on the depreciated capital expenditure (Auerbach, Devereux & Simpson 
2008; Boadway & Bruce 1984; Mayo 2013). Further, unlike under a Brown tax design, in 
which the government provides cash payments in any year in which cash flows are negative 
(i.e., immediate full loss offset), under an ACCRRT, losses (negative cash flows) are 
instead carried forward at an uplift rate until these can be credited against positive cash 
flows. However, in the event of net losses at the time a project is terminated (i.e., 
unsuccessful investment), the government provides refunds for its share of the loss (i.e., 
delayed full loss offset). The imputed return on the depreciated capital expenditure and the 
uplift rate on the unutilised losses carried forward are generally set at the LTBR (Boadway 
& Keen 2010; Ergas & Pincus 2014; Fane 1987; Freebairn 2015; Garnaut 2010; Mayo, 
1979, 2013).  
                                                 
46 Such a tax can be thought of as a modified version of a Brown tax. 
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As seen in Chapter 3, as for a Brown tax, such tax design imposes a tax only on a mineral 
project’s portion of the total returns above normal returns (i.e., economic rent). It is 
important to note that the tax just described is financially equivalent to a cash flow tax with 
delayed write off and delayed full loss offset, and therefore, to a Brown tax (see Chapter 3).  
4.2.1.3 Garnaut and Clunies Ross resource rent tax 
The GCRRT is generally viewed as a practical alternative to the Brown tax. It is 
structurally similar to a Brown tax, except that instead of negative cash flows attracting 
immediate cash refunds, these are carried forward at an interest rate (i.e., threshold rate), 
which can then be claimed and utilised as deductions against future net positive cash flows 
(Garnaut 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1981, 1983; Mayo 2013). In other 
words, unlike under a Brown tax design, a GCRRT does not provide full loss offset. Hence, 
to compensate investors for the possible loss of these unutilised deductions (i.e., 
unrecouped losses), the threshold rate is generally set above the LTBR. The GCRRT is 
only paid in years the return on the investment in the mineral project being taxed47 
surpasses the threshold rate (Garnaut 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1981, 
1983; Mayo 2013). Such taxation design underpins the current PRRT and the now repealed 
MRRT, and is financially equivalent to the cash flow tax design incorporating immediate 
expensing of capital expenditure with delayed loss offset discussed in Chapter 3. 
It should be noted that all the aforementioned profit rent-based taxes are cash flow taxes or 
cash flow equivalent taxes, financially equivalent to those discussed in Chapter 3, but rather 
than imposed on corporate cash flows, they are levied on individual mineral projects’ cash 
flows. These taxes have in common the taxation of economic rent while maintaining the 
principle of tax neutrality. It is hence important to note that while both the Brown tax and 
the ACCRRT can achieve tax neutrality, the GCRRT is likely to deviate from neutrality 
because of the possibility of unrecouped loss (see Chapter 3). 
                                                 
47 Although as discussed in chapter 3, to diminish the likelihood of unrecouped losses, options such as 
allowing losses to be transferred within and between companies can be employed. 
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4.2.2 Output-based taxes 
Output-based taxes include specific royalties, ad valorem royalties and excises. Like profit-
based taxes, royalty taxes are imposed at a constant rate. While specific royalties are 
typically imposed as a flat fiat currency quantity per physical unit of production from a 
resource project, ad valorem royalties are levied as a flat percentage of the value of 
production. Ad valorem royalty taxation is the most common form of resource taxation. It 
should, however, be noted that specific royalty tax arrangements are generally imposed on 
low value, high volume mineral resources (Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010; Guj 2012; 
Hogan, 2007, 2003, 2012; Hogan & Goldsworthy 2010). 
Excises can be described as variants of ad valorem royalties whereby rates are imposed on 
an increasing scale. In other words, the higher the production rate, the higher the excise 
rate.  
4.3 Resource Taxation Arrangement Assessment 
To assess resource taxation options, the following criteria, as described in Garnaut and 
Clunies Ross (1975) and Baunsgaard (2001), are generally used: 
• Economic efficiency (neutrality): this indicates how distortionary or tax neutral a 
fiscal instrument is. For instance, the extent to which a resource taxation 
arrangement creates negative distortions during the decision-making processes in 
the different stages of mining operations.48 For example, a resource project may 
become unprofitable after the implementation and application of a particular 
resource tax arrangement. Economic efficiency also includes the extent to which a 
fiscal instrument affects investor, sovereign49 and project risk assessments. 
• Rent collection: this indicates the capacity of a resource tax option to collect an 
adequate share of the resource rent under a range of different economic and 
geological conditions. In other words, it refers to how responsive a taxation 
arrangement is to changes in future market environments. 
                                                 
48 These are mainly exploration, development, production and closure. 
49 Sovereign risk refers to any political or policy risk associated with investor assessment of a mineral project. 
More particularly, it refers to the risk of modifications in fiscal settings, including taxation rates and coverage. 
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• Revenue stability: this captures the extent to which a resource tax arrangement 
offers relatively predictable and stable revenue streams. That is, the ability that a 
fiscal instrument offers in managing the risks associated with revenue collection and 
fiscal loss. For instance, the former may be delayed when revenue is collected well 
after the production phase commencement date; the latter may occur in periods of 
falls in commodity prices.  
• Compliance and administration costs: these refer to the costs associated with a 
taxation instrument, not only those associated with the implementation, design and 
compliance monitoring incurred by government, but those related to compliance 
incurred by investors. 
The literature on resource taxation generally recognises that profit-based taxes, and 
particularly, rent-based taxes, rank more highly than output-based tax arrangements on rent 
collection and economic efficiency criteria. In contrast, output-based taxes rank higher on 
revenue stability and compliance and administration cost criteria (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 
1975; Heaps & Helliwell 1985, Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010; Ergas, Harrison & 
Pincus 2010; Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Hogan, 2003, 
2007, 2008, 2012 
4.4 Neutrality and Mining Taxation in a Supply–Demand Framework 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in a general context, tax neutrality is important because it 
maintains allocative efficiency. Further, efficient allocation of resources is important 
because departure results in a deadweight loss.50 
In a mineral resource context, a non-neutral tax is one that removes incentives to efficient 
exploitation of mineral resources and results in a reduction of the resource rent available for 
capture (i.e., deadweight loss), and therefore, a reduction in potential government revenue 
from the taxation of resource rent (Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010; Ergas, Harrison & 
Pincus 2010; Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Hogan, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012). 
                                                 
50 As demonstrated in chapter 3, in general, all taxes create a negative income effect, but a non-neutral tax 
also creates a substitution effect. Regardless of the income effect, it is the presence of the substitution effect 
that gives rise to deadweight loss. 
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In a supply–demand framework, a non-neutral mineral resource tax is one that gives rise to 
either under exploitation or over exploitation (i.e., substitution effect) of mineral resources 
relative to what would be the case in the absence of resource taxation (Daniel, Keen & 
McPherson 2010; Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010; Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 
2010; Garnaut 2010; Hogan, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012). 
4.4.1 Economic efficiency and rent collection in a supply–demand framework 
As discussed above, the neutrality principle requires a tax to not generate a substitution 
effect, as this results in a deadweight loss. In this section a graphical analysis representing 
the traditional approach at an industry level is considered (i.e., a supply–demand diagram 
analysis) to investigate the effect of the resource taxation options discussed in Section 4.2. 
As the Australian Government argued that the proposed tax reforms (i.e., the switch from 
an output-based tax to a profit-based taxes RSPT and MRRT)51 would not only reduce the 
distortion caused by the current output-based resource taxation but also likely collect a 
more reasonable and constant share of resource rent under diverse and varying economic 
conditions, this thesis focuses on the economic efficiency, rent collection and revenue 
stability criteria of both profit-based and output-based taxes.  
It is widely recognised that a profit-based tax is superior to an output-based tax in capturing 
an adequate and steady share of resource rent generated from the exploitation of mineral 
resources. A profit-based tax is also less distortionary with respect to investment and 
production decisions (Heaps & Helliwell 1985; Boadway & Keen 2010; Garnaut 1978, 
2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012; Mayo 1979, 2013). 
This can be analysed using the traditional supply–demand framework employed in Chapter 
2. Applying the concept of tax neutrality in such a framework, a tax is neutral if the 
equilibrium output remains unchanged after the implementation of a tax (i.e., remains at 𝑞𝑅𝑁
∗  
in Figure 2.2). 
                                                 
51A more detail discussion is provided in Chapter 5. 
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4.4.1.1 Risk-neutral investor 
4.4.1.1.1 Brown tax 
The profit-based tax to be considered is the Brown tax because in such a framework, it 
provides a useful benchmark to assess other taxes against as it is theoretically neutral52 
(Boadway & Keen 2010; Garnaut 1978, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975; Hogan 2003, 
2007, 2008, 2012; Mayo 1979, 2013). Assuming that investors are risk neutral, it can be 
shown that a Brown tax does not distort the level of output produced. To see that, Figure 
4.1 depicts the outcome after the introduction of a Brown tax on the industry equilibrium 
described for risk-neutral investors in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.2). It is important to recall 
that a Brown tax takes a constant percentage of the positive net cash flow.  
While, as predicted, such a tax scheme reduces expected profit (see income effect 
discussion in previous sections), it does not distort industry output. This can be seen from 
Figure 4.1 where the after tax total level of output produced remains unchanged from the 
before-tax outcome, at 𝑞𝑅𝑁
∗  (see also Figure 2.2). In this case, the government collects tax 
revenue equal to the tax rate multiplied by the resource rent (𝑝𝑤𝐹𝐵) and the resource rent 
accrued to the private investor is represented by the area 𝐹𝐷𝐵.  
While the share of rent collected is adequate, since tax payments fluctuate with project 
profitability, this design may result in revenue instability/delay since tax liabilities are only 
payable once a project becomes profitable. 
                                                 
52The other profit-based taxes discussed in the previous section, the ACCRRT and the GCRRT, can be 
designed as a practical surrogate for a Brown tax. The aim of this subsection is to highlight the main 
differences between profit-based and output-based taxes from an economic efficiency and rent collection 
criteria perspective in the traditional supply–demand framework. For this reason, analysis is conducted only 
for the Brown tax as, under certain conditions and assumptions, other profit rent-based taxes consisting of 
rent-based taxes would give similar results (Garnaut 2010; Hogan 2012; Mayo 2013). A detailed analysis and 
comparison of the effect on tax neutrality of these three profit-based taxes in a discounted cash flow analysis 
framework is provided later in this chapter. 
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Figure 4.1: Effect of a Brown Tax on Risk-Neutral Investors 
Figure 4.2 represents the outcome under an ad valorem royalty. As discussed in the 
previous section, such a tax is levied at a constant percentage of the value of the quantity 
produced. The imposition of this tax is comparable to a reduction in the price received at 
each level of quantity produced, that is (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑣)𝑃𝑤. The industry outcome under an ad 
valorem tax is illustrated in Figure 4.2 where the government collects a percentage of the 
value of the quantity produced at the ad valorem royalty rate 𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑣. The royalty revenue is 
𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑤𝑞𝑅𝑁,𝑎𝑑𝑣
∗  and is represented by the gray area. The post ad valorem royalty tax industry 
output is reduced to 𝑞𝑅𝑁,𝑎𝑑𝑣
∗ , resulting in an efficiency loss (deadweight loss) represented 
by the area 𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑣′𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑣𝐵. 
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Finally, it is important to note that, unlike a profit-based tax (Brown tax or surrogate), 
which is responsive to variations in a project’s net cash flows (i.e., profitability), an ad 
valorem royalty tax is only responsive to variations in the value of production (i.e., prices). 
As a consequence, an ad valorem royalty tax has a tendency to under tax (over tax) high 
profit (low profit) projects relative to a profit-based tax. Thus, an ad valorem royalty may 
not only cause a pre-tax marginal or low profit project not to proceed,53 but lead to 
premature closure of mineral deposits.54 In other words, a mining project may switch from 
being economic pre-tax to uneconomic post tax. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that an ad valorem royalty tax fails to capture an appropriate 
share of the resource rent, because it collects a bigger (smaller) share of the resource rent 
when profitability is either negative or low (high). However, although the magnitude of the 
revenue collected under an ad valorem royalty varies with changes in prices, revenue 
collected is more stable than under a profit-based tax, as royalty taxes are paid as soon as a 
mineral project operates. 
                                                 
53That is, following the profit maximisation rule discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of a low profit resource 
deposit, the price received by the resource entity under an ad valorem royalty is likely to be lower than the 
average cost at any given point, causing the project not to proceed. 
54Once again using the profit maximisation rule, it can be demonstrated that ad valorem royalty taxes tend to 
discourage production from mineral deposits towards the end of their life. This is the case because it is 
precisely during this time that profitability is likely to be low and therefore prices fail to cover extraction cost 
and the royalty tax. Consequently, this is likely to lead to premature closure of the mineral deposit. 
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Figure 4.2: Risk-Neutral Investors and Ad Valorem Royalty Tax 
A specific royalty (Figure 4.3) is typically imposed as a fixed amount per physical quantity 
produced at the specific royalty rate 𝑡𝑠𝑝. Like an ad valorem royalty, the final price 
received by producers is decreased by the corresponding royalty tax rate, (𝑃𝑤− 𝑡𝑠𝑝).
55 The 
impact of a specific royalty tax is similar to that of an ad valorem tax; that is, a reduction in 
the post specific royalty tax industry level of quantity produced to 𝑞𝑅𝑁,𝑠𝑝
∗ , where 
𝑞𝑅𝑁,𝑠𝑝=
∗ 𝑞𝑅𝑁,𝑎𝑑𝑣
∗ . The revenue collected by the government is shown by the gray area and the 
deadweight loss by the triangle 𝐵𝑠𝑝′𝐵𝑠𝑝𝐵. 
                                                 
55 For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that the post-tax price received by producers for both royalties 
(specific and ad valorem) is similar; that is 𝑡𝑠𝑝 = 𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑤. 
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It is important to note that a specific royalty tax is only responsive to variations in 
production (i.e., prices). As a consequence, like an ad valorem royalty tax, a specific 
royalty tax has a tendency to under tax (over tax) high profit (low profit) projects relative to 
a profit-based tax. However, the latter royalty tax is likely to create greater distortion than 
the former, because unlike an ad valorem royalty tax, a specific royalty tax is unresponsive 
to changes in prices. As with an ad valorem royalty tax, a mining project may become 
uneconomic post tax; that is, a pre-tax marginal or low profit project may not proceed 
and/or prematurely close. 
Therefore, it can be asserted that like an ad valorem royalty tax, a specific royalty tax fails 
to capture an appropriates share of the resource rent, although to a further extent than an ad 
valorem royalty tax, as the special royalty tax is unresponsive to changes in prices. 
However, the lack of responsiveness to variation in prices signifies that such tax will 
generate stable revenue and rank higher that an ad valorem royalty tax in terms of the 
revenue stability criteria. 
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Figure 4.3: Risk-Neutral Investors and Specific Royalty Tax 
4.4.1.2 Risk-averse investors 
In the previous discussion, the economic framework presented was that of risk-neutral 
investors. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, investors in the mining industry are assumed 
to be risk averse. Under this assumption, Chapter 2 demonstrated that industry equilibrium 
output is lower under risk-averse investors than under risk-neutral investors. It further 
established that with regard to risk, resource rent is not only a function of the level of 
political and economic risk associated with a mining project but of investor risk 
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characteristics.56 Given this, the implications of risk aversion for mineral resource taxation 
in terms of economic efficiency, rent collection and revenue stability is important not only 
to private investors in their decision-making processes but to government in its attempt and 
desire to collect a stable and appropriate proportion of resource rent.57 
4.4.1.2.1 Brown tax 
Because of the risk-sharing characteristics of a Brown tax (see previous section and 
previous chapter) risk-averse investors may see their risk premium reduced. To see that, 
Figure 4.4 depicts the outcome after the introduction of a Brown tax on the industry 
equilibrium for risk-averse investors described in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3). The reduction 
in investor risk premium is represented in Figure 3.5 in the downward shift of the supply 
curve from 𝑆𝑅𝐴 to 𝑆𝑅𝐴,𝑏𝑡. Such effect results in a post-tax industry output level greater than 
𝑞𝑅𝐴
∗  at 𝑞𝑅𝐴,𝑏𝑡
∗ .58 The rent accruing to the government becomes area 𝑝𝑤𝐹𝐴𝑏𝑡 and rent 
accruing to investors increases to area 𝐹𝐶𝑏𝑡𝐴𝑏𝑡. 
In the presence of risk and risk-averse investors, the reduction in investor risk premium 
resulting from the risk-sharing characteristics of a Brown tax not only increases the rent 
accruing to both government and private investors, but the possibility of a project’s ranking 
switching from being submarginal pre-tax to becoming economic post the Brown tax.  
                                                 
56 It is important to recall that to the extent that resource rent exists, it is a function of other non-risk variables. 
For instance, resource rent is a function of differential and scarcity rent as well as entrepreneurial skill (see 
Chapter 2). 
57 Risk is discussed in a traditional supply and demand framework in this section, but is further discussed in 
the subsequent section in a discounted cash flow analysis framework. 
58 Although the post Brown tax industry output level may be larger than the pre-Brown tax output level under 
risk averse investors, it will remain lower than the pre-tax output level under risk neutral investors. 
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Figure 4.4: Risk-Averse Investors and a Brown Tax 
4.4.1.2.2 Ad valorem and specific royalty taxes 
As discussed in the previous subsection, in the presence of risk-neutral investors, the effects 
of an ad valorem and a specific royalty tax are similar—a reduction in the post-tax industry 
level of quantity produced. While in the presence of risk and risk-averse investors, the 
impact of both output taxes share similarities, some differences do transpire. 
With respect to risk assessment, both ad valorem and a specific royalty increase investor 
risk premium, because under an output-based tax scheme, tax is paid whenever production 
is positive. Owing to royalty obligations, any losses incurred during the exploitation of 
mineral resources would therefore be greater than would otherwise be the case. This is 
likely to result in actual profitability being lower than expected, causing an increase in 
investor risk exposure and therefore in the risk-averse investor risk premium.  
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Confirming an increase in risk-averse investor risk premium under an output-based tax is 
the fact that any such taxes have a tendency to increased sovereign risk (Daniel, Keen & 
McPherson 2010; Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010; Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 
2010; Hogan, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012). That is, since output-based taxes are unresponsive 
to variations in project profitability, governments are more likely to adjust royalty rates in 
response to changes in commodities prices and mining company revenues. As a 
consequence, investors may be concerned with the risk of increase in royalty rates during 
mining booms, while facing delays in royalty rate reductions during mining downturns or 
following the end of a mining boom. 
An increase in investor risk premium is associated with an upward shift of the supply 
curves and a reduction in the industry output level, as seen in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The 
revenue collected by the government under ad valorem and specific royalty taxes is shown 
by the gray areas in Figure 4.5 for the former and Figure 4.6 for the latter. The deadweight 
loss associated with the ad valorem and specific royalty taxes are represented by areas 
𝐴𝑎𝑑𝑣′𝐴′𝐴 and 𝐴𝑠𝑝′𝐴′𝐴 respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the presence of 
risk and risk-averse investors, output-based taxes result in a lower industry level of output 
and a greater loss of economic efficiency than would otherwise occur.  
However, it is important to note that the magnitude of the augmentation in risk-averse 
investor risk premium is likely to be higher under a specific royalty scheme, consequently 
increasing the likelihood of a project becoming submarginal post tax relative to an ad 
valorem royalty tax. This is the case as, unlike an ad valorem royalty, which is responsive 
to unexpected variations in price, a specific royalty is unresponsive to this. 
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Figure 4.5: Risk-Averse Investors and an Ad Valorem Royalty Tax 
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Figure 4.6: Risk-Averse Investors and a Specific Royalty Tax 
This subsection highlighted the key differences between output-based and profit rent-based 
taxes in a supply–demand framework with respect to economic efficiency, rent collection 
and revenue stability. It is important to recall that when designing a resource tax system, a 
government’s main objective is to ensure that it receives the value of the resource rent and 
no more, while at the same time avoiding or reducing distortions to investor decisions. As 
discussed earlier, in a mining industry context, a neutral tax is one that does not give rise to 
over exploitation or under exploitation of mineral resources relative to what would be the 
case in the absence of resource taxation.  
As such, whether it is in the presence of risk-averse or risk-neutral investors, a profit-based 
tax appears to be the most appropriate resource tax. Not only is it neutral (in the presence of 
risk-averse investors) or less distortionary (in the presence of risk and risk-averse investors, 
a Brown tax is likely to have a positive distortionary effect on industry output), but it is the 
most likely of the three resource taxes discussed to capture an appropriate share of the 
68 
industry resource rent. This is the case as a profit-based tax is designed to be responsive to 
broad fluctuations in industry conditions (i.e., fluctuations in cost, quantity produced and 
prices) or, in other words, to project profitability.  
By contrast, an output-based tax is designed to be responsive to fluctuations in the value of 
production in the case of an ad valorem royalty tax or to changes in production in the case 
of a specific royalty tax. Therefore, such tax design not only distorts production decisions, 
but fails to capture an appropriate share of the resource rent. As discussed, this is because 
these may discourage the exploitation of some mineral projects (i.e., not proceeding and/or 
premature closure), hindering further mineral development and lowering the amount of 
possible resource rent extracted and collected by governments. It is also important to recall 
that because, unlike an ad valorem royalty, a specific royalty tax is unresponsive to changes 
in prices, the latter is not only considered more economically inefficient but captures a 
more inappropriate share of the resource rent. 
Hence, since a profit-based tax is designed to vary with project profitability, it tends to rank 
more highly than an output-based tax with regards to economic efficiency and rent 
collection. However, because output-based taxes are unresponsive to changes in project 
profitability, and therefore collect (earn) royalty payments (tax revenue) in all years in 
which production is positive, these rank more highly under the revenue stability criteria. It 
is important to note that a specific royalty tax will generate more stable revenue than an ad 
valorem royalty tax as, unlike the former, the latter is responsive to variation in commodity 
prices. 
4.5 Neutrality and Discounted Cash Flow Analysis: Resource Taxation 
Practical Illustration 
This section illustrates the practical operation and application of the different cash flow 
taxes discussed in Chapter 3 to mineral resources using two hypothetical mineral resource 
projects. The purpose of this section is to analyse their effects on tax neutrality in a 
discounted cash flow analysis framework as discussed in Chapter 3. While the design and 
features of the cash flow tax options as well as that of the hypothetical mining projects are 
simplified for the purpose of analysis, they remain close to those of the profit rent-based 
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taxes discussed earlier and therefore to the proposed RSPT and MRRT and the current 
PRRT. For this reason, although the following is adopted from Mayo (2013), several 
modifications were performed to reflect the mechanisms of the proposed resource tax 
reforms (the RSPT and MRRT) as accurately as possible. 
4.5.1 Immediate expensing of capital expenditure and full loss offset (Brown tax) 
As discussed earlier, under a Brown tax scheme all costs are immediately expensed, and an 
immediate cash rebate is provided for tax losses. Hence with a 40 percent tax rate, all 
negative cash flows (losses) are reduced by the 4059 percent rebate and all positive cash 
flows (profits) are cut by the 40 percent cash flow tax. The tax payments and cash rebate 
associated with the project are show in column (g) and it can be seen from column (h) 
which represents the post-tax cash flow that the pre-tax cash flows are indeed cut by 40%. 
Table 4.1 further indicates that regardless of the discount rate chosen by the investor to 
assess the viability of the mining project, its NPV is cut in proportion by the tax rate and 
that the IRR remains unchanged. This supports the finding from Chapter 3 that such 
taxation design can achieve tax neutrality (i.e. investment decision post tax is the same as 
that of the pre-tax one). 
  
                                                 
59 40% was chosen as this was the RSPT tax rate. 
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Table 4.1: Brown Tax – 20 Years 
Table 4.1 shows the effect of a 40% Brown tax on a 20-year hypothetical mineral resource project. The first 
column (b) represents the capital expenditure for the initial five years. These could be a mixture of successful 
exploration expenditures as well as successive project development expenses. The two last years of column 
(b) represent the closing down expenses. Column (c) displays the results of the sales proceeds from the 
mining resources associated with the project. Column (e) represents the net receipts from the mining project; 
that is, gross receipts column (c) minus operating expenses. The pre-cash flow taxes are shown in column (f). 
These are computed as net receipts less capital expenditure associated with the mining project. 
Year Capital 
expenditure 
(b) 
$m 
Gross 
receipts 
(c) 
$m 
Operating 
cost 
(d) 
$m 
Net 
receipts 
(e) 
$m 
Pre-tax 
cash flow 
(f) 
$m 
Tax rebates 
/payments 
(g) 
$m 
Post-tax 
cash flow 
(h) 
$m 
0 85.5 
   
-85.5 -34.2 -51.3 
1 6.5 
   
-6.5 -2.6 -3.9 
2 36.5 
   
-36.5 -14.6 -21.9 
3 129.4 
   
-129.4 -51.8 -77.6 
4 118.2 
   
-118.2 -47.3 -70.9 
5 15 140.8 12 128.8 113.8 45.5 68.3 
6 
 
281.6 18 263.6 263.6 105.4 158.2 
7 
 
281.6 18 263.6 263.6 105.4 158.2 
8 
 
281.6 18 263.6 263.6 105.4 158.2 
9 
 
257.5 17.1 230.4 230.4 92.2 138.2 
10 
 
217.8 16.3 201.5 201.5 80.6 120.9 
11 
 
191.4 15.4 176 176 70.4 105.6 
12 
 
168.3 14.7 153.6 153.6 61.4 92.2 
13 
 
148.5 13.9 134.6 134.6 53.8 80.8 
14 
 
130.9 13.2 117.7 117.7 47.1 70.6 
15 
 
114.4 12.6 101.8 101.8 40.7 61.1 
16 
 
101.2 1 89.2 89.2 35.7 53.5 
17 
 
89.1 11.3 77.8 77.8 31.1 46.7 
18 20 79.2 10.8 68.4 48.4 19.4 29.0 
19 20 69.3 10.2 59.1 39.1 15.6 23.5 
NPV@10% 
    
608.5 (i) 243.4 365.1 (i) 
NPV@20% 
    
178.6 (i) 71.4 107.1 (i) 
IRR (J) 
    
31.2% 31.2% 31.2% 
Source: Mayo 2013. 
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4.5.2 Immediate or delayed write off of capital expenditure and delayed full loss offset 
As discussed earlier, variants of cash flow tax can be used in the taxation of economic rent. 
The Brown tax is a cash flow tax with immediate expensing (write off) of capital 
expenditure and immediate full loss offset. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, a similar 
financial outcome to a Brown tax can be achieved (tax neutrality) by using a delayed full 
loss offset design combined with either immediate or delayed write off of capital 
expenditure. By using Mayo’s (2013) five-year hypothetical marginal mineral project for an 
investor with a 15% risk weighted discount rate,60 this section shows how these cash flow 
taxes incorporating a delayed full loss design are financially equivalent to a Brown tax. 
Table 4.2 represents the financial outcome under a Brown tax, while Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
represent the financial outcome under immediate write off / delayed full loss offset and 
delayed write off / delayed full loss offset designs respectively. 
4.5.2.1 Immediate write off of capital expenditure and delayed full loss offset 
Under this cash flow tax design, rather than the government providing an immediate full 
loss offset, these are carried forward to be offset against positive cash flows in subsequent 
years. In the event of early insufficient positive cash flows, losses carried forward are 
uplifted at the LTBR and attract a government cash rebate after a specific event (closing 
down of the mining project) or after a specified time frame. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
uplifting of the carried forward losses maintain their value and act as a surrogate to a 
Brown tax.61  
Chapter 3 established that for this tax design to be financially equivalent to a Brown tax, 
the uplift rate should be set at the LTBR. Table 4.3 shows how an uplift rate set at the 
LTBR combined with a delayed full loss offset acts as a surrogate to a Brown tax. 
In contrast to a Brown tax (Table 4.2), with a delayed full loss offset tax scheme, the 
project generates a lower overall return (IRR of 11.5%) and a negative NPV of $104 
                                                 
60 This signifies that this particular mineral project’s IRR is 15%. It is important to recall that the mineral 
project is marginal because its pre-tax earned return of 15% per year matches the investor risk weighted 
discount rate. In other words, the mineral project generates a zero NPV using a 15% discount rate. 
61That is, because the value of losses is maintained through time until either absorbed by positive cash flows 
or attracting government cash rebates. 
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million (see column (f) of Table 4.3). These outcomes suggest that while under a Brown tax 
the project is marginal, ceteris paribus, the imposition of a delayed full loss offset would 
render it submarginal.62 Care must be taken in the interpretation of these results because the 
post cash flows in column (f) are comprised of a series of cash flows that are both risk free 
and risky.  
To see that, column (h) shows the difference in cash flows arising from the application of a 
delayed full loss offset tax (column (f)) and those that would result from the imposition of a 
Brown tax (column (g)). In other words, the stream of cash flows in column (h) represents 
the risk-free cash flow component of the overall post delayed full loss offset tax cash flows. 
It is riskless because these represent guaranteed government cash rebates for outstanding 
uplifted losses at the end of the mining project. Taking this risk-free component from the 
overall post-tax cash flow (column (f)) gives the risky component of the project (column 
(g)).  
Consequently, to properly assess the viability of this mining project, an investor would 
have to discount the risky cash flow component using a risk weighted discount rate and the 
cash flow risk-free component using the LTBR (risk free). Discounting the overall post-tax 
cash flow (both risk free and risky) in column (f) using a discount rate of 15% (the risk 
weighted discount rate) would be misleading, as this would imply discounting a risk-free 
asset using a risky weighted discount rate. Not surprisingly, discounting the overall cash 
flow in column (f) using a 15% discount rate results in a post-tax NPV of −$140 million. 
This negative NPV only arises as a consequence of discounting the cash flows risk-free 
component using a risk weighted discount rate. However, if the overall post cash flow 
associated with the delayed full loss offset tax is broken into two components (risky and 
risk free) and properly discounted using the respective appropriate discount rates, the 
project in Table 4.3 remains marginal. 
In fact, the financial outcomes under a Brown tax (Table 4.2) and that under the cash flow 
tax design incorporating immediate write off and delayed full loss offset (Table 4.3) are 
alike. Indeed, it can be seen from column (h) of Table 4.3 that relative to a Brown tax 
                                                 
62 Because the mineral project earns a return inferior to the investor weighted discount rate of 15%. 
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scheme, the initial deficit of $400 million in Year 0 is fully recovered by Year 5 via lower 
tax repayments in Years 3 and 4. These lower tax payments arise because instead of 
receiving an immediate government cash rebate for losses associated with the upfront 
capital expenditure in Year 0, losses are compounded forward at the LTBR (5%),63 to be 
offset against the mining project net positive cash flows in these years (Years 3 and 4).  
Hence, proper financial analysis (that is, by discounting the risk-free cash flow component 
in column (h) and risky component in column (g) using the LTBR for the former and the 
risky weighted discount rate for the latter) produces the same NPV as in Table 4.2; that is, a 
zero NPV. This implies that under either tax scheme, no tax is paid in discounted terms. It 
can further be seen that even when applying a 5% discount to the mining project cash 
flows, the pre-tax and post-tax cash flows in both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 produce the same 
NPV; that is, a $390 pre-tax NPV and $234 million post-tax NPV. Therefore, these results 
show that a cash flow tax scheme that incorporates immediate write off of capital 
expenditure with delayed full loss offset is financially equivalent to a cash flow tax design 
incorporating immediate write off of capital expenditure and immediate full loss offset (i.e., 
a Brown tax). 
4.5.2.2 Delayed write off of capital expenditure and delayed full loss offset 
Table 4.4 represents the financial outcome under a cash flow tax scheme incorporating both 
delayed write off of capital expenditure and delayed loss offset.64 What differs from the tax 
scheme discussed above (Table 4.3) is that instead of immediate expensing of the upfront 
$1000 capital expenditure (Year 0), a five-year straight-line write off of this upfront capital 
expenditure is applied. 
An interesting observation is that the value of the post-tax cash flows and amount of tax 
paid under both immediate expensing of capital expenditure (Table 4.3) and delayed write 
off (Table 4.4) are the same. This happens because compounded forward losses to Year 465 
are the same under both tax schemes. Indeed, while the Year 3 tax base after loss uplift 
                                                 
63 This corresponds to the Australian 10-year government bond rate at the time of writing this chapter. 
64 This cash flow tax design underpins the ACCRRT design and the proposed RSPT. 
65 It is important to note that Year 4 is both the first year in which compounded forward losses are fully 
absorbed by the project’s net receipts and the last year of the five-year write off period.  
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value (−$178) under delayed write off (column (g) of Table 4.4) is smaller than that under 
immediate write off (−$378) (column (d) of Table 4.3), this deficit is fully compensated in 
Year 4 by the extra write off deduction allowances in that year.66 Once again, the mining 
project’s risk-free asset component has a zero NPV when applying a 5% LTBR (column 
(k)) and post-tax flows associated with the risky asset component (column (j)) mirrors the 
effect of a pure tax cash flow scheme had that scheme been applied to this particular mining 
project. 
We can therefore assert that regardless of whether a cash flow tax design employs delayed 
loss offset, delayed write off or both, applying an appropriate uplift rate to the value of 
losses being carried forward aims at maintaining their values and providing financial 
equivalence to a cash flow taxation employing immediate expensing of capital expenditure 
and immediate full loss offset (i.e., a Brown tax). 
Table 4.2: Brown Tax – 5 Years 
Table 4.2 shows the effect of a 40% Brown tax on a five-year hypothetical mining project. Under this tax 
design, immediate expensing and full loss offset is provided. The first column represents the capital 
expenditures associated with the mineral project, where the only expenditure is a $1000 million upfront 
capital expenditure. The net receipt column represents the gross receipts from the sales of mineral products 
less operating costs. Pre-tax cash flows are computed as the net receipts minus the capital expenditures. The 
tax rebates/payments are computed as the product of the tax rate (40%) and the pre-tax cash flow. The post-
tax cash flows (column (f)) are computed deducting the tax rebates/payments from the pre-tax cash flows. It is 
important to note that the cash rebate is equal to the product of the tax rate and the initial capital expenditure 
(cash outflow). 
Year Capital 
expenditure 
(b) 
$m 
Net 
receipts 
(c) 
$m 
Pre-tax cash 
flow 
(d) 
$m 
Tax rebates 
/payments 
(e) 
$m 
Cash flow after 
Brown tax 
(f) 
$m 
0 1000   -1000  -400(g) -600 
1     0   0 
2     0   0 
3   780 780 312 468 
4   662 662 265 397 
5   219 219 88 131 
NPV@15%     Zero (h)  Zero Zero (h) 
NPV@5%     390 (h)  156 234 (h) 
IRR %     15 15  15  
                                                 
66 Some $210; that is, the value the previous year’s capital write off of the five write off period ($200) plus 
the tax value uplift ($10). 
75 
 
  
76 
Table 4.3: Cash Flow Tax with Immediate Expensing of Capital Expenditure and 
Delayed Loss Offset 
Table 4.3 shows the effect of a 40% cash flow tax incorporating delayed full loss offset on a five-year 
hypothetical mining project. The first column represents capital expenditures associated with the mining 
project. Immediate expensing of all costs is available but negative cash flows are compounded forward at the 
Australian 10-year government bond rate of 5%, which represents the risk-free rate. Any uplifted losses that 
remain at the end of the fifth year attract a 40% cash rebate from the government. Columns (b) and (c) are the 
same as in Table 4.1. Column (d) represents the tax base, that is, prior years’ negative cash flows uplifted by 
the 5% risk-free rate plus any pre-tax cash flow for the relevant period. Column (e) represents the tax 
payments associated with the mining project; that is, 40% of any year’s base tax after uplift of any tax losses. 
Finally, column (f) represents the pre-tax cash flows minus any third column tax payment. Columns (g) and 
(h) enable the comparison between a pure cash flow tax (Brown tax) and a cash flow tax with delayed loss 
offset. Column (g) represents the post Brown tax cash flow that would result had a Brown tax rate of 40% 
been applied to that mining project. These represent the overall project’s risky component, like those 
displayed in column (f). 
Year Capital 
expenditure 
(b) 
$m 
Net 
receipts 
(b) 
$m 
Pre-tax 
cash 
flow 
(c) 
$m 
Base 
after 
loss 
uplift 
(d) 
$m 
Tax 
payments 
(e) 
$m 
Post-tax 
cash 
flow 
(f) 
$m 
Cash flow 
after 
Brown 
tax 
(g) 
$m 
Cash 
flow (f) 
less (g) 
(h) 
$m 
0 1000   -1000 -1000   -1000 -600 -400 
1     0 -1050   0 0 0 
2     0 -1103   0 0 0 
3   780 780 -378   780 468 312 
4   662 662 265 106 556 397 159 
5   219 219 219 88 131 131 0 
NPV@15%     Zero     -104 (I) Zero (J) -104 (I) 
NPV@5%     390 (k)     234 (k) 234 (J) Zero (k) 
IRR %     15     11.5 (I) 11.5 (I) 5 (I) 
Source: Mayo 2013. 
  
 Table 4.4: Cash Flow Tax with Delayed Write Off of Capital Expenditure and Delayed Full Loss Offset 
Table 4.4 shows the effect of a 40% cash flow tax incorporating delayed write off and full loss offset on a five-year hypothetical mining project. Column (c) 
represents a five-year straight-line capital expenditure write off value ($200 each year) commencing in Year 0 and ending in Year 4. Column (d) shows the capital 
expenditure write down value; that is, the upfront capital expenditure of $1000 minus all write off deductions permitted to date. Column (e) represents the tax 
value uplift; that is, the LTBR (5%) uplift rate applied to the previous year’s written down value. This represents an extra deduction for upfront capital costs and 
ensures that the value of delayed deduction is maintained until either they are absorbed by positive cash flow or attract a government cash rebate for losses. The 
tax base pre-loss uplift (column (f)) is computed as net receipts generated by the mining project less any annual uplifted write off deductions. The tax base after 
loss uplift for any year is then computed as the previous year’s negative value, uplifted by the LTBR (5%) plus the tax base pre-loss uplift value that year. These 
extra deductions (equal to an interest component (uplift rate) applied to the previous year’s written down value) ensure financial equivalence between immediate 
expensing of upfront capital expenditure and delayed write off. 
Year Pre-tax 
cash flow 
 
(b) 
$m 
Capital 
write off 
 
 
(c) 
$m 
Written 
down value 
 
(d) 
$m 
Tax value 
uplift 
 
(e) 
$m 
Base pre-
loss uplift 
 
 
(f) 
$m 
Base after 
loss uplift 
 
 
(g) 
$m 
Tax paid 
 
 
 
(h) 
$m 
Post-tax 
cash flow 
 
(i) 
$m 
Post- Brown 
cash flow 
 
(j) 
$m 
Cash flow 
(i) less (j) 
 
 
(k) 
$m 
0 -1000 200 800   -200 -200   -1000 -600 -400 
1 0 200 600 40 -240 -450         
2 0 200 400 30 -230 -703         
3 780 200 200 20 560 -178   780 468 312 
4 662 200 0 10 452 265 106 556 397 159 
5 219 0 0   219 219 88 131 131   
NPV@15% Zero             -104 Zero -104 
NPV@5% 390             234 234 Zero 
IRR % 15%             11.5% 15% 5% 
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4.5.3 Immediate expensing of capital expenditure and delayed loss offset 
In this tax design, all costs are immediately expensed, and yearly tax losses are carried 
forward (as with the delayed full loss scheme (Table 4.5) and uplifted annually at the 
threshold rate (20%).67  
The first important point to note is that the post-tax cash flow stream, and therefore the 
stream of tax payments, differs between a Brown tax scheme and this last cashflow tax 
design. For instance, during the first five years (including Year 0) of the mining project, 
cash outflows under this last cash flow tax scheme are higher than those under a Brown 
tax scheme. This due to government cash rebates provided under the Brown tax design. 
However, from the 5th to the 8th year of the project, cash inflows are lower under the 
Brown tax scheme. This is because tax payments are reduced in between these years 
because of the previous years’ tax losses, which are compounded forward. 
A second observation is that, as expected, regardless of the discount rate used to 
compute the project’s NPV, under a Brown tax design, the project post-tax NPV is 
always 40% (the tax rate) lower than the pre-tax NPV (see (j)). However, under this last 
cash flow tax scheme, if the discount rate is lower than the threshold rate, the post 
project NPV is higher than under a Brown tax (see (i)), because it benefits from the tax 
losses that accumulate at a rate higher than the discount rate. The reverse is true when 
the discount rate is higher than the threshold rate (see (l)). In that case, it is seen as a 
disadvantage, as tax losses are compounded forward at a lower rate than the investor 
discount rate. It is only when the investor discount rate is equal to the tax threshold rate 
that the project post-tax NPV is reduced in proportion to the tax rate (40%). Finally, the 
project post-tax IRR is reduced to below the pre-tax rate of 31.2% (see (m)), because 
the tax threshold of 20% is lower than the pre-tax project IRR. In contrast, under a 
Brown tax, the project’s IRR remains unchanged (see (n)). 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that where the tax 
threshold is set higher than an investor’s discount rate, projects that generate sufficient 
positive cash flow to fully absorb all compounded forward losses are seen by investors 
as more generous under this last cash flow tax scheme than under a Brown tax design. 
This is because tax losses accumulate at a higher rate than the discount rate. In contrast, 
                                                 
67 This cash flow tax design underpins the now repealed MRRT and the current PRRT. 
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those investors with a discount rate higher than the tax threshold rate are seen as 
disadvantaged (i.e., post-tax NPVs) as their discount rate is higher than the tax loss 
compounding rate.  
Further, the financial outcome regarding pre-tax marginal and above-margin projects 
under this last cash flow tax design for investors whose discount rates match the tax 
threshold rate will be consistent with that under a cash flow tax with delayed full loss 
offset design.68 In addition, regardless of whether the discount rate used by investors is 
higher or equal to the tax threshold rate,69 project that are judged unviable under a pre-
cash flow tax design incorporating immediate expensing of capital expenditure and 
delayed loss offset as well as pre-Brown tax will remain unviable after both these tax 
schemes. However, the financial outcome will be worse under the last cash flow tax 
scheme relative to a Brown tax design, because while no tax is paid, the project does not 
receive any recompense for tax losses. 
The results of this section therefore indicate that most corporate cash flow taxation 
designs, if applied at a mineral resource project level, might achieve resource tax 
neutrality. That is, as long as the cash flow tax designs provide either an immediate full 
loss offset design, or a delayed full loss offset provision with an uplift rate set at the 
LTBR, as seen in the hypothetical mineral project investigated, most of the pre-tax IRR 
project remain unchanged.  
However, anything less than full loss offset, such as the cash flow tax design 
incorporating immediate write off and delayed loss offset, will result in a non-neutral 
resource tax outcome, as seen from the change in the pre-tax IRR project. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, such results arise from the possibility of eventual complete loss of the 
carried forward losses (unrecouped losses).   
                                                 
68 Once again absent risk of possible losses. 
69 Assuming the tax threshold rate is equal to project rate of return. 
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Table 4.5: Cash Flow Tax Design with Immediate Write Off and Delayed Loss 
Offset 
Table 4.5 represents the operation and application of a 40% cash flow tax design incorporating immediate 
write off of capital expenditure and delayed loss offset with a 20% threshold on the 20-year hypothetical 
mining project described earlier (Table 4.2). Columns (b), (c) and (d) are computed as in Table 4.2. 
Column (e) represents the resource rent tax base after the 20% tax threshold rate uplift. It is computed by 
adding to the current year pre-tax cash flow (column (d)) the previous year’s uplifted compounded 
forward loss. The tax payment (column (f)) represents 40% tax rate of the positive resource rent tax base 
in column (e). The post-tax cash flows (column (g)) are found by deducting the tax payments from the 
pre-tax cash flow (column (d)). Finally, column (h) represents the post-tax cash flows had a Brown tax 
been applied. This last column allows direct comparison between a Brown tax and this cash flow tax 
design. It is important to note that this project generates sufficient positive cash flows in its later years to 
fully absorb the initial year’s losses compounded forward at the threshold rate. 
Year Capital 
expenditure 
 
(b) 
$m 
Net 
receipts 
 
(c) 
$m 
Pre-tax 
cash 
flow 
(d) 
$m 
Tax base 
after 20% 
uplift 
(e) 
$m 
Tax 
payments 
 
(f) 
$m 
Post-Tax 
cash flow 
 
(g) 
$m 
Post-
Brown tax 
cash flow 
 
(h) 
$m 
0 85.5   -85.5 -85.5   -85.5 -42.8 
1 6.5   -6.5 -109.1   -6.5 -3.3 
2 36.5   -36.5 -167.4   -36.5 -18.3 
3 129.4   -129.4 -330.3   -129.4 -64.7 
4 118.2   -118.2 -5514.6   -118.2 -59.1 
5 15 128.8 113.8 -503.7   113.8 56.9 
6   263.6 263.6 -145.4   263.6 131.8 
7   263.6 263.6 89.1   263.6 131.8 
8   263.6 263.6 230.4 35.6 228.0 131.8 
9   230.4 230.4 201.5 92.2 138.2 115.2 
10   201.5 201.5 176 80.6 120.9 100.8 
11   176 176 156.6 70.4 105.6 88 
12   153.6 153.6 134.6 62.6 91.0 76.8 
13   134.6 134.6 117.7 53.8 80.8 67.3 
14   117.7 117.7 101.8 47.1 70.6 58.9 
15   101.8 101.8 89.2 40.7 61.1 50.9 
16   89.2 89.2 77.8 35.7 53.5 44.6 
17   77.8 77.8 48.4 31.1 46.7 38.9 
18 20 68.4 48.4 39.1 19.4 29.0 24.2 
19 20 59.1 39.1   15.6 23.5 19.6 
NPV@10%     608.5    368.5  419.3 (i)  304.2 (j)  
NPV@20%     178.6    256.4  107 (k)  89.3 (j)  
NPV@31.2%     Zero      - 27.2 (i) Zero (j) 
NPV@35%     -30.1     -50.7 (i) - 15.1 (j) 
IRR     31.2     27.9 (m) 31.2 (n) 
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4.6 Issues to Consider 
4.6.1 Capital levy / starting base of existing project 
Swan (1976) showed that under certain conditions, the investment neutrality properties 
of a cash flow tax scheme can be hindered. That is, if the tax is unexpectedly and 
immediately introduced or the design of existing taxes changes, current investors could 
face a capital levy effect. This would occur if and only if, at the time of the unexpected 
or immediate introduction or modification of the tax, the market value of existing assets 
was not allowed as a tax deduction.70 It is important to note that it is only investors with 
capital already invested that would experience such a capital levy. 
4.6.2 Royalties, corporate income tax and profit rent-based taxes 
Under a federal system of government (such as in Australia), state governments 
typically impose an output-based tax (ad valorem and/or specific royalty) on mined 
commodities in their respective regions.71 However, as demonstrated in this chapter, 
these types of taxes create distortions and are inefficient. That is, they reduce a project’s 
pre-tax expected return and therefore affect its post-tax viability.72 Hence, as shown in 
Murray (2016), Kellow (2016), Valle de Souza, Dollery and Kortt (2017) and Ergas, 
Harrison and Pincus (2010), the use of a royalty tax in conjunction with a profit rent-
based tax raises issues because of distortions that royalties impose on production and 
investment decisions. Consequently, for tax neutrality to be achieved when introducing 
a new profit rent-based tax on mineral resources already subject to state royalty tax, the 
latter must be removed entirely. 
However, if state royalty taxes are to be maintained, tax neutrality can still be achieved 
with a cash flow tax design incorporating fully refundable credits for unrestricted state 
royalty payments. Incorporating such a design/scheme would mitigate the distortive 
effects associated with any state royalty payments. The resulting cash flows (pre-tax and 
post-tax) would be similar to those under a Brown tax design. A mineral project would 
therefore remain unaffected by the distortion that a volume and/or value-based royalty 
creates. If instead, the new tax to be introduced incorporated a delayed loss offset 
                                                 
70 For instance, for existing projects, the proposed RSPT allowed existing assets to be deducted at their 
accounting book value instead. 
71 This is discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 
72 Relative to the outcome under a profit rent-based tax. 
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design, a distortive effect is likely to persist because of the prospect of no cash refunds 
for state royalty payments.73 However, the distortionary effect associated with state 
royalty payments can be removed if and only if a full refund is provided for excess 
royalty payments (Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010; Freebairn 2015; Mayo 2013). 
The interaction between profit rent-based taxes and corporate income tax can also give 
rise to distortionary effects. Although cash flow taxation and corporate income tax can 
achieve tax neutrality when imposed in isolation, their combined imposition can create 
an overall distortionary effect on an investor’s mining project assessment (project NPV 
and IRR) (Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kellow 2016; 
Mayo 1979, 2013; Murray 2016). In fact, when any form of profit rent-based tax is 
imposed prior to corporate income taxation on any mineral resource operation, the 
income tax treatment of the mining project capital expenditure can violate investment 
neutrality conditions (by imposing a distortion on investors’ pre-tax decision making) 
(Mayo 2013). More specifically, the way annual change in the value of mining project 
cash flow streams (i.e., income tax treatment of capital expenditure) is determined for 
corporate income tax purposes after prior74 resource rent taxation can impose a wedge 
between pre- and post-tax investor discount rates and therefore affect potential mining 
project/investment assessments, and as a result, investment decisions (Freebairn 2015; 
Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Kellow 2016; Mayo 1979, 2013; Murray 
2016). 
Mayo (2013) demonstrates that if the change in value of a mining project is determined 
on the basis of pre-resource rent taxation cash flows, the depreciation method would 
create a flow of corporate income tax payments ‘that is heavily front loaded’ (p. 2749). 
This results in a decrease in mining project expected return or IRR, increasing the 
possibility of a project’s ranking switching from being marginal pre-tax to submarginal 
after the imposition of both taxes together (corporate income tax applied after resource 
rent taxation). This distortion arises because in such a design, depreciation allowance is 
effectively determined from the mining project capital expenditure gross of cash rebates 
provided from prior cash flow taxation.75 Imposing corporate income tax on these 
                                                 
73 That is, if no tax is payable, excess royalty payments will be lost. 
74 When corporate income tax is applied after resource rent taxation as was the case in both the RSPT and 
MRRT. 
75 As discussed previously, under a cash flow tax design, cash rebates for prior capital expenditure in the 
first year of a mining project’s operation are provided. 
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resource rent taxation cash rebates (or financial equivalence when delayed designs are 
imposed) fails to recognise the loss in capital value of a mining project associated with 
prior capital expenditure. 
In contrast, if depreciation of a mining project is based on the change in the value of 
post resource rent tax cash flows, heavily front-loaded corporate income tax stream 
payments will be replaced by a flow of steadily declining corporate tax payments, 
because under this treatment, prior resource rent taxation cash rebates are excluded from 
assessable income. In such a design, an overall taxation neutral outcome can be 
achieved.  
Hence, when both corporate cash flow taxation and corporate income tax are imposed, 
overall tax neutrality can be achieved if depreciation allowance for the mining project 
capital expenditure is determined net of cash flow taxation cash rebates and with the 
mining project’s net receipts assessed for income tax purposes net of prior cash flow 
taxation. In other words, if an economic depreciation method is used for capital 
expenditure and cash flow tax rebates from prior cash flow taxation are excluded from 
the income tax base. It is, however, important to note that such a scheme would not be 
investment neutral in the absence of full loss offset provision76 (Freebairn & Quiggin 
2010; Garnaut 2010; Mayo 1979, 2013; Murray 2016) 
4.7 Conclusion 
The main goal of this chapter was to combine the concept of resource rent discussed in 
Chapter 2 with the concept of tax neutrality discussed in Chapter 3 and apply these to 
the taxation of mineral resources. 
The chapter began with a discussion on resource taxation arrangements. It showed that 
these are categorised as either output-based or profit-based taxes. Profit-based taxes 
generally impose a constant tax rate on either some measure of a resource project’s net 
cash flow (in the case of a profit rent-based tax) or on some measure of a resource 
project’s accounting profit (in the case of profit-income-based tax). Output-based taxes 
are the most common form of resource taxation. These are generally imposed as either a 
flat fiat currency quantity per physical unit of production from a resource project 
                                                 
76 This is because of the possible distortionary effect associated with a loss offset provision only design, 
as recognised and discussed in previous sections (i.e., possibility of unrecouped resource rent tax losses). 
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(specific royalties) or as a flat percentage of the value of production (ad valorem 
royalty), with the former mostly imposed on low value, high volume mineral resources. 
Because the 2010 resource tax reform focused on the implementation of profit rent-
based taxes to replace output-based taxes, this thesis emphasis these types of mineral 
resource taxes. Particularly, this thesis concentrates on the following three profit rent-
based taxes: the Brown tax, the allowance for corporate capital resource rent tax and the 
Garnaut Clunies Ross resource rent tax. This thesis chose to draw attention to these 
specific profit rent-based taxes not only because they underpin the proposed RSPT and 
MRRT and the current PRRT, but because other profit rent-based tax options are either 
modifications or hybrids of these three.  
In fact, this chapter showed that these profit rent-based taxes are cash flow taxes or 
equivalent cash flow taxes similar to those discussed in Chapter 3, but rather than being 
applied at a corporate level, they are imposed at a mineral resource project level. For 
instance, the allowance for corporate capital resource rent tax is a cash flow tax 
equivalent to incorporating delayed write off and delayed full loss offset design, while 
the Garnaut Clunies Ross resource rent tax is a cash flow tax incorporating immediate 
write off and delayed loss offset design. While the former is viewed as a modified 
Brown tax and underpins the proposed RSPT, the latter is viewed as a practical 
application of the Brown tax and underpins the now repealed MRRT and the current 
PRRT. 
This chapter then defined the key criteria used in the assessment of resource taxation, 
namely economic efficiency, rent collection, revenue stability and compliance and 
administration costs, where economic efficiency assesses tax neutrality, rent collection 
indicates the capacity to collect an adequate share of the resource rent under a range of 
different economic and geological conditions and revenue stability represents the extent 
to which a resource tax arrangement offers relatively predictable and stable revenue 
streams. 
Thereafter, the chapter applied the general concept of tax neutrality (i.e., income and 
substitution effects as well as deadweight loss) defined in Chapter 3 to mineral 
resources and asserted that in a mining context with a supply–demand analysis 
framework, a neutral tax is one that does not give rise to either under exploitation or 
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over exploitation of mineral resources relative to what would occur in the absence of 
resource taxation. In other words, no deadweight loss is created as result of the taxation, 
and therefore, an appropriate share of the resource rent is collected. 
Using the supply–demand framework and the concept of resource rent for both risk-
neutral and risk-averse investors (described in Chapter 2), this chapter investigated the 
economic efficiency, rent collection and revenue stability criteria of both profit-based 
and output-based taxes. It demonstrated that whether investors are risk averse or risk 
neutral, while a profit-based tax ranks more highly than an output-based tax with 
regards to economic efficiency and rent collection, the latter ranks more highly in the 
revenue stability criteria. In other words, output-based taxes are non-neutral and create a 
deadweight loss and negative distortion effect by reducing the quantity produced, and 
therefore, economic output or GDP is not maximised. In contrast, in the presence of 
risk-neutral investors, a profit-based tax is found to be neutral, while creating a positive 
distortionary effect in the presence of risk-averse investors because its risk-sharing 
characteristic reduces the risk-averse investor risk premium. 
This chapter illustrated the practical operation and application of the different corporate 
cash flow taxes discussed in Chapter 3 by using two hypothetical mineral resource 
projects. The purpose was to investigate their effect on tax neutrality in the discounted 
cash flow analysis framework discussed in Chapter 3. While the design and features of 
these corporate cash flow tax options and those of the hypothetical mining projects were 
simplified for the purpose of analysis, they remained close to those of the profit rent-
based taxes discussed at the start of the chapter, and therefore, the proposed RSPT and 
MRRT and the current PRRT. The results validated the theoretical discussion on the use 
of cash flow taxation, the taxation of economic rent and tax neutrality from Chapter 3. 
That is, as long as the cash flow tax designs provide either an immediate full loss offset 
or a delayed full loss offset provision with an uplift rate set at the LTBR, tax neutrality 
can be achieved. 
The chapter concluded with some issues to consider when profit-based taxes are levied 
on petroleum and mineral resources, as these could potentially lead to deviation from 
tax neutrality. The first issue discussed the capital levy effect faced by current investors 
arising from the unexpected and immediate introduction or change to the design of 
existing taxes. It was, however, showed that such effects could be prevented if, at the 
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time of the unexpected and immediate introduction or modification of the tax, the 
market value of existing assets were allowed as a tax deduction.  
The second issue regarded the introduction of a profit-based tax on mineral resources 
already subject to an output-based tax. To avoid inefficiency, output-based taxes must 
be removed entirely if a profit-based tax is to be introduced. Further, if output-based 
taxes are to be maintained, the distortive effect associated with output-based taxes could 
be mitigated only by incorporating fully refundable credits for unrestricted state royalty 
payments to a cash flow tax providing full loss offset provisions.  
The last issue discussed was with respect to the interaction between corporate income 
tax and profit rent-based tax. It was asserted the income tax treatment of a mining 
project capital expenditure can violate investment neutrality conditions if profit rent-
based tax is imposed prior to corporate income taxation. More specifically, the way 
annual change in the value of mining project cash flow streams (i.e., income tax 
treatment of capital expenditure) is determined for corporate income tax purposes after 
prior resource rent taxation can impose a wedge between pre- and post-tax investor 
discount rate, and therefore, affect potential mining project/investment assessments and 
investment decision. It was, however, demonstrated that overall tax neutrality might be 
achieved if the economic depreciation method is used for capital expenditure and cash 
flow tax rebates from prior cash flow taxation are excluded from the income tax base. 
This is possible only if the cash flow taxation incorporates full loss offset provisions. 
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 Australian Mining and Resource Taxation History 
5.1 Introduction 
While the primary focus of this thesis is to analysis the equity market reaction (i.e., 
income effect (chapter 7) and substitution effect (chapter 8)) to the announcement of the 
proposed RSPT and the MRRT, such analysis cannot be considered without first a 
discussion on the European discovery and colonisation of Australia and the 
development of modern mining in Australia. The development and evolution of mining 
legislation, with a particular focus on mining acts, is then discussed to provide a general 
background and understanding of the institutional setting within which the mining 
industry operates. This leads to a section emphasising the taxation of non-renewable 
resources in Australia. This section is important for this thesis because it discusses not 
only early resource taxation but the historical, economic justification and motivation for 
the taxation of non-renewable resources as well as the resource taxation arrangements 
applied in Australia, prior to the introduction of the MRRT. Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the motivation, rational, features and design of the 
proposed resources tax reforms: the RSPT and the MRRT, ending with a brief 
discussion on the repeal of the MRRT. 
5.2 Colonisation and Early Mining 
Although Australia was first sighted by Europeans in March 1606 by Dutch and Spanish 
explorers, it was not until 1688 that William Dampier became the first British explorer 
to set foot on Australian land, on the north-west coast of Australia (Australian 
Government 2008). In 1770, James Cook claimed part of the east coast of Australia as 
British territory (Davison, Hirst & MacIntyre 2001). The establishment of a penal 
colony in Sydney Cove by Governor Arthur Philip in January 1788 marked the 
commencement of the European settlement of Australia (Veatch & Fisher 1911). Arthur 
Philip was the first Governor of New South Wales, the first British colony established 
on the Australian continent (Davison, Hirst & MacIntyre 2001). Under the British 
colonial system, governors were heads of the colonial administration, appointed by the 
monarch to represent the British government and oversee the colonies. Governors were 
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given the authority to make laws and as such had extensive powers (Parliament of New 
South Wales n.d.).  
While it is commonly reported that convicts were deported to Australia to address the 
problem of overcrowded British prisons (Blainey 1993), they were seen as a source of 
cheap labour to help constructing the new colony. Arthur Philip, the then Governor of 
New South Wales, had established a system of allocation of labour in which, regardless 
of their crimes, convicts were employed according to their area of expertise. Educated 
convicts were assigned administrative work, such as record keeping, whereas skilled 
workers were employed as makers, carpenters, nurses, servants, cattlemen, shepherds 
and farmers (Davison, Hirst & MacIntyre 2001). 
Modern mining77 began in Australia after the arrival of British settlers in 1788, when 
Hawkesbury sandstone was quarried to construct buildings at Sydney Cove (Marshall 
2010). While coal was first discovered by escaped convicts at Newcastle in 1791, it was 
not until 1799 that the government commenced mining of coal, employing convict 
labour (Forbes & Lang 1987). The first shipment of coal was exported to India a year 
later in 1800 and then to the Cape of Good Hope (Industry Commission 1991). 
However, in 1821, because of poor profits because of failure of the colonial government 
to efficiently manage the mining of coal, Special Commissioner Bigge78 suggested that 
Newcastle mines would be more efficiently run by private companies. This marked the 
formation of the Australian Agricultural Company, incorporated by the Act of 
Parliament of 21 June 1824 (Forbes & Lang 1987). The first metal to be mined and 
produced in Australia was lead in 1841, found in Adelaide. The following year, copper 
was discovered in rich deposits around the same area. While there were reports of gold 
in New South Wales around 1823, it was not until 1849 that large discoveries were 
made (Blainey 1993; Forbes & Lang 1987; Industry Commission 1991). 
5.3 Mining Legislation Development 
Mining acts are the main legislation in the mining industry. They cover all matters 
relating to mining activities, such as leases/licences/permits and royalties. Mining rights 
                                                 
77 Mining in Australia can be traced as far back as 40,000 years, when aboriginal tribes fossicked for 
stone and dug for ochre. Stone was of great importance, as it was used to make weapons and tools to 
gather and process food, while ochre was used for cave and body painting as well as artefact decoration. 
78 On 5 January 1819, Bigge was appointed as Special Commissioner to examine the Government of the 
Colony of New South Wales (Veatch & Fisher 1911). 
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include conditions imposed on exploration and producing activities as well as allocation 
systems. There is a high degree of dependency between royalties and resource taxation 
on one hand and mining rights on the other hand, which affects the mining industry. 
Further, it should be noted that existing mining legislation is essentially modification of 
older legislation (Industry Commission 1991a; Industry Commission 1991b). It is 
therefore important to identify and understand the different phases associated with the 
development of mining legislation in Australia. 
When minerals were first discovered, no specific mineral laws were in place and the 
common law rule of real property inherited from the British colony was applied to 
mining activities (O’Hare 1971). The basic rule in that system of land ownership was 
that all minerals belonged to the owner of the soil, with the exception of gold and silver 
‘which were vested in the Crown by virtue of royal prerogative’ (Fitzgerald 2001, p. 
93). As a result, all lands granted by the colonial governments conveyed with them title 
to all minerals other than those of royal metals. It should however be noted that ‘until 
1828, there were generally no reservations of minerals made in Crown grants’ (O’Hare 
1971, p. 284). While from 1828, New South Wales (which at the time included 
Queensland and Victoria) started to reserve gold and silver and coal two year later, 
directions were issued by the then British Secretary of State to include all minerals in 
future grants (Fitzgerald 2001). 
The gold rush that started in the 1850s marked the development of mining legislation in 
Australia. On news of gold discovery, seeing the potential mineral wealth to the colony, 
Charles FitzRoy, the then Governor of New South Wales, enacted the first Australian 
mining law by proclaiming on 22 May 1851, ‘the crown’s right to all gold discovered’ 
(Fitzgerald 2001, p. 95). Soon after, each of the colonies began to enact legislation 
severing ownership of all minerals from land title. The latter half of the 19th century saw 
the establishment and development of mining legislation, such as the Gold Field Act in 
1853 and 1855 in Victoria and New South Wales respectively (Hunt 2009). Mining acts 
have been constantly amended, and differ between states as a result of differing mining 
history (Industry Commission 1991b).  
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse each and every individual act 
and its history, it is possible to grasp a general picture. Mining acts have provisions 
covering ‘issues through from the inception of the idea of a mine to rehabilitation of the 
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mine site after mining has been completed’ (Industry Commission 1991b, p. 315). Not 
only do they cover matters such as licence fees and royalty rates, but most importantly, 
they set out terms and conditions under which mining leases, mining and exploration 
rights are granted. Such rights encompass the authority to enter, prospect and explore 
for minerals and are vital for the development of the mining industry (Forbes & Lang 
1987; Hunt 2009; O’Hare 1971). Detailed information of current mining legislation can 
be obtained from the websites for the responsible government in each state and 
territory.79 
The last point concerns the control and management of mineral resources. Until the 
middle of the 19th century, control and management of natural resources was retained by 
the colonial governors acting for the British Empire. However, from 1855, the entire 
management and control, including all mine and mineral royalties, started to be vested 
in the colonies, beginning with those of New South Wales and Victoria, with the 
enactment of their constitutions (Australian Government 2008; Blainey 1993; Fitzgerald 
2001; Harris; 1980; Smith 1993). Up to the mid-1960s, the state and territory 
governments were responsible for all offshore and onshore natural resources. However, 
in 1980, after a package of bills passed in the parliament, ownership of offshore mineral 
resources situated beyond three nautical miles of the coast were vested in the federal 
government. Responsibility over minerals on land and offshore petroleum located 
within three nautical miles of the coast was rendered to the corresponding state or 
territory government, excluding uranium in the Northern Territory, which remained 
under federal ownership and control (Hogan 2003, 2007; Australian Government the 
Treasury 2008; Hogan & McCallum 2010 Australian Government 2010a; Australian 
Government 2010b; Australian Government 2017). It is important to note that royalty 
rates, licence fees, conditions, allocations of permits and such are defined and set in 
individual state and territory mining acts. 
                                                 
79 For Northern Territory (Department of Resources Minerals and Energy: 
http://www.nt.gov.au/d/Minerals_Energy/), for Western Australia (Department of Mine and Petroleum: 
http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/), for New South Wales (Department of Primary Resources: 
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/minerals), for Victoria (Department of Primary Resources: 
http://www.dpi.vic.gov.au/), for South Australia (Department for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, 
Resources and Energy: http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/minerals/geology/mineral_resources), for Queensland 
(Department of Mines and Energy: http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/mining/default.htm), for Tasmania 
(Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources: http://www.mrt.tas.gov.au). 
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5.4 Australian Resource Taxation 
5.4.1 Early resource taxation 
Not only did the gold rush mark the development of mining legislation in Australia, it 
led to the introduction of taxes on mining resources, royalties and licence fees being the 
first form of resource taxation in Australia.  
When gold fever began in the mid-1800s, the influx of population searching for gold, 
coupled with existing industry being deprived of workers, created inflationary pressure. 
It is important to note that the flow of migrants from 1852 to 1856 averaged 45,000, a 
35,000 increase on the years preceding the gold discovery (Industry Commission 
1991a). At the same time, there was an urgent need to raise revenue to finance public 
spending. On 22 May 1851, New South Wales imposed a licence fee of 30 shillings a 
month for the mining of gold, making it illegal to mine for gold without holding a 
licence (Forbes & Lang 1987). This was followed by Victoria on 5 August 1851. 
However, this licensing system was perceived as an unjust tax by diggers as this flat-
rate fee was imposed on miners regardless of the quantity of gold found (Harris 1980; 
Smith 1993). Discontentment started to spread amid less successful diggers who found 
it hard to pay their licence fee. This widespread sentiment was particularly evident in 
the Victorian colony, where easily mined alluvial gold was running out, resulting in the 
prospect of widespread unemployment (Harris 1980; Smith 1993). 
While Victorian diggers were calling for a reduction of their licence fee, the government 
passed a new regulation increasing it to three pounds per month. At the same time, the 
New South Wales colony reduced the licence fee to 10 shillings per month. Undeniably, 
this turn of events raised a storm of protest that led to the Eureka Stockade on the 
goldfield of Ballarat on 3 December 1854. The Eureka revolt contributed to the 
abolishment of the gold licence, which from 20 April 1855 was substituted with an 
annual miner’s right of 20 shillings per year and an export fee based on the quantity of 
gold of two shillings and six pence per ounce (Mills 1925).  
The first direct tax specific to the mining industry was introduced by the colony of 
Western Australia in 1899, with the Company Duties Act, which imposed a duty of 5% 
on the profits made by mining companies (Harris 1980; Smith 2004). The first indirect 
tax specific to the mining industry was an output-based royalty that can be traced as far 
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back as 1851 in the colony of New South Wales. A royalty of 10% was applied on gold 
gross output (Veatch & Fisher 1911). There was no logical rational for the charging of 
royalties, except that of the regalian system of ownership; that is, minerals were the 
personal property of the sovereign and it was deemed a privilege to mine. For that 
privilege, a payment to the sovereign was required, thus the term royalty (Harris 1980; 
Livingstone 1979).  
5.4.2 First resource tax reform in Australia 
Before discussing the different type of taxation currently applied to the resource sector 
in Australia, it is important to first talk about the early theoretical development of 
mining taxation as well as the first application of a profit rent-based tax in Australia. 
As just discussed, there was no real logical rational for the taxation of mineral 
resources. The justification for the taxation of non-renewable resources however 
evolved into the idea that:  
1. Exhaustible resources generate resource rent or unearned income which can 
theoretically be taxed away at a level close to 100 percent without affecting 
production and investment decisions at the margin (Boadway & Keen 2010; 
Daniel et al. 2010; Baunsgaard 2001; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; McLaren 
2011; Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2011; Hogan 2012; Garnaut & Clunes Ross 
1975, 1979, 1983; Garnaut 2010; Kittrekk 1957). 
2. The community owns all natural resources and governments should on behalf of 
the community seek an appropriate return for their exploitation by taxing 
resource rent (Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Passant 
2012; Australian Government 1985, 2008, 2010a), 2010b), 2017; Henry 2009, 
2010; Henry et al. 2009). 
This indicates that the evolution of the justification for the taxation of exhaustible 
resources can be associated to the general concept of economic rent80, more specifically, 
the classical school of economics concept of rent. 
 
                                                 
80 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the concept of economic rent. 
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In the period up to the mid-1970s, royalties (output-based taxes) were the main method 
of taxation applied to exhaustible resources by federal, territory and state 
governments.81 The first government to contemplate reform of the taxation of non-
renewables in Australia was the Fraser government82 (Valle de Souza, Dollery & Kortt 
2017; Hogan 2003; Li & Tran 2016; Mayo 2013). In December 1983, a white paper was 
released with the terms of reference for the application of a profit rent-based tax to all 
petroleum mining in Australia. It is important to note that traditional royalty and excise 
regimes apply onshore, in coastal waters and to the North-West Shelf project area in 
Australia (Australian Government 1985, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Forbes & Lang 
1987; Hogan 2003; Hogan & Goldsworthy 2010; McLaren 2011). 
The main motivation behind the discussion paper was to design a profit rent-based tax 
not only to replace the prevailing royalties and excises for petroleum mining, but to 
serve as a base model to be extended to and replace existing imposts on other parts of 
the resource sector. The economic justification was to reduce the distorting effect 
associated with output-based royalties and gain efficiency as well as to capture a more 
adequate share of resource rent (as output-based royalty generally fail to do so, see 
Chapter 4) (Australian Government 1985, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Forbes & Lang 
1987; Hogan 2003; Hogan & Goldsworthy 2010; McLaren 2011). 
After further rounds of consultation and the release of further papers on the possible 
impacts of a profit rent-based tax, the Hawke Labor government83 declared in April 
1984 that if a profit rent-based tax was to be imposed, it would only be applied to new 
offshore petroleum projects. In June 1984, the government announced that from 1 July 
1984, the PRRT was to be imposed on all new offshore petroleum projects. The 
Australian Government established the first resource profit-based tax in Barrow Island 
in 1985, with the introduction of a resource rent royalty. In 1987, the PRRT was 
introduced to all new offshore petroleum exploration and development projects 
(Australian Government 1985, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Forbes & Lang 1987; Hogan 
                                                 
81 Although it is important to note that in 1927, the Commonwealth government introduced an excise duty 
on petroleum and oil to finance road grants to states. A tax on gold was also introduced in 1939 as a 
wartime revenue-raising measure but was suspended in 1947 and repealed in 1950 (Smith 1993). 
Following the dramatic surge in oil prices caused by the 1973 oil crisis, the then Labor government 
introduced a crude oil excise in August 1975, expressing rates as a percentage of the volume-weighted 
average of sale prices and exempting the first 30 million barrels (Webb 2001). 
82 Malcolm Fraser was the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of the Liberal Party from 1975 to 
1983. 
83 Bob Hawke was the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of the Labor Party from 1983 to 1991. 
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2003; Hogan & Goldsworthy 2010; McLaren 2011; Smith 2004). Until the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT, the PRRT applied to all oil and gas 
projects in offshore areas under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth government 
(except the North-West Shelf project (Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 
2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010). 
The PRRT is levied on the net project income before company income tax is applied 
and with PRRT payments deductible for company income tax purposes The PRRT is a 
profit rent-based tax imposed as a flat percentage of a resource project’s net cash flow, 
in the like of the Garnaut and Clunies Ross model84 (Australian Government 2008, 
2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Garnaut 
1978, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1983). Hence, unlike an output-based 
tax, the PRRT is imposed on the profits generated from a resource project (as opposed 
to being applied to the volume or value of production [i.e., output-based]).  
The key ﬁscal settings in the PRRT are as follows: 
• PRRT is levied at a rate of 40% of net project income after the threshold rate of 
return is achieved (that is, after accumulated exploration and general project 
expenditures have been deducted). 
• General expenditures are accumulated at the long-term bond rate plus 5 
percentage points. 
• Exploration expenditures are transferable between projects (within the same 
company). 
• Undeducted exploration expenditures are accumulated at the long-term bond rate 
plus 15 percentage points if the expenditures are incurred within ﬁve years of the 
date of the lodgement of data required for the granting of the production licence. 
• Undeducted exploration expenditures are maintained in real terms if the 
expenditures are incurred more than ﬁve years before the lodgement date of data 
for the production licence. 
It is important to note that under the PRRT, past exploration expenditures are set to 
attract a threshold rate of GDP deflator above that of the LTBR. Further, to mitigate the 
                                                 
84 It is important to note that Garnaut and Clunies Ross acknowledged that their work was based on the 
classical definition of rent, that is rent is an unearned surplus (Garnaut & Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1983; 
McLaren 2011) 
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risk of losing unutilised deductions, the government announced in May 1985 that any 
project losses incurred as a result of closing down expenses would be refunded on the 
project past tax payments equivalent to only 40% the value of these incurred losses. 
Finally, from July 1990, the threshold rate for general project expenses was reduced 
from 15 to 5 percentage points above the LTBR. This same year, the coverage of the 
PRRT was extended to cover the Bass Strait project (Australian Government 2008, 
2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010). 
It is important to note that unlike a Brown tax, a profit rent-based tax excludes interest 
from the tax base and does not allow immediate expensing of all investment costs. 
Further, under the scheme, tax losses do not generate any immediate government cash 
rebate but instead are carried forward to be offset against future positive cash flows 
from the project (Boadway & Keen 2008, 2010, 2014; Boadway et al 1983; Lund 2009; 
Mayo 1979; Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2011; Garnaut 1978, 2010; Garnaut & Clunies 
Ross 1975, 1979, 1983; Passant 2012; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Hogan 2012).  
The last comment worth mentioning is that through the provision of deductions for 
allowable expenditures and the uplift of carried forward expenditure, in theory, the 
PRRT (or similar resource taxation arrangements) taxes only resource rent generated 
from the exploitation of mineral resources, thereby meeting the main motivation or 
justification for the taxation of the resource sector; that is, taxing resource rent / 
unearned income (Boadway & Keen 2008, 2010, 2014; Boadway et al 1983; Lund 
2009; Mayo 1979; Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2011; Garnaut 1978, 2010; Garnaut & 
Clunies Ross 1975, 1979, 1983; Passant 2012; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Hogan 
2012). 
5.4.3 Australia’s resource taxation arrangements (pre-2010 resource tax reform) 
Resource taxation such as royalties, PRRT and crude oil excise are specific to the 
mining industry. As previously noted, minerals belong to the crown and the federal, 
state and territory governments are responsible for mineral resources located in their 
jurisdiction. Governments do not exploit non-renewable resources but instead allow 
private companies to explore and develop those resources by transferring them the right 
to do so. This transfer of temporary ownership is done through the granting of mining 
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leases (Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; 
Hogan & McCallum 2010; Industry Commission 1991b). 
To collect returns from the production of those resources, governments use different 
taxation arrangements. Although output-based royalties have traditionally been applied, 
Hogan (2003, 2007, and 2012) noted that there have been a number of resource policy 
developments over the last 40 years, particularly with the introduction of a crude oil 
excise and the PRRT. This section discusses and provides an overview of the current 
resource taxation arrangements in Australia. 
Existing non-renewable resource taxation in Australia is a complex arrangement of 
various taxes, differing not only across states but within states and from mineral to 
mineral, with very little consistency. Except for the PRRT (discussed in earlier 
sections), exhaustible resource taxation arrangements levied in Australia are mainly 
output based. Ad valorem royalties tend to apply to metallic minerals,85 coal, diamond 
and gemstones, while speciﬁc royalties are generally imposed on low value, high 
volume non-metallic minerals. A mix of arrangements applies to oil and gas resources 
(Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010, ABARES 2010, 2011, 2017). The 
following table provides a summary of the resource taxation arrangements applied in all 
jurisdictions in Australia. However, since the focus of this thesis is to analyse the equity 
market reaction to the proposed resource tax reforms (a switch from an output-based tax 
to a profit-based tax), the information in the table below is only to provide an overview 
of the type of resource taxation imposed across resources and for each jurisdiction. 
Detailed information regarding the various taxation rates can be obtained from the 
websites for the responsible department in each state and territory.  
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 Copper, iron ore, lead and zinc are examples of metallic minerals. 
 Table 5.1: Resource Taxation Arrangements in Australia 
This table provides an overview of the main type of resource taxations applied in Australia. The information is provided by responsible jurisdictions (State and Territory as 
well as at the federal level) where jurisdiction represents the responsible Government for the imposition and collection of the taxation arrangement. Petroleum resources 
include oil and gas. Coal include black and brown coal. Metallic minerals include iron ore, gold, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, ilmenite, rutile, zircon, bauxite, uranium, tantalum, 
manganese, tin and silver. Non-metallic minerals include diamonds and other gemstones, salt, limestone, clay shale, dimension stone and construction material. 
Jurisdiction Petroleum86 Coal Metallic minerals Non-metallic minerals 
Australian Government87 Petroleum Resource Rent 
Tax (PRRT) and ad 
valorem  
- - - 
Western Australia Ad valorem Ad valorem (exported) 
Specific (not exported) 
Ad valorem Specific88 
Queensland Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem Specific 
New South Wales Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem  Specific89 
Victoria Ad valorem Specific Ad valorem Ad valorem 
Northern Territory Ad valorem N/a90 Profit-based91 Ad valorem and profit-
based92 
South Australia Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem Ad valorem 
Tasmania N/a93 Ad valorem  Ad valorem and profit-based Specific 
Source: ABARES 2017.     
                                                 
86 Oil and gas. 
87 The Australian Government is only responsible for offshore petroleum resources and uranium resources in the Northern Territory. 
88 Except for diamonds and other gemstones where ad valorem royalties apply. 
89 Except for diamonds and other gemstones where ad valorem royalties apply. 
90 Coal production in Northern Territory is zero. 
91 Constant rate based on the net value of production. 
92 Constant rate based on the net value of production. 
93 Petroleum production in Tasmania is zero. 
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A final important point arises in relation to tax concessions provided to the mining 
industry. Government policies in Australia have historically encouraged the 
development of mineral resources and have always recognised the uniqueness of the 
minerals industry and the need for incentives to encourage development.  
Those special characteristics include high sunk costs, long production periods, 
exhaustibility of mineral resources and uncertainty (Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010). 
As a result, special provisions have been contained in income tax acts providing 
taxation concessions. Deductibility of capital and exploration expenditures are current 
examples of special concessions. As early as the mid-1800s, the Australian colonies 
were offering and paying considerable sums to encourage the finding of mineral 
deposits. For instance, a reward of 1,000 pounds was promised for the discovery of a 
coal field by the Victorian colony, while in New South Wales, 20,000 pounds was set 
aside every year to encourage prospecting for minerals (Veatch & Fisher 1911). As 
Smith (1993) noted, certain mining and exploration companies were exempt from 
federal income tax.  
Although an analysis of capital and exploration deductions falls beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it is possible to provide a brief overview. Explicit provisions are made in the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 to deal with the special aspects of the mineral 
industry. For instance, immediate deduction of exploration expenditure and certain 
types of capital expenditure such as plant, equipment and building are allowed rather 
than the normal amortisation method. Further, the list of allowable capital expenditure 
deductions is much more extensive in the mining industry than for many other activities 
(Industry Commission 1991b; Reed 1980). 
5.4.4 Other general taxes imposed on mining industry 
Like most other industries, the mining industry in Australia is subject to a variety of 
general taxes, some of which are direct and others indirect. Examples of direct taxes 
include company tax, fringe benefits tax, capital gains tax and payroll tax, while 
examples of indirect taxes include sales tax and fuel excise. Since it is important to 
understand general features of the Australian taxation system, these taxes are briefly 
discussed.  
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A corporate tax is generally a tax levied on the net profit of a company. Although not 
the preferred form of taxation among colonies, by federation, several had introduced a 
company tax, with their own rates and definitions of assessable income (Mills 1925; 
Reinhardt & Steel 2006; Smith 2004). The Australian Government first became 
involved in the income tax field during the First World War. Its spending had increased 
from nearly nothing to almost 20% of national product (Smith 2004). With the collapse 
of customs and excise duties caused by the disturbance of trade, the revenue base had to 
be expanded to fund the involvement of Australia in the First World War. In 1915, the 
Commonwealth government introduced a federal corporate tax on undistributed 
company profits, which was changed in 1922 to apply to all company profits (i.e., 
undistributed and distributed).  
These federal taxes were in addition to the existing state company taxes until 1942, 
creating a two-tiered system (Smith 2004). To reduce tax structure complexity and in a 
desire to take sole responsibility for imposing income tax, the Commonwealth 
government established in 1942 a system of uniform tax by which grants to the states 
from the federal government replaced state revenue raised from income tax, which 
ceased to be levied at the state level (Downing et al. 1964; Reinhardt & Steel 2006). As 
Smith (2004) noted, taxation was seen as an instrument to manage aggregate demand, 
with income tax a macroeconomic policy management tool. Greater control over 
taxation by the Commonwealth government was a bid to help contain inflation as well 
as a way to efficiently oversee tax incidence in a booming war economy. 
Another impost introduced by the Australian Government was the wholesales sales tax 
(WSL) in 1930. It was established as a measure to help the Commonwealth government 
finance its budget shortfall caused by declining revenue with the great depression. This 
tax was levied at the wholesale level to lessen the number of taxing points (Reinhardt & 
Steel 2006). The levy was established at a rate of 2.5% and was imposed on consumable 
items, although preferential treatment was applied to items such as food, primary 
industry inputs and produce (Smith 1999). While by 1940, the rate had been raised, a 
multiple rates structure had been established. The wholesales sales tax was widely 
criticised by both academics and professionals as not only inefficient and complex but 
as having a distorting effect on production and consumption decisions (Groenewegen 
1983; Reinhardt & Steel 2006). 
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In fact, a broad-based consumption tax was proposed as early as 1975 by the Asprey 
Committee and then again in the 1985 Tax Summit but attempts to establish such a tax 
were unsuccessful (Asprey et al. 1975; Australian Government 1985; Reinhardt & Steel 
2006). However, in 2000, the Commonwealth government introduced the goods and 
services tax (GST) to replace the wholesales sales tax. This value added based model 
was part of broad reforms of the Australian taxation system and federal financial 
relations. For instance, the goods and services tax not only replaced the wholesales sales 
tax but a range of state taxes deemed inefficient, such as financial institutions duty, 
debit tax, accommodation taxes and stamp duty on credit arrangements (Reinhardt & 
Steel 2006). Until the present day, revenue from the GST are distributed to the state 
governments on the basis of per capita relativities using the principle of fiscal 
equalisation (Webb 2002). 
While a tax on fuel had been imposed as early as federation with the application of 
customs duty to imported petroleum products, excise duty was not imposed until 1929. 
Although it was initially introduced as a way to finance road infrastructure projects and 
repair roads, it later became an important source of revenue. In fact, in 1931, the excise 
base was extended to coal tar and coke and then to heavy fuel in 1940 and to diesel in 
1957 (Australian Government the Treasury 2001). Businesses and industries that rely 
heavily on the use of fuels are generally eligible for grants and incentives such as 
rebates and tax credits (Australian Government the Treasury 2001; Smith 2004). Payroll 
tax, introduced in 1941, was also established as a financing measure by the 
Commonwealth government, to fund a national child endowment scheme (Reinhardt & 
Steel 2006). The rate of the payroll tax at its inception was 2.5%. This tax is paid by 
companies for the right to employ workers and is assessed on the basis of salaries paid 
by employers. Payroll tax was handed to the states in 1971 and since then has 
represented an essential source of revenue. Rates vary among states, eroding the 
uniformity while levied by the Australian Government (Reinhardt & Steel 2006).  
Another tax related to employment is fringe benefits tax (FBT), introduced in 1986 after 
explicitly being proposed in the recommendation made by the draft white report in 
1985. It is a tax imposed on non-cash benefits (in addition to salaries) provided by 
employers. It should be noted that a number of benefits are exempt from fringe benefits. 
In addition, there are certain concessions that apply to specific organisations such as 
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public educational, charitable and religious institutions (Reinhardt & Steel 2006). In 
addition to the FBT, the draft white paper recommended the taxation of capital gains. A 
capital gain is a profit realised on capital (i.e., investment or real estate) when sold in 
excess of the purchasing price. Capital gains tax was implemented in 1985, with a 
capital gains discount introduced in 1999, to promote a more efficient flow of funds 
across the economy and make Australian internationally competitive in taxation of 
capital gains (Reinhardt & Steel 2006). 
To conclude, until the 1970s, the major developments in the Australian taxation system 
had been the broadening of the revenue base in a bid to finance expenditure 
programmes, such as the fuel tax to fund road infrastructure and repairs, the payroll tax 
to finance a national child endowment scheme and the WSL to help finance the 
Commonwealth government budget shortfall. After 1980, the focus changed towards 
the reform of the taxation system to improve efficiency and reduce complexity, such as 
the introduction of the GST, capital gains tax and FBT (Reinhardt & Steel 2006). 
5.5 2010 Resource Tax Reform 
5.5.1 Australia’s Future Tax System Review 
Before discussing the designs, features, application and mechanism of the proposed 
RSPT and the MRRT, it is important to first discuss the background to the introduction 
of these proposed resources tax reforms as well as their rational, motivation and 
justification. 
Following the Australia 2020 Summit held in April 2008, which proposed a complete 
review of the federal and state tax system, the Australian Government announced on 
May 2008 Australia’s Future Tax System Review, hereafter the Henry tax review. The 
terms of reference of the commissioned review were to examine the current tax and 
transfer system and make recommendations to build a tax structure that would enable 
Australia to manage and enhance its environmental, economic and social challenges and 
wellbeing respectively (Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 
2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2009, 2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 
2012). 
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In the final report released in May 2010, the Henry review acknowledged that because 
of its limited and high-quality reserves, the exploitation of mineral and petroleum 
resources in Australia generates large economic rent. Yet, the review recognised that the 
current taxes and charges on non-renewable natural resources had failed to collect an 
appropriate return for the Australian community. That is, although resource prices and 
resource companies’ profitability had been augmenting, the revenue contribution from 
the resources sector had been falling. Importantly, the review asserted that the existing 
royalty regimes applied by the state and territory governments were not only inflexible 
but having a distortionary effect on investment and production decisions but also on 
sovereign risk94(Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 
2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2009,2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 2012). 
In addition, it acknowledged the need for a change in the tax mix. That is, a shift away 
from the taxation of mobile to immobile factor of productions (in other words, away 
from normal return to economic rent95), providing the opportunity to address the 
imbalance of a 2-speed economy, caused by the mining boom96, but also to render the 
corporate tax rate internationally competitive in a bid to attract mobile international 
investment (Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 
2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2009, 2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 2012). 
Consequently, the Henry tax review recommended the imposition of a uniform profit 
rent-based tax that should be administrated by the Australian Government Such new tax 
regime was to replace the current resource charging arrangement and be levied at a rate 
of 40% on all-natural non-renewable resources projects (Australian Government 2008, 
2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2009, 
2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 2012).  
Before discussing the design and features of the RSPT and MRRT, it should be noted 
that the Henry review made 138 recommendations grouped under 9 broad themes. 
However, since the aim of this thesis is to investigate the equity market reaction to the 
                                                 
94 The effect of output-based taxation is discussed in chapter 4. 
95 Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between economic rent, normal return, immobile and mobile factor 
of production, taxation of economic rent and neutral taxation. 
96 While the resources sector and associated service industries beneficiate from the resource boom, 
industries that export Australian made good and services (i.e., tourism, farmers, manufacturers, foreign 
student education) suffer from a higher Australian dollar caused by higher demand for resources products 
(Australian Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Henry 2009, 2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 2012). 
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proposed RSPT and the MRRT in the resources sector, this thesis principally focused on 
the findings and recommendations made under the broad theme efficient land and 
resource taxation with a particular emphasis on the charging for non-renewable 
resources. It is however important to note that in its recommendations, the Henry review 
concluded that a lower company tax rate would be beneficial to the Australian economy 
in the sense that it would attract internationally mobile capital investment. The review 
however asserted that the lowering of company tax would be desirable conditional on 
the new profit rent-based tax capturing an adequate level of resource rent (Australian 
Government 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2017; Hogan 2003, 2007, 2012; Hogan & McCallum 
2010; Henry 2009, 2010; Henry et al. 2009; Passant 2012). 
5.5.2 RSPT 
The RSPT was announced on 2 May 2010, following the recommendations made in 
Henry tax review. It was to be introduced on 1 July 2012 at a rate of 40% on profits 
made from the exploitation of Australia’s non‐renewable resources (Australian 
Government 2010a, 2010b, Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2010). The RSPT was to 
be levied on the extraction of all natural non-renewable resources in Australia, affecting 
approximately 2,500 companies.  
Although the RSPT was to replace the existing crude oil excise, the state and territory 
governments were to continue operating their royalty regimes. Following the 
commencement of the RSPT, resource firms were to be provided with refundable 
credits to negate royalties that would have been paid to the state and territory 
governments. Projects subject to the PRRT97 were to be given the opportunity to opt for 
the RSPT or to stay in the PRRT. The election into the RSPT would be irrevocable 
(Australian Government 2010a, 2010b, Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2010). The 
RSPT was to be payable on the realised value of the resource project, measured as the 
difference between the revenues generated from the extraction of the non-renewable 
resource (assessable revenue) and associated expenditures. It is important to note that 
the RSPT was to be a deductible expense for income tax purposes (Australian 
                                                 
97 The PRRT is a profit-based tax, levied on all offshore petroleum projects and was passed by the 
Parliament of Australia in 1987, becoming effective from 15 January 1988. The PRRT is levied at a rate 
of 40% on a measure of cash flow with losses carried forward for exploration, development and operating 
expenditures. 
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Government 2010a, 2010b, Hogan & McCallum 2010; Henry 2010). The following 
figure and table illustrate the application of the RSPT. 
 
Figure 5.1: RSPT Tax Liability Chart (Australian Government 2010b) 
 
Table 5.1: RSPT Tax calculation (Australian Government 2010b) 
5.5.3 MRRT 
As mentioned in chapter 1, due to concerns amid the Australian community and 
pressure from the mining sector, the Australian Government with its new Premier 
Minister Julia Gillard introduced the proposed Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) to 
replace the RSPT. The MRRT was a tax levied only to a narrow range of minerals, iron 
ore and coal and approximately 320 firms were to be subject to the MRRT. Although 
several design features of the RPST were maintained, the MRRT differed in many ways 
from the RSPT. Most notably, the MRRT was scaled down compared to the RSPT with 
respect to the effective tax rate, threshold rate, extraction allowance and uplift rate 
(Hogan 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; Passant 2012; Australian Government the 
Senate 2013; Australian Government the Treasury 2010, Australian Government the 
Treasury 2011; Kompo-Harms, S & Sanyal, K 2011). 
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For instance, the MRRT was to be applicable only to mining companies whose resource 
profit exceeded $75 million per annum (no tax-free threshold was applicable under the 
RSPT). In addition, no extraction allowance was offered under the RSPT, while under 
the MRRT, projects were entitled to a 25% extraction allowance. Hence, the RSPT had 
a net tax rate of 40%, while under the MRRT, the net rate to be applied was 22.5%, that 
is, a headline tax rate of 30% reduced by 25% to allow for the extraction allowance. 
Further, it is important to note that whilst under the RSPT tax arrangement, onshore and 
offshore oil projects would have been subject to the tax, the MRRT did not cover these 
petroleum projects. Instead, under the MRRT regime, these were to be made subject to 
the existing Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) which was extended to all onshore 
oil and gas projects, including coal seam gas (Hogan 2012; Hogan & McCallum 2010; 
Passant 2012; Australian Government the Senate 2013; Australian Government the 
Treasury 2010, Australian Government the Treasury 2011; Kompo-Harms, S & Sanyal, 
K 2011). The following figure and table illustrate the application of the MRRT and the 
main differences in the key designs and features of the RSPT, MRRT and PRRT 
(extension) respectively. 
 
Figure 5.2: MRRT Tax Liability Calculation (Australian Government the 
Treasury 2011) 
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Table 5.2: Key designs and features comparison between the RSPT, MRRT and 
PRRT (extension) 
5.5.4 Repeal of MRRT 
As just noted, the MRRT became effective on July the 1st, 2012. However, in the lead 
up of the 2013 election, the then leader of the opposition Tony Abbott promised that if 
the Coalition were elected to form the new Government they would repeal the MRRT. 
The Abbot government was sworn in the 18 of September 2013 and the MRRT was 
repealed on the 2nd of September 2014. The repeal of the MRRT resulted in onshore and 
                                         Name
Design / Feature
RSPT MRRT PRRT (extension)
Announcement date May-2010 Jul-2010 Jul-2010
Commencement date Jul-2012 Jul-2012 Jul-2012
Coverage/application Exploitation of all new and 
existing onshore and 
offshore mineral and  
petroleum resources within 
Australia (existing projects 
subsject to PRRT able to opt 
into RSPT).
Exploitation of all new and 
existing Onshore iron ore 
and coal  wihtin Australia.
Exploitation of all new and 
existing onshore and  
offshore petroleum 
resources within Australia.
Threshold None. No tax liability for assessable 
profits < $75 million.
None.
Taxe rate 40%. 30%. 40%.
Resource losses Refundable and 
tranferable. 
Not refundable. Transferable 
to other coal and iron ore 
project within Australia. 
Unutilised losses carried 
forward and uplifted at uplift 
rate.
Not refundable. 
Transferable to other  
projects within Australia. 
Unutilised losses carried 
forward and uplifted at 
uplift rate.
Uplift rate LTBR. LTBR +7%. LTBR +15% (on carried 
forward losses) or  5% (on 
unsused credit for 
royaylties paid and starting 
base expenditure in most 
cases).
Extraction allowance None. 25%. None.
State government royalties Payable and credited 
against RSPT liabilities. 
Unsuded credit can be 
immediatly refunded or 
tansferred.
Payable and credited against 
MRRT liabilities. Unsuded 
credit carried forward and 
uplifted at uplift rate. Not 
refundable or tansferrable.
Payable and credited 
against PRRT liabilities. 
Unsuded credit carried 
forward and uplifted at 
uplift rate. Not refundable 
or tansferrable.
Existing projects: starting 
base allowance
Existing projects' assets 
recognised at book value.
Existing projects' assets 
recognised at either market 
or book value (uplifted at 
uplift rate).
Existing projets's assets 
recognised at either market 
or book value (uplifted at 
uplift rate).
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offshore oil and gas projects (including coal seam gas) to be subject to the PRRT and all 
mineral resources to the various state governments resource charging arrangements in 
place prior to the introduction of the MRRT (Australian Government the Treasury 2014; 
Australian Government 2017). 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a historical background of mining development in Australia. 
Claimed as a British territory, established as a penal colony, Australia inherited its 
mining law from the British Empire. Mining acts are the main legislation and define the 
system of allocation of resources, licence fees and royalty rates. As result, a high degree 
of dependency exists between mining legislation, ownership of minerals, and resources 
taxation. Minerals belong to the crown and ownership of exhaustible resources is vested 
in the state and territory governments. The Australian Government is generally 
responsible for offshore oil and gas activities while state and territory governments are 
responsible for minerals situated in the land and within coastal waters. 
The chapter showed that the justification for the taxation of mineral and petroleum 
resources is that, these generate resource rent which can theoretically be taxed away at a 
level close to 100 percent without affecting production and investment decisions at the 
margin, and that on behalf of the community, the government seeks an appropriate 
return for their exploitation by taxing the resource rent. This chapter then asserted that 
prior to the introduction of the MRRT, the main methods of resource taxation had 
traditionally been output-based royalties. However, the economic inefficiency of these 
types of taxes had been recognised with the introduction of the PRRT, a profit-based tax 
applied to offshore oil and gas projects. 
The chapter concluded with the 2010 resources tax reforms (i.e., the RSPT and the 
MRRT), elaborating on their motivations, rationales, designs, features and repeal. It 
contended that the main motivations and rationales for these profit rent-based taxes 
were similar to those advocated in the introduction of the PRRT. That is, resource 
output base tax regimes have a distortionary effect on investment and production 
decisions and fail to collect an appropriate share of the resource rent for the Australian 
community. In addition, it asserted that such resources tax reforms offered the 
possibility to increase the tax on immobile factors of production (economic rent), 
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allowing the reduction in tax on mobile factors of production (normal return), and, 
providing the opportunity to address the imbalance in the economy (2-speed economy 
resulting from the mining boom) but also enabling the setting of an internationally 
competitive corporate tax rate in a bid attract mobile international investments. Further 
it demonstrated that although both RSPT and MRRT were profit-based taxes, the latter 
was a scaled down version of the former, particularly with respect to the tax rate, 
coverage, threshold rate and uplift rate. Finally, following the repeal of the MRRT on 
the 2nd of September 2014, onshore and offshore petroleum resources remained subject 
to the PRRT while mineral resources taxation arrangements reverted back to the exiting 
arrangements in place before the introduction of the MRRT. 
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 Event Study Methodology and Data 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by discussing the reason for using a price-based event study 
methodology to empirically investigate an income effect resulting from the proposed 
RSPT and the MRRT98. It follows with a review of the event study literature with an 
emphasis on the effect of tax reforms or regulatory changes on equity markets. It then 
provides a discussion and description of the different models used in price- based event 
study methodology but also describes and explains the different statistical tests used to 
draw inferences about the significance of the results found. In other words, it discusses 
the methodology that is used to observe and quantify the income effect (chapter 7) and 
to a certain extent in the investigation of the presence or otherwise of a substitution 
effect (chapter 8). In addition, it describes and defines the different data and most 
importantly provides the various results and their descriptive statistics used for the 
analysis in Chapter 7 and to a certain extent in chapter 8. 
6.2 Event study and the 2010 resource tax reforms announcements 
An event study is an empirical technique used to investigate the effect of an event on 
security market behaviour and has been widely used in finance and accounting research 
as well as in the field of law, economics and public finance. For instance, it has served 
as a major research technique to test theories of corporate finance99 (Aharony & Swary 
1980; Mandelker 1974; Patell 1976), in securities fraud cases (Mitchell & Netter 1994), 
to investigate the impact of change in the regulatory environment (Farrell & Petersen 
1982; Lang & Shackelford 2000; Shackelford 2000), accounting rule changes (Collins 
& Dent 1979) and announcement of macroeconomic variables (McQueen & Roley 
1993). While some event studies focus on the effect of the event on return variances, 
trading volume, operating performance and earnings management, most focus on the 
security market prices (Armitage 1995; Barakat &Terry 2013; Binder 1985, 1998; Bird 
et al. 2013; Kothari & Warner 2007; Serra 2002; Patell 1976). 
                                                 
98While this thesis investigates the equity market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT, 
MRRT and the repeal of the latter, due to robustness issues, the repeal of the MRRT is only briefly 
investigated (further detail is provided later in Chapter 7). 
99Dividend policy, earning announcements and mergers and acquisition, among others. 
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A price-based event study estimates and draws inferences about the impact of an event 
on shareholders’ wealth. It is designed to identify abnormal price performances in 
financial assets around the time of a particular event. It examines the behaviour of 
security prices around the event by assessing the magnitude to which the security price 
performance is abnormal. The extent of abnormal price changes provides a direct 
measure of its unanticipated effect on the wealth of the firms’ security claimholders 
(Brown & Warner 1980, 1985; Schwert 1981, 2003; Fama 1991; MacKinlay 1997; Park 
2004; Kothari & Warner, 2007; Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010; Beaver 1968; Beaver et 
al.1980). 
Its effectiveness arises from the fact that given efficient markets / rational expectation 
hypothesis, asset prices are formed to fully reflect all available relevant information. In 
other words, stock prices are expected to nearly continuously reflect almost all 
obtainable information (Brown & Warner 1980, 1985; Schwert 1981, 2003; Fama 1991; 
Binder 1985, 1998; Dyckman et al. 1984; Beaver 1968; Beaver et al.1980). Hence, if 
stocks are priced rationally, any useful new information will be used in the process of 
determining equilibrium securities prices. Consequently, the effect of an unanticipated 
event should instantaneously be reflected in asset prices. 
As postulated by Schwert (1981), any unanticipated change in regulations predicted to 
affect a firm’s future expected cash flow would cause a revision in its security price. 
Therefore, in the instance of a change in taxation arrangements (i.e., RSPT and MRRT), 
a change in a company tax payments/liability would be predicted to directly affect its 
expected after tax cash flow and consequently its disposable income. As suggested and 
evidenced by the cash flow approach and in the asset pricing model literature, such 
changes would result in a one-off adjustment in a corporation share price (Cutler 1988; 
Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Jang 1994; Pacini et al. 
2006; Parmenter, Breckenridge & Gray 2010; Smith, Bradley & Jarrell 1986).  
It is reasonable to argue that the announcement of the proposed new resource taxations 
(designs, features and coverage) took the financial community by surprise and came as a 
shock to the mining industry. Indeed, news articles suggested that billions of dollars had 
been decimated from the market value of Australian mining firms in the aftermath of the 
RSPT announcement (Burrell 2010), and several resources firms declared the halting 
and/or reviewing of mining projects in the days following (Burrell 2010; Shanahan & 
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Franklin, 2010; Thomson 2010). Observed change in security prices around the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT would therefore provide an unbiased 
estimate of their effect on the wealth of firms’ common stock holders. Thus, price-based 
event studies offer an ideal tool to appraise the impact of the RSPT and the MRRT 
announcements on the wealth of the affected firms’ claimholders and therefore the size, 
magnitude and persistence of the income effect resulting from these proposed resource 
tax reforms. 
An essential point to note is that while event studies are used to appraise the 
announcement effects for both long-term and short-term horizons (Ahern 2009; Barakat 
& Terry 2013; Brown & Warner 1980; Ritter 1991; Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010; Kothari 
& Warner, 2007;), this thesis focuses on the short-term horizon effect around the 
proposed resources taxation reforms. 
Conducting only a short-run price-based event study analysis provides a more consistent 
and precise measure of the equity market reaction to the proposed RSPT and MRRT. 
Indeed, as evidenced by Kothari and Warner (2007), Barakat and Terry (2013), Ahern 
(2009), Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) and Corrado (2011), short-run event studies are 
more reliable, better specified, have less serious limitations and have higher power to 
detect the equity reaction associated with an event (abnormal returns) than long-horizon 
studies. In addition, shorter run studies facilitate and permit the removal of potential 
confounding effects, providing a cleaner measure of the equity market reaction to the 
proposed RSPT and MRRT100 (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) 
6.3  Literature review 
A survey of the event study methodology literature indicates that while several studies 
used the event study methodology to empirically analyse the effect of tax reforms or 
regulatory changes on equity markets very few concentrated their analysis on resource 
taxations and/or resources tax reforms. This suggests an important gap within the 
literature. The following provides a summary of the main existing related literature. 
Aharony and Swary (1981) evaluated the market reaction to an amendment to the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, legislation that regulates bank holding companies in the 
                                                 
100 The impact of confounding effects is discussed in greater detail in the data section of this chapter. 
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U.S. Their results failed to recognize any significant differential volatility effect as well 
as any abnormal excess returns. Amoako-Adu (1983a) investigated the effect of 
personal taxation on equity prices by conducting an empirical analysis of the market 
response to the Canadian tax reform of cash dividends and capital gains. While 
excluding mining and oil stocks due to the complexity of their tax laws, he observed a 
significant variation in the value of average and cumulative average residuals. His 
results support the existence of a tax effect in capital markets.  
Cutler (1988) analysed the excess returns of companies composing the 1985 Fortune 
500 largest industrial corporations as a measure of responsiveness to the tax reform act 
of 1968. Though modest evidence was found in favour of a large market response to the 
tax news, his findings confirm the differential taxation effect on market values. 
However, Binder (1985) questioned the use of equity prices to determine the effect of 
regulatory change on capital markets. He examined 20 major regulations from several 
industries and failed to recognise the ability of stock return-based event studies to gauge 
the impact of regulatory change on capital market. He attributed this rejection to the 
difficulty to accurately identifying announcements that contains unanticipated 
information.  
Nevertheless, Smith et al (1986) explored the economics effects of the 1973 U.S oil 
price regulation on the market value of petroleum companies listed on the New York 
stock exchange.  Their results showed evidence of a differential regulation effect on the 
equity value of integrated refiners and oil producing firms. Jang (1994) provided further 
evidence that new tax laws have a significant impact on the pricing of securities. His 
finding is also consistent with the existence of differential tax effects. Shackelford 
(2000) and Lang and Shackelford (2000) reviewed several studies that investigated the 
correlation between equity prices and capitals gain taxation. He findings supported 
significant and quick adjustments to security prices in response to taxation regulatory 
change. Auerbach and Hasset (2005) combined a theoretical model with the use of 
return - based event methodology to assess the effect of dividends tax cuts on 
shareholders’ wealth and concluded that a differential tax effect exists. 
Davidson (2010) proposed an empirical analysis of the performance of Australian 
resources stocks relative to the Australian market and on to the global resource market 
around the announcement of the Australian Government proposed resource super profit 
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tax (RSPT). His results showed that while Australian resources stocks appeared to 
underperform the Australian market during the 3 days preceding the announcement of 
the RSPT, it rapidly recovered during the post announcement period during which it 
appeared to have outperformed the general market. In addition, his findings indicated 
that relative to the global resource market, the Australian resource market performed 
poorly during most of the investigated 60 days period around the announcement of the 
proposed RSPT. Brown et al. (2012) examined the materials and energy equity market 
reactions to the announcement of the Australian Government proposed resource super 
profit tax (RSPT) announcement and various RSPT policy related announcements. 
Their main findings showed that within the 3 days period surrounding the 
announcement of the RSPT, smaller firms as measured by market capitalisation, 
companies involved in the exploitation of iron ore, coal and oil and gas commodities 
and firms with larger Australian mining operational focus all experienced larger 
negative average abnormal returns. 
Other studies combine return-based event studies with volume-based event studies to 
use price-volume relationships to investigate financial markets reactions to changes in 
regulations, earning announcements and other types of information content 
announcements (Beaver 1968; Beaver et al.1980; Karpoff 1987; Pacini et al.2006). For 
example, Karpoff (1987) argued that combining price and volume when conducting 
event studies enhance the power of hypotheses testing. In fact, volume and equity prices 
can capture different aspects of investor reaction to information and therefore provide 
different information (Cready and Hurtt 2002). Beaver (1968) argues that volume 
reflects changes in the expectation of individual investors while price reflects changes in 
the expectation of the market as a whole. Knowledge and understanding of price - 
volume relationships can also be used to investigate how the riskiness of equities or 
portfolios is altered by information content of an event (Karpoff 1987). By using 
different measures of volume (i.e. percentage of outstanding share traded, number of 
transaction amongst others), the correlation between volume and volatility can be used 
to draw inference about the change in the relative risk of any security or portfolios. The 
price - volume relationship can also provide information about the market structure. 
That is its size and frequency, as well as the extent to which new content information 
announcements is conveyed or interpreted by market participants (Karpoff 1987). 
Finally, as evidenced by Cready and Hurtt (2002) using combination of event study 
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return and volume metrics allows superior detection of investors’ response to regulatory 
changes, earning announcements and other type of information content announcements. 
Prices that do not change should not be an indication that capital markets remain 
unaffected, volumes can also significantly vary while leaving security prices unchanged. 
6.4 Model for Measuring Expected Return 
As stated in previous sections, central to a price-based event study is the measurement 
of an abnormal security performance. It is therefore essential to specify a model to 
measure abnormal returns. To detect excess returns, the data must be segregated in two 
periods; namely, the event window and the estimation period. The event window is used 
to examine the impact of the event, while the estimation period is used to estimate the 
unobserved expected return; that is, the normal return earned by investors unconditional 
of the event taking place. The abnormal return for a given security is identified as the 
difference between its actual/ex-post and expected/ex-ante return over the event 
window. 
For each sample firm, the return on the firm’s common stock i at time t, itR is defined as: 
ititit eKR +=  (1) 
Where: 
=itR  Observed return on sample security i for time period t 
=itK  Predicted return on sample security i for time period t 
=ite  Abnormal return on sample security i for time period t 
And where ite  is determined by taking the difference between the observed return and 
the predicted return, as follows: 
ititit KRe −=  (2) 
To measure abnormal returns, a model generating predicted returns must be specified. 
The predicted return is the expected return or normal return earned by security holders 
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unconditional on the event. Thus, ite  in Equation (2) offers a direct measure of the 
unanticipated change in common stockholder wealth related to the event. A variety of 
expected return models have been used in the literature.  
While MacKinlay (1997) reported event study analysis as early as 1933,101 the 
foundation of a typical event study methodology can be found in pioneering studies 
such as Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969).102 Although the methodology 
introduced by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) is predominantly the same 
as that employed today, several modifications have been developed over the years, 
mainly to handle econometric problems due to violations of statistical assumptions 
(MacKinlay 1997). Regardless of the length of the event time horizon (i.e., short-run or 
long-run event studies), various models and modifications must be used to deal with 
these econometric issues.103 
These issues, as well as the different models and modifications used in this thesis, are 
discussed and described in subsequent sections. 
The following provides a description of models used to estimate normal returns. These 
return-generating process models are the mean adjusted return, market adjusted return 
and market models.  
6.4.1 Mean adjusted return 
This model is commonly referred to as the ‘naïve model’ in the literature (Brown & 
Warner 1980; Dyckman, Philbrick & Stephan 1984; Kothari & Warner 2007) and is 
perhaps the simplest model. It assumes that the normal returns for a given security equal 
a constant, measured by averaging a series of past performances: 
iiti KRRE ==)( ,  (3) 
                                                 
101 Dolley (1933) investigated stock price reaction to stock splits. 
102 Ball and Brown (1968) examined the information content of earnings while Fama et al. (1969) 
investigated the impact of stock splits. 
103 As asserted by Kothari and Warner (2007), these issues become compounded and more critically 
important in long longer-run event studies.  
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Where iR  is the historical average continuously compounded return for firm i. The 
abnormal return for a given security is found by taking the difference between the 
observed return and the expected return: 
iititit RReAR −==  (4) 
Where iR  is the average continuously compounded past performance return for firm i 
during the estimation period. 
6.4.2 Market adjusted return 
While the mean adjusted market assumes that expected security performance is constant 
over the estimation period and varies across firms, the market adjusted return makes the 
assumption of time variant security expected return over the estimation period (though 
equal across firms). Because market-wide information affects stock prices, it is 
important to control for those factors to correctly measure the effect of the particular 
event. Unlike the mean adjusted return, which fails to disentangle such factors, the 
market adjusted return controls for them by removing overall market movements taking 
place at the same time as the sample securities event. The expected return for given 
security is identical to the market return for that period: 
ttMti KRRE == ,, )(  (5) 
Where tMR ,  is the continuously compounded return on an appropriate national broad 
market index during the estimation period. The abnormal return for a given security is 
found by taking the difference between the observed return and the expected return: 
tMititit RReAR ,−==  (6) 
6.4.3 Market model 
Unlike the market adjusted model, which only accounts for market-wide factors, the 
market model controls for both risk and market-wide movements. It suggests that the 
expected return on a security is linearly related to its covariance, with the return on 
some index composed of all marketable risky securities, commonly called the market 
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portfolio (Sharpe 1963, 1964; Markowitz 1952; Park 2004; Brown & Warner 1980; 
Kothari & Warner 2007), defined as follows: 
ittMiiti KRRE =+= ,,
ˆˆ)( 
 (7) 
Where 
MR  the return on the market portfolio and where ˆ  and ˆ  are ordinary 
least squares (OLS) parameter estimates from the estimation period. 
The abnormal return for a given security is found by taking the difference between the 
observed return and the expected return, as follows: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 (8) 
6.4.3.1 Thin trading 
Ball (1977) demonstrated that data from infrequently traded securities present 
potentially severe biases in the moment and co-moment of stock returns. With the use of 
daily data, this econometric problem of errors in variables appears particularly serious. 
For instance, the OLS method generates estimators of alpha and beta104 that are biased 
and inconsistent (Scholes & Williams 1977). This may impede the ability of the various 
methodologies used in this thesis to detect abnormal returns, hence resulting in type I or 
type II errors. This implication is important for this thesis, given the presence of thinly 
traded mining companies in our sample dataset (see the statistics description section 
below and Table 6.11). Although several methods have been suggested in the literature 
to adjust or correct for the bias in beta (Blume 1971; Dimson 1979; Fowler & Rorke 
1983; Klemkosky & Martin 1975; Scholes & Williams 1977; Vasicek 1973), only the 
two most widely recognised techniques are used here: the Scholes–Williams technique 
and the Fowler and Rorke method. 
6.4.3.1.1 Scholes-Williams beta 
Scholes and Williams (1977) showed that thin trading or nonsynchronous security 
trading induces spurious auto and cross-sectional correlation. These effects have 
implications for the OLS estimates of alpha and beta of the market model—thinly 
traded stocks will have upward biased alphas and downward biased betas, while higher 
                                                 
104 Of the market model and Fama French three-factor model. 
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frequency traded securities will have understated alphas and overstated betas. These 
outcomes result from lead and lag effects. To correct the biased beta, they developed a 
procedure to estimate market model parameters in the presence of nonsynchronous 
trading. Specifically, they show that to obtain consistent, less biased estimators, both the 
lag and lead effects must be taken into account. Such estimators are obtained by taking a 
weighted average of the separate regression estimates of lag, contemporaneous and lead 
betas:  
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Where 
n
ˆ  = the beta stock 
−s
n  = the lag beta estimated by OLS regression from the estimation period  
+s
n  = the lead beta estimated by OLS regression from the estimation period. 
MR  = the continuously compounded return on the market portfolio 
nR  = the continuously compounded return on security n  
s
M  = the first-order correlation coefficient on the market portfolio.
 
6.4.3.1.2 Fowler and Rorke 
Unlike the Scholes and Williams beta correction, which requires separate regressions, 
Dimson (1979) produced a simpler adjustment by only using a one-pass regression of 
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the stock return on the synchronous market return and a number of lagging and leading 
values of the market return. The adjusted beta then becomes the sum of the multiple 
regression beta coefficients: 

+
−=
=−
jt
ktn
ii bD   (13) 
And where the beta estimates are derived from the following model: 
itjtM
j
itMiktM
k
iit RRRR  ++++= +− ,,, ..............  (14) 
Where 
itR  = continuously compounded return on security i 
MtR  = continuously compounded return on the market portfolio 
it  = residual error from the regression, security 
k  = the number of lagged terms included within the regression 
j  = the number of lead terms included within the regression 
However, Fowler and Rorke (1983) argued that due to misspecification in their 
procedure, Dimson’s estimator becomes inconsistent with that of Scholes and Williams 
and recommended a minor correction to the Dimson method. That is, before aggregating 
the beta coefficients in Equation (17), all regression coefficients are first scaled by a 
weighting factor, as follows: 
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Fowler and Rorke (1983) argued that the correction made to the Dimson adjustment 
renders their procedure theoretically superior. It is, however, important to note that the 
use of these adjusted betas provides very little marginal improvement to the power of 
tests (Brown & Warner 1985; Davidson & Josev 2005; Dyckman, Philbrick & Stephan 
1984; Jain 1986).  
6.4.3.2 Confounding effect 
Perhaps the most crucial assumption in event study, along with the belief that markets 
are efficient, is that the event window is free of confounding effects. Confounding 
events consist of announcements or events that might affect security prices during the 
event period (McWilliams & Siegel 1997). Failure to control for such effects could 
invalidate inferences drawn from empirical results. For instance, if the announced 
proposed RSPT is accompanied by firm-specific announcements, the resulting 
calculated return will reflect a combination of the former and the latter, making it 
difficult to isolate the effect of the proposed tax. Indeed, Bird, Grosse and Yeung (2013) 
showed that the market reacts in a significantly positive way to exploration and resource 
announcements made by Australian mining companies.  
One way to fully capture the financial impact of the proposed tax reforms would be to 
remove any company experiencing extraneous individual events within 20 days on 
either side of the event date from the sample. The difficulty lies in the fact that the 
announcements of the RSPT and MRRT fall around the reporting season of many of the 
companies under examination. Further, since all resource companies listed on the ASX 
are subject to the Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC)105 code of disclosure, it is 
likely that announcements related to mining activities occur frequently. Such activities 
include project updates and exploration results, as well as technical and feasibility study 
results.  
                                                 
105 The code was introduced in 1989, with the latest edition incorporated in the listing rules of the ASX 
(Australian stock exchange) and NZX (New Zealand stock exchange) on December 2004. It requires 
listed companies to comply with a set of public reporting standards. For instance, firms must divulge any 
pertinent information related to a mineral deposit that could materially influence its economic value and 
must also promptly report any material changes in resources or ore reserves (JORC 2004). 
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A Factiva106 search was conducted to identify companies with firm-specific news events 
containing information likely to have a financial impact on share prices. The search 
confirmed that of the 706 firms under investigation (see Section 6.7), 649 experienced 
some kind of noteworthy extraneous individual event.107 It was however decided not to 
remove from the sample any firms experiencing such events. This choice was made for 
two reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of unrelated news has an 
expected value of zero over a large sample (Thompson 1988). Thus, the effect on 
shareholder wealth of such announcements would be value destructive about as 
frequently as it is value creative. Second, a dummy variable regression analysis (see 
Equation (18) and table 6.1) was conducted to test how sensitive the ARs and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) (RSPT) used in this thesis are to the various firm-
specific announcements.  
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𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑡 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1       (19) 
Where 
iD  = a binary variable taking a value of 1 when there is a particular firm-specific 
announcement within the investigated event window and zero otherwise.  
The results show that the various dummy variables used are statistically insignificant. 
This in essence confirms early findings from Thompson (1988) that with the use of the 
market model, ignoring extraneous individual company events has little effect on type I 
errors.  
Deciding not to remove firms from the sample does not imply that confounding effects 
are totally disregarded. Several methods can be employed to control or minimise 
impacts. The most appropriate for this thesis is the use of short event windows. Using 
                                                 
106 Factiva provides a broad and comprehensive array of local and international news from a collection of 
global newspapers and is widely cited in the finance and economic literature (Baker & Wurgler 2004; 
Cohen & Frazzini 2008; Lee & Mykland 2012). Its content can be accessed via the website 
http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/index.asp?link=djc-topnav. 
107 Earning releases, merger and acquisition negotiations, stock splits, dividends, project updates, changes 
in substantial shareholding, exploration, resource and reserve announcements, feasibility studies and 
survey completion and annual, quarterly and interim activity reports, among others. 
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shorter event windows lessens the likely incidence of contemporaneous disclosures. 
Care must however be taken when using narrower time periods, as the likelihood of the 
actual event date not being included in the designated event window augments the 
shorter the event period. However, as mentioned earlier, since the event date of the 
proposed resource tax announcement can be established with confidence, reducing the 
event window should not diminish the statistical power of this event study. To test the 
robustness of the results to the length of the event window, this thesis estimates 
cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of each of the 
proposed resource taxes over several event periods with different intervals (see Chapter 
7).  
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Table 6.1: Dummy Variable Regression Model 
This table presents the results of Equation (18). All average abnormal returns and cumulative average 
abnormal returns are computed using the market model and the Scholes William method, as described in 
(8) and (9) respectively. All models cover the sample data discussed in Section 5.5. Model 1 uses as the 
dependent variable the average abnormal returns one day prior to the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT ((Ars (-1)). Models 2 and 3 use the average abnormal returns on the day of the announcement of 
the proposed RSPT ((Ars (0)). Model 4 uses the 3-day cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding 
the announcement of the proposed RSPT (CAR (-1; +1)) while Model 5 uses the 11-day cumulative 
average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT (CAR (-5; +5)). D0 
represents a binary variable and takes a value of 1 when a company-specific news/events/announcement 
takes place on the day of the announcement of the RSPT or a value of 0 otherwise. D-1 represents a 
binary variable and takes a value of 1 when a company-specific news/events/announcement takes place 
on the day prior to the announcement of the RSPT or a value of 0 otherwise. D (-1 to 1) represents a 
binary variable and takes a value of 1 when a company-specific news/events/announcement takes place 
within the three days (-1; +1) surrounding the announcement of the RSPT or a value of 0 otherwise. D (-5 
to 5) represents a binary variable and takes a value of 1 when a company-specific 
news/events/announcement takes place within the 11 days (-5; +5) surrounding the announcement of the 
RSPT or a value of 0 otherwise. The t-statistics are derived from the standard OLS estimates and their 
associated p-values are presented in parenthesis. 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (N=706) (N=706) (N=706) (N=706) (N=706) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 
-0.004 -0.032 -0.027 -0.060 -0.063 
(-0.358) (-0.000)*** (-0.000)*** (-0.000)*** (0.191) 
D 0 
- - 0.003 - - 
- - (0.805) - - 
D -1 
0.007 0.010 - - - 
(-0.465) (-0.266) - - - 
D (-1 to 1) 
- - - 0.013 - 
- - - (0.406) - 
D (-5 to 5) 
- - -  -0.042 
- - - - (-0.437) 
      
𝑅2 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.004 
Adj.𝑅2 -0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level. 
6.5 Average Abnormal and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
In order to establish overall inferences about the average immediate effect of the 
proposed RSPT and the MRRT announcements on shareholders’ wealth, abnormal 
securities performance must be aggregated across firms and through time. Summing the 
abnormal returns across all firms at time t yields the average abnormal returns (AAR) 
for day t, as follows: 
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Where N is the number of companies in the sample, t refers to period t in the event 
window and wi  represents the proportion invested in stock i.  
By aggregating the average abnormal returns over time, we obtain the CAR. For any 
horizon length, that is, (L = 112 +− tt ) in the event window, the CAR is defined as: 
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Given the above discussion, the market model with Scholes and Williams’s adjusted 
beta is used for the estimation of expected returns. All other variant models are however 
estimated to provide robustness and can be found in the appendices. It is the series of 
cumulative and average abnormal returns defined above that are utilised to investigate 
the security price reactions to the tax reform announcements. 
6.6 T-Stat Measures 
In event studies, the basis for inference about the significance of the abnormal 
performance is a test statistic. It is typically calculated as the ratio of the average event 
window excess return to its estimated standard deviation. Implicit in the traditional test 
statistic is a number of assumptions that, when violated, may lead to inaccurate 
inferences. For instance, the hypothesis of no abnormal returns could be rejected when 
true (i.e., type I error) or failed to be rejected when false (i.e., type II error).  
Hence, a variety of tests both parametric and non-parametric are conducted to provide 
robustness. These alternative tests make less restrictive assumptions than those of the 
conventional procedure and/or include adjustments to handle any misspecification in the 
statistical properties arising under certain conditions (event-induced volatility and 
clustering effects, among others).  
The following parametric and non-parametric tests are used to test the significance of 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. 
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6.6.1 Parametric test 
6.6.1.1 Cross-sectional test 
Perhaps the most straightforward method is the ordinary cross-sectional procedure, 
found by dividing the event window mean abnormal returns by the contemporaneous 
cross-sectional standard deviation (Boehmer, Masumeci & Poulsen 1991; Kothari & 
Wasley 1989; Strong 1992). For day t, this is defined as follows: 
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Where 
ite  = Abnormal return on sample security i for time period t 
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Assuming independence across time, the test statistic over the event window interval is 
the ratio of the cumulative average excess returns to 
its standard deviation, computed as: 
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Where 
1T  and 2T  = The starting and ending days of the multi-day event window. 
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The cross-sectional procedure is well specified both with and without event date 
variance change;108 however, it has restrictions. For instance, while it accounts for 
event-induced variance, the method implicitly assumes equal variances across securities 
and cross-sectional independence in the firm’s specific excess performances (Strong 
1992). Assuming homogenous variance across firms is almost certainly unsuitable in 
any empirical study (Collins & Dent 1984), while the assumption of zero 
contemporaneous correlation is invalid in the presence of event date and industry 
clustering effects.109 As a result, the estimated average excess performance will be 
inefficient, and estimates of the variances biased, leading to misspecification in the 
statistical test. Further, in not considering data from the estimation period, the test may 
not be as powerful in the absence of variance shift (Brown & Warner 1985). 
6.6.1.2 Standardised residual test 
Among the earliest studies to employ this approach was Patell (1976). Although the 
standardised test continues to assume zero contemporaneous correlation, it recognises 
the possible presence of heteroskedastic variance across firms. However, unlike the 
cross-sectional test, event-induced variance is assumed to be insignificant. This 
procedure is essentially comparable to using a weighted least square, whereby each 
abnormal return in the event window is standardised by its estimated estimation period 
standard deviation (Collins & Dent 1984). To account for forecast error, a further 
standard econometric adjustment is made to the variance before the standardisation of 
the abnormal performances. These are then aggregated across securities to form the 
following test statistic for day t, as defined in Campbell, Cowan & Salotti (2010): 
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Where 
                                                 
108The literature provides evidence of increases in the standard deviation of a firm’s price in the days 
occurring around certain types of events (Beaver 1968; Corrado 2011; Patell & Wolfson 1979). It would 
therefore be natural to observe event-induced variance around the announcement of the proposed RSPT 
as well as around the announcement of the MRRT.  
109 Event date and industry clustering effects are present given the nature of this thesis and the event 
investigated.  
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And where 
iM  = The number of non-missing return in estimation period for firm i 
EstmR _  = The estimation period average return on the market index  
1K  and 2K  = The starting and ending days of the 252 days estimation period. 
Test statistics for cumulative abnormal returns are computed as follows: 
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Where: 
L  = The number of days the cumulative period. 
6.6.1.3 Standardised cross-sectional test 
This procedure is proposed by Boehmer, Masumeci and Poulsen (1991) to handle the 
issue of misspecification in the cross-sectional test that arises from the event-induced 
variance changes and the assumption of equal variance across securities. It is a hybrid 
test and is essentially a combination of the standardised and cross-sectional procedures. 
This method is similar to the test proposed by Patell (1976), except that a cross-
sectional variance adjustment is made; that is, the test statistic is found by dividing the 
mean event window standardised abnormal return by the contemporaneous cross-
sectional standard deviation. For day t, it is as follows:  
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Where 
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window abnormal performances. 
and where 
ite and its  are as previously defined. 
This procedure takes into account information from the estimation period and permits 
event-induced variance, which improves its efficiency and enhances its power. As a 
result, this test is more robust to variance changes attributed to a particular event and 
has therefore become more established than the standardised residual test (Boehmer et 
al. 1991; Kolari & Pynnönen 2010). 
6.6.1.4 Crude adjustment 
The benefit of the standardised residual and standardised cross-sectional test is found in 
their similitude with the generalised least squares method. By weighting the abnormal 
returns with the inverse of their estimated standard deviation, it effectively attributes 
less weight to the noisier observations, which enhances reliability (Collins & Dent 
1984; Kolari & Pynnönen 2010).  
However, failure to account for cross-sectional correlation raises severe issues. 
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the seriousness of problems that arise from 
contemporaneous cross-correlation. Indeed, as previously mentioned, calendar time and 
industry clustering are likely in events such as tax law changes. These clustering effects 
lessen the number of firms that behave independently, inducing positive correlation 
across securities. The positive cross-sectional correlation increases the standard 
deviation of the mean abnormal performance, hindering the ability of the test to detect 
abnormal returns (Brown & Warner 1980; Peterson 1989). 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) pointed out that when the event of interest is clustered 
in calendar time, the use of a risk and market adjusted model to generate expected 
returns might diminish intercorrelation to almost nothing. However, the industry effect 
remains present and ignoring cross-correlation would result in an over rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no mean excess performance when it is in fact true (Bernard 1987; 
Collins & Dent 1984; Kothari & Warner 2007). The correlation matrixes formed in this 
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thesis and presented in Table 6.11 indicate a fairly small cross-sectional correlation 
level. Nevertheless, even a relatively low amount of cross-correlation will lead to a 
severe misspecification in the test statistic. Hence, ignoring cross-sectional dependency 
may cause extensive downward bias of the variance estimates, leading to overstated test 
statistics, which will result in the null hypothesis being rejected too frequently (Kolari 
& Pynnönen 2010; Da García 2010). 
A possible approach to address the issue of cross-sectional correlation is the use of the 
crude adjustment proposed by Brown and Warner (1980), which assumes cross-
sectional dependence by taking into account dependence across firms’ average residual 
in the estimation period where the standard deviation is defined as follows: 
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By assuming independence across time, the test statistic over the event window interval 
is the ratio of the cumulative average excess returns to its standard deviation, computed 
as: 
   (30) 
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1T  and 2T  = The starting and ending days of the multi-day event window. 
6.6.1.5 Adjusted standardised cross-sectional test 
While the crude adjustment approach avoids potential issues associated with cross-
sectional dependence of the abnormal returns, it is sub-optimal (Kolari & Pynnonem 
2010). For instance, it fails to account for unequal variances across firms as well as 
forecast error and event-induced variance. To resolve the concern of contemporaneous 
correlation, Kolari and Pynnonem (2010) proposed the following modification to the 
standardised cross-sectional test: 
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Where r = Mean of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation period abnormal 
returns. 
6.6.2 Non-parametric test 
The test statistics described thus far are of a parametric nature, where it is generally 
assumed that the abnormal returns are normally distributed. However, it is clear from 
the data descriptive section (6.7.2) that the excess performances are slightly skewed to 
the right with a leptokurtic distribution. Validity of the parametric test statistics is 
contingent on the assumption of normal distributions and departure from normality 
distributed performances results in the parametric tests being poorly specified, 
potentially yielding inaccurate inferences (Berry et al. 1990; Corrado & Zivney 1992; 
Corrado 1989, 2011; Cowan 1992). Non-parametric tests offer alternative approaches 
that provide robustness against non-normally distributed observations. These procedures 
do not necessitate as stringent conditions about the probability distribution of excess 
returns as parametric tests. In the presence of fat-tailed distributed observations, non-
parametric tests not only have a power advantage over the parametric tests but provide 
improved specification (Corrado 1989, 2011; Berry et al. 1990; MacKinlay 1997). The 
generalised sign test and the rank test, discussed below, are the two non-parametric tests 
used in this thesis, based on the frameworks of Cowan (1992) and Corrado (1989, 2011) 
respectively. 
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6.6.2.1 Rank test 
The first non-parametric test used is the rank test defined in Corrado (1989). It regards 
the estimation period and the event window as a single time series where each firm’s 
abnormal performances are assigned a rank110 from the smallest to largest. It then 
compares the ranks in the event period with the expected average ranks under the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal performances (Serra 2002). This technique produces 
uniformly distributed rank values irrespective of the asymmetrical distribution 
potentially exhibited by the security abnormal returns (Corrado 1989). The rank test for 
Day 0 is as follows: 
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And where: 
0ik  = The rank of security i’s abnormal return for Day 0 
T  = The number of days in the combined estimation and event period  
tN  = number non-missing returns on day t 
3K  and 4K  = The starting and ending days of the 293 days of the combined 
estimation and event period. 
                                                 
110 When ties occur, the midrank procedure is used; that is, when more than one value has the same rank, 
the simple average of the ranks is returned. 
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To adjust for missing observations, each rank is divided by the number of non-missing 
excess performances in each firm’s time series plus one. Failing to make such an 
adjustment would imply an assumption of constant expected rank across securities, 
which may cause the rank test to be misspecified (Corrado & Zivney 1992; Cowan & 
Sergeant 1996).  
6.6.2.2 Generalised sign test 
The generalised sign test is described in Cowan (1992). As for the rank test, it does not 
necessitate cross-sectional excess performance to be normally distributed. While the 
rank test assigns each firm’s time series of excess performances their corresponding 
ranks, the generalised sign test uses the frequency of negative or positive abnormal 
returns (Campbell, Cowan & Salotti 2010). It compares the proportion of positive 
excess returns around a particular event to the proportion unconditional of the event 
taking place, as follows: 
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And where
 
iM  = The number of non-missing returns in estimation period for firm i 
w  = The number of stocks in the event window or on the event date for which 
cumulative e  or e  is positive. 
1K  and 2K  = The starting and ending days of the 252-day estimation period. 
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While overall, the rank test performs better than the generalised sign test, it is not as 
robust and well specified in the presence of thin trading, event-induced variance and 
when examining cumulative excess returns (Cowan 1992; Cowan & Sergeant 1996). 
For instance, the poor performance of the rank test in the presence of event-induced 
variance is explained by the fact that extreme observations receive lower or higher 
ranks, influencing test statistics. In contrast, the generalised sign test relies on the sign 
rather than the magnitude of excess performances, rendering it robust to event-induced 
volatility (Cowan 1992). With regards to infrequently traded securities, zero returns 
produce tied ranks, which result in a downward bias of the estimated variance of the 
ranks for every security. 
As a final note, while non-parametric tests are recommended for robustness in the 
presence of non-normally distributed data, such tests provide and use less information 
than parametric tests. In other words, these tests indicate the direction of change of the 
observations but do not provide any magnitude (Cam & Ramiah 2014; Corrado 2011; 
Ramiah 2012; Ramiah, Martin & Moosa 2013; Srivastava, Shenoy & Sharma 1989; 
Whitley & Ball, 2002; Berry et al.1990). 
6.6.3 T-stat measure final choice 
Given the nature of the event investigated and the discussion above,111 the adjusted 
standardised cross-sectional test (see Equation (31)) provides the most robust t-
statistical measure and is therefore used to draw inferences about the significance of the 
presence or otherwise of abnormal performances. Other t-statistical measures discussed 
in this section are undertaken to provide robustness and can be found in the appendices. 
6.6.4 Multiple period event windows 
Drawing conclusions solely based on the graphical representation of the cumulative 
prediction errors could result in type I errors. Indeed, Brown and Warner (1980) 
suggested that, for a given sample, the cumulative excess performance could appear to 
wander from zero even in the absence of excess returns. They explained that this result 
is consistent with the fact that, for a given sample, the cumulative abnormal 
performance by construction follows a random walk process and as such could exhibit 
                                                 
111 On event induced variance, cross-sectional correlation, calendar time and industry clustering, lack of 
information from non-parametric tests. 
134 
significant trends when none actually exist, and as a result, emphasised the necessity for 
hypothesis testing of the cumulative abnormal returns. As previously mentioned, 
cumulative abnormal returns are computed by aggregating the individual period excess 
returns over the event window. The variance of the cumulative abnormal returns is 
traditionally calculated as the sum of the individual abnormal return variances. 
However, this procedure ignores intertemporal correlation and presents a potential bias. 
Cowan (1993), Salinger (1992) and Sweeney (1991) demonstrated that failure to 
account for serial dependence leads to an overstatement of the traditional test statistic. 
While the bias is insignificant for short multiperiod windows, it becomes important in 
the presence of event time clustering (Cowan 1993), which could result in the analysis 
of cumulative abnormal returns becoming meaningless (Brown & Warner 1980). Since 
the events of interest in this thesis are clustered in calendar time, a correction to the 
traditional test statistic that incorporates an adjustment for intertemporal correlation 
must be undertaken. Therefore, for multi-day intervals, a corrected test statistic, 
introduced by Mikkelson and Partch (1997) and used in Campbell, Cowan and Salotti 
(2010), is employed: 
SCARS
N
i
i
s
N
TTSCAR
t

== 1
2
csc
),1(
 (38) 
Where 

=
=
2
1
21 ),(
T
Tt
iti eTTCAR  (39) 
)2,1(
21
21
),(
),(
TTCAR
i
i
i
S
TTCAR
TTSCAR =  (40) 
( )
2/1
22
1
_
2
_
2
1
2
1
2
2 1*
2
1
),1(




























−






−
++





−
=



=
=
=
K
Kk
Estmmk
Estmi
T
Tt
mt
i
i
i
K
Kk
ik
i
CAR
RR
RWR
M
W
We
M
TTS
i
 (41) 
135 
2/1
1
2
1
2,12,1 )(
1
)(
1
1
















−
−
=  
= =
N
i
N
i
iiSCAR TTSCAR
N
TTSCAR
N
S  (42) 
Where 
iM  = The number of non-missing return in estimation period for firm i 
iW  = The number of non-missing return in event window for firm i 
EstmR _  = The estimation period average return on the market index  
1T  and 2T  = The starting and ending days of the multi-day event window. 
The adjusted standardised cross-sectional test statistic for multi-period interval 
becomes: 
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Where r  = Mean of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation period abnormal 
returns. 
6.7 Model for measuring observed return 
Although continuously compounded and simple returns produce similar type I errors 
and test power in event studies (Brown & Warner 1985; Thompson 1985, 1988; 
Thompson 1995), the former offers theoretical and practical advantages. For instance, 
Fama (1976) suggested that natural logarithm returns accommodate better the normal 
distribution assumption underlying regression analysis and parametric statistical tests. 
Further, in addition to reducing the skewness of daily share returns (characterising most 
daily security returns used for this thesis, as can be seen in the subsequent descriptive 
statistics section), the use of continuously compounded returns enhances the ability to 
detect negative effects (Thompson 1988; Shevlin 1981).The latter point is particularly 
relevant to this thesis given the fact that the announcements of the respective proposed 
resource taxes are expected to be value destructive for equity investors in non-
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renewable resource companies. As a result, continuous return is used in this thesis, 
calculated as follows:112 
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Where 
itR  = continuously compounded return on security i for time period t 
itp  = market value per share of security i on for time period t 
1−it
p  = market value per share of security i on for time period t-1 
itd  = dividends per share of security i from time period t-1 to t. 
While continuous compounded return is used in the various return-generating process 
models and the computation of abnormal performances, simple return is also computed 
to compare and contrast the distributional properties under both types of return 
calculations. Simple return is defined as follows: 
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Another issue that needs to be addressed is the weighting scheme used to proxy the 
market index when computing expected returns and when aggregating abnormal returns 
across firms. For instance, Brown and Warner (1980) indicated that the choice between 
a value weighted and an equally weighted index may influence the performance of the 
market model. While both indices share similar constituents, a value weighted index 
gives more weight to large companies, whereas the equally version tends to introduce a 
bias towards smaller firms.  
Similarly, using an equally or value weighted approach when aggregating abnormal 
returns across firms may affect outcomes. Although a value weighted index appears to 
                                                 
112 Share returns are fully adjusted for dividends and capital changes. 
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be theoretically superior and more appropriate (Henderson 1990; Ohlson & Rosenberg 
1982; Roll 1981), an equally weighted index is more likely to detect excess return 
(Armitage 1995; Brown & Warner 1980; Peterson 1989). Because an equally weighted 
scheme performs better than the value weighed version, particularly with Australian 
security returns data (Corrado & Truong, 2008), the former is used in the analysis of the 
effect of proposed tax reforms. Nevertheless, the latter is also constructed, to test 
whether the results are sensitive to the weighting choice and can be found in the 
appendices. 
6.8 Data 
6.8.1 Data description 
The dataset consists of all mining, oil and gas producers and industrial metals and 
mining companies listed on the ASX. This thesis investigates those sectors as they are 
most likely to be affected by the proposed resource tax. The industry classification 
benchmark (ICB) was used to identify the firms’ subsectors. The ICB is a company 
classification system that uses a system of 10 industries, partitioned into 20 super 
sectors, further divided into 41 sectors, which then contain 114 subsectors. A 
description of the different subsectors is provided in Panel B of Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. 
This leads to an initial sample of 1,151 firms for the study period of the RSPT 
announcement analysis, 1,108 companies for the MRRT announcement and 1,108 
companies for the ‘combined RSPT & MRRT’ (Panel A of Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4) 
Daily share price data are obtained from Thomson Reuters DataStream over the sample 
periods 3 April 2009 to 30 July 2010, 13 August 2012 to 7 October 2013, and 6 August 
2013 to 30 September 2014. The first sample period is used for the investigation of the 
equity market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT. While 
not the main focus of this thesis, the latter two sample periods are used for the analysis 
of the equity market reaction to the 2013 federal election results (won by the Liberal 
Party) and to the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of 
Parliament.113 
                                                 
113 The motivation behind the latter empirical analysis is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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For the estimation of abnormal returns,114 S&P/ASX 200 index data, obtained from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream, are used to proxy the returns on the market portfolio. For 
each security, a maximum of 293 daily return observations is used for the period around 
the announcement of the RSPT and MRRT, starting at day -272 and ending at day +20 
relative to each announcement. The first 252 days in this period (-272 through -21) is 
designated the ‘estimation period’, and the following 41 days (-20 through +20) is 
designated the ‘event window’. Day 0 is the first trading day after the announcement of 
the introduction of the respective resource taxes. For a security to be included in the 
sample, it must be traded on more than 52 days of the 252-day window used in the 
estimation period, equivalent to saying that a firm must be traded on average at least 
once a week. Further, firms with missing returns data in the 293 trading days around the 
event date of interest are excluded from the analysis (this filters out the most thinly 
traded securities). Similar procedures were used by Brown and Warner (1985), Bird, 
Grosse and Yeung (2013), Campbell, Cowan and Salotti (2010) and Dyckman, 
Philbrick and Stephan (1984). Analysis was carried out for each proposed resource tax 
announcement, as well as the 2013 federal election results and the passage of the 
Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament. The investigation period spans 
the 41-day period from 20 trading days before the announcement (i.e., Day 0) through 
20 trading days following each announcement. Although abnormal returns are 
calculated for each day in the event window (i.e., -20 through +20), a particular focus is 
made on Day 0, which represents the first trading day after the announcement of each 
event under investigation. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns are also computed over several event periods 
surrounding each proposed resource tax announcement. It serves to capture the speed of 
adjustment to the information content of the respective proposed tax announcements as 
well as to investigate whether any design features of the RSPT and MRRT were 
partially anticipated. It is, however, important to point out that since only 42 trading 
days separate the proposed MRRT announcement from the RSPT announcement, the 
estimation period used in the computation of the abnormal returns associated with the 
former overlaps the event window used in the latter.  
                                                 
114 The mean adjusted return, market adjusted return and market model are used to determine abnormal 
returns. 
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While there is very little overlap115 and its effect is likely to be negligible, overlapping 
of the event window and estimation periods across events may bias estimates of the 
mean excess performances. Hence, to ensure that the results are robust to the 
overlapping of the event window and estimation periods across the two events, a third 
analysis ‘combined RSPT and MRRT’ is conducted, which utilises the OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period spanning -272 days through -21 days relative to the 
RSPT announcement. The event window then becomes the 84 trading day period 
starting 20 trading days before the announcement of the RSPT and extending 20 trading 
days beyond the announcement of the MRRT. This reduces issues associated with 
attrition, as some companies drop out of the sample in the period between which both 
resource taxes are announced.116  
Further, by following the reaction of the same groups of companies across the two 
profit-based tax announcements not only allows a more accurate but more robust 
inference as to the total effect of the introduction of a resource profit tax in place of the 
existing royalty-based taxes and the net effect of both individual RSPT and MRRT as 
well as the effect of the RSPT repeal/replacement by the MRRT. 
 
                                                 
115 Less than 8% of the estimation period used for the MRRT overlaps with the event window utilised in 
the RSPT. 
116 For instance, because of mergers and acquisitions, deaths, suspensions and delistings. 
 Table 6.2: Description of Sample Firms (RSPT) 
Table 6.2 provides a subsector breakdown and description of the sample firms used in the analysis of the market reaction to the announcement of the RSPT. 
Panel A: Sample breakdown   
  No. of Firms 
Initial number of firms  1151 
Less: Firms that died, suspended or 
delisted within the sample period 
 14 
Less: Firms with no data in 
estimation period 
 7 
Less: firms with missing data in 
estimation period 
 9 
Less: firms < 52 trading days in 
estimation period 
 407 
Final sample size  714 
Panel B: Subsector classification of firms 
included in the analysis 
 
Subsector 
# of 
firms 
Description of subsector 
Exploration & Production 117 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas products. 
General Mining 330 Companies engaged in the exploration, extraction or refining of minerals not defined elsewhere within the Mining sector. 
Coal 35 Companies engaged in the exploration for or mining of coal. 
Panel B: Subsector classification of firms 
included in the analysis 
 
 Subsector 
# of 
firms 
Description of subsector 
Nonferrous Metals 75 
Producers and traders of metals and primary metal products other than iron, aluminum and steel. Excludes companies that 
make finished products, which are categorised according to the type of end product. 
Gold Mining 106 Prospectors for and extractors or refiners of gold-bearing ores. 
Iron & Steel 33 
Manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products such as pipes, wires, sheets and bars, encompassing all 
processes from smelting in blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. Includes companies that primarily mine iron ores. 
Aluminum 
 
3 
Companies that mine or process bauxite or manufacture and distribute aluminum bars, rods and other products for use by 
other industries. Excludes manufacturers of finished aluminum products, such as siding, which are categorised according to 
the type of end product. 
 
Platinum & Precious Metals 
 
7 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of platinum, silver and other precious metals not defined 
elsewhere. 
 
Diamonds & Gemstones 
 
8 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of diamonds and other gemstones. 
 
 
  
 Table 6.3: Description of Sample Firms (MRRT) 
Table 6.3 provides a subsector breakdown and description of the sample firms used in the analysis of the market reaction to the announcement of the MRRT. 
Panel A: Sample breakdown   
  No. of Firms 
Initial number of firms  1108 
Less: Firms that died, suspended or delisted within the sample period  17 
Less: firms < 52 trading days in estimation period  377 
Final sample size  714 
Panel B: Subsector classification of firms included in the analysis 
 
Subsector # of firms Description of subsector 
Exploration & Production 115 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, refining 
and supply of oil and gas products. 
General Mining 330 
Companies engaged in the exploration, extraction or refining of minerals not 
defined elsewhere within the Mining sector. 
Coal 36 Companies engaged in the exploration for or mining of coal. 
Nonferrous Metals 75 
Producers and traders of metals and primary metal products other than iron, 
aluminum and steel. Excludes companies that make finished products, 
which are categorised according to the type of end product. 
Gold Mining 105 Prospectors for and extractors or refiners of gold-bearing ores. 
Iron & Steel 34 
Manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products such as 
pipes, wires, sheets and bars, encompassing all processes from smelting in 
blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. Includes companies that 
primarily mine iron ores. 
 Aluminum 
 
3 
Companies that mine or process bauxite or manufacture and distribute 
aluminum bars, rods and other products for use by other industries. 
Excludes manufacturers of finished aluminum products, such as siding, 
which are categorised according to the type of end product. 
 
Platinum & Precious Metals 
 
7 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of platinum, silver 
and other precious metals not defined elsewhere. 
 
Diamonds & Gemstones 
 
9 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of diamonds and 
other gemstones. 
 
 
  
 Table 6.4: Description of Sample Firms (Combined RSPT & MRRT) 
Table 6.4 provides a subsector breakdown and description of the sample firms used in the third analyses, ‘combined RSPT & MRRT’. 
Panel A: Sample breakdown   
  No. of Firms 
Initial number of firms  1108 
Less: Firms that died, suspended or delisted within the sample period  25 
Less: firms < 52 trading days in estimation period  377 
Final sample size  706 
Panel B: Subsector classification of firms included in the analysis 
 
Subsector # of firms Description of subsector 
Exploration & Production 114 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and drilling, production, refining 
and supply of oil and gas products. 
General Mining 327 
Companies engaged in the exploration, extraction or refining of minerals not 
defined elsewhere within the Mining sector. 
Coal 34 Companies engaged in the exploration for or mining of coal. 
Nonferrous Metals 75 
Producers and traders of metals and primary metal products other than iron, 
aluminum and steel. Excludes companies that make finished products, 
which are categorised according to the type of end product. 
Gold Mining 105 Prospectors for and extractors or refiners of gold-bearing ores. 
Iron & Steel 33 
Manufacturers and stockholders of primary iron and steel products such as 
pipes, wires, sheets and bars, encompassing all processes from smelting in 
blast furnaces to rolling mills and foundries. Includes companies that 
primarily mine iron ores. 
 Aluminum 
 
3 
Companies that mine or process bauxite or manufacture and distribute 
aluminum bars, rods and other products for use by other industries. 
Excludes manufacturers of finished aluminum products, such as siding, 
which are categorised according to the type of end product. 
 
Platinum & Precious Metals 
 
7 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of platinum, silver 
and other precious metals not defined elsewhere. 
 
Diamonds & Gemstones 
 
8 
Companies engaged in the exploration for and production of diamonds and 
other gemstones. 
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6.8.2 Descriptive statistics 
6.8.2.1 Descriptive statistics of return measures 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 provide the time series distributional properties and the cross-
sectional properties of the daily simple and continuously compounded returns at several 
multi day periods surrounding the announcement date of the RSPT.  
Statistics for Table 6.5 are calculated at the individual stock level for each of the 
different subsectors over diverse sample periods, and a simple mean of the time series 
calculated statistics is then computed across companies. Statistics for Table 6.6 are 
calculated across firms for every day within the full sample period (i.e., -272 through 
+20) in each of the different subsectors and a simple mean of the cross-sectional 
calculated statistics is then computed over diverse time periods. 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 provide the time series distributional properties and the cross-
sectional properties of the daily simple and continuously compounded returns at several 
multi-day periods surrounding the announcement date of the MRRT. The procedure 
described above for Tables 6.5 and 6.6 was repeated. 
 
 Table 6.5: Time Series Properties of RSPT Returns 
Table 6.5 provides the time series distributional properties of daily simple and continuously compounded returns over several multi-day periods surrounding the 
announcement date of the RSPT. Logarithmic and arithmetic returns are computed using Equations (44) and (45) respectively. Statistics are calculated at the individual stock 
level for each of the different subsectors over diverse sample periods. A simple mean of the time series calculated statistics is then computed across companies. This process is 
followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in Table 6.5 is the average value of the 
various descriptive statistics. For instance, in Panel B at the intersection of the first column and second row, an average is calculated over the 252-day estimation period for 
each security that constitutes the exploration and production subsector. The grand mean across those securities is then computed. This procedure is repeated for the 
computation of the statistics reported in Table 6.5. Hence, the intersection of the first column and second row in Panel B indicates that the grand mean of the daily simple 
returns from 117 companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas products over the estimation period (i.e., [-272; -21]) is 
0.33%. 
Panel A: All subsector                         
 Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.40 6.94 1.72 16.01 47.71 -22.80  0.15 6.58 0.67 10.98 36.17 -28.23 
[-272; -21] 0.48 7.01 1.70 15.04 46.35 -22.16  0.22 6.62 0.70 10.47 35.25 -27.37 
[-20; +20] -0.10 6.06 0.47 3.22 18.53 -13.59  -0.33 5.94 0.14 2.86 16.33 -15.00 
              
Panel B: Exploration and production                   
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.27 6.40 1.52 14.08 43.02 -21.50  0.06 6.07 0.57 9.77 32.98 -25.93 
[-272; -20] 0.33 6.41 1.46 12.20 40.86 -20.41  0.11 6.07 0.60 8.57 31.49 -24.45 
[-20; +20] -0.08 5.80 0.55 3.14 18.15 -12.87  -0.28 5.69 0.23 2.67 16.03 -14.19 
              
             
Panel C: General mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.44 7.22 1.79 16.82 49.75 -24.06  0.17 6.86 0.67 11.91 37.63 -30.43 
[-272; -20] 0.54 7.34 1.80 16.28 49.03 -23.59  0.26 6.95 0.71 11.64 37.13 -29.82 
[-20; +20] -0.16 6.02 0.35 2.85 17.70 -14.02  -0.38 5.94 0.03 2.61 15.74 -15.43 
              
Panel D: Coal                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.44 6.55 1.88 20.67 49.98 -21.61  0.21 5.96 0.79 13.78 35.34 -26.30 
[-272; -20] 0.52 6.58 1.75 19.54 48.31 -20.48  0.28 5.96 0.73 13.70 34.12 -24.68 
[-20; +20] -0.02 5.75 0.81 4.33 18.90 -12.53  -0.21 5.65 0.44 3.81 16.78 -13.98 
              
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.40 7.13 1.91 16.73 50.73 -22.67  0.14 6.65 0.87 9.51 38.20 -26.43 
[-272; -20] 0.50 7.19 1.92 15.98 49.49 -21.75  0.24 6.68 0.92 9.34 37.47 -25.20 
[-20; +20] -0.24 6.34 0.50 4.16 20.52 -14.48  -0.46 6.21 0.12 3.70 17.89 -16.06 
              
 Panel F:  Gold mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.38 6.78 1.75 16.69 46.43 -21.28  0.12 6.49 0.71 11.62 35.53 -26.83 
[-272; -20] 0.42 6.78 1.63 14.88 43.78 -20.90  0.17 6.50 0.66 10.55 33.72 -26.32 
[-20; +20] 0.13 6.29 0.63 3.75 20.05 -12.99  -0.13 6.06 0.31 3.26 17.33 -14.30 
              
Panel G:  Iron and steel                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.49 6.32 1.58 10.87 41.41 -18.72  0.26 5.96 0.81 6.32 32.74 -21.42 
[-272; -20] 0.60 6.38 1.59 10.80 40.59 -18.72  0.36 6.00 0.82 6.46 32.14 -21.42 
[-20; +20] -0.16 5.60 0.60 2.29 17.26 -11.69  -0.33 5.49 0.33 1.82 15.44 -12.58 
 
  
 Table 6.6: Cross-Sectional Properties of RSPT Returns 
Table 6.6 provides the cross-sectional properties of the daily simple and continuously compounded returns at several multi-day periods surrounding the announcement date of 
the RSPT. Logarithmic and arithmetic returns are computed using Equations (44) and (45) respectively. Statistics are calculated across firms for every day within the full 
sample period (i.e., -272; +20) in each of the different subsectors. A simple mean of the cross-sectional calculated statistics is then computed over diverse time periods. This 
process is followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in this table is the average 
value of the various descriptive statistics. For instance, in Panel B the number at the intersection of the second column and second row is obtained by initially calculating the 
standard deviation across the securities that constitute the exploration and production subsector for each individual day of the 252-day estimation period. The simple mean of 
those calculated standard deviations is then computed across the estimation period. This procedure is repeated for the computation of the statistics reported in this table. 
Hence, the intersection of the second column and second row in Panel B indicates that the estimation period cross-sectional standard deviation of the daily simple returns from 
117 companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas products is 6.44. 
Panel A: All subsector                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.40 7.25 2.90 41.54 75.41 -34.26  0.15 6.82 0.67 26.82 52.57 -46.31 
[-272; -20] 0.48 7.34 2.97 42.77 76.94 -33.96  0.22 6.88 0.71 27.89 53.21 -46.36 
[-20; +20] -0.10 6.69 2.42 33.99 65.99 -36.08  -0.33 6.42 0.45 20.22 48.63 -46.05 
0 -1.83 5.46 -0.54 11.63 25.31 -50.00  -2.00 5.81 -2.16 27.04 22.56 -69.31 
[-1; +1] -1.39 6.08 2.36 37.97 59.83 -35.00  -1.59 5.95 0.29 21.95 44.68 -44.57 
[-2; +2] -1.59 5.84 1.27 26.78 46.72 -36.45  -1.79 5.88 -0.45 21.00 36.39 -47.14 
[-5; +5] -0.88 6.61 2.07 34.78 59.40 -39.79  -1.11 6.47 -0.09 24.46 44.46 -52.55 
[-5; -1] -0.30 6.69 2.65 37.61 59.95 -41.42  -0.51 6.34 0.40 28.65 44.78 -54.94 
[+1; +5] -1.27 6.76 2.00 36.58 65.68 -36.12  -1.52 6.73 -0.18 19.76 48.51 -46.80 
              
Panel B: Exploration and production                     
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.27 6.40 1.27 10.52 32.91 -19.75  0.06 6.11 0.55 8.94 26.92 -22.84 
[-272; -20] 0.33 6.44 1.28 10.23 33.16 -19.53  0.11 6.13 0.57 8.63 26.98 -22.59 
[-20; +20] -0.08 6.14 1.18 12.30 31.34 -21.11  -0.28 5.99 0.39 10.79 26.51 -24.39 
0 -0.24 5.40 1.42 5.50 24.89 -12.18  -0.38 5.26 1.03 4.02 22.23 -12.99 
[-1; +1] -0.75 5.81 1.67 7.12 28.41 -14.58  -0.93 5.65 1.21 5.20 24.97 -15.86 
 [-2; +2] -1.48 6.07 0.50 9.95 25.15 -23.01  -1.70 6.32 -0.18 11.42 22.27 -28.37 
[-5; +5] -0.70 6.51 1.56 15.79 33.77 -19.78  -0.93 6.28 0.83 12.82 27.47 -23.26 
[-5; -1] -0.24 7.20 2.41 29.88 46.14 -22.06  -0.50 6.72 1.28 24.34 35.25 -27.31 
[+1; +5] -1.25 6.04 0.75 3.76 23.17 -19.02  -1.48 6.05 0.34 3.06 20.75 -21.27 
              
Panel C: General mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.44 7.36 2.12 23.42 56.78 -28.45  0.17 6.97 0.66 16.84 42.09 -36.64 
[-272; -20] 0.54 7.50 2.20 24.01 58.45 -28.45  0.26 7.08 0.70 17.40 42.96 -37.01 
[-20; +20] -0.16 6.48 1.63 19.78 46.53 -28.45  -0.38 6.29 0.37 13.39 36.76 -34.41 
0 -1.81 5.21 0.37 4.49 25.31 -22.50  -1.97 5.30 -0.11 3.90 22.56 -25.49 
[-1; +1] -1.36 6.41 2.88 37.77 56.12 -25.04  -1.57 6.05 1.12 17.92 42.06 -28.92 
[-2; +2] -1.70 5.96 1.74 23.95 41.49 -23.55  -1.90 5.82 0.53 11.97 32.32 -27.00 
[-5; +5] -0.96 6.43 1.59 22.38 44.58 -28.30  -1.18 6.32 0.19 14.56 34.99 -34.80 
[-5; -1] -0.39 5.77 1.13 8.99 34.24 -22.12  -0.56 5.68 0.40 6.96 29.24 -25.28 
[+1; +5] -1.35 7.33 2.30 39.36 58.78 -35.65  -1.64 7.16 0.03 24.29 43.23 -46.17 
              
Panel D: Coal                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.44 6.28 0.85 7.25 22.66 -13.77  0.21 5.95 0.45 6.86 19.04 -15.44 
[-272; -20] 0.52 6.36 0.88 7.41 23.28 -13.76  0.28 5.99 0.49 7.00 19.41 -15.43 
[-20; +20] -0.02 5.80 0.62 6.22 18.91 -13.85  -0.21 5.70 0.25 5.98 16.75 -15.46 
0 -3.15 4.21 0.90 3.60 11.84 -11.11  -3.29 4.28 0.63 2.72 11.19 -11.78 
[-1; +1] -1.53 5.63 1.45 7.43 20.93 -9.30  -1.73 5.26 1.20 6.14 17.82 -9.79 
[-2; +2] -1.78 5.44 -0.07 8.50 15.17 -15.32  -1.97 5.43 -0.38 8.64 13.22 -17.10 
[-5; +5] -0.94 5.97 0.09 7.09 17.55 -16.45  -1.17 6.09 -0.32 7.43 15.45 -19.21 
[-5; -1] -0.39 6.68 -0.41 10.47 19.63 -21.20  -0.67 7.04 -0.95 11.93 17.15 -25.98 
[+1; +5] -1.04 5.60 0.43 4.41 16.61 -12.77  -1.25 5.51 0.12 3.87 14.61 -13.93 
              
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                       
Days relative to AD Mean across firm of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.40 6.92 1.13 8.59 30.83 -18.25  0.14 6.56 0.53 7.15 25.46 -20.54 
[-272; -20] 0.50 7.01 1.19 8.78 31.63 -18.29  0.24 6.62 0.57 7.26 26.02 -20.58 
[-20; +20] -0.24 6.38 0.79 7.42 25.94 -18.02  -0.46 6.21 0.26 6.48 22.05 -20.30 
0 -2.36 4.81 -0.75 1.52 8.55 -16.68  -2.51 5.03 -0.96 1.87 8.21 -18.25 
[-1; +1] -1.51 5.83 0.49 3.89 18.71 -15.88  -1.71 5.79 0.18 3.34 16.77 -17.38 
[-2; +2] -1.44 5.54 0.55 4.33 18.68 -16.06  -1.62 5.53 0.18 3.61 16.84 -17.56 
[-5; +5] -1.20 5.42 0.17 3.32 15.89 -16.19  -1.37 5.48 -0.14 3.09 14.53 -17.86 
[-5; -1] -0.55 5.32 0.36 4.50 16.73 -14.94  -0.71 5.30 0.04 4.28 15.17 -16.41 
[+1; +5] -1.61 5.64 0.16 2.50 16.52 -17.35  -1.81 5.75 -0.15 2.15 15.15 -19.24 
              
Panel F:  Gold mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.38 6.90 1.34 13.56 36.06 -21.18  0.12 6.60 0.50 11.66 29.05 -25.31 
[-272; -20] 0.42 6.88 1.35 13.22 35.80 -21.05  0.17 6.60 0.52 11.35 28.95 -25.18 
[-20; +20] 0.13 7.00 1.29 15.63 37.70 -22.00  -0.13 6.61 0.36 13.56 29.67 -26.08 
0 -2.48 7.04 -2.68 21.13 22.22 -50.00  -2.82 8.46 -4.70 37.45 20.07 -69.31 
[-1; +1] -1.81 5.65 -1.23 8.78 15.39 -28.63  -2.04 6.28 -2.10 14.63 14.23 -36.57 
[-2; +2] -1.43 5.37 -0.29 7.19 17.06 -22.39  -1.62 5.72 -0.96 10.21 15.58 -27.56 
[-5; +5] -0.64 6.37 0.91 12.77 29.96 -20.07  -0.86 6.23 0.16 10.94 24.53 -23.50 
[-5; -1] 0.06 6.45 2.18 18.20 38.73 -15.90  -0.14 5.85 1.35 11.75 30.08 -17.51 
[+1; +5] -0.98 6.15 0.36 5.67 22.74 -18.24  -1.19 6.16 -0.06 4.83 19.88 -20.32 
              
Panel G:  Iron and steel                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.49 6.21 0.81 6.45 21.42 -13.21  0.26 5.93 0.45 6.10 18.37 -14.67 
[-272; -20] 0.60 6.31 0.82 6.73 22.08 -13.38  0.36 6.01 0.45 6.40 18.82 -14.92 
[-20; +20] -0.16 5.55 0.79 4.76 17.34 -12.21  -0.33 5.42 0.48 4.23 15.59 -13.14 
0 -3.84 4.67 -1.32 1.20 2.17 -16.67  -4.04 5.01 -1.42 1.50 2.14 -18.23 
[-1; +1] -2.79 4.44 -0.40 1.08 7.05 -13.09  -2.94 4.62 -0.54 1.08 6.76 -14.08 
 [-2; +2] -1.95 4.77 0.20 2.19 10.94 -12.73  -2.09 4.85 -0.01 1.87 10.20 -13.65 
[-5; +5] -1.10 5.31 0.20 2.71 13.61 -13.92  -1.28 5.35 -0.08 2.57 12.58 -15.07 
[-5; -1] -1.20 4.76 -0.10 2.88 11.54 -14.57  -1.33 4.87 -0.40 3.16 10.90 -15.89 
[+1; +5] -0.46 5.99 0.80 2.84 17.97 -12.73  -0.68 5.89 0.51 2.19 16.34 -13.62 
 
  
 Table 6.7: Time Series Properties of MRRT Returns 
Table 6.7 provides the time series distributional properties of daily simple and continuously compounded returns over several multi-day periods surrounding the 
announcement date of the MRRT. Logarithmic and arithmetic returns are computed using Equations (44) and (45) respectively. Statistics are calculated at the individual stock 
level in each of the different subsectors over diverse sample periods. A simple mean of the time series calculated statistics is then computed across companies. This process is 
followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in this table is the average value of the 
various descriptive statistics. For instance, in Panel B at the intersection of the first column and second row, an average is calculated over the 252-day estimation period for 
each security that constitutes the exploration and production subsector. The grand mean across those securities is then computed. This procedure is repeated for the 
computation of the statistics reported in this table. Hence, the intersection of the first column and second row in Panel B indicates that the grand mean of the daily simple 
returns from 117 companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas products over the estimation period (i.e., [-272; -21]) is 
0.16%. 
Panel A: All subsector                          
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.28 6.57 1.54 15.21  43.54 -21.72  0.04 6.29 0.56 10.87 33.57 -26.90 
[-272; -20] 0.29 6.63 1.47 13.67  41.85 -21.11  0.04 6.35 0.57 9.82 32.43 -26.06 
[-20; +20] 0.21 5.64 0.59 4.07  18.00 -12.55  0.01 5.50 0.26 3.68 15.85 -13.86 
               
Panel B: Exploration and production                    
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.16 5.93 1.32 12.74  38.10 -20.05  -0.03 5.68 0.49 9.27 29.90 -23.79 
[-272; -20] 0.16 6.00 1.23 11.13  36.75 -19.68  -0.04 5.74 0.45 8.28 28.85 -23.30 
[-20; +20] 0.16 5.15 0.54 3.41  15.87 -11.41  0.01 5.08 0.26 3.12 14.38 -12.40 
               
              
Panel C: General mining                        
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.31 6.87 1.67 16.56  46.18 -22.63  0.05 6.56 0.63 11.60 35.28 -28.29 
[-272; -20] 0.33 6.95 1.61 14.84  44.38 -22.01  0.06 6.63 0.65 10.39 34.08 -27.40 
[-20; +20] 0.21 5.79 0.60 4.42  18.78 -13.11  0.00 5.65 0.24 3.99 16.49 -14.55 
               
Panel D: Coal                          
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.28 5.77 1.28 18.67  39.07 -21.60  0.07 5.83 0.27 17.06 30.79 -31.01 
 [-272; -20] 0.28 5.83 1.06 16.63  36.39 -21.18  0.06 5.94 0.17 15.20 28.91 -30.52 
[-20; +20] 0.27 4.83 0.52 4.79  16.18 -10.40  0.12 4.65 0.25 4.31 14.15 -11.24 
               
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                        
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.23 6.69 1.49 15.35  45.66 -21.97  -0.01 6.31 0.55 9.31 34.52 -25.62 
[-272; -20] 0.22 6.65 1.38 13.15  42.43 -20.83  -0.01 6.27 0.55 8.26 32.47 -24.03 
[-20; +20] 0.28 6.24 0.65 3.68  19.96 -13.80  0.04 6.07 0.29 3.25 17.23 -15.41 
                
Panel F:  Gold mining                        
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.30 6.59 1.58 14.55  43.47 -20.56  0.04 6.34 0.61 10.76 33.71 -25.98 
[-272; -20] 0.31 6.60 1.55 13.69  42.44 -20.03  0.06 6.37 0.63 10.02 33.12 -25.21 
[-20; +20] 0.20 5.90 0.63 3.94  18.46 -12.51  -0.07 5.71 0.30 3.50 16.06 -13.91 
               
Panel G:  Iron and steel                        
Days relative to AD 
 Mean across time of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis  max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] 0.35 5.96 1.62 13.10  39.61 -19.23  0.15 5.67 0.73 8.17 31.41 -22.59 
[-272; -20] 0.41 6.17 1.63 12.57  39.61 -19.00  0.19 5.85 0.76 7.92 31.41 -22.32 
[-20; +20] 0.02 4.28 0.37 3.52  12.47 -10.82  -0.08 4.26 0.12 3.43 11.53 -11.70 
  
 Table 6.8: Cross-Sectional Properties of MRRT Returns 
Table 6.8 provides the cross-sectional properties of the daily simple and continuously compounded returns at several sample periods relative to the announcement date of the 
MRRT. Logarithmic and arithmetic returns are computed using Equations (44) and (45) respectively. Statistics are calculated across firms for every day within the full sample 
period (i.e., -272; +20) in each of the different subsectors. A simple mean of the cross-sectional calculated statistics is then computed over diverse time periods. This process 
is followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in this table is the average value of 
the various descriptive statistics. For instance, in Panel B the number at the intersection of the second column and second row is obtained by initially calculating the standard 
deviation across the securities that constitute the exploration and production subsector for each individual day of the 252-day estimation period. The simple mean of those 
calculated standard deviations is then computed across the estimation period. This procedure is repeated for the computation of the statistics reported in this table. Hence, the 
intersection of the second column and second row in Panel B indicates that the estimation period cross-sectional standard deviation of the daily simple returns from 117 
companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas products is 6.08. 
Panel A: All subsector                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.28 7.04 2.95 44.30 75.67 -36.20  0.04 6.67 0.46 29.89 53.22 -49.76 
[-272 ; -20] 0.29 7.12 2.99 45.36 77.01 -36.26  0.04 6.75 0.46 31.07 53.80 -50.37 
[-20 ; +20] 0.21 6.52 2.66 37.79 67.43 -35.81  0.01 6.22 0.45 22.64 49.66 -46.00 
0 0.71 6.03 1.88 11.37 50.00 -24.77  0.54 5.76 1.10 7.96 40.55 -28.46 
[-1 ; +1] 0.91 6.53 1.12 12.51 49.52 -38.46  0.69 6.41 -0.21 14.70 39.77 -49.96 
[-2 ; +2] 0.16 6.99 2.29 32.36 69.74 -42.74  -0.08 6.79 -0.24 24.97 51.60 -57.70 
[-5 ; +5] 0.00 6.96 2.44 35.77 69.75 -44.06  -0.24 6.73 -0.24 27.00 51.43 -59.95 
[-5 ; -1] -0.75 7.50 3.06 43.65 80.35 -48.23  -1.03 7.17 -0.03 29.41 57.82 -66.12 
[+1 ; +5] 0.60 6.60 1.93 32.76 63.10 -43.75  0.39 6.49 -0.72 28.39 47.23 -60.07 
              
Panel B: Exploration and production                     
Days relative to AD Mean across firm of: 
 Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.16 5.99 1.08 9.65 29.62 -18.96  -0.03 5.78 0.42 8.39 24.73 -21.67 
[-272 ; -20] 0.16 6.08 1.13 9.82 30.33 -19.00  -0.04 5.84 0.46 8.47 25.14 -21.77 
[-20 ; +20] 0.16 5.48 0.78 8.60 25.29 -18.72  0.01 5.41 0.16 7.85 22.20 -21.03 
0 1.00 5.91 0.76 3.50 25.88 -16.66  0.83 5.77 0.35 2.99 23.02 -18.22 
[-1 ; +1] 1.03 6.79 1.31 15.93 37.26 -20.06  0.81 6.49 0.40 13.92 30.56 -23.42 
[-2 ; +2] 0.23 6.15 1.00 10.62 29.57 -18.29  0.04 5.98 0.33 9.27 24.97 -20.89 
[-5 ; +5] -0.01 5.62 0.45 8.08 24.37 -19.90  -0.17 5.57 -0.15 7.86 21.24 -22.60 
[-5 ; -1] -0.82 5.76 0.82 9.81 26.42 -18.76  -0.99 5.63 0.21 8.10 22.33 -21.09 
[+1 ; +5] 0.60 5.42 0.03 7.26 22.03 -21.69  0.44 5.47 -0.61 8.60 19.79 -24.98 
              
Panel C: General mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.31 7.24 2.28 29.08 59.14 -30.14  0.05 6.87 0.53 21.10 43.64 -39.23 
[-272 ; -20] 0.33 7.36 2.32 29.68 60.45 -30.25  0.06 6.97 0.56 21.60 44.29 -39.66 
[-20 ; +20] 0.21 6.46 1.99 25.40 51.12 -29.51  0.00 6.21 0.33 18.02 39.61 -36.54 
0 0.84 6.73 1.94 11.94 50.00 -24.77  0.63 6.40 1.05 8.24 40.55 -28.46 
[-1 ; +1] 1.16 6.37 1.27 9.92 38.20 -27.13  0.96 6.14 0.35 11.50 32.17 -32.67 
[-2 ; +2] 0.19 7.09 2.53 32.24 61.21 -35.94  -0.06 6.84 -0.06 23.96 46.15 -47.32 
[-5 ; +5] 0.04 6.96 1.91 29.59 58.72 -36.37  -0.20 6.80 -0.44 25.30 44.72 -47.91 
[-5 ; -1] -0.76 7.10 1.43 31.39 58.72 -38.09  -1.03 7.03 -0.82 27.31 44.43 -49.99 
 [+1 ; +5] 0.68 6.86 2.38 31.32 60.47 -36.97  0.46 6.64 -0.36 26.69 45.84 -49.72 
              
Panel D: Coal                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.28 5.70 0.75 7.12 19.85 -13.34  0.07 5.63 0.38 6.78 17.30 -15.48 
[-272 ; -20] 0.28 5.79 0.72 7.16 20.14 -13.72  0.06 5.74 0.34 6.89 17.52 -16.07 
[-20 ; +20] 0.27 5.14 0.95 6.86 18.12 -11.03  0.12 4.93 0.65 6.14 15.97 -11.87 
0 0.23 3.77 0.19 1.35 10.00 -9.86  0.16 3.76 0.01 1.46 9.53 -10.38 
[-1 ; +1] 1.16 7.05 1.53 5.79 28.26 -10.87  0.91 6.54 1.15 4.31 24.30 -11.53 
[-2 ; +2] 0.49 6.31 0.92 4.33 21.30 -12.20  0.28 6.06 0.62 3.48 18.68 -13.15 
[-5 ; +5] 0.19 6.52 0.82 6.07 23.47 -13.64  -0.05 6.12 0.45 5.05 19.69 -14.88 
[-5 ; -1] -0.55 8.12 0.53 6.04 28.68 -16.41  -0.93 7.42 0.15 4.70 22.52 -18.17 
[+1 ; +5] 0.93 5.47 1.23 7.05 20.97 -11.63  0.78 5.29 0.84 6.11 18.89 -12.50 
              
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.23 6.65 1.00 8.34 29.27 -18.19  -0.01 6.35 0.40 7.07 24.33 -20.47 
[-272 ; -20] 0.22 6.63 1.01 8.16 29.10 -17.97  -0.01 6.32 0.42 6.83 24.18 -20.15 
[-20 ; +20] 0.28 6.82 0.93 9.48 30.30 -19.56  0.04 6.59 0.27 8.52 25.26 -22.45 
0 1.21 4.78 1.73 5.03 22.59 -8.57  1.10 4.56 1.48 3.99 20.37 -8.96 
 [-1 ; +1] 0.57 6.40 -0.44 6.48 21.14 -22.30  0.33 6.71 -1.01 7.78 19.15 -26.09 
[-2 ; +2] 0.28 7.24 0.71 7.86 29.78 -19.62  0.00 7.20 0.10 7.40 25.67 -22.49 
[-5 ; +5] 0.05 6.68 1.56 11.61 32.79 -16.27  -0.19 6.32 0.96 9.47 27.06 -18.15 
[-5 ; -1] -0.81 7.59 1.68 14.90 39.56 -17.64  -1.11 6.94 0.96 11.51 30.84 -19.59 
[+1 ; +5] 0.67 6.16 1.41 9.64 28.06 -16.44  0.47 6.06 0.85 8.52 24.63 -18.56 
              
Panel F:  Gold mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] 0.30 6.86 1.29 14.55 36.02 -21.44  0.04 6.59 0.41 12.88 28.98 -25.87 
[-272 ; -20] 0.31 6.78 1.24 13.40 35.03 -21.02  0.06 6.53 0.41 11.75 28.37 -25.28 
[-20 ; +20] 0.20 7.30 1.55 21.60 42.10 -24.04  -0.07 6.89 0.41 19.78 32.72 -29.45 
0 -0.64 4.52 1.10 8.34 23.30 -14.23  -0.75 4.47 0.54 6.56 20.95 -15.35 
[-1 ; +1] 0.04 6.00 0.48 9.65 26.12 -25.33  -0.17 6.26 -0.67 13.96 23.13 -32.39 
[-2 ; +2] -0.18 7.27 1.31 24.17 40.67 -28.37  -0.46 7.17 -0.25 26.03 32.20 -36.75 
[-5 ; +5] -0.18 8.06 1.56 25.59 46.81 -29.17  -0.51 7.85 0.06 24.56 35.99 -37.38 
[-5 ; -1] -0.63 9.37 2.56 35.94 61.67 -31.85  -1.04 8.92 0.64 32.03 46.05 -41.08 
[+1 ; +5] 0.35 7.46 0.65 18.70 36.65 -29.48  0.05 7.44 -0.62 20.69 28.93 -38.08 
              
Panel G:  Iron and steel                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
Simple return   Continuously compounded return 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
 [-272 ; +20] 0.35 5.86 0.73 6.79 20.23 -13.26  0.15 5.65 0.36 6.47 17.55 -14.76 
[-272 ; -20] 0.41 6.10 0.83 7.02 21.41 -13.45  0.19 5.86 0.45 6.64 18.44 -15.04 
[-20 ; +20] 0.02 4.39 0.14 5.41 12.99 -12.09  -0.08 4.39 -0.18 5.41 12.05 -13.09 
0 0.45 3.77 0.40 3.72 13.04 -8.48  0.39 3.74 0.13 3.27 12.26 -8.86 
[-1 ; +1] -0.03 4.01 -0.54 8.97 11.52 -13.93  -0.11 4.12 -0.94 9.52 10.87 -15.24 
[-2 ; +2] -0.59 3.94 -0.71 6.83 9.86 -13.16  -0.68 4.06 -1.02 7.24 9.36 -14.27 
[-5 ; +5] -0.53 4.35 -0.15 6.06 12.40 -13.62  -0.64 4.43 -0.53 6.20 11.62 -14.82 
[-5 ; -1] -1.26 4.94 -0.66 5.82 12.17 -16.83  -1.40 5.12 -1.09 6.50 11.38 -18.68 
[+1 ; +5] 0.00 3.87 0.25 6.76 12.50 -11.43  -0.08 3.87 -0.10 6.48 11.73 -12.15 
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6.8.2.2 Descriptive statistics of excess return performances 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 provide the time series distributional and cross-sectional properties 
of daily excess returns over several sample periods relative to the announcement dates 
of the proposed RSPT and MRRT. 
Statistics for Table 6.9 are calculated at the individual stock level in each of the 
different subsectors over diverse sample periods around the announcement of the RSPT 
and MRRT. A simple mean of the time series calculated statistics is then computed 
across companies.   
Statistics for Table 6.10 are calculated across firms for every day within the full sample 
period (i.e., -272; +20) in each of the different subsectors. A simple mean of the cross-
sectional calculated statistics is then computed over diverse time periods. This process 
is followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in both tables is the average 
value of the various descriptive statistics. 
Table 6.11 provides the residuals’ grand mean intra-subsector correlation and the grand 
mean percentage of zero returns for each subsector included in the analysis. The mean 
correlation of the residuals for subsector k is computed by averaging the pairwise 
correlations of the estimation period abnormal returns within the group of firms that 
constitute subsector k. 
 Table 6.9: Time Series Properties of RSPT and MRRT Excess Returns 
Table 6.9 provides the time series distributional properties of daily excess returns over several sample periods relative to the announcement date 
of the RSPT and MRRT. Abnormal returns are computed as 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡, where itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance 
and observed returns on firm i for time period t, 
iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the estimation period and are 
computed using the Scholes William method (as defined in Equation (9)). Statistics are calculated at the individual stock level in each of the 
different subsectors over diverse sample periods around the announcement of RSPT and MRRT. A simple mean of the time series calculated 
statistics is then computed across companies. This process is followed for the computation of the measures of standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis, maximum and minimum. Each number reported in this table is the average value of the various descriptive statistics. For instance, in 
Panel B, at the intersection of the first column and second row, an average is calculated over the 252-day estimation period relative to the 
announcement of the RSPT for each security that constitutes the exploration and production subsector. The grand mean across those securities is 
then computed. This procedure is repeated for the computation of the statistics reported in this table. Hence, the intersection of the first column 
and second row in Panel B indicates that the grand mean of the daily excess returns from 117 companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, 
production, refining and supply of oil and gas products over the estimation period (i.e., [-272; -21]) is -0.01%. 
Panel A: All subsector                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.04 6.50 0.69 11.09 35.80 -28.18  -0.02 6.21 0.58 11.05 33.30 -26.72 
[-272; -20] -0.01 6.56 0.71 10.49 34.86 -27.34  -0.01 6.26 0.58 9.95 32.13 -25.84 
 [-20; +20] -0.27 5.79 0.17 2.82 15.94 -14.68  -0.06 5.49 0.25 3.46 15.73 -13.84 
              
Panel B: Exploration and production                   
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.02 5.99 0.58 10.08 32.83 -25.88  0.00 5.60 0.52 9.64 29.81 -23.58 
[-272; -20] -0.01 6.00 0.60 8.78 31.25 -24.46  -0.01 5.65 0.47 8.49 28.74 -22.99 
[-20; +20] -0.11 5.52 0.28 2.81 15.81 -13.58  0.02 5.05 0.32 3.25 14.50 -12.32 
              
Panel C: General mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.05 6.79 0.68 11.96 37.28 -30.45  -0.02 6.49 0.64 11.75 35.01 -28.18 
[-272; -20] 0.00 6.90 0.73 11.63 36.78 -29.84  -0.01 6.55 0.66 10.53 33.82 -27.26 
[-20; +20] -0.39 5.81 0.04 2.53 15.29 -15.23  -0.08 5.64 0.22 3.67 16.27 -14.56 
              
Panel D: Coal                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.03 5.86 0.85 14.31 35.60 -25.94  -0.01 5.73 0.35 17.54 30.63 -30.28 
[-272; -20] -0.01 5.87 0.76 13.87 33.75 -24.41  -0.01 5.83 0.23 15.61 28.81 -29.86 
[-20; +20] -0.15 5.45 0.53 4.18 16.57 -13.58  0.03 4.59 0.34 4.39 14.21 -10.91 
               
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.06 6.54 0.85 9.52 37.43 -26.43  -0.01 6.21 0.53 9.34 34.06 -25.24 
[-272; -20] -0.01 6.59 0.91 9.25 36.67 -25.17  -0.01 6.16 0.52 8.30 31.89 -23.71 
[-20; +20] -0.37 5.98 0.12 3.29 17.08 -15.75  0.01 6.04 0.29 2.94 17.37 -15.27 
              
Panel F:  Gold mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.03 6.44 0.72 11.58 35.06 -26.86  -0.03 6.28 0.62 10.69 33.33 -25.94 
[-272; -20] -0.03 6.46 0.68 10.48 33.44 -26.47  -0.01 6.29 0.65 9.93 32.62 -24.99 
[-20; +20] -0.01 5.96 0.35 3.13 17.19 -13.95  -0.17 5.75 0.26 3.16 15.97 -14.13 
              
Panel G:  Iron and steel                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across time of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272; +20] -0.06 5.80 0.88 6.51 32.01 -21.15  -0.04 5.50 0.79 8.59 30.93 -22.73 
[-272; -20] -0.01 5.86 0.87 6.55 31.36 -21.08  0.00 5.68 0.81 8.32 30.93 -22.56 
[-20; +20] -0.33 5.22 0.44 2.18 15.19 -12.01  -0.30 4.13 0.04 3.27 10.80 -11.44 
 
   
 Table 6.10: Cross-Sectional Properties of RSPT and MRRT Excess Returns 
Table 6.10 provides the cross-sectional properties of the daily excess returns over several sample periods relative to the announcement date of the RSPT and MRRT. 
Abnormal returns are computed as 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡, where itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t, 
iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method (as defined in Equation (9)). Statistics 
are calculated across firms for every day in the full sample period (i.e. -272; +20) in each of the different subsectors. A simple mean of the cross-sectional calculated statistics 
is then computed over diverse time periods. This process is followed for the computation of the measure of standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum and minimum. 
Each number reported in this table is the average value of the various descriptive statistics. For instance, in Panel B the number at the intersection of the second column and 
second row is obtained by initially calculating the excess returns standard deviation across the securities that constitute the exploration and production subsector for each 
individual day of the 252-day estimation period. The simple mean of those calculated standard deviations is then computed across the estimation period. This procedure is 
repeated for the computation of the statistics reported in this table. Hence, the intersection of the second column and second row in Panel B indicates that the estimation period 
cross-sectional standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns from 117 companies engaged in the exploration and drilling, production, refining and supply of oil and gas 
products is 6.15. 
 Panel A: All subsector                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.04 6.83 0.56 24.91 52.18 -46.43  -0.02 6.68 0.46 29.63 53.24 -49.65 
[-272 ; -20] -0.01 6.88 0.58 25.77 52.74 -46.49  -0.01 6.75 0.46 30.77 53.72 -50.22 
[-20 ; +20] -0.27 6.46 0.42 19.68 48.70 -46.08  -0.06 6.27 0.49 22.65 50.30 -46.13 
0 -1.79 5.81 -2.13 26.36 23.75 -68.61  0.51 5.80 1.10 7.92 40.49 -28.67 
[-1 ; +1] -1.46 5.98 0.26 21.10 44.78 -44.03  1.31 6.46 -0.18 13.83 40.35 -48.96 
[-2 ; +2] -1.43 5.93 -0.48 20.21 36.48 -46.67  0.24 6.86 -0.15 24.67 53.03 -57.31 
 [-5 ; +5] -0.79 6.53 -0.14 23.26 44.53 -52.27  -0.07 6.79 -0.15 27.10 53.04 -59.84 
[-5 ; -1] -0.32 6.35 0.40 28.25 44.80 -54.58  0.08 7.20 0.00 29.01 59.29 -64.83 
[+1 ; +5] -1.07 6.84 -0.27 17.64 48.41 -46.68  -0.34 6.58 -0.56 29.03 49.30 -61.08 
              
Panel B: Exploration and production                     
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.02 6.14 0.49 8.52 26.83 -22.95  0.00 5.80 0.40 8.26 24.77 -21.67 
[-272 ; -20] -0.01 6.15 0.51 8.16 26.85 -22.66  -0.01 5.85 0.44 8.35 25.18 -21.77 
[-20 ; +20] -0.11 6.06 0.35 10.73 26.76 -24.70  0.02 5.44 0.14 7.66 22.29 -21.03 
0 -0.04 5.20 0.93 3.81 21.22 -13.07  0.88 5.79 0.35 3.10 23.26 -18.25 
[-1 ; +1] -0.68 5.72 1.11 5.27 24.90 -17.28  1.49 6.54 0.31 13.50 31.22 -23.38 
[-2 ; +2] -1.23 6.37 -0.26 11.25 22.23 -29.03  0.43 6.01 0.28 9.01 25.57 -20.69 
[-5 ; +5] -0.50 6.36 0.76 12.76 27.53 -23.66  0.07 5.65 -0.07 7.95 22.59 -22.24 
[-5 ; -1] -0.19 6.73 1.29 24.47 35.45 -27.30  0.16 5.66 0.15 7.85 23.37 -20.39 
[+1 ; +5] -0.90 6.21 0.19 2.84 20.86 -22.13  -0.18 5.61 -0.38 9.02 21.68 -24.89 
              
Panel C: General mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.05 6.98 0.57 16.15 41.73 -37.04  -0.02 6.87 0.52 21.11 43.57 -39.33 
[-272 ; -20] 0.00 7.08 0.61 16.65 42.53 -37.39  -0.01 6.97 0.55 21.64 44.19 -39.74 
 [-20 ; +20] -0.39 6.34 0.32 13.06 36.76 -34.86  -0.08 6.26 0.34 17.88 39.76 -36.83 
0 -1.83 5.32 -0.13 4.39 23.75 -26.26  0.58 6.43 1.04 8.21 40.49 -28.67 
[-1 ; +1] -1.51 6.09 1.06 17.11 42.61 -29.13  1.52 6.23 0.32 11.02 32.53 -32.29 
[-2 ; +2] -1.65 5.88 0.49 11.48 32.59 -27.22  0.21 6.92 0.01 23.85 47.21 -47.31 
[-5 ; +5] -0.97 6.39 0.12 13.49 34.93 -34.84  -0.07 6.85 -0.41 25.06 45.19 -47.95 
[-5 ; -1] -0.46 5.72 0.38 7.03 29.10 -25.52  -0.01 7.06 -0.85 26.82 44.95 -49.14 
[+1 ; +5] -1.30 7.26 -0.09 21.77 42.99 -45.88  -0.25 6.72 -0.25 26.68 46.38 -50.63 
              
Panel D: Coal                         
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.03 5.95 0.37 6.66 18.57 -15.81  -0.01 5.64 0.36 6.60 17.11 -15.53 
[-272 ; -20] -0.01 5.98 0.39 6.79 18.85 -15.83  -0.01 5.74 0.30 6.67 17.26 -16.13 
[-20 ; +20] -0.15 5.72 0.23 5.89 16.83 -15.64  0.03 5.03 0.71 6.14 16.18 -11.84 
0 -3.04 4.31 0.59 2.37 11.25 -11.79  0.10 3.81 0.06 1.47 9.69 -10.68 
[-1 ; +1] -1.58 5.25 1.24 5.86 17.80 -10.02  1.51 6.55 1.16 4.39 25.11 -11.26 
[-2 ; +2] -1.56 5.44 -0.21 7.51 13.83 -16.46  0.58 6.12 0.61 3.26 19.20 -13.02 
[-5 ; +5] -0.81 6.13 -0.30 6.92 15.90 -19.25  0.09 6.20 0.50 5.01 20.27 -14.86 
[-5 ; -1] -0.46 7.09 -0.89 11.31 17.48 -25.71  0.16 7.47 0.12 5.08 24.06 -17.61 
[+1 ; +5] -0.71 5.54 0.13 3.43 15.26 -14.28  0.02 5.41 0.96 5.65 18.60 -12.94 
              
Panel E: Nonferrous metals                       
Days relative to AD Mean across firm of: 
 RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.06 6.56 0.44 6.67 25.13 -20.79  -0.01 6.35 0.38 7.07 24.31 -20.51 
[-272 ; -20] -0.01 6.61 0.48 6.70 25.61 -20.82  -0.01 6.30 0.39 6.83 24.09 -20.18 
[-20 ; +20] -0.37 6.24 0.19 6.48 22.15 -20.64  0.01 6.63 0.32 8.54 25.65 -22.58 
0 -2.23 5.04 -1.11 2.21 7.95 -18.53  1.12 4.63 1.47 4.10 20.81 -9.00 
[-1 ; +1] -1.54 5.83 0.07 3.77 16.92 -17.84  1.08 6.76 -0.87 7.08 20.59 -24.83 
[-2 ; +2] -1.18 5.53 -0.02 3.59 16.50 -17.70  0.41 7.30 0.16 6.94 26.82 -22.37 
[-5 ; +5] -0.98 5.52 -0.25 3.25 14.70 -18.13  0.05 6.39 1.00 9.26 27.53 -18.04 
[-5 ; -1] -0.47 5.26 0.05 4.17 14.86 -15.65  0.18 7.01 0.98 11.51 32.55 -18.84 
[+1 ; +5] -1.24 5.88 -0.36 2.53 15.88 -20.53  -0.29 6.13 0.92 8.04 23.86 -19.05 
              
Panel F:  Gold mining                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.03 6.62 0.46 11.12 28.95 -25.39  -0.03 6.60 0.41 12.73 28.94 -25.87 
[-272 ; -20] -0.03 6.62 0.48 10.77 28.81 -25.33  -0.01 6.54 0.41 11.60 28.27 -25.27 
[-20 ; +20] -0.01 6.64 0.38 13.26 29.82 -25.73  -0.17 6.96 0.43 19.70 33.08 -29.56 
0 -2.53 8.43 -4.65 37.13 20.47 -68.61  -0.80 4.54 0.58 6.34 21.18 -15.35 
[-1 ; +1] -1.84 6.22 -2.07 14.36 14.49 -36.27  0.48 6.26 -0.58 13.15 24.02 -31.37 
[-2 ; +2] -1.17 5.75 -1.00 10.00 15.93 -27.55  -0.13 7.23 -0.15 25.86 33.11 -36.21 
[-5 ; +5] -0.46 6.27 0.15 10.58 24.83 -23.25  -0.35 7.89 0.14 24.62 36.73 -37.06 
[-5 ; -1] 0.12 5.86 1.28 11.60 30.18 -17.57  0.14 8.94 0.76 32.27 47.90 -39.27 
 [+1 ; +5] -0.63 6.25 -0.02 4.24 20.35 -19.87  -0.76 7.51 -0.57 20.63 28.67 -39.18 
              
Panel G:  Iron and steel                       
Days relative to AD 
Mean across firm of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min  Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis max  min 
[-272 ; +20] -0.06 5.94 0.40 5.94 18.02 -15.06  -0.04 5.64 0.36 6.51 17.32 -14.99 
[-272 ; -20] -0.01 6.01 0.39 6.23 18.40 -15.33  0.00 5.84 0.44 6.65 18.18 -15.23 
[-20 ; +20] -0.33 5.52 0.45 4.17 15.68 -13.42  -0.30 4.42 -0.17 5.69 12.06 -13.54 
0 -3.82 5.15 -1.46 1.71 2.30 -18.63  0.22 3.73 0.10 3.23 12.00 -8.83 
[-1 ; +1] -2.84 4.66 -0.62 1.15 6.46 -14.68  0.53 4.25 -1.17 10.04 11.23 -15.66 
[-2 ; +2] -1.70 4.94 -0.11 1.72 10.24 -13.91  -0.41 4.06 -1.04 7.25 9.80 -14.22 
[-5 ; +5] -0.94 5.47 -0.16 2.31 12.96 -15.19  -0.56 4.42 -0.44 6.52 11.87 -14.61 
[-5 ; -1] -1.15 4.84 -0.47 2.97 10.66 -15.43  -0.16 5.18 -1.38 7.26 11.92 -18.51 
[+1 ; +5] -0.15 6.17 0.41 1.77 17.38 -14.27  -1.11 3.80 0.38 6.45 11.79 -11.86 
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Table 6.11: RSPT and MRRT Cross-Sectional Correlation and Proportion of Zero 
Returns 
Table 6.11 provides the residuals’ grand mean intra-subsector correlation and the grand mean percentage 
of zero returns for each subsector included in the analysis. The mean correlation of the residuals for 
subsector k is computed by averaging the pairwise correlations of the estimation period abnormal returns 
within the group of firms that constitute subsector k. Abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡,  
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period 
t. 
iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the estimation period and are computed 
using the Scholes William method as defined in Equation (9). The percentage of zero returns is calculated 
from the time series continuously compounded returns over the estimation period. Logarithmic returns are 
computed using Equation (45). 
Subsector 
Mean of: 
RSPT   MRRT 
Average 
correlation 
Percentage of 
zero  
 Average 
correlation 
Percentage of 
zero  
All subsector 0.0184 38.96  0.0219 37.13 
Exploration and 
production 
0.0234 34.18  0.0279 32.77 
General mining 0.0162 41.22  0.0198 39.35 
Coal 0.0187 31.13  0.0302 30.12 
Nonferrous metals 0.0223 38.74  0.0250 37.37 
Gold mining 0.0443 41.02  0.0435 37.54 
Iron and steel 0.0265 34.91  0.0336 33.77 
 
It is evident from the various descriptive statistics that the daily returns and excess 
performances are slightly skewed to the right with a leptokurtic distribution This 
validates the finance literature findings of fat-tailed distributed observations in financial 
securities (Barakat & Terry 2013; Campbell, Cowan & Salotti 2010; Corrado & Truong 
2008; Hettmansperger 1984; Hollander & Wolfe, 1973; Lehman 1986; Manoukian 
1986). In addition, the high proportion of zero returns in the time series continuously 
compounded returns over the estimation period validates the characteristic found in 
Corrado and Truong (2008) that the Australian stock exchange has one of the highest 
proportion of zero daily security price returns in the Asia Pacific region. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion on the reason for using an event study (price-
based) methodology to examine the effect of the proposed RSPT and MRRT on equity 
markets (i.e. income effect). It showed that a price-based event study is an empirical 
technique used to measure the impact of unanticipated events on security market prices. 
It postulated that any unanticipated event predicted to impact a firm’s future expected 
cash flow would results in a one-off adjustment in a firm security price. It further argued 
that the unanticipated proposed new resource taxations were predicted to directly impact 
the affected firms’ expected post tax cash flows and disposable income. Given all the 
aforementioned, it was asserted that a price-based event study provided an ideal 
technique to empirically investigate the shareholder wealth effect (income effect) of 
these proposed resource taxes. Although long term horizon event studies can be 
conducted to investigate the long-term effect of an event, this thesis focused on the short 
effect of these proposed resources tax reforms as short-term horizon event studies are 
argued to be more consistent and precise. 
This chapter indicated that although several studies had investigated the impact of tax 
reforms and/or regulatory changes on equity markets very few focused-on resource 
taxation reforms.  
It described the different models used to measure abnormal security performances and 
the main t-stat measures used to draw inferences about the significance of these 
abnormal performances. Doing so, it showed that the main issues encountered in event 
studies were cross-sectional correlation, event-induced variance, unequal variances 
across securities, confounding effects and nonsynchronous security trading and 
considered the various procedures to handle these issues, that is the use of parametric 
and non-parametric t-stat measures.  
This chapter also provided and described the data set and different results measures 
used for the empirical analysis of the income effect in Chapter 7 and to some extent for 
the investigation of the presence or otherwise of a substitution effect in chapter 8. 
Given the nature of the event investigated (calendar time and industry clustering) as 
well as the statistical properties of the data (thin trading and excess performances 
slightly skewed to the right with a leptokurtic distribution), this chapter specified the 
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most robust model generating predicted returns and statistical test to be used in Chapter 
7; that is, the market model with the use of the Scholes-Williams  adjustment (as 
described in Equations (8) and (9)) and the standardised cross-sectional statistical test 
(as defined in Equations (31) and (43)). 
  
175 
 Event Study Empirical Results: Investigation of an 
Income Effect 
7.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 3, and 6, following the announcement of the RSPT and 
MRRT, a market reaction was thought likely to occur. That is, firms subject to the new 
proposed resources taxes were predicted to experience a one-off adjustment in their 
stock price (income effect). The principal aim of this chapter is to investigate and 
quantify the resources sector equity market reaction to the announced resources tax 
reforms that is, to gain additional insights into the magnitude, sign and significance of 
the various subsectors’ abnormal returns (income effect).  
Further (minor) empirical investigations are also conducted, including the analysis of 
the market reaction to the 2013 federal election outcome and the passage of the Mining 
Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament. It is natural to seek to investigate the 
market reaction to the idea of a repeal of the MRRT as well as its actual repeal. 
However, failure to meet some event study technique fundamental assumptions 
hindered the robustness of the results.  
To investigate the market reaction to these events, this chapter computes the excess 
performances and aggregated cumulative excess performances across the full sample of 
firms and each individual subsector (described in Chapter 6). These excess 
performances and their associated significance levels are computed for various event 
windows surrounding the announcement of each of the events investigated as well as for 
each day within the event period.117 Each of the series of event windows were viewed as 
being potentially relevant to resource firm shareholders in assessing the impact of the 
respective proposed resource taxes on expected future cash flows and therefore on the 
expected rate of return on their equity investment. Hence, each of those event periods is 
regarded as appropriate to capture the market’s reaction to the proposed resource taxes.  
                                                 
117 Analysis of the market reaction to the 2013 Federal election outcome and to the passage of the Mining 
Tax Repeal bill in both Houses of Parliament is only conducted for the (-20; +20) event and each day 
within the event period. No other event window is investigated due to robustness issues. 
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The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, a discussion of the results with respect 
to the RSPT announcement is conducted for the sample as a whole and for each 
subsector. A similar approach is followed in regard to the MRRT announcement. Then 
the results established in the third analysis (combined RSPT and MRRT) are discussed. 
Finally, results of the market reaction to the federal election outcome and the passage of 
the Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament are presented and discussed. 
Figure 7.1 plots the average excess performances earned by the sample firms 
surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT. Figures 7.2 concentrates on the 
abnormal returns realised by exploration and production, iron steel and coals firms, 
while Figure 7.3 focuses on general mining, nonferrous metals and gold companies. 
Figure 7.4 displays the cumulative mean abnormal returns for the entire sample as well 
as for each individual subsector. Table 7.1 presents the level of mean abnormal returns 
with their associated t-statistic values and level of significance. These average excess 
performances are provided for each day in the (-20; +20) event window surrounding the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT. Table 7.2 provides the value of the mean 
cumulative prediction errors with their associated t-statistics and level of significance 
around the announcement of the proposed RSPT for selected windows.  
Figures 7.5–7.8 and Tables 7.3 and 7.4 concentrate on the average abnormal and 
cumulative returns around the announcement of the proposed MRRT for the entire 
sample as well as the various subsectors defined in Chapter 6. Figure 7.9 and Tables 7.5 
and 7.6 present the results of the combined RSPT and MRRT analysis for the full 
sample of firms and the subsectors outlined in Chapter 6. 
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 and Tables 7.7 and 7.8 concentrate on the average abnormal and 
cumulative returns around the 2013 federal election outcome and the passage of the 
Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament for the entire sample as well as 
for the various subsectors defined in Chapter 6. 
7.2 RSPT Announcement Analysis 
Examination of the full event window (i.e., -20; +20) through the use of mean excess 
performance and average cumulative abnormal returns shows that the announcement of 
the proposed RSPT is associated with a significant negative share price reaction for the 
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entire sample as well as for all individual subsectors under investigation (see Figures 
7.1–7.4 and Tables 7.1 and 7.2). 
While on the basis of their sign, there appears to be very little to differentiate between 
the different subsectors’ average and cumulative average prediction errors, their 
magnitudes seem to indicate that the announcement of the proposed RSPT had a 
substantially more significant impact on some of the subsectors’ common price 
performance. 
For all subsectors investigated, the average abnormal returns and cumulative mean 
excess performances start at Day -20, ranging from a minimum of 0.25% for the general 
mining subsector to a maximum of 2.38% for the coal subsector. Although on average 
gold mining and iron subsectors earn abnormal returns of 1.65% and 1.99% 
respectively, most other subsectors produce mean excess performances close to zero on 
that day. It is worth noting that on that same day, the only statistically significant 
abnormal return (at the 1% level) is found in the iron and steel subsector.  
An overall steady positive trend for all subsector cumulative average abnormal returns 
can be observed until a general negative price change occurs just a few days prior to the 
proposed RSPT announcement (see Figure 7.4). For instance, the rise in the general 
mining subsector’s cumulative mean prediction errors can be seen as far as four days 
before the proposed RSPT is announced, reaching an all-time high of 2.86%, however, 
this is statistically insignificant (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). A positive drift that continues 
until five days prior to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is also evident for the 
sample as a whole and the exploration and production subsector, each realising their 
respective 41-day event window highest mean cumulative abnormal return of 4.42% 
(significant at 1%) and 7.72% (significant at 5%) The coal and iron steel subsectors earn 
on average positive abnormal returns up to six days before the proposed RSPT was 
announced, attaining their respective all-time high cumulative mean excess 
performances of 12.04% and 5.85%, of which only the former is statistically significant 
at the 1% level (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2).  
The nonferrous metal subsector produces positive prediction errors for only a short 
period of five days after the start of the full event period, generating a statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal return of 5.37% (at the 5% level), its maximum in the 
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41-day event window. Last, the gold mining subsector’s cumulative excess performance 
upward trend persists as far as Day -2, reaching a high of 7.30%, although 
insignificantly different from zero (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). It is however safe to say that 
all these significant positive excess performances across subsectors can hardly be 
attributed to the announcement of the RSPT. Rather, the obvious is suggested—the 
surge in commodity prices118 over this period. Indeed, as demonstrated by Boyer and 
Filion (2007), El-Sharif et al. (2005), Nandha and Faff (2008), Ramos and Veiga (2011) 
and Sadorsky (2001), oil and gas company security prices are sensitive to variation in 
natural gas and oil prices as well as interest rates. Hence, it is reasonable to assert that 
this observed upward trend was caused by an increase in commodity prices.  
Cumulative average excess performance begins to decline from Day -14 for the 
nonferrous metals subsector and from around Day -5 and onwards for all other 
subsectors. Only companies involved in nonferrous exhibit statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal loss in the (-15; -1) and (-14; -1) multi-day event periods, while 
general mining-focused companies accumulate statistically significant abnormal losses 
over the CAR (-4; -1) and (-3; -1) and investors in iron and steel companies endure 
excess losses in the CARS (-6; +1), (-4; -1), (-3 -1) and (-2; -1) (see Table 7.2). Those 
cumulative abnormal losses are in fact caused by few isolated significant negative 
prediction errors in those time periods (see Table 7.1) For instance the iron and steel 
subsector produces a significant negative abnormal return on Day -1 and Day -3, while 
statistically abnormal loss is observed on Day -3 for the general mining subsector and 
Days -13 and -3 for companies in the nonferrous subsector. This suggests that, to some 
extent, as news and reports of a resource tax emerged, investors gradually became 
aware of an approaching potential RSPT announcement, and that only stockholders of 
companies involved in the iron ore, nonferrous and general mining subsectors seemed to 
progressively re-assess the impact of such a tax on the value of their companies.  
Average cumulative excess performances continued to progressively drift downward 
over the pre-announcement period as the probability of the resource tax being 
introduced augmented. However, the relative impact of the proposed RSPT on resource 
companies was not clear until the RSPT was actually announced and its detailed 
                                                 
118
 A historical price analysis revealed that most commodity prices increased during this particular 
period. 
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features released. Hence, any initial adverse market reaction associated with the likely 
resource tax could only be based on very preliminary and sketchy assumptions and 
assessments of the potential effect of the RSPT. It should be noted that there is no 
evidence of mean cumulative abnormal returns for firms involved in other subsectors 
over the CARS (-6; -1), (-4; -1), (-3 -1), (-2; -1), (-15; -1) and (-14; -1) multi-day event 
windows. 
These results indicate the existence of a small pre-announcement effect in the general 
mining, nonferrous and iron ore subsectors, although only evident for companies in the 
latter subsectors. This may be due to discussions and meetings between the government 
and a few major firms;119 this issue will be further investigated in subsequent sections. 
When attention is restricted to the announcement of the proposed RSPT (i.e., Day 0), a 
notable pattern emerges; that is, a negative abnormal return is observed across most 
subsectors, with four of the six investigated statistically significant (see Table 7.1). This 
announcement effect suggests that security prices adjusted to reflect the introduction of 
the RSPT and confirms that, in a state of equilibrium, securities are ‘priced to equalize 
after tax yields’ (Amoako Adu 1983b, p. 1674). These abnormal losses indicate that 
investors responded to the RSPT announcement in a significantly negative way and 
corroborates the fact that the RSPT was generally perceived by market participants as 
being ‘bad news’ and likely to be value destructive. It also suggests that the market had 
perhaps expected a less radical resource tax, as only a worse-than-expected 
announcement would be negatively reflected in security prices.  
Table 7.1 indicates that the mean excess performance observed on Day 0 for the entire 
sample is -1.78%, and -1.83%, -3.04%, -2.22% and -3.81% for the general mining, coal, 
nonferrous metal and iron and steel subsectors respectively, all of which are statistically 
significant at the 5%, 1% and/or 10% levels. These findings strongly confirm the 
existence of an announcement effect on Day 0. While there is some evidence of a small 
pre-announcement effect in a few of the subsectors investigated, the existence of a 
sizeable and statistically significant negative abnormal performance on the 
announcement day also reinforces the idea that the proposed RSPT took the financial 
community by surprise and came as a bombshell to the mining industry. Only the 
exploration and production gold subsectors appear unaffected by the RSPT 
                                                 
119 As reported in The Australian on 4 May 2010 (Burrell 2010). 
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announcement, with no average abnormal returns observed on the day of 
announcement. Table 7.1 shows that on average the most pronounced statistically 
significant negative abnormal excess returns take place between Days 0 and 2 and 
between Days 11 and 14. This effectively implies that the negative reaction to the RSPT 
announcement was not quickly reversed and that the market continued to use RSPT 
information to price securities until 14 days after the announcement. In fact, as detailed 
features of the RSPT were publicly disclosed, the relative magnitude of its impact 
became more evident, and as a result, one would expect the initial market reaction 
during the pre-announcement period across subsectors to be reinforced through further 
market adjustments.  
For instance, while companies in the iron ore and coal subsectors suffered the largest 
losses on the day the RSPT was announced, in the three-day period (0; 2), general 
mining and exploration and production-focused firms exhibited the largest cumulative 
abnormal losses. However, losses accumulated over the (11; 14) multi-day window 
were observed for nonferrous and gold mining companies (see Table 7.2). These results 
confirm that market participants continue to utilise the proposed RSPT information or 
analyst/media reports to price securities (Burrell 2010; Thomson 2010; Phaceas 2010; 
Shanahan & Franklin 2010; Hausman 2010). These robust negative mean abnormal 
performances observed in Days 0, 1 and 2 and 11–14 are reflected in a substantial 
decline of the cumulative average excess returns over those periods (see Figure 7.4). 
While the majority of the mean prediction errors are randomly distributed around 0 or 
equivalently, there is no further systematic movement in the abnormal returns outside 
the 3-day window (0; +2) and 4-day window (+11; +14), and sporadic mean excess 
returns can be observed between Days 6 and 10 and beyond two weeks after the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT. For instance, the mean prediction error for 
companies involved in the exploration and production subsector is 1.73% and 1.92% on 
Days 6 and 9 respectively, both of which are significantly different from zero at the 
10% level for the former and 5% for the latter. Further, on Day 7, a significant negative 
average abnormal return of 1.77% was produced by coal-focused firms. The lack of 
excess performances between Days 3 and 10 could be explained by the fact that 
investors reassessed the RSPT or failed to appreciate its full implication and only 
reacted when analysts forecasts of the full ramifications of the proposed RSPT were 
released and/or revised and actual implications were realised. This argument is also true 
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for lack of excess performances observed on Day 0 for companies in the gold mining 
and exploration and production subsectors.  
The absence of abnormal returns beyond 14 days may be because the market adjusted to 
the probability of the RSPT being repealed and replaced with a more generous form of 
resource profit tax. Indeed, regulators, federal government, lobby groups and other 
various stakeholders were meeting to consider and discuss potential regulatory changes 
to the proposed RSPT (Brown et al.2012). It is important to note that the absence of 
average excess performances from after Day 14 to the end of the event window causes 
the cumulative average abnormal returns to level off and slightly increase over these 
periods (see Figure 7.4). In contrast to other subsectors, gold mining firms saw on 
average a dramatic rise of about 6.92 % in their cumulative excess performance during 
the four days between Days 7 and 10, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. This 
was most likely caused by the significant positive abnormal return of 2.77% produced 
on Day 7. During this period, the mean excess returns observed in the gold mining 
subsectors were all positive (100%) but those of other subsectors produced at least one 
or several negative abnormal returns. However, the rise in the cumulative prediction 
errors is short lived and declines again over the following days. It is safe to say that this 
significant positive excess performance could not be attributed to the announcement of 
the RSPT. Once again, the obvious is suggested—the surge in the price of gold during 
this period. Indeed, the most drastic increase in the average cumulative abnormal returns 
in firms involved in gold mining coincides with a surge in the price of gold. Similarly, 
the upward trend observed across all subsectors at the start of the event window that 
lasted for several days was likely to be caused by an increase in commodity prices (see 
footnote 118).  
Reaction to the proposed RSPT was homogenous across most subsectors, as 
demonstrated by their signs, yet differences in their magnitudes can be observed; for 
instance, on the day of the RSPT announcement, the negative share price impact on the 
iron and steel and coal companies is much more pronounced than the other subsectors. 
This differential treatment demonstrates that market participants took the proposed 
RSPT into consideration in pricing securities, and that on Day 0, the RSPT was seen by 
investors as having a greater destructive impact on the share value of companies 
involved in iron ore and coal relative to other subsectors. That is, the markets 
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discounted more heavily the share price of companies involved in those two subsectors. 
This differential impact however changes over different windows, which suggest that 
investors continually reassessed the impact of the RSPT as news and analyst reports 
emerged. For example, the negative response produced by the iron and steel subsector 
became less than those of the coal, general mining and nonferrous subsectors over the 
(0; 2) window period. A similar pattern can be observed over different window periods 
and days in the full event window. Once again, this differential tax effect may be related 
to firms/subsectors specific characteristics and will be investigated further in Chapter 8. 
Table 7.2 summarises the cumulative prediction errors for all subsectors investigated 
and their associated t-statistics. The cumulative average abnormal performance for the 
41 days surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT is -11% for the sample as 
a whole, -4.39% for the E&P, -15.84% for general mining, -6.34% for coal, -15.36% for 
nonferrous mining and -0.59% for gold mining, of which only the entire sample, general 
mining and nonferrous mining are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
However, to size the cumulative impact of the proposed RSPT as accurately as possible, 
cumulative excess performances must be measured over the period starting from when 
the first reactions to the proposed RSPT announcement were observed. 
As previously noted, while there is evidence of a small pre-announcement effect across 
a few subsectors, initial reactions could only be based on preliminary and sketchy 
assumptions and assessments about the design/features of the potential RSPT. It is 
therefore more appropriate to cumulate average abnormal returns from Day 0 onwards. 
Table 7.2 indicates that security holders in each subsector on average suffered large 
abnormal losses over the post-adjustment phase including Day 0. While the whole 
sample realises a mean abnormal loss of 1.78% on the day of the announcement, 
performance cumulates to a little more than -13% over the 21-day post-announcement 
period. The general mining and coal subsectors appear to be the most affected, with a 
cumulative abnormal loss of 15.80% and just over 16% respectively. All results are 
significant at the 1%, 5% and/or 10% level. Conversely, during the same period, 
stockholders of firms in the gold mining subsectors sustained the lowest excess losses 
(7.22%, with associated test statistic of -0.952). 
To conclude this section the following can be stated: 
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Analysis of daily excess performance over the 41 days surrounding the announcement 
of the proposed RSPT reveals that not only the market responds immediately to the 
proposed RSPT announcement, but it also confirms the existence of a significant post 
announcement effect for most subsectors investigated. The results also suggest that a 
small pre- announcement effect is present a few days before the announcement of the 
RSPT for some subsectors particularly more noticeable for iron ore focused companies.  
Figures 7.11 to 7.3 and tables 7.1 and 7.2 confirm the existence of sizable and 
statistically significant negative abnormal return on the day the proposed RSPT is 
announced and that the bulk of the statistically significant average excess losses occur 
during the (0; 2) and (11; 14) window. This indicates that during those 2 post 
adjustment phases, security prices of resources companies on average declined much 
further than is implied by the normal relationship between their stock prices and the 
market model price behaviour. These results confirm the finding in Davidson (2010) 
and Brown et al. (2012) that the RSPT was negatively perceived by equity market 
participants. 
The data from table 7.1 and 7.2 support the overall impression gained from figures 7.11 
to 7.3 that there is a negative abnormal performance associated with the announcement 
of the proposed RSPT. Those results convincingly demonstrate that the announcement 
of the RSPT has a significant impact on the common stock return behaviour of the 
companies involved in all subsectors investigated and further confirm that the proposed 
RSPT is largely viewed adverse for all subsectors subject the new resources tax. There 
is also evidence of the existence of a differential tax effect across subsectors120.  
The magnitude and persistence of these negative abnormal returns give sense to the 
nearly A$22 million spent on TV advertisements by mining companies to campaign 
against the RSPT  
Finally ,whilst beyond the scope of this thesis, a final point worthwhile mentioning is 
that the results of this analysis indicate that the actual proposed RSPT announcement 
has information content and that its implications do explain the behaviour of securities 
returns in the period surrounding its announcement This is indeed supported by the fact 
that significant mean abnormal returns and average cumulative excess performance are 
                                                 
120 This will be tested in the subsequent chapter. 
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observed around day 0 as well as differences across subsectors. It also demonstrates that 
the average excess performances observed during these periods are driven by the 
anticipated announcement and announcement rather than just the market model. 
 
 Figure 7.1: Overall Sample Percentage Average Abnormal Return (RSPT) 
Figure 7.1 shows the overall sample, ‘all subsector’ average abnormal returns series time plot for each given day in the event window surrounding the announcement of the 
RSPT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
 correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method, as defined in the previous chapter. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days, 
relative to the announcement day. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 
330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as classified by 
the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector, as defined in the previous chapter. The 
equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6, where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the 
S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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 Figure 7.2: Percentage Average Abnormal Returns, Comparison by Subsectors (RSPT) 
Figure 7.2 shows various subsectors’ average abnormal returns series time plots for each given day in the event window surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. The 
abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in the previous chapter. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days 
relative to the announcement day. The exploration and production subsector consists of 117 firms, the coal subsector covers 35 stocks and the iron and steel subsector includes 
33 firms. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios based on their subsector of belonging, as defined in the previous chapter. The equally weighted average 
abnormal return for day t is computed for each subsector as described in Chapter 6, where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 
value weighted index. 
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 Figure 7.3: Percentage Average Abnormal Returns, Comparison by Subsectors (RSPT) 
Figure 7.3 shows various subsectors’ average abnormal returns series time plots for each given day in the event window surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. The 
abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in the previous chapter  The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days 
relative to the announcement day. The general mining subsector contains 330 companies, the gold mining subsector comprises 106 companies, and the nonferrous metals 
subsector encompasses 75 companies. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios based on their subsector of belonging as defined in the previous chapter. 
The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the 
S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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 Table 7.1: Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed RSPT 
Table 7.1 shows the different subsectors’ average abnormal and cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. The 
abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in the previous chapter. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days 
relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production 
subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as 
classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in the 
previous chapter. The equally weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed as in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average 
abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the 
continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted 
standardised cross-sectional methods as defined Chapter 6. The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) 
relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
  
 Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals (N=75) Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 0.68 
(1.112) 
0.68 
(1.112) 
0.31 
(0.703) 
0.31 
(0.703) 
0.25 
(0.635) 
0.25 
(0.635) 
2.38 
(1.593) 
2.38 
(1.593) 
0.57 
(0.831) 
0.57 
(0.831) 
1.65 
(0.969) 
1.65 
(0.969) 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
-19 0.62 
(0.582) 
1.30 
(1.225) 
0.72 
(0.524) 
1.04 
(1.015) 
0.07 
(0.037) 
0.33 
(0.500) 
1.50 
(1.776)* 
3.89 
(2.190)** 
1.90 
(1.146) 
2.47 
(1.485) 
1.72 
(0.865) 
3.38 
(1.283) 
-0.40 
(-0.569) 
1.59 
(1.389) 
-18 0.62 
(0.832) 
1.93 
(1.506) 
1.21 
(1.366) 
2.26 
(1.777)* 
0.38 
(0.562) 
0.71 
(0.714) 
-0.14 
(0.315) 
3.75 
(2.059)** 
0.45 
(0.713) 
2.93 
(1.641) 
1.03 
(0.432) 
4.41 
(1.461) 
0.63 
(0.667) 
2.22 
(1.493) 
-17 0.32 
(0.687) 
2.25 
(1.727)* 
0.18 
(0.267) 
2.44 
(1.664)* 
0.33 
(0.672) 
1.05 
(0.997) 
-0.21 
(0.289) 
3.53 
(2.261)** 
1.87 
(1.346) 
4.80 
(2.311)** 
-0.31 
(0.436) 
4.10 
(1.544) 
0.09 
(0.052) 
2.32 
(1.520) 
-16 0.72 
(0.836) 
2.98 
(1.911)* 
1.47 
(1.133) 
3.91 
(1.843)* 
0.30 
(0.428) 
1.35 
(1.124) 
2.25 
(1.212) 
5.79 
(2.434)** 
0.49 
(0.315) 
5.30 
(2.317)** 
1.41 
(0.948) 
5.52 
(1.861)* 
0.12 
(0.083) 
2.45 
(1.386) 
-15 0.66 
(0.959) 
3.64 
(2.212)** 
0.77 
(1.062) 
4.69 
(2.384)** 
0.64 
(0.941) 
2.00 
(1.521) 
2.23 
(2.172)** 
8.02 
(2.849)*** 
0.06 
(0.030) 
5.37 
(2.221)** 
0.88 
(0.383) 
6.41 
(1.856)* 
0.62 
(0.234) 
3.07 
(1.321) 
-14 0.13 
(0.309) 
3.78 
(2.168)** 
-0.11 
(-0.035) 
4.58 
(2.174)** 
0.40 
(0.452) 
2.41 
(1.595) 
1.34 
(1.546) 
9.37 
(3.104)*** 
-0.77 
(-0.514) 
4.60 
(1.993)** 
-0.32 
(-0.036) 
6.08 
(1.695)* 
0.64 
(1.378) 
3.72 
(1.596) 
-13 -0.44 
(-0.651) 
3.33 
(1.906)* 
0.54 
(0.156) 
5.13 
(2.080)** 
-0.69 
(-0.909) 
1.71 
(1.280) 
-0.90 
(-1.748)* 
8.46 
(2.859)*** 
-0.47 
(-0.613) 
4.13 
(1.666)* 
-0.69 
(-0.501) 
5.39 
(1.567) 
0.57 
(0.370) 
4.29 
(1.741)* 
-12 0.02 
(-0.259) 
3.35 
(1.739)* 
0.17 
(-0.296) 
5.30 
(1.891)* 
0.61 
(0.736) 
2.32 
(1.465) 
-0.76 
(-1.459) 
7.69 
(2.710)** 
-1.68 
(-2.289)** 
2.44 
(0.980) 
-0.17 
(-0.257) 
5.21 
(1.428) 
-0.39 
(-0.358) 
3.90 
(1.616) 
-11 0.37 
(0.465) 
3.73 
(1.911)* 
0.36 
(0.624) 
5.67 
(2.138)** 
0.44 
(0.538) 
2.77 
(1.610) 
0.43 
(0.458) 
8.13 
(3.198)*** 
-0.09 
(-0.522) 
2.34 
(0.879) 
0.34 
(0.168) 
5.56 
(1.466) 
0.16 
(-0.111) 
4.07 
(1.621) 
-10 -0.01 
(-0.187) 
3.71 
(1.734)* 
0.10 
(-0.223) 
5.78 
(1.716)* 
-0.50 
(-0.814) 
2.26 
(1.304) 
0.72 
(0.558) 
8.85 
(3.182)*** 
-0.83 
(-0.482) 
1.51 
(0.605) 
1.80 
(0.915) 
7.36 
(1.763)* 
-0.85 
(-0.816) 
3.21 
(1.309) 
-9 -0.55 
(-0.558) 
3.16 
(1.469) 
-0.26 
(-0.049) 
5.51 
(1.615) 
-0.82 
(-1.135) 
1.43 
(0.894) 
0.65 
(0.764) 
9.51 
(2.957)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.123) 
1.46 
(0.530) 
-1.13 
(-0.899) 
6.23 
(1.455) 
-0.07 
(-0.241) 
3.14 
(1.052) 
-8 0.34 
(0.330) 
3.50 
(1.479) 
0.06 
(0.033) 
5.58 
(1.558) 
0.85 
(0.858) 
2.29 
(1.104) 
0.94 
(0.602) 
10.45 
(2.905)*** 
-0.41 
(-0.665) 
1.04 
(0.324) 
-0.56 
(-0.718) 
5.66 
(1.285) 
0.45 
(1.198) 
3.59 
(1.324) 
-7 0.10 
(0.336) 
3.61 
(1.526) 
0.64 
(1.033) 
6.23 
(1.815)* 
-0.06 
(-0.011) 
2.22 
(1.061) 
0.45 
(0.257) 
10.91 
(2.776)*** 
-0.01 
(0.020) 
1.03 
(0.305) 
-1.13 
(-0.060) 
4.53 
(1.183) 
1.42 
(0.596) 
5.02 
(1.341) 
-6 0.23 
(0.433) 
3.84 
(1.637) 
-0.18 
(-0.030) 
6.04 
(1.819)* 
0.03 
(0.200) 
2.26 
(1.110) 
1.13 
(0.933) 
12.04 
(3.011)*** 
0.57 
(0.625) 
1.60 
(0.468) 
0.70 
(0.795) 
5.24 
(1.326) 
0.83 
(0.093) 
5.85 
(1.217) 
 -5 0.57 
(0.536) 
4.42 
(1.752)* 
1.67 
(1.311) 
7.72 
(2.344)** 
0.26 
(0.341) 
2.53 
(1.183) 
-0.87 
(-0.333) 
11.16 
(2.198)** 
-0.45 
(-0.554) 
1.15 
(0.381) 
1.67 
(0.552) 
6.91 
(1.454) 
-0.64 
(-0.247) 
5.21 
(1.149) 
-4 -0.05 
(0.105) 
4.37 
(1.717)* 
-0.32 
(0.078) 
7.40 
(2.189)** 
0.33 
(0.286) 
2.86 
(1.256) 
0.10 
(-0.072) 
11.26 
(2.154)** 
0.04 
(-0.025) 
1.19 
(0.348) 
-0.53 
(0.046) 
6.38 
(1.407) 
-1.71 
(-1.016) 
3.49 
(0.937) 
-3 -1.09 
(-1.256) 
3.27 
(1.283) 
-0.34 
(-0.200) 
7.05 
(2.038)** 
-1.65 
(-2.053)** 
1.20 
(0.616) 
-0.66 
(-0.823) 
10.60 
(2.048)** 
-2.42 
(-2.567)** 
-1.22 
(-0.325) 
0.47 
(0.051) 
6.86 
(1.371) 
-1.29 
(-1.963)* 
2.20 
(0.580) 
-2 -0.69 
(-0.807) 
2.57 
(0.900) 
-2.04 
(-1.032) 
5.00 
(0.924) 
-0.68 
(-1.006) 
0.52 
(0.340) 
-1.76 
(-1.125) 
8.84 
(1.852)* 
0.28 
(0.028) 
-0.93 
(-0.308) 
0.44 
(0.253) 
7.30 
(1.420) 
-0.24 
(-0.730) 
1.95 
(0.396) 
-1 -0.34 
(-0.646) 
2.22 
(0.733) 
0.07 
(-0.044) 
5.08 
(0.909) 
-0.56 
(-0.604) 
-0.03 
(0.145) 
0.92 
(-0.133) 
9.76 
(1.673) 
0.20 
(0.063) 
-0.72 
(-0.288) 
-0.67 
(-1.001) 
6.63 
(1.234) 
-1.87 
(-2.811)*** 
0.08 
(-0.214) 
0 -1.78 
(-2.304)** 
0.44 
(0.207) 
-0.03 
(-0.212) 
5.04 
(0.868) 
-1.83 
(-2.390)** 
-1.87 
(-0.505) 
-3.04 
(-3.407)*** 
6.72 
(1.143) 
-2.22 
(-2.163)** 
-2.95 
(-0.819) 
-2.48 
(-1.608) 
4.15 
(0.854) 
-3.81 
(-3.063)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.055) 
1 -2.24 
(-2.799)*** 
-1.80 
(-0.486) 
-2.07 
(-1.944)* 
2.96 
(0.428) 
-2.14 
(-2.656)*** 
-4.02 
(-1.290) 
-2.63 
(-3.533)*** 
4.09 
(0.713) 
-2.59 
(-2.466)** 
-5.55 
(-1.417) 
-2.25 
(-1.446) 
1.89 
(0.413) 
-2.82 
(-2.788)*** 
-6.55 
(-1.721)* 
2 -2.09 
(-2.269)** 
-3.89 
(-1.015) 
-2.05 
(-1.969)* 
0.91 
(0.065) 
-3.01 
(-3.320)*** 
-7.03 
(-2.243)** 
-1.26 
(-1.104) 
2.83 
(0.499) 
-1.57 
(-1.430) 
-7.12 
(-1.727)* 
-0.63 
(-0.562) 
1.26 
(0.262) 
0.25 
(0.585) 
-6.30 
(-1.512) 
3 -0.57 
(0.038) 
-4.47 
(-0.949) 
-0.88 
(-0.320) 
0.03 
(-0.000) 
-0.58 
(-0.143) 
-7.61 
(-2.118)** 
1.13 
(1.144) 
3.96 
(0.867) 
-0.95 
(-0.657) 
-8.07 
(-1.853)* 
-0.91 
(0.056) 
0.34 
(0.257) 
0.27 
(0.734) 
-6.02 
(-1.084) 
4 -0.76 
(-0.458) 
-5.24 
(-1.047) 
-0.98 
(-0.589) 
-0.94 
(-0.112) 
-0.91 
(-0.802) 
-8.53 
(-2.318)** 
-1.32 
(-0.781) 
2.63 
(0.762) 
-1.23 
(-0.797) 
-9.31 
(-2.082)** 
0.06 
(0.515) 
0.40 
(0.393) 
-0.26 
(0.332) 
-6.29 
(-0.901) 
5 0.35 
(0.350) 
-4.88 
(-0.988) 
1.49 
(1.319) 
0.55 
(0.112) 
0.15 
(0.151) 
-8.38 
(-2.379)** 
0.53 
(0.118) 
3.16 
(0.804) 
0.13 
(0.421) 
-9.17 
(-2.000)** 
-0.01 
(-0.341) 
0.38 
(0.302) 
1.80 
(1.134) 
-4.48 
(-0.625) 
6 0.85 
(1.036) 
-4.03 
(-0.744) 
1.73 
(1.742)* 
2.29 
(0.421) 
0.85 
(0.950) 
-7.52 
(-2.092)** 
0.65 
(0.289) 
3.82 
(0.854) 
0.35 
(0.350) 
-8.81 
(-1.898)* 
0.91 
(0.815) 
1.29 
(0.517) 
-1.05 
(-1.237) 
-5.54 
(-0.807) 
7 0.22 
(0.472) 
-3.81 
(-0.607) 
-1.32 
(-1.107) 
0.96 
(0.217) 
0.07 
(0.253) 
-7.45 
(-1.933)* 
-1.77 
(-1.904)* 
2.04 
(0.666) 
0.32 
(0.099) 
-8.48 
(-1.802)* 
2.77 
(2.091)** 
4.07 
(1.081) 
-0.88 
(-0.609) 
-6.42 
(-0.877) 
8 0.31 
(0.314) 
-3.49 
(-0.542) 
-0.67 
(-0.754) 
0.29 
(0.116) 
0.46 
(0.320) 
-6.98 
(-1.836)* 
0.53 
(0.459) 
2.58 
(0.739) 
0.59 
(0.571) 
-7.89 
(-1.669)* 
0.90 
(0.978) 
4.97 
(1.273) 
0.31 
(-0.079) 
-6.11 
(-0.949) 
9 1.07 
(1.517) 
-2.42 
(-0.240) 
1.92 
(2.361)** 
2.21 
(0.419) 
0.85 
(1.233) 
-6.12 
(-1.485) 
0.05 
(0.455) 
2.63 
(0.827) 
1.34 
(1.175) 
-6.55 
(-1.365) 
1.48 
(0.898) 
6.46 
(1.466) 
-0.29 
(0.064) 
-6.40 
(-0.944) 
10 -0.53 
(-0.327) 
-2.95 
(-0.302) 
-0.90 
(-0.697) 
1.30 
(0.293) 
-0.92 
(-0.873) 
-7.05 
(-1.654)* 
-2.52 
(-1.488) 
0.11 
(0.506) 
-0.67 
(-0.472) 
-7.22 
(-1.495) 
1.75 
(1.489) 
8.22 
(1.712)* 
-1.41 
(-0.737) 
-7.82 
(-1.007) 
11 -1.46 
(-1.992)** 
-4.42 
(-0.671) 
-0.09 
(-0.445) 
1.20 
(0.234) 
-1.46 
(-1.776)* 
-8.51 
(-2.071)** 
-2.51 
(-2.164)** 
-2.40 
(0.061) 
-1.85 
(-1.755)* 
-9.08 
(-1.934)* 
-2.26 
(-2.047)** 
5.95 
(1.400) 
-1.63 
(-1.728)* 
-9.45 
(-1.338) 
 12 -1.30 
(-1.280) 
-5.72 
(-0.964) 
-1.24 
(-0.527) 
-0.04 
(0.135) 
-1.60 
(-1.461) 
-10.11 
(-2.386)** 
-1.33 
(-1.210) 
-3.74 
(-0.162) 
0.05 
(-0.030) 
-9.03 
(-1.893)* 
-1.31 
(-1.151) 
4.64 
(1.179) 
-1.39 
(-1.158) 
-10.84 
(-1.414) 
13 -1.63 
(-2.036)** 
-7.36 
(-1.315) 
-1.21 
(-1.362) 
-1.25 
(-0.066) 
-1.83 
(-2.118)** 
-11.94 
(-2.737)*** 
-1.04 
(-1.498) 
-4.78 
(-0.392) 
-1.20 
(-0.769) 
-10.23 
(-1.961)* 
-2.43 
(-2.009)** 
2.20 
(0.735) 
-0.95 
(-1.334) 
-11.80 
(-1.580) 
14 -3.21 
(-2.957)*** 
-10.58 
(-1.965)** 
-2.10 
(-1.856)* 
-3.35 
(-0.397) 
-3.16 
(-2.916)*** 
-15.11 
(-3.456)*** 
-2.69 
(-1.884)* 
-7.48 
(-0.674) 
-6.09 
(-2.860)*** 
-16.33 
(-2.954)*** 
-2.65 
(-2.216)** 
-0.44 
(0.296) 
-3.30 
(-1.120) 
-15.10 
(-1.832)* 
15 0.37 
(0.069) 
-10.21 
(-1.952)* 
-0.26 
(-0.243) 
-3.62 
(-0.435) 
0.53 
(0.178) 
-14.58 
(-3.425)*** 
-0.50 
(-0.807) 
-7.99 
(-0.784) 
1.25 
(0.498) 
-15.08 
(-2.827)*** 
0.42 
(0.220) 
-0.02 
(0.345) 
0.14 
(-0.434) 
-14.96 
(-2.058)** 
16 -0.59 
(-0.394) 
-10.80 
(-1.957)* 
-0.64 
(-0.601) 
-4.27 
(-0.491) 
-1.11 
(-1.047) 
-15.69 
(-3.554)*** 
-0.34 
(-0.097) 
-8.34 
(-0.761) 
0.25 
(0.382) 
-14.82 
(-2.849)*** 
0.06 
(0.452) 
0.04 
(0.438) 
0.34 
(0.164) 
-14.61 
(-1.808)* 
17 -0.66 
(-0.506) 
-11.47 
(-2.040)** 
-0.96 
(-0.925) 
-5.23 
(-0.637) 
-0.84 
(-0.836) 
-16.54 
(-3.696)*** 
1.46 
(1.528) 
-6.87 
(-0.492) 
-0.20 
(0.098) 
-15.03 
(-2.843)*** 
-0.80 
(-0.423) 
-0.76 
(0.357) 
-0.61 
(0.319) 
-15.22 
(-1.794)* 
18 -0.28 
(-0.295) 
-11.75 
(-2.102)** 
-0.01 
(-0.130) 
-5.24 
(-0.668) 
-0.40 
(-0.324) 
-16.94 
(-3.735)*** 
-0.97 
(-1.274) 
-7.85 
(-0.667) 
-0.85 
(-0.599) 
-15.88 
(-2.865)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.075) 
-0.88 
(0.354) 
1.50 
(1.226) 
-13.72 
(-1.569) 
19 0.66 
(0.487) 
-11.09 
(-2.059)** 
0.62 
(0.894) 
-4.62 
(-0.549) 
0.91 
(0.826) 
-16.03 
(-3.630)*** 
0.82 
(0.793) 
-7.02 
(-0.588) 
1.02 
(0.663) 
-14.85 
(-2.673)*** 
0.42 
(-0.401) 
-0.45 
(0.273) 
-0.18 
(-0.227) 
-13.90 
(-1.664) 
20 0.08 
(0.150) 
-11.00 
(-2.002)** 
0.23 
(0.363) 
-4.39 
(-0.497) 
0.19 
(0.130) 
-15.84 
(-3.498)*** 
0.67 
(1.846)* 
-6.34 
(-0.382) 
-0.50 
(-0.390) 
-15.36 
(-2.697)*** 
-0.13 
(-0.006) 
-0.59 
(0.260) 
0.34 
(0.067) 
-13.55 
(-1.626) 
Notes: The ***, ** and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 Figure 7.4: Percentage Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (RSPT) 
This figure shows the overall sample ‘all subsector’ average cumulative returns as well as those of the various individual subsectors for the 41-day period within the event 
window surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the 
general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel as classified by the 
industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Table 6.2. The 
equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding 
the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 
value weighted index.  
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 Table 7.2: Multi-Day Window Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed RSPT 
Table 7.2 shows the different subsectors’ average cumulative returns for various multi-day periods within the event window surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. 
Abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general mining 
subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification 
benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging, as defined in the previous chapter. The equally weighted 
average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value 
weighted index. The t-statistics for the CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null 
hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
  
 Days relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  
car -20 to -15 3.64 
(2.212)** 
4.69 
(2.384)** 
2.00 
(1.521) 
8.02 
(2.849)*** 
5.37 
(2.221)** 
6.41 
(1.974)* 
3.07 
(1.321) 
car -20 to -6 3.84 
(1.637) 
6.04 
(1.819)* 
2.26 
(1.110) 
12.04 
(3.011)*** 
1.60 
(0.468) 
5.24 
(1.410) 
5.85 
(1.217) 
car -20 to -5 4.42 
(1.752)* 
7.72 
(2.344)** 
2.53 
(1.183) 
11.16 
(2.198)** 
1.15 
(0.381) 
6.91 
(1.546) 
5.21 
(1.149) 
car -20 to -4 4.37 
(1.717)* 
7.40 
(2.189)** 
2.86 
(1.256) 
11.26 
(2.154)** 
1.19 
(0.348) 
6.38 
(1.497) 
3.49 
(0.937) 
car -20 to -2 2.57 
(0.900) 
5.00 
(0.924) 
0.52 
(0.340) 
8.84 
(1.852)* 
-0.93 
(-0.308) 
7.30 
(1.510) 
1.95 
(0.396) 
car -15 -1 -0.75 
(-0.344) 
1.16 
(0.145) 
-1.39 
(-0.569) 
3.97 
(0.791) 
-6.03 
(-1.885)* 
1.11 
(0.085) 
-2.37 
(-0.948) 
car -14 to -1 -1.41 
(-0.636) 
0.39 
(-0.104) 
-2.04 
(-0.887) 
1.73 
(0.277) 
-6.10 
(-1.968)* 
0.22 
(-0.068) 
-2.99 
(-1.157) 
car -6 -1 -1.38 
(-0.823) 
-1.15 
(-0.433) 
-2.26 
(-1.172) 
-1.14 
(-0.393) 
-1.76 
(-1.047) 
2.10 
(0.386) 
-4.93 
(-3.031)*** 
car -4 to -1 -2.19 
(-1.513) 
-2.64 
(-1.011) 
-2.57 
(-1.847)* 
-1.40 
(-0.971) 
-1.88 
(-1.390) 
-0.27 
(-0.264) 
-5.12 
(-2.991)*** 
car -3 to -1 -2.14 
(-1.780)* 
-2.31 
(-1.065) 
-2.90 
(-2.526)** 
-1.50 
(-0.961) 
-1.92 
(-1.556) 
0.25 
(-0.359) 
-3.41 
(-3.630)*** 
car -2 to -1 -1.04 
(-1.089) 
-1.96 
(-1.013) 
-1.24 
(-1.247) 
-0.84 
(-0.695) 
0.49 
(0.069) 
-0.22 
(-0.581) 
-2.12 
(-3.054)*** 
car 0 to 2 -6.12 
(-4.846)*** 
-4.16 
(-2.762)*** 
-6.99 
(-5.431)*** 
-6.93 
(-4.159)*** 
-6.39 
(-3.769)*** 
-5.37 
(-3.256)*** 
-6.38 
(-2.723)** 
 car 1 to 2 -4.34 
(-4.015)*** 
-4.12 
(-3.195)*** 
-5.16 
(-4.466)*** 
-3.89 
(-2.855)*** 
-4.16 
(-3.241)*** 
-2.89 
(-1.920)* 
-1.49 
(-2.568)** 
car 3 to  10 0.94 
(1.168) 
0.39 
(0.690) 
-0.01 
(0.389) 
-2.71 
(-0.144) 
-0.10 
(0.358) 
6.95 
(2.760)*** 
-1.51 
(0.471) 
car 7 to 10 1.08 
(0.970) 
-0.98 
(-0.401) 
0.47 
(0.480) 
-3.71 
(-1.361) 
1.58 
(0.968) 
6.92 
(2.934)*** 
-2.27 
(-0.856) 
car 11 to 14 -7.62 
(-4.909)*** 
-4.66 
(-2.333)** 
-8.06 
(-4.840)*** 
-7.59 
(-4.522)*** 
-9.11 
(-3.958)*** 
-8.66 
(-4.481)*** 
-7.28 
(-3.337)*** 
car 15 to 20 -0.42 
(-0.247) 
-1.03 
(-0.227) 
-0.72 
(-0.552) 
1.13 
(1.190) 
0.97 
(0.530) 
-0.14 
(-0.073) 
1.54 
(0.911) 
car -14 to 20 14.65 
(3.364)*** 
9.08 
(1.495) 
17.84 
(4.446)*** 
14.37 
(2.141)** 
20.74 
(4.530)*** 
7.00 
(0.833) 
16.63 
(2.213)** 
car -5to 20 -14.85 
(-3.984)*** 
-10.44 
(-2.206)** 
-18.11 
(-5.008)*** 
-18.39 
(-3.754)*** 
-16.97 
(-4.209)*** 
-5.83 
(-0.833) 
-19.41 
(-3.272)*** 
car -4 to 20 -15.43 
(-4.271)*** 
-12.11 
(-2.719)*** 
-18.37 
(-5.197)*** 
-17.51 
(-4.536)*** 
-16.51 
(-4.203)*** 
-7.50 
(-0.998) 
-18.77 
(-3.248)*** 
car -3 to 20 -15.37 
(-4.468)*** 
-11.79 
(-2.865)*** 
-18.70 
(-5.473)*** 
-17.61 
(-4.632)*** 
-16.55 
(-4.367)*** 
-6.97 
(-1.040) 
-17.05 
(-3.252)*** 
car -2 to 20 -14.28 
(-4.244)*** 
-11.44 
(-2.937)*** 
-17.05 
(-5.135)*** 
-16.95 
(-4.574)*** 
-14.13 
(-3.879)*** 
-7.45 
(-1.049) 
-15.76 
(-3.019)*** 
car -1 to 20 -13.58 
(-4.057)*** 
-9.40 
(-2.353)** 
-16.36 
(-4.957)*** 
-15.18 
(-4.377)*** 
-14.42 
(-3.901)*** 
-7.89 
(-1.159) 
-15.51 
(-2.851)*** 
car 0 to 20 -13.23 
(-3.918)*** 
-9.47 
(-2.478)** 
-15.80 
(-4.775)*** 
-16.11 
(-4.684)*** 
-14.63 
(-3.937)*** 
-7.22 
(-0.952) 
-13.64 
(-2.199)** 
Notes: The ***, ** and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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7.3 MRRT Announcement Analysis 
Figures 7.5–7.8 indicate the presence of slight negative prediction errors accumulating 
until around two days prior to the announcement of the proposed MRRT across the 
various subsectors. For instance, over the period (-20; -2), the sample as a whole 
produces on average abnormal performances of -8.06%, while nonferrous, iron and 
steel, exploration and production, coal and gold mining suffer average losses of 8.94%, 
8.12%, 6.16%, 5.52% and 2.64% respectively over the same period (Table 7.4). Over 
this 23-day event window, general mining appears to be the most affected subsector 
with a negative mean excess performance of 10.90%. Table 7.4 indicates that those 
average excess cumulative returns are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
level for all subsectors but exploration and production, coal and gold mining, for which 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
Figures 7.5–7.8 then reveal a sudden positive jump in the average abnormal returns and 
cumulative mean excess performances the day preceding the announcement of the 
MRRT across all subsectors, which interrupts the downward trend thus far observed. 
Table 7.3 validates the graphical findings observed, that on average there is a significant 
positive pre-announcement effect. For instance, a positive and statistically significant 
excess return of 2.92% is observed on Day 1 for the entire sample. The exploration and 
production, general mining and coal, nonferrous metals and iron also exhibit significant 
positive abnormal returns on that same day, of 2.96%, 3.40%, 2.77% and 1.04% 
respectively, all of which are significant except for the coal and gold subsectors. 
General mining companies display by far the strongest one-day pre-announcement 
positive. In contrast, firms involved within the iron and steel subsector earn on that day 
the weakest statically significant abnormal returns. This observed differential tax 
treatment is probably caused by market participants perceiving that firms belonging to 
particular subsectors were on average more likely to benefit from the RSPT being 
repealed and replaced by the MRRT consequently gaining more value relative to other 
subsectors. 
This differential tax effect may be related to firms/subsectors specific characteristics 
and will be investigated further in Chapter 8. However, the surge in the mean 
cumulative prediction errors over the pre-announcement period does not necessarily 
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imply that an investor who acquired stocks of resources companies after the RSPT was 
amended and the MRRT announced would earn abnormal returns. Indeed, as Mandelker 
(1974) noted, prediction errors of individual securities differ from the behaviour of the 
cross-sectional average abnormal returns. Each security has some high and low 
prediction errors on some days, and these vary from company to company. The issue of 
profitable trading rules and firm-specific characteristics will be investigated in 
subsequent chapters. While during the 20-day period (-20; -1) the proportion of negative 
average abnormal returns across all subsectors is relatively important at almost 83% 
(although few of statistical significance), no negative mean excess performance is 
observed the day prior to the announcement of the MRRT.  
The following explanation is suggested. The likelihood of the RSPT being repealed or 
amended in favour of a more generous form of resource tax may have dramatically 
increased during the period leading to its announcement. Discussions between various 
stakeholders, rumours, dismissal of the then Prime Minster Kevin Rudd, major lobbying 
by the largest resources companies as well as analysts’ predictions of a repeal or 
amendment of the RSPT and arguments about the RSPT being value destructive all 
augmented the likelihood of the RSPT being amended or removed in favour of a 
friendlier resource tax. The dramatic increase in the probability of the RSPT being 
repealed or amended likely resulted in the rapid augmentation of the market value of 
firms subject to the RSPT.  
Indeed, the stock price response to an event’s announcement is simply the product of 
the perceived costs or benefits associated with the event and the probability of that event 
taking place. As it became evident that the RSPT would not be implemented, market 
participants revised their outlook about expected future earnings and results in a 
reallocation of their portfolios based on the expectation of improved future profits. The 
share price reaction depicted in Figures 7.5–7.8 is consistent with revised shareholder 
expectations of better future returns because of a potential repeal/amendment of the 
RSPT, for a better outcome than under the initial proposed RSPT. This confirms that the 
share value of all companies subject to the RSPT was reassessed during this period and 
that the potential amendment or repeal of the RSPT was perceived by the market as 
‘good news’. It is therefore safe to assume that investors predicted a sharp improvement 
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in the earning prospects of resource companies in the days immediately preceding the 
announcement of the MRRT. 
Figures 7.5–7.8 show little market reaction on the day the MRRT was announced, and 
the lack of statistical significance on that day is confirmed in Table 7.3, corroborating 
the absence of abnormal returns on Day 0. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show that while there is a 
mix of sporadically significant positive and negative abnormal average returns across 
subsectors on the day the MRRT was announced and the days following, most are 
insignificantly different from zero over the 21 days of the post-announcement period 
(including Day 0). In other words, the cumulative mean prediction errors surged 
dramatically on Day -1 but other than this day, there is no further systematic movement, 
with the mean residuals randomly distributed around zero. Thus, no evidence of unusual 
performance is found. The fact that no excess performance is noticed on that particular 
day suggests that security holders of companies subject to the amended resource tax did 
not respond to the proposed MRRT announcement and points to the possibility that 
news of the proposed MRRT was not meaningful.  
The following interpretation is suggested. As previously mentioned, discontent 
associated with the RSPT within the mining community, reports of meetings taking 
place between different stakeholder groups, mining industry campaigning against the 
RSPT, the removal of Kevin Rudd, knowledge of regulators, federal government, lobby 
groups and other various stakeholders meeting to consider and discuss potential 
regulatory changes to the proposed RSPT all occurred prior to the actual MRRT 
announcement. Consequently, market participants interpreted those events (correctly) as 
a high possibility of the RSPT being removed or amended and replaced by a more 
generous form of resource tax. Such events or announcements send a signal to the 
market that the government is seeking a ‘fairer’ resource tax (i.e., the MRRT) that 
would not be as value destructive as the initial RSPT. To the extent that investors could 
accurately anticipate the nature of forthcoming change (i.e., the replacement of the 
RSPT with the MRRT), anticipation of the proposed MRRT announcement may have 
seen large price increase in the few days immediately preceding the announcement of 
the MRRT, which in turn produced abnormal security performance in this pre-
announcement period. This price adjustment is because of altering expectations and 
revaluations from security holders concerning the future of the companies and 
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ultimately share values. This is because a more generous resource tax would improve 
stockholder confidence with regards to future earnings of the companies subject to the 
potential resource tax. Therefore, at the time it became clear that a more generous form 
of taxation was to be implemented in place of the RSPT, a corresponding price 
adjustment took place (between Days -2 and -1).  
The fact that the average cumulative excess performances (Figure 7.5) rose sharply for 
most subsectors around a day before the MRRT was announced is consistent with the 
suggestion that market participants recognised the likely repeal or amendment of the 
RSPT in favour of a more generous form of taxation and associated it with a lesser 
impact on the stream of expected income for resource companies under the RSPT. 
Then, when the MRRT was announced (Day 0), only an insignificant further adjustment 
was necessary; small or no share price adjustments took place following the 
announcement, reflecting that the MRRT was rightly anticipated. This is confirmed by 
the absence of up and down movements in the cumulative mean abnormal returns and 
by small average prediction errors randomly scattered around zero during the post-
announcement period (Figure 7.5–7.8).  
Table 7.4 further confirms this graphical representation and indicates that there are very 
few statistically significant average abnormal returns after the MRRT was announced. 
In addition, Table 7.4 shows that all of the cumulative mean excess returns (0; +20) and 
(1; +20) are statistically insignificant. This indicates that the apparent effect of the pre- 
MRRT announcement period was almost entirely wiped away during the post-
announcement phase. In fact, as Day 20 approaches, security returns revert to their 
normal relationships with the market model. In sum, the results indicate that once the 
implications of the MRRT were properly considered by the market, its effects were 
fully reflected in the price by the end of the entire event period. This occurred by means 
of a price adjustment to the magnitude associated with changes in the estimated level of 
future streams of income from the stock or earnings from the company caused by the 
MRRT. Although not the focus of this study, another point worth making is with respect 
to market efficiency. The results of this analysis lend support to the assumption that the 
market is efficient, at least in its semi-strong form, in the sense that the speed at which 
security prices adjusted to the new information content of the MRRT announcement 
was rapid. 
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While overall no announcement nor post-announcement effects are evidenced across 
subsectors, closer inspection of Figures 7.8 and Tables 7.3 and 7.4 reveals that three of 
the six subsectors investigated produce several statistically significant short-lived 
negative post-announcement prediction errors, beginning around two–four days after the 
MRRT announcement. For instance, iron and steel, gold mining and general mining 
experience average abnormal cumulative losses of 5.39%, 2.67% and 1.43% 
respectively over the 3-day period (+2; +4). Abnormal losses accumulate a little longer 
for the gold mining and iron and steel subsector; -6.35% and -5.70% over the (+4; 12) 
multi-window period. The subsequent decline in the cumulative mean excess 
performance exhibited after the announcement of the MRRT in those subsectors is 
consistent with the assumption that investors were fooled by the forthcoming MRRT 
announcement; that is, market participants believed that the announcement would imply 
higher performances of resource firms subject to the defunct RSPT and hence revised 
their expectation upwards in the pre-announcement period, as seen in Figure 7.7 and 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4.  
However, after the MRRT was announced, investors seemed to revise their expectations 
downward. A possible explanation is that stock prices were influenced by shareholders 
who failed to appreciate the full ramifications of the proposed MRRT, consequently 
failing to react immediately after the announcement of the proposed MRRT. That is, 
some stockholders unable to form an unbiased expectation of the potential implication 
of the MRRT may not have reacted until analyst forecasts were released and/or revised 
and actual implications realised, which in this case, occurred quite soon after the 
announcement (within a few days) (Figure 7.7). In this case, once investors in iron and 
steel, gold and general firms absorbed the proposed MRRT announcement, those 
companies’ price performance returned to previous negative levels exhibited under the 
RSPT, which perhaps indicates that expectations for the firms prior to the MRRT had 
been too positive. This would suggest that media reports, analyst views and such 
conveyed useful information for the valuation of companies subject to the MRRT. 
The behaviour displayed by the various subsectors investigated in this section is 
markedly different within the immediate to short–medium-term post-adjustment phase. 
For instance, the portfolios of companies involved in exploration and production and 
coal and nonferrous metals appear to be relatively unaffected by post-announcement 
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effects within the (2; 4), (1; 2) and (1; 4) multi-day windows. In contrast, iron and steel, 
gold mining and general mining seem to suffer abnormal losses over the same windows. 
Investors in the gold mining and iron and steel continued to suffer statistically 
significant losses, which grew to 5.70% and 6.38% respectively, especially during the 
(2; 12) window (see Table 7.6). These results provide evidence that during these short 
periods, stockholders of companies involved in the iron and steel, gold mining and 
general mining subsectors reacted negatively to the announcement of the MRRT; over 
the days following the announcement of the MRRT, abnormal losses exhibited by the 
general mining, gold mining and iron and steel subsectors were significantly greater 
than those of the exploration and production, coal and nonferrous subsectors.  
This provides scant evidence that a movement towards the MRRT was viewed 
favourably by investors in iron and steel and gold mining companies. It is interesting to 
note that the difference in the magnitude of the average cumulative prediction errors 
accentuates over the post-announcement period between the iron ore and other 
subsectors, and that this difference amplifies as the window length widens. For instance, 
Table 7.3 indicates that on Day 0, the cumulative mean abnormal losses observed across 
subsectors range between 1.73% for the coal subsector and 6.92% for general mining, 
while the iron subsector generates a cumulative average abnormal loss of 6.86%, though 
the coal subsector cars is the only one that is significant on Day 0. However, at the end 
of the event window (Day 20), cumulative average excess returns fluctuate between -
5.88% and 1.20% across subsectors, whereas the iron subsector cumulative mean 
abnormal loss increased two-fold, to reach 12.30%. It should be noted that the only 
significant cumulative excess returns on Day 20 is produced by the iron subsectors. For 
most of the event window, Figure 7.8 shows that the results for the exploration and 
production subsector are similar to those of coal and general mining, with the 
cumulative mean excess performance of the former paralleling those of the latter 
subsectors.  
While the iron and steel subsector displays by far the strongest negative post-
announcement response to the MRRT announcement, with a statistically significant 
average loss of 6.38% over the (2; 12) window, the nonferrous subsector produces over 
the same period on average a 3.19% return in excess of the normal return estimated by 
the market model, the highest post-adjustment phase performance (although statistically 
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insignificant). This indicates that the modest average abnormal returns earned by the 
iron and steel and gold mining subsectors during the pre-announcement period were all 
lost over the 12 days following the announcement of the MRRT.  
To conclude this section the following can be stated: 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 validate the graphical findings observed in Figures 7.5 to 7.8 that on 
average there is a significant positive abnormal return a day prior to the announcement 
of the MRRT. Whilst there is a mix of negative and positive spikes over the 41 days 
window (excluding day -1), only a few are significant 
During the period between day -20 to day -1 all groups of portfolios suffer abnormal 
losses with an average cumulative abnormal loss of 8.06% for the entire sample (table 
7.6) but these losses were only significantly different from zero for companies involved 
within general mining, nonferrous metal as well as iron and steel subsectors. 
Performances in the day prior to its announcement, show positive mean excess returns 
of moderate magnitude across all subsectors with a mean excess return of 2.92% 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level for the full sample.  
Overall there is evidence of a significant preannouncement positive drift. It should 
however be noted that these abnormal gains are only significant for the exploration and 
production, general mining, nonferrous and iron and steel subsectors. The positive 
steeper slopes a day prior to the MRRT announcement indicate a positive market build 
up caused by the anticipation of good news i.e. RSPT being replaced by the MRRT.  
Most information or detail feature of future change/repealing of the RSPT or 
implementation of MRRT is anticipated by market participants before the proposed 
MRRT is announced as seen in Figures 7.5 to 7.8 with a positive peak between day -2 
and -1. In fact, anticipation is accurate enough not to cause unusual jumps at the 
announcement day when the proposed MRRT is announced. The lack/absence of 
abnormal performances on the day the MRRT is announced indicate that market 
participants do not respond in any significant manner to the announcement of the 
MRRT.  
From the announcement day to the end of the window period, shareholders of each 
subsector earn abnormal returns except for those of companies involved within the gold 
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mining and iron ore which cumulate abnormal losses over this period thought all of 
these abnormal performances are statistically insignificant. The lack of statistical 
significance therefore validates the null hypothesis over this period. A small positive 
drift take place toward the end of the 41-window period although insignificant. Hence 
announcement of the proposed MRRT was good news for all the subsectors included on 
the analysis but the iron ore and gold mining subsectors. The results of the 
announcement of the proposed MRRT provide robust evidence that the MRRT was 
viewed favourably by the equity market. The event study findings suggest that the share 
price effect of the announcement of the proposed MRRT on the affected subsectors is 
predominantly positive. These findings seem to suggest that the market reacts positively 
to the announcement of the MRRT 
 Figure 7.5: Overall Sample Percentage Average Abnormal Return (MRRT) 
Figure 7.5 shows the overall sample ‘all subsector’ average abnormal returns series time plot for every given day within the event window surrounding the announcement of 
the MRRT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6  The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 115 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the 
general mining subsector, 36 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 34 to iron and steel, as classified by the 
industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The 
equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the 
S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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 Figure 7.6: Percentage Average Abnormal Returns by Subsectors (MRRT) 
Figure 7.6 shows various subsectors’ average abnormal returns series time plots for each given day within the event window surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. 
The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The exploration and production subsector consists of 115 firms, the coal subsector covers 36 stocks and the iron and steel subsector includes 34 firms. 
Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios based on their subsector of belonging as defined in the previous chapter. The equally weighted average abnormal 
return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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 Figure 7.7: Percentage Average Abnormal Returns by Subsectors (MRRT) 
Figure 7.7 shows various subsectors’ average abnormal returns series time plots for every given day within the event window with regard to the announcement of the MRRT. 
The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The general mining subsector contains 330 companies, the gold mining subsector comprises 105 companies, and the nonferrous metals subsector 
encompasses 75 companies. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios based on their subsector of belonging as defined in the previous chapter. The equally 
weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 
value weighted index. 
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 Table 7.3: Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed MRRT 
Table 7.3 shows the different subsectors’ average abnormal and cumulative returns for each given day within the event window surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. 
The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 115 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general mining 
subsector, 36 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 34 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification 
benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average 
abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6, where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value 
weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 
6. The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is 
zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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(-0.822) 
-4.46 
(-0.929) 
0.35 
(0.629) 
-11.15 
(-2.440)** 
12 -0.87 
(-0.957) 
-4.37 
(-0.962) 
-0.60 
(-1.048) 
0.47 
(0.345) 
-0.67 
(-0.604) 
-6.05 
(-1.448) 
0.12 
(0.265) 
-0.71 
(0.334) 
-1.21 
(-1.378) 
-2.52 
(-0.149) 
-2.14 
(-1.182) 
-6.60 
(-1.275) 
-1.77 
(-2.383)** 
-12.92 
(-2.707)** 
13 0.50 
(0.449) 
-3.87 
(-0.830) 
0.44 
(0.410) 
0.91 
(0.414) 
0.37 
(0.387) 
-5.68 
(-1.336) 
0.04 
(-0.176) 
-0.66 
(0.302) 
-0.19 
(-0.144) 
-2.71 
(-0.175) 
1.61 
(0.598) 
-4.98 
(-1.016) 
0.52 
(0.508) 
-12.40 
(-2.599)** 
14 1.05 
(1.557) 
-2.82 
(-0.467) 
1.15 
(1.583) 
2.07 
(0.676) 
0.52 
(1.185) 
-5.15 
(-1.050) 
1.82 
(1.407) 
1.15 
(0.600) 
3.55 
(1.838)* 
0.83 
(0.535) 
0.76 
(0.818) 
-4.21 
(-0.829) 
0.22 
(1.250) 
-12.17 
(-2.325)** 
15 -0.35 
(-0.539) 
-3.17 
(-0.568) 
-1.68 
(-1.621) 
0.39 
(0.360) 
0.09 
(-0.021) 
-5.06 
(-1.018) 
0.66 
(0.312) 
1.81 
(0.635) 
-0.45 
(-0.618) 
0.37 
(0.443) 
-0.59 
(-0.529) 
-4.81 
(-0.919) 
0.08 
(0.372) 
-12.08 
(-2.219)** 
16 0.04 
(0.219) 
-3.13 
(-0.513) 
-0.70 
(-0.236) 
-0.31 
(0.308) 
0.45 
(0.563) 
-4.60 
(-0.872) 
-0.48 
(-0.562) 
1.33 
(0.572) 
-0.38 
(0.014) 
-0.01 
(0.423) 
0.37 
(0.172) 
-4.43 
(-0.893) 
-0.49 
(-0.137) 
-12.58 
(-2.129)** 
17 -0.45 
(-0.544) 
-3.58 
(-0.605) 
-0.72 
(-0.979) 
-1.04 
(0.159) 
-0.70 
(-0.821) 
-5.30 
(-1.006) 
0.87 
(0.525) 
2.20 
(0.660) 
0.64 
(1.011) 
0.63 
(0.613) 
-0.73 
(-1.075) 
-5.16 
(-1.100) 
0.89 
(0.601) 
-11.69 
(-1.994)* 
18 -0.40 
(-0.784) 
-3.99 
(-0.760) 
-0.49 
(-0.689) 
-1.53 
(0.045) 
0.03 
(-0.176) 
-5.27 
(-1.038) 
-1.61 
(-2.062)** 
0.59 
(0.293) 
0.26 
(0.275) 
0.90 
(0.656) 
-1.86 
(-1.743)* 
-7.03 
(-1.472) 
-0.69 
(-1.272) 
-12.38 
(-2.163)** 
19 0.42 
(0.625) 
-3.56 
(-0.631) 
0.63 
(0.617) 
-0.90 
(0.142) 
0.40 
(0.635) 
-4.86 
(-0.897) 
-0.04 
(0.248) 
0.55 
(0.325) 
0.04 
(-0.028) 
0.94 
(0.632) 
0.29 
(0.462) 
-6.74 
(-1.357) 
-0.96 
(-0.060) 
-13.35 
(-2.095)** 
20 1.09 
(1.161) 
-2.47 
(-0.394) 
1.69 
(1.356) 
0.78 
(0.402) 
1.43 
(1.515) 
-3.42 
(-0.553) 
0.64 
(0.417) 
1.20 
(0.443) 
-0.47 
(-0.518) 
0.47 
(0.543) 
0.85 
(0.788) 
-5.88 
(-1.193) 
1.04 
(0.670) 
-12.30 
(-2.003)* 
Notes: The ***, ** and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 Figure 7.8: Percentage Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (MRRT) 
Figure 7.8 shows the overall sample ‘all subsector’ average cumulative returns as well as those of each various individual subsector for the 41 -days period within the event 
window surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 115 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the 
general mining subsector, 36 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 34 to iron and steel, as classified by the 
industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The 
equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the 
S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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 Table 7.4: Multi-Day Window Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed MRRT 
Table 7.4 shows the different subsectors’ average cumulative returns for various multi-day periods within the event window surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. The 
abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter estimates from the 
estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 115 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general mining 
subsector, 36 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 34 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification 
benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average 
abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value 
weighted index. The t-statistics for the CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null 
hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. The ***, ** and * refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 Days relative to 
AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production (N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  
car (-20 -10) -4.74 
(-2.106)** 
-3.27 
(-0.955) 
-3.25 
(-6.616)*** 
-1.63 
(-0.258) 
-5.68 
(-2.023)** 
-0.96 
(-0.177) 
-7.48 
(-2.682)** 
car (-20 -2) -8.06 
(-2.514)** 
-6.16 
(-1.502) 
-10.90 
(-3.547)*** 
-5.52 
(-0.916) 
-8.94 
(-2.327)** 
-2.64 
(-0.382) 
-8.12 
(-2.013)* 
car (0 to 2) -0.16 
(-0.066) 
0.66 
(0.386) 
-0.23 
(-0.120) 
0.78 
(0.835) 
0.68 
(0.318) 
-1.19 
(-0.675) 
-1.62 
(-1.048) 
car (1 to 2) -0.67 
(-0.465) 
-0.22 
(-0.084) 
-0.80 
(-0.720) 
0.67 
(0.858) 
-0.43 
(-0.344) 
-0.69 
(-0.283) 
-1.84 
(-1.837)* 
car (0 to 4) -0.90 
(-0.718) 
0.51 
(-0.213) 
-0.72 
(-0.380) 
-0.25 
(0.400) 
-0.73 
(-0.481) 
-2.30 
(-1.502) 
-4.85 
(-3.310)*** 
car (1 to 4) -1.42 
(-1.124) 
-0.36 
(-0.653) 
-1.29 
(-0.859) 
-0.35 
(0.432) 
-1.85 
(-1.064) 
-1.80 
(-1.348) 
-5.07 
(-4.490)*** 
car (2 to 4) -1.91 
(-1.917)* 
-0.97 
(-1.482) 
-1.43 
(-1.859)* 
-1.08 
(-0.822) 
-1.20 
(-1.419) 
-2.67 
(-1.870)* 
-5.39 
(-4.937)*** 
car (2 to 12) -0.24 
(-0.389) 
2.18 
(0.662) 
-0.08 
(0.299) 
0.29 
(-0.006) 
3.19 
(0.889) 
-5.70 
(-1.884)* 
-6.38 
(-2.574)** 
car (4 to 12) 0.48 
(0.020) 
2.62 
(1.002) 
1.32 
(0.340) 
-0.21 
(-0.031) 
2.49 
(1.044) 
-4.87 
(-1.542) 
-3.89 
(-1.919)* 
car ( 4 to 18) 0.87 
(0.154) 
0.60 
(0.292) 
2.11 
(0.578) 
1.09 
(-0.047) 
5.91 
(1.730)* 
-5.30 
(-1.686)* 
-3.35 
(-1.172) 
car (13 to 20) 1.90 
(0.929) 
0.30 
(0.204) 
2.63 
(1.424) 
1.91 
(0.298) 
2.99 
(1.302) 
0.71 
(-0.194) 
0.61 
(0.943) 
car ( 0 +20) 2.66 
(0.608) 
3.98 
(0.912) 
4.06 
(1.097) 
3.03 
(0.687) 
6.65 
(1.632) 
-4.60 
(-1.338) 
-5.22 
(-1.348) 
car (-1 +1) 3.93 
(2.638)*** 
4.45 
(1.931)* 
4.54 
(3.384)*** 
4.51 
(1.668) 
3.23 
(1.797)* 
1.74 
(0.914) 
1.58 
(1.426) 
car (-1 0) 3.43 
(2.579)** 
3.84 
(1.955)* 
3.98 
(3.194)*** 
3.79 
(1.115) 
3.89 
(2.771)*** 
0.87 
(0.384) 
1.26 
(1.570) 
car (0 +1) 1 
(1.075) 
1.49 
(1.011) 
1.13 
(1.288) 
0.82 
(1.014) 
0.46 
(0.585) 
0.37 
(0.031) 
0.53 
(0.312) 
car (1 to 20) 2.15 
(0.481) 
3.10 
(0.738) 
3.49 
(0.926) 
2.93 
(0.737) 
5.53 
(1.297) 
-4.11 
(-1.268) 
-5.44 
(-1.478) 
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7.4 Combined RSPT and MRRT Announcement Analysis 
Figure 7.9 plots the results of company average cumulative abnormal performances in 
portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as well as for the entire sample. The 
results confirm those of previous sections. While shareholders across subsectors responded 
negatively to the announcement of the proposed RSPT, the anticipated MRRT was 
perceived rather positively by the market. Its announcement however had very little impact, 
and nearly no post-announcement effect is observed. The positive pre-announcement 
reaction to the MRRT is not sufficient to offset the negative impact associated with the 
possible introduction of a profit-based tax in place of the existing output based tax regime. 
Table 7.5 confirms the results from the previous section that on average most firms 
experience abnormal losses as a result of the RSPT announcement and that the bulk of 
average abnormal losses were incurred during the (0; 2) and (11; 14) window periods. With 
the prospect of a modified resource profit tax (the MRRT), all subsectors begin to earn 
modest abnormal returns in the day prior to its announcement, although these are only 
statistically significant for companies in the exploration and production, general mining and 
nonferrous subsectors (see Table 7.5). During that day, most subsectors earn average 
abnormal returns ranging from 2.297% to 2.81%, with the exception of gold mining and 
iron, respectively earning only 0.92% and 0.57% in excess of the return predicted by the 
market model. Most firms in the sample, regardless of subsector, are relatively unaffected 
by the announcement of the MRRT. No post-announcement effect is observed, although a 
slight positive drift is noticed for the coal, exploration and production, general mining and 
nonferrous subsectors (though this is statistically insignificant) (see Tables 7.5 and 7.6 and 
Figure 7.9). A small statistically insignificant post-announcement negative trend is also 
observed for both the gold mining and iron subsectors. It should however be noted that a 
significant short-lived negative post-announcement drift lasting two days is noticed for 
firms in the iron subsector a couple of days after the MRRT was announced. During this 3-
day period, the iron subsector suffers a cumulative loss of 5.07%. Over the 82-day window, 
the cumulative effect of both resource tax announcements is on average negative, with 
losses accumulated across subsectors. However, from the time the MRRT is first 
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anticipated until the end of the event window, these cumulative losses are generally reduced 
across all subsectors except iron and gold mining. These results suggest that while 
abnormal gains are earned just before the MRRT is announced, these are too modest to 
mitigate losses incurred around the RSPT announcement, keeping in mind that the absence 
of abnormal performances post-MRRT announcement also contributes to reducing previous 
accumulated losses but to a small extent only. 
Comparison of the cumulative mean prediction errors across portfolios also confirms that 
the announcement of the RSPT and MRRT affect the market value of resource companies 
differently. For instance, iron ore companies and firms in the coal subsector appear to suffer 
the most on the day of the RSPT announcement, with statistically significant losses of 
3.81% and 3.14% respectively. In contrast, gold mining companies and exploration and 
production firms seem to be unaffected by the RSPT announcement, with no excess returns 
observed on that day. Two days post RSPT announcement, on average, all companies incur 
statistically significant abnormal losses, with the coal subsector accumulating the largest 
loss (7.13%) and the exploration and production the smallest loss (4.24%). Table 7.6 
indicates that from the period over which the first signs of reaction to the RSPT 
announcement are detected until one day before the first signs of reactions to the MRRT 
announcement are noticed121 (i.e., I), companies involved in the nonferrous, general mining 
and iron ore subsectors accumulate the largest losses. Once again, gold mining firms 
exhibit no abnormal returns over this period. By the end of the full event period, those 
accumulated losses dwindle for most subsectors except iron ore and gold mining companies 
(see Table 7.6 II) It is important to note that firms involved in exploration and production 
and gold mining suffer smaller cumulative abnormal losses than do other subsectors during 
the period between which reaction to the RSPT is first observed and the end of the event 
window (i.e., 20 days post-MRRT announcement) (see Table 7.6 II). 
This suggests that following the announcement of the MRRT, gold mining companies 
accumulate larger losses than other firms except for those involved in iron ore. Investors in 
iron ore firms continue to suffer further losses during the post-MRRT period, especially 
                                                 
121 This enables the measurement of the effect of the RSPT announcement only, that is, separate to any effect 
from the inception phase where ARS are positive and those of the MRRT announcement. Since there is 
evidence of a one-day pre-MRRT announcement effect, we stopped at Day 41, inclusive. 
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between Days 45 and 47, i.e., MRRT 2 to 4. It is this short-lived post-MRRT negative 
reaction combined with the lack of positive abnormal returns prior to announcement that 
causes the iron subsectors not to reduce cumulative losses over the time period from which 
the MRRT is announced. While the gold mining subsector also incurs further losses during 
the post-MRRT period, magnitudes pale in comparison to those of the iron ore subsector 
(about half). As indicated previously, the surge in abnormal losses experienced by gold 
mining firms is much more modest over this period than those of iron ore companies, 
indicating that although there is little difference in the performance across subsectors on the 
day the RSPT is announced, following its announcement, dissimilarities in abnormal 
returns start to surface and some of those differences grow progressively larger following 
the RSPT announcement. While some of these differences become more accentuated post-
MRRT, evidence of a reversal is observed across others. These differences may well be 
related to firms/subsector specific characteristics and will be investigated further in Chapter 
8. Nevertheless, the total cumulative loss over the full event window is severe enough for 
companies in iron ore, coal, nonferrous metals and general mining subsectors to suggest 
that the nature of their core activities was likely to suffer the most from a switch to a new 
resource profit tax (i.e., switch from an output-based tax to a profit-based tax). 
To conclude this section, the following can be said: 
Over the full event window, that is including the combined reaction to the RSPT and 
MRRT announcements, companies involved within the gold mining and the exploration 
subsectors suffer the least losses. In contrast firms involved within other subsectors suffer 
twice as much cumulative losses over the full event window with the iron subsectors 
suffering the most. Once again, these results are consistent with previous findings and 
indicate than iron ore companies suffer the most as a result of the introduction of these 
resources taxes. It is clear that investors in this particular subsector whilst seeing the MRRT 
not as value destructive as the RSPT yet perceive the MRRT less beneficial to them than do 
companies involved in other subsectors. Overall the MRRT is perceive by market 
participant as good news and much more less value destructive than the RSPT. One could 
possibly argue that the replacement of the RSPT by the MRRT is value constructive as its 
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anticipation produces on average positive excess returns across most subsectors but has 
very little medium to longer term impact as its post announcement effect is non-existent. 
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Table 7.5: Market Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed RSPT and MRRT 
Table 7.5 shows the different subsectors average abnormal and cumulative returns for each given for the period beginning 20 trading days before the 
announcement of the RSPT and extending through 20 trading days following the announcement of the MRRT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period (i.e., (-272; -21) days relative to the announcement of the RSPT) and are computed using the Scholes William method as 
defined in Chapter 6. The sample size consists of 706 firms listed on the ASX, of which 114 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 327 to the 
general mining subsector, 34 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as classified 
by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging. The equally 
weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed as in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for 
period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously 
compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted 
standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the 
event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess 
return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=706) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=114) 
General Mining  
(N=327) 
Coal  
(N=34) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 0.66 
(1.099) 
0.66 
(1.099) 
0.32 
(0.704) 
0.32 
(0.704) 
0.26 
(0.652) 
0.26 
(0.652) 
1.79 
(1.402) 
1.79 
(1.402) 
0.57 
(0.831) 
0.57 
(0.831) 
1.66 
(0.964) 
1.66 
(0.964) 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
-19 0.58 
(0.549) 
1.24 
(1.187) 
0.61 
(0.446) 
0.94 
(0.960) 
0.03 
(-0.009) 
0.30 
(0.474) 
1.51 
(1.769)* 
3.31 
(2.034)** 
1.90 
(1.146) 
2.47 
(1.485) 
1.72 
(0.855) 
3.38 
(1.271) 
-0.40 
(-0.569) 
1.59 
(1.389) 
-18 0.63 
(0.846) 
1.88 
(1.483) 
1.26 
(1.421) 
2.21 
(1.772)* 
0.39 
(0.570) 
0.69 
(0.698) 
-0.19 
(0.294) 
3.12 
(1.911)* 
0.45 
(0.713) 
2.93 
(1.641) 
1.05 
(0.438) 
4.43 
(1.455) 
0.63 
(0.667) 
2.22 
(1.493) 
-17 0.33 
(0.702) 
2.22 
(1.713)* 
0.33 
(0.370) 
2.54 
(1.714)* 
0.31 
(0.650) 
1.01 
(0.971) 
-0.24 
(0.283) 
2.87 
(2.112)** 
1.87 
(1.346) 
4.80 
(2.311)** 
-0.31 
(0.438) 
4.12 
(1.540) 
0.09 
(0.052) 
2.32 
(1.520) 
-16 0.68 
(0.807) 
2.91 
(1.884)* 
1.25 
(1.034) 
3.79 
(1.818)* 
0.30 
(0.424) 
1.31 
(1.099) 
2.31 
(1.216) 
5.19 
(2.308)** 
0.49 
(0.315) 
5.30 
(2.317)** 
1.42 
(0.947) 
5.54 
(1.857)* 
0.12 
(0.083) 
2.45 
(1.386) 
-15 0.67 
(0.961) 
3.58 
(2.188)** 
0.78 
(1.054) 
4.58 
(2.358)** 
0.65 
(0.950) 
1.97 
(1.501) 
2.27 
(2.175)** 
7.46 
(2.734)*** 
0.06 
(0.030) 
5.37 
(2.221)** 
0.89 
(0.386) 
6.44 
(1.853)* 
0.62 
(0.234) 
3.07 
(1.321) 
-14 0.14 
(0.316) 
3.72 
(2.148)** 
-0.10 
(-0.020) 
4.47 
(2.155)** 
0.41 
(0.460) 
2.39 
(1.580) 
1.34 
(1.534) 
8.81 
(2.992)*** 
-0.77 
(-0.514) 
4.60 
(1.993)** 
-0.32 
(-0.031) 
6.12 
(1.694)* 
0.64 
(1.378) 
3.72 
(1.596) 
-13 -0.46 
(-0.666) 
3.26 
(1.882)* 
0.57 
(0.168) 
5.05 
(2.067)** 
-0.72 
(-0.944) 
1.66 
(1.253) 
-0.93 
(-1.766)* 
7.87 
(2.744)*** 
-0.47 
(-0.613) 
4.13 
(1.666)* 
-0.71 
(-0.511) 
5.41 
(1.564) 
0.57 
(0.370) 
4.29 
(1.741)* 
-12 0.04 
(-0.245) 
3.30 
(1.719)* 
0.18 
(-0.291) 
5.24 
(1.878)* 
0.59 
(0.708) 
2.26 
(1.427) 
-0.17 
(-1.209) 
7.69 
(2.688)** 
-1.68 
(-2.289)** 
2.44 
(0.980) 
-0.16 
(-0.250) 
5.24 
(1.427) 
-0.39 
(-0.358) 
3.90 
(1.616) 
-11 0.34 
(0.442) 
3.65 
(1.884)* 
0.38 
(0.641) 
5.62 
(2.135)** 
0.45 
(0.544) 
2.71 
(1.577) 
-0.23 
(0.089) 
7.46 
(3.055)*** 
-0.09 
(-0.522) 
2.34 
(0.879) 
0.35 
(0.169) 
5.59 
(1.464) 
0.16 
(-0.111) 
4.07 
(1.621) 
-10 0.02 
(-0.154) 
3.68 
(1.720)* 
0.11 
(-0.220) 
5.74 
(1.711)* 
-0.49 
(-0.790) 
2.22 
(1.279) 
1.38 
(0.969) 
8.85 
(3.155)*** 
-0.83 
(-0.482) 
1.51 
(0.605) 
1.81 
(0.915) 
7.41 
(1.762)* 
-0.85 
(-0.816) 
3.21 
(1.309) 
-9 -0.57 
(-0.590) 
3.10 
(1.445) 
-0.30 
(-0.090) 
5.44 
(1.594) 
-0.86 
(-1.183) 
1.35 
(0.856) 
0.68 
(0.772) 
9.54 
(2.941)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.123) 
1.46 
(0.530) 
-1.15 
(-0.916) 
6.25 
(1.449) 
-0.07 
(-0.241) 
3.14 
(1.052) 
-8 0.35 
(0.347) 
3.46 
(1.462) 
0.08 
(0.056) 
5.53 
(1.543) 
0.88 
(0.886) 
2.24 
(1.079) 
0.94 
(0.591) 
10.49 
(2.887)*** 
-0.41 
(-0.665) 
1.04 
(0.324) 
-0.57 
(-0.720) 
5.68 
(1.279) 
0.45 
(1.198) 
3.59 
(1.324) 
-7 0.12 
(0.353) 
3.58 
(1.515) 
0.66 
(1.044) 
6.19 
(1.804)* 
-0.03 
(0.024) 
2.20 
(1.049) 
0.43 
(0.244) 
10.92 
(2.754)*** 
-0.01 
(0.020) 
1.03 
(0.305) 
-1.13 
(-0.057) 
4.54 
(1.178) 
1.42 
(0.596) 
5.02 
(1.341) 
-6 0.23 
(0.430) 
3.81 
(1.625) 
-0.19 
(-0.037) 
6.00 
(1.806)* 
0.03 
(0.197) 
2.24 
(1.097) 
1.16 
(0.940) 
12.08 
(2.992)*** 
0.57 
(0.625) 
1.60 
(0.468) 
0.70 
(0.787) 
5.25 
(1.319) 
0.83 
(0.093) 
5.85 
(1.217) 
-5 0.52 
(0.487) 
4.34 
(1.726)* 
1.71 
(1.318) 
7.72 
(2.335)** 
0.21 
(0.278) 
2.46 
(1.152) 
-1.56 
(-0.529) 
10.51 
(2.114)** 
-0.45 
(-0.554) 
1.15 
(0.381) 
1.68 
(0.549) 
6.93 
(1.447) 
-0.64 
(-0.247) 
5.21 
(1.149) 
228 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=706) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=114) 
General Mining  
(N=327) 
Coal  
(N=34) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-4 -0.07 
(0.080) 
4.26 
(1.685)* 
-0.33 
(0.079) 
7.39 
(2.181)** 
0.28 
(0.232) 
2.74 
(1.209) 
0.08 
(-0.087) 
10.60 
(2.070)** 
0.04 
(-0.025) 
1.19 
(0.348) 
-0.53 
(0.046) 
6.39 
(1.400) 
-1.71 
(-1.016) 
3.49 
(0.937) 
-3 -1.08 
(-1.237) 
3.18 
(1.258) 
-0.36 
(-0.212) 
7.02 
(2.022)** 
-1.64 
(-2.023)** 
1.10 
(0.577) 
-0.67 
(-0.823) 
9.93 
(1.964)* 
-2.42 
(-2.567)** 
-1.22 
(-0.325) 
0.56 
(0.113) 
6.96 
(1.386) 
-1.29 
(-1.963)* 
2.20 
(0.580) 
-2 -0.66 
(-0.791) 
2.51 
(0.885) 
-1.80 
(-0.975) 
5.22 
(0.949) 
-0.69 
(-1.027) 
0.40 
(0.297) 
-1.82 
(-1.134) 
8.11 
(1.769)* 
0.28 
(0.028) 
-0.93 
(-0.308) 
0.44 
(0.244) 
7.40 
(1.433) 
-0.24 
(-0.730) 
1.95 
(0.396) 
-1 -0.36 
(-0.662) 
2.15 
(0.715) 
0.08 
(-0.034) 
5.30 
(0.936) 
-0.59 
(-0.636) 
-0.18 
(0.093) 
0.91 
(-0.148) 
9.02 
(1.594) 
0.20 
(0.063) 
-0.72 
(-0.288) 
-0.67 
(-1.001) 
6.72 
(1.247) 
-1.87 
(-2.811)*** 
0.08 
(-0.214) 
0 -1.78 
(-2.300)** 
0.36 
(0.190) 
0.06 
(-0.102) 
5.37 
(0.914) 
-1.84 
(-2.403)** 
-2.03 
(-0.560) 
-3.14 
(-3.464)*** 
5.88 
(1.063) 
-2.22 
(-2.163)** 
-2.95 
(-0.819) 
-2.51 
(-1.621) 
4.21 
(0.864) 
-3.81 
(-3.063)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.055) 
1 -2.24 
(-2.790)*** 
-1.87 
(-0.503) 
-1.98 
(-1.875)* 
3.39 
(0.487) 
-2.15 
(-2.651)*** 
-4.18 
(-1.345) 
-2.70 
(-3.580)*** 
3.18 
(0.632) 
-2.59 
(-2.466)** 
-5.55 
(-1.417) 
-2.29 
(-1.462) 
1.92 
(0.418) 
-2.82 
(-2.788)*** 
-6.55 
(-1.721)* 
2 -2.14 
(-2.330)** 
-4.01 
(-1.041) 
-2.33 
(-2.290)** 
1.05 
(0.084) 
-3.01 
(-3.302)*** 
-7.19 
(-2.295)** 
-1.28 
(-1.105) 
1.89 
(0.424) 
-1.57 
(-1.430) 
-7.12 
(-1.727)* 
-0.64 
(-0.577) 
1.27 
(0.263) 
0.25 
(0.585) 
-6.30 
(-1.512) 
3 -0.59 
(0.026) 
-4.61 
(-0.977) 
-0.90 
(-0.334) 
0.14 
(0.014) 
-0.60 
(-0.159) 
-7.79 
(-2.172)** 
1.19 
(1.159) 
3.08 
(0.793) 
-0.95 
(-0.657) 
-8.07 
(-1.853)* 
-0.94 
(0.041) 
0.33 
(0.254) 
0.27 
(0.734) 
-6.02 
(-1.084) 
4 -0.76 
(-0.458) 
-5.37 
(-1.074) 
-1.04 
(-0.657) 
-0.89 
(-0.110) 
-0.88 
(-0.764) 
-8.68 
(-2.356)** 
-1.33 
(-0.767) 
1.75 
(0.690) 
-1.23 
(-0.797) 
-9.31 
(-2.082)** 
0.04 
(0.502) 
0.37 
(0.386) 
-0.26 
(0.332) 
-6.29 
(-0.901) 
5 0.37 
(0.373) 
-5.00 
(-1.009) 
1.56 
(1.383) 
0.67 
(0.126) 
0.17 
(0.178) 
-8.50 
(-2.410)** 
0.46 
(0.078) 
2.21 
(0.724) 
0.13 
(0.421) 
-9.17 
(-2.000)** 
0.00 
(-0.326) 
0.37 
(0.300) 
1.80 
(1.134) 
-4.48 
(-0.625) 
6 0.84 
(1.027) 
-4.15 
(-0.767) 
1.77 
(1.748)* 
2.45 
(0.437) 
0.84 
(0.931) 
-7.66 
(-2.127)** 
0.68 
(0.293) 
2.89 
(0.773) 
0.35 
(0.350) 
-8.81 
(-1.898)* 
0.90 
(0.809) 
1.28 
(0.513) 
-1.05 
(-1.237) 
-5.54 
(-0.807) 
7 0.23 
(0.481) 
-3.92 
(-0.626) 
-1.36 
(-1.117) 
1.08 
(0.229) 
0.09 
(0.271) 
-7.57 
(-1.961)* 
-1.86 
(-1.951)* 
1.03 
(0.579) 
0.32 
(0.099) 
-8.48 
(-1.802)* 
2.80 
(2.105)** 
4.09 
(1.081) 
-0.88 
(-0.609) 
-6.42 
(-0.877) 
8 0.28 
(0.288) 
-3.64 
(-0.566) 
-0.95 
(-1.109) 
0.13 
(0.098) 
0.47 
(0.333) 
-7.09 
(-1.859)* 
0.48 
(0.429) 
1.52 
(0.648) 
0.59 
(0.571) 
-7.89 
(-1.669)* 
0.92 
(1.000) 
5.01 
(1.277) 
0.31 
(-0.079) 
-6.11 
(-0.949) 
9 1.09 
(1.540) 
-2.54 
(-0.261) 
1.85 
(2.304)** 
1.98 
(0.391) 
0.85 
(1.228) 
-6.23 
(-1.508) 
0.71 
(1.034) 
2.23 
(0.789) 
1.34 
(1.175) 
-6.55 
(-1.365) 
1.49 
(0.893) 
6.51 
(1.469) 
-0.29 
(0.064) 
-6.40 
(-0.944) 
10 -0.51 
(-0.307) 
-3.05 
(-0.318) 
-0.92 
(-0.725) 
1.06 
(0.261) 
-0.86 
(-0.812) 
-7.10 
(-1.660)* 
-2.54 
(-1.476) 
-0.31 
(0.471) 
-0.67 
(-0.472) 
-7.22 
(-1.495) 
1.74 
(1.474) 
8.25 
(1.711)* 
-1.41 
(-0.737) 
-7.82 
(-1.007) 
11 -1.48 
(-2.006)** 
-4.54 
(-0.690) 
-0.10 
(-0.437) 
0.96 
(0.203) 
-1.48 
(-1.791)* 
-8.58 
(-2.079)** 
-2.61 
(-2.195)** 
-2.92 
(0.020) 
-1.85 
(-1.755)* 
-9.08 
(-1.934)* 
-2.28 
(-2.058)** 
5.97 
(1.397) 
-1.63 
(-1.728)* 
-9.45 
(-1.338) 
229 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=706) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=114) 
General Mining  
(N=327) 
Coal  
(N=34) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
12 -1.34 
(-1.326) 
-5.89 
(-0.992) 
-1.30 
(-0.558) 
-0.33 
(0.094) 
-1.60 
(-1.463) 
-10.19 
(-2.395)** 
-2.01 
(-1.686) 
-4.93 
(-0.259) 
0.05 
(-0.030) 
-9.03 
(-1.893)* 
-1.34 
(-1.175) 
4.62 
(1.172) 
-1.39 
(-1.158) 
-10.84 
(-1.414) 
13 -1.63 
(-2.025)** 
-7.52 
(-1.337) 
-1.23 
(-1.367) 
-1.57 
(-0.106) 
-1.84 
(-2.127)** 
-12.03 
(-2.748)*** 
-1.05 
(-1.497) 
-5.99 
(-0.491) 
-1.20 
(-0.769) 
-10.23 
(-1.961)* 
-2.30 
(-1.974)* 
2.32 
(0.759) 
-0.95 
(-1.334) 
-11.80 
(-1.580) 
14 -3.22 
(-2.972)*** 
-10.75 
(-1.988)** 
-2.18 
(-1.931)* 
-3.76 
(-0.450) 
-3.19 
(-2.931)*** 
-15.23 
(-3.473)*** 
-2.13 
(-1.680) 
-8.13 
(-0.715) 
-6.09 
(-2.860)*** 
-16.33 
(-2.954)*** 
-2.67 
(-2.231)** 
-0.35 
(0.316) 
-3.30 
(-1.120) 
-15.10 
(-1.832)* 
15 0.39 
(0.090) 
-10.35 
(-1.971)** 
-0.24 
(-0.200) 
-4.00 
(-0.480) 
0.56 
(0.203) 
-14.67 
(-3.435)*** 
-0.59 
(-0.858) 
-8.72 
(-0.832) 
1.25 
(0.498) 
-15.08 
(-2.827)*** 
0.44 
(0.233) 
0.09 
(0.368) 
0.14 
(-0.434) 
-14.96 
(-2.058)** 
16 -0.61 
(-0.415) 
-10.97 
(-1.979)** 
-0.68 
(-0.649) 
-4.68 
(-0.540) 
-1.13 
(-1.067) 
-15.81 
(-3.569)*** 
-0.30 
(-0.070) 
-9.03 
(-0.802) 
0.25 
(0.382) 
-14.82 
(-2.849)*** 
0.03 
(0.431) 
0.12 
(0.457) 
0.34 
(0.164) 
-14.61 
(-1.808)* 
17 -0.64 
(-0.492) 
-11.62 
(-2.059)** 
-0.66 
(-0.776) 
-5.34 
(-0.652) 
-0.84 
(-0.829) 
-16.65 
(-3.709)*** 
0.80 
(1.299) 
-8.22 
(-0.586) 
-0.20 
(0.098) 
-15.03 
(-2.843)*** 
-0.80 
(-0.417) 
-0.67 
(0.377) 
-0.61 
(0.319) 
-15.22 
(-1.794)* 
18 -0.32 
(-0.331) 
-11.94 
(-2.127)** 
-0.22 
(-0.312) 
-5.57 
(-0.705) 
-0.41 
(-0.334) 
-17.07 
(-3.751)*** 
-1.06 
(-1.319) 
-9.29 
(-0.769) 
-0.85 
(-0.599) 
-15.88 
(-2.865)*** 
-0.09 
(-0.063) 
-0.77 
(0.377) 
1.50 
(1.226) 
-13.72 
(-1.569) 
19 0.65 
(0.479) 
-11.29 
(-2.087)** 
0.57 
(0.881) 
-5.00 
(-0.589) 
0.90 
(0.815) 
-16.16 
(-3.647)*** 
0.79 
(0.762) 
-8.50 
(-0.699) 
1.02 
(0.663) 
-14.85 
(-2.673)*** 
0.44 
(-0.390) 
-0.33 
(0.298) 
-0.18 
(-0.227) 
-13.90 
(-1.664) 
20 0.14 
(0.199) 
-11.15 
(-2.021)** 
0.59 
(0.588) 
-4.41 
(-0.501) 
0.19 
(0.131) 
-15.97 
(-3.514)*** 
0.69 
(1.855)* 
-7.81 
(-0.488) 
-0.50 
(-0.390) 
-15.36 
(-2.697)*** 
-0.14 
(-0.011) 
-0.47 
(0.283) 
0.34 
(0.067) 
-13.55 
(-1.626) 
21 -0.47 
(-0.516) 
-11.62 
(-2.055)** 
-0.14 
(-0.401) 
-4.55 
(-0.536) 
-0.64 
(-0.683) 
-16.61 
(-3.559)*** 
-0.39 
(-0.253) 
-8.21 
(-0.504) 
-0.77 
(-0.772) 
-16.13 
(-2.831)*** 
-0.19 
(0.368) 
-0.67 
(0.332) 
-0.92 
(-1.172) 
-14.48 
(-1.849)* 
22 -0.79 
(-1.033) 
-12.41 
(-2.180)** 
-0.57 
(-0.978) 
-5.12 
(-0.643) 
-0.59 
(-0.625) 
-17.21 
(-3.585)*** 
-1.31 
(-1.261) 
-9.52 
(-0.627) 
-1.45 
(-1.229) 
-17.59 
(-2.987)*** 
-0.88 
(-0.759) 
-1.55 
(0.197) 
0.04 
(-0.301) 
-14.44 
(-1.818)* 
23 -0.87 
(-1.250) 
-13.29 
(-2.398)** 
-0.39 
(-0.449) 
-5.51 
(-0.707) 
-1.14 
(-1.829)* 
-18.35 
(-3.873)*** 
-1.19 
(-0.874) 
-10.71 
(-0.733) 
-0.42 
(-0.204) 
-18.02 
(-3.168)*** 
-1.30 
(-1.186) 
-2.86 
(0.020) 
-0.00 
(-0.402) 
-14.44 
(-1.964)* 
24 0.06 
(0.200) 
-13.22 
(-2.334)** 
0.84 
(1.296) 
-4.67 
(-0.478) 
-0.02 
(-0.035) 
-18.38 
(-3.871)*** 
-0.82 
(-0.578) 
-11.54 
(-0.752) 
-1.62 
(-1.710)* 
-19.64 
(-3.453)*** 
1.03 
(0.849) 
-1.83 
(0.130) 
-0.99 
(-1.063) 
-15.44 
(-2.018)* 
25 -0.40 
(-0.360) 
-13.63 
(-2.332)** 
-0.76 
(-1.023) 
-5.43 
(-0.614) 
-1.09 
(-1.049) 
-19.47 
(-3.893)*** 
0.17 
(0.220) 
-11.36 
(-0.745) 
0.01 
(0.219) 
-19.63 
(-3.219)*** 
1.34 
(1.007) 
-0.48 
(0.272) 
0.65 
(0.735) 
-14.79 
(-1.897)* 
26 -0.97 
(-1.046) 
-14.60 
(-2.486)** 
-1.08 
(-0.944) 
-6.52 
(-0.712) 
-1.15 
(-1.270) 
-20.63 
(-4.158)*** 
-0.84 
(-0.995) 
-12.21 
(-0.828) 
-1.47 
(-0.935) 
-21.10 
(-3.402)*** 
-0.02 
(0.160) 
-0.51 
(0.303) 
-1.39 
(-1.911)* 
-16.18 
(-2.181)** 
27 -0.49 
(-0.788) 
-15.10 
(-2.571)** 
-0.74 
(-0.931) 
-7.27 
(-0.844) 
-0.18 
(-0.484) 
-20.81 
(-4.194)*** 
-1.06 
(-1.349) 
-13.27 
(-0.933) 
-0.04 
(-0.130) 
-21.14 
(-3.454)*** 
-1.01 
(-0.497) 
-1.52 
(0.220) 
-1.36 
(-1.031) 
-17.55 
(-2.273)** 
230 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=706) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=114) 
General Mining  
(N=327) 
Coal  
(N=34) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
28 -0.46 
(-0.878) 
-15.57 
(-2.700)*** 
-0.15 
(0.036) 
-7.43 
(-0.855) 
-0.71 
(-1.478) 
-21.53 
(-4.491)*** 
-0.94 
(-1.589) 
-14.22 
(-1.057) 
0.14 
(-0.324) 
-21.00 
(-3.394)*** 
-0.06 
(0.049) 
-1.59 
(0.230) 
-1.56 
(-1.774)* 
-19.11 
(-2.434)** 
29 -0.88 
(-1.181) 
-16.45 
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(-1.039) 
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-23.82 
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-20.74 
(-2.512)** 
31 -0.65 
(-0.757) 
-18.19 
(-3.113)*** 
-0.65 
(-0.509) 
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(-1.218) 
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0.99 
(1.248) 
-14.36 
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(-0.449) 
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-24.61 
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34 -0.58 
(-0.371) 
-18.45 
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-24.91 
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(-0.266) 
-12.48 
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-0.70 
(-0.517) 
-25.31 
(-4.019)*** 
-1.67 
(-0.497) 
-4.05 
(0.049) 
-0.18 
(0.346) 
-22.68 
(-2.408)** 
35 -0.54 
(-0.460) 
-18.99 
(-3.037)*** 
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-25.41 
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(-3.967)*** 
-0.41 
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-4.47 
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-0.55 
(-0.433) 
-23.23 
(-2.457)** 
36 -0.36 
(-0.331) 
-19.36 
(-3.023)*** 
-0.00 
(0.046) 
-9.61 
(-1.090) 
-0.63 
(-0.649) 
-26.05 
(-4.983)*** 
-1.86 
(-1.463) 
-15.71 
(-1.107) 
-0.38 
(-0.533) 
-26.79 
(-4.025)*** 
0.06 
(0.255) 
-4.40 
(0.044) 
0.36 
(0.379) 
-22.87 
(-2.331)** 
37 -0.16 
(-0.285) 
-19.53 
(-3.032)*** 
-0.59 
(-0.634) 
-10.20 
(-1.160) 
-0.36 
(-0.413) 
-26.41 
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0.55 
(0.880) 
-15.15 
(-0.954) 
-0.27 
(-0.164) 
-27.06 
(-4.046)*** 
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(-0.053) 
-3.87 
(0.037) 
0.94 
(0.227) 
-21.92 
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(-0.054) 
-19.82 
(-2.975)*** 
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(0.558) 
-9.83 
(-1.063) 
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(-0.067) 
-26.68 
(-4.885)*** 
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(-1.110) 
-16.13 
(-0.995) 
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(-0.760) 
-28.04 
(-4.063)*** 
-0.24 
(0.109) 
-4.12 
(0.054) 
-0.28 
(-0.033) 
-22.21 
(-2.272)** 
39 -0.82 
(-0.918) 
-20.64 
(-3.044)*** 
-0.95 
(-1.064) 
-10.79 
(-1.169) 
-0.94 
(-1.078) 
-27.63 
(-4.963)*** 
1.82 
(0.596) 
-14.31 
(-0.845) 
-0.80 
(-1.543) 
-28.85 
(-4.204)*** 
-1.19 
(-0.443) 
-5.32 
(-0.031) 
-0.79 
(-0.670) 
-23.01 
(-2.317)** 
40 -0.90 
(-1.012) 
-21.54 
(-3.169)*** 
-0.93 
(-1.042) 
-11.72 
(-1.291) 
-1.42 
(-1.551) 
-29.05 
(-5.090)*** 
-1.87 
(-1.768)* 
-16.18 
(-1.007) 
0.17 
(0.129) 
-28.67 
(-4.180)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.424) 
-5.43 
(-0.105) 
-0.73 
(-0.615) 
-23.75 
(-2.403)** 
41 -1.90 
(-1.868)* 
-23.45 
(-3.402)*** 
-1.77 
(-1.535) 
-13.49 
(-1.473) 
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(-2.275)** 
-31.54 
(-5.425)*** 
-1.40 
(-0.936) 
-17.59 
(-1.090) 
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-30.45 
(-4.263)*** 
-0.57 
(-0.490) 
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(-0.161) 
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(-2.012)* 
-25.63 
(-2.675)** 
42 2.39 
(2.524)** 
-21.06 
(-2.943)*** 
2.62 
(1.803)* 
-10.87 
(-1.043) 
2.81 
(3.232)*** 
-28.72 
(-4.850)*** 
3.11 
(1.301) 
-14.48 
(-0.845) 
2.29 
(2.097)** 
-28.16 
(-3.586)*** 
0.92 
(0.836) 
-5.08 
(-0.044) 
0.57 
(1.681) 
-25.05 
(-2.505)** 
43 0.40 
(0.453) 
-20.65 
(-2.918)*** 
0.79 
(0.682) 
-10.07 
(-0.966) 
0.43 
(0.626) 
-28.28 
(-4.789)*** 
0.09 
(-0.211) 
-14.38 
(-0.878) 
0.93 
(1.229) 
-27.22 
(-3.326)*** 
-0.56 
(-1.082) 
-5.65 
(-0.171) 
0.35 
(0.367) 
-24.69 
(-2.450)** 
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(-0.981) 
0.27 
(0.371) 
-29.03 
(-4.772)*** 
0.43 
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-10.84 
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(0.284) 
-13.84 
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-30.48 
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-21.50 
(-3.044)*** 
0.20 
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-8.66 
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-0.66 
(-0.708) 
-28.60 
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-1.56 
(-1.814)* 
-15.40 
(-0.790) 
-1.34 
(-0.879) 
-28.47 
(-3.404)*** 
-1.68 
(-0.943) 
-9.31 
(-0.616) 
0.82 
(0.206) 
-29.66 
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52 0.57 
(0.619) 
-20.92 
(-2.935)*** 
0.97 
(0.834) 
-7.68 
(-0.682) 
0.17 
(0.390) 
-28.42 
(-4.681)*** 
0.47 
(0.360) 
-14.93 
(-0.735) 
1.99 
(1.455) 
-26.48 
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0.76 
(0.193) 
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(-0.563) 
0.21 
(0.154) 
-29.45 
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53 0.72 
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-20.19 
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0.76 
(1.065) 
-6.92 
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0.63 
(0.664) 
-27.79 
(-4.564)*** 
1.34 
(1.597) 
-13.59 
(-0.631) 
1.32 
(1.282) 
-25.16 
(-2.922)*** 
1.15 
(0.864) 
-7.39 
(-0.449) 
-0.56 
(-1.178) 
-30.01 
(-3.370)*** 
54 -0.21 
(-0.316) 
-20.40 
(-2.810)*** 
-0.20 
(-0.114) 
-7.13 
(-0.583) 
0.17 
(0.270) 
-27.61 
(-4.448)*** 
-1.73 
(-1.771)* 
-15.32 
(-0.746) 
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(0.075) 
-25.05 
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(-1.264) 
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(-0.579) 
-0.13 
(0.264) 
-30.14 
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(-0.961) 
-21.19 
(-2.926)*** 
-0.50 
(-1.066) 
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(-0.555) 
-28.18 
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(0.344) 
-15.10 
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(-0.758) 
-1.67 
(-2.421)** 
-31.81 
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(0.430) 
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0.50 
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-7.12 
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0.29 
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-27.89 
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-0.04 
(-0.247) 
-15.14 
(-0.713) 
-0.34 
(-0.339) 
-26.61 
(-3.073)*** 
1.59 
(0.577) 
-8.85 
(-0.641) 
0.85 
(0.780) 
-30.96 
(-3.244)*** 
57 0.71 
(1.301) 
-20.00 
(-2.629)*** 
0.81 
(1.337) 
-6.30 
(-0.473) 
0.15 
(0.811) 
-27.74 
(-4.218)*** 
1.62 
(1.340) 
-13.52 
(-0.564) 
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(1.737)* 
-23.41 
(-2.509)** 
0.47 
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-20.06 
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-12.89 
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-20.01 
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(-0.657) 
0.47 
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(-4.038)*** 
-0.63 
(-0.811) 
-13.52 
(-0.566) 
-0.46 
(-0.102) 
-24.16 
(-2.575)** 
0.45 
(0.268) 
-8.13 
(-0.532) 
-0.46 
(-0.112) 
-30.98 
(-2.965)*** 
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Figure 7.9: Overall Sample Percentage Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns RSPT and MRRT 
Figure 7.9 shows the overall sample (i.e., ‘all subsectors’) as well as the individual subsector average cumulative returns for the period beginning 20 trading days 
before the announcement of the RSPT and extending through 20 trading days following the announcement of the MRRT. 
The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period (i.e., (-272; -21) days relative to the announcement of the RSPT) and are computed using the Scholes William method as 
defined in Chapter 6. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 706 firms listed on the ASX, of which 114 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 
327 to the general mining subsector, 34 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as 
classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios based on their subsector of belonging as defined 
in the previous chapter. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the 
continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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Table 7.6: Multi-Day Window Reaction to the Announcement of the Proposed RSPT and MRRT 
Table 7.6 shows various subsectors’ average cumulative returns for the period beginning 20 trading days before the announcement of the RSPT and extending 
through 20 trading days following the announcement of the MRRT. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period (i.e., (-272; -21) days relative to the announcement of the RSPT) and are computed using the Scholes William method as 
defined in Chapter 6.  The sample size consists of 706 firms listed on the ASX, of which 114 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 327 to the 
general mining subsector, 34 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 33 to iron and steel, as classified 
by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging. The equally 
weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed as in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for 
period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously 
compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted 
standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the 
event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess 
return is zero. 
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Phase 
Days relative to 
AD 
All Sector 
Exploration & 
Production 
General Mining Coal Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining Iron & Steel 
 (N=706) (N=114) (N=327) (N=34) (N=105) (N=33) 
CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  CAAR  
I 
car -15 to 41 -26.37 -17.29 -32.86 -22.78 -35.76 -11.56 -28.08 
(-4.368)*** (-2.067)** (-6.037)*** (-2.207)** (-5.528)*** (-0.910) (-3.161)*** 
car -14 to 41 -27.04 -18.07 -33.51 -25.06 -35.83 -12.45 -28.71 
(-4.572)*** (-2.268)** (-6.253)*** (-2.544)** (-5.653)*** (-0.975) (-3.303)*** 
car -6 to 41 -27.04 -19.69 -33.74 -28.51 -31.49 -10.55 -30.65 
(-4.971)*** (-3.013)*** (-6.500)*** (-3.535)*** (-5.461)*** (-0.843) (-4.106)*** 
car -5to 41 -27.27 -19.5 -33.78 -29.68 -32.06 -11.26 -31.49 
(-5.110)*** (-3.026)*** (-6.677)*** (-3.675)*** (-5.762)*** (-0.954) (-4.266)*** 
car -4 to 41 -27.79 -21.21 -34 -28.11 -31.61 -12.94 -30.84 
(-5.286)*** (-3.292)*** (-6.806)*** (-3.951)*** (-5.820)*** (-1.068) (-4.331)*** 
car -3 to 41 -27.72 -20.88 -34.29 -28.2 -31.65 -12.4 -29.13 
(-5.434)*** (-3.414)*** (-7.005)*** (-3.997)*** (-5.884)*** (-1.109) (-4.343)*** 
car -2 to 41 -26.63 -20.52 -32.64 -27.52 -29.23 -12.97 -27.84 
(-5.299)*** (-3.348)*** (-6.858)*** (-3.964)*** (-5.407)*** (-1.142) (-4.213)*** 
car -1 to 41 -23.82 -18.87 -29.51 -23.48 -27.5 -10.23 -21.89 
(-4.853)*** (-3.353)*** (-6.409)*** (-3.350)*** (-5.059)*** (-0.795) (-2.951)*** 
II 
car -15 to 63 -22.81 -11.41 -27.56 -19.77 -29.71 -15.39 -33.54 
(-3.349)*** (-1.109) (-4.322)*** (-1.602) (-3.545)*** (-1.524) (-3.211)*** 
car -14 to 63 -23.49 -12.19 -28.21 -22.04 -29.78 -16.29 -34.17 
(-3.507)*** (-1.255) (-4.503)*** (-1.878)* (-3.620)*** (-1.564) (-3.309)*** 
car -6 to 63 -23.49 -13.81 -28.44 -25.5 -25.44 -14.39 -36.11 
(-3.776)*** (-1.616) (-4.707)*** (-2.535)** (-3.178)*** (-1.472) (-4.076)*** 
car -5to 63 -23.72 -13.62 -28.48 -26.66 -26.01 -15.09 -36.95 
(-3.885)*** (-1.606) (-4.847)*** (-2.676)** (-3.314)*** (-1.579) (-4.346)*** 
car -4 to 63 -24.24 -15.33 -28.7 -25.1 -25.56 -16.78 -36.3 
(-3.977)*** (-1.786)* (-4.921)*** (-2.669)** (-3.330)*** (-1.658) (-4.331)*** 
car -3 to 63 -24.17 -15 -28.99 -25.18 -25.6 -16.24 -34.59 
(-4.031)*** (-1.812)* (-5.023)*** (-2.740)*** (-3.274)*** (-1.684)* (-4.207)*** 
car -2 to 63 -23.08 -14.64 -27.34 -24.51 -23.18 -16.8 -33.3 
(-3.904)*** (-1.777)* (-4.870)*** (-2.674)** (-2.988)*** (-1.712)* (-4.097)*** 
car -1 to 63 -22.42 -12.83 -26.65 -22.69 -23.47 -17.24 -33.05 
(-3.860)*** (-1.615) (-4.770)*** (-2.553)** (-2.984)*** (-1.781)* (-3.988)*** 
III 
CAR 45 to 47  -1.61 -0.72 -1.46 -1.61 -1.17 -2.13 -5.07 
(-1.884)* (-1.409) (-1.344) (-1.398) (-1.391) (-1.542) (-4.711)*** 
car 42 to 63 3.55 5.87 5.3 3.01 6.04 -3.83 -5.46 
(0.835) (1.318) (1.39) (0.586) (1.394) (1.209) (1.118) 
CAR 43 to 63 1.15 3.25 2.48 -0.09 3.75 -4.75 -6.04 
(-0.138) (0.689) (0.671) (-0.102) (0.88) (-1.450) (-1.649) 
IV 
CAR -3 to 1 -6.14 -4 -6.93 -7.42 -6.74 -4.47 -10.05 
(-3.638)*** (-1.604) (-4.180)*** (-3.407)*** (-3.570)*** (-2.089)** (-4.633)*** 
CAR -3 to 2 -4.01 1.05 -7.19 1.89 -7.12 1.27 -6.3 
(-1.041) (0.084) (-2.295)** (0.424) (-1.727)* (0.263) (-1.512) 
car 0 to 2 -6.17 -4.24 -7.01 -7.13 -6.39 -5.44 -6.38 
(-4.868)*** (-2.766)*** (-5.433)*** (-4.232)*** (-3.769)*** (-3.119)*** (-2.723)** 
car 11 to 14 -7.69 -4.82 -8.13 -7.81 -9.11 -8.6 -7.28 
(-4.948)*** (-2.404)** (-4.874)*** (-4.613)*** (-3.958)*** (-4.170)*** (-3.337)*** 
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7.5 2013 Federal Election Outcome and Repeal of the MRRT Analysis 
As discussed in the introduction chapter, the primary focus of this thesis is to investigate 
the market reaction (income and substitution effects)122 to the announcements of the RSPT 
and the MRRT. However, during the writing of this chapter, the MRRT was repealed. It is 
natural to seek to investigate how market participants reacted to such an event. This section 
therefore briefly analyses not only the market reaction to the idea of the MRRT being 
repealed but the market reaction to the actual repeal of the MRRT.  
As mentioned in the general introduction chapter, in the lead up to the 2013 election (won 
by the Coalition) the then leader of the opposition Tony Abbott promised to repeal the 
MRRT if elected. The 2013 federal election outcome date can therefore be viewed as being 
potentially relevant to resource firm shareholders in assessing the impact of the idea of the 
MRRT being repeal on expected future cash flows and therefore on the expected rate of 
return on their equity investment. This event can therefore be regarded as appropriate to 
investigate the market reaction to the idea of a repeal of the MRRT. To investigate the 
market reaction to the actual repeal of the MRRT, the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal 
Bill in both Houses of Parliament indicated was selected. 
It is important to note that because of the extensive lapse of time between the lead up to the 
2013 federal election, its outcome and the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill in 2014, 
the timing of impact of these events on the equity market cannot be determined with 
accuracy, making it more likely to be excluded from the designated event window. This 
violates a fundamental assumption in event study that the event of interest must be 
identified with confidence. Further, in such long periods, confounding events are more 
likely to be present, violating the fundamental assumption that the event of interest is free 
of any confounding effects. For these reasons, the event study methodology becomes a less 
powerful, less reliable and less likely to provide a cleaner measure of the market reaction to 
the idea and actual repeal of the MRRT, and the results from these minor analyses lack 
robustness and are only descriptive at best. Therefore, the following concentrates mostly on 
                                                 
122 The income effect is investigated in this chapter. While the substitution effect can be observed to a certain 
extent, it is investigated in greater detail and length in Chapter 8. 
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the investigation of the market reaction on the day of each of the aforementioned events 
(i.e., Day 0). 
7.5.1 Results discussion 
Figure 7.10 displays the cumulative mean abnormal returns for the entire sample as well as 
for each individual subsector. Table 7.7 presents the level of mean abnormal returns with 
their associated t-statistic values and level of significance. These average excess 
performances are provided for each day in the (-20; +20) event window surrounding the 
2013 federal election. 
Figure 7.11 plots the average cumulative excess performances for the overall sample of 
firms and for each individual subsector surrounding the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal 
Bill in both Houses of Parliament. Table 7.8 provides the value of the mean cumulative 
prediction errors with their associated t-statistics and level of significance for each day in 
the (-20; +20) event window surrounding the Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of 
Parliament. 
Both figures show that no market reaction on the day of the respective events investigated; 
a lack of statistical significance on that day is confirmed in Tables 7.7 and 7.8, 
corroborating the absence of abnormal returns on Day 0. Thus, no evidence of unusual 
performance is found on Day 0 and the fact that no excess performance is noticed on that 
particular day suggests that security holders of resource companies did not respond to the 
outcome of the 2013 federal election (won by the Liberals) nor to the passage of the Mining 
Tax Repeal Bill. As expected, this points to the possibility that news of these events is 
meaningless, as these were certainly fully anticipated. 
A brief examination of the full event window (-20; +20) of mean and cumulative excess 
performance shows that while there is a mix of sporadically significant positive and 
negative abnormal average returns across subsectors on some of the days before and 
following both events under investigation, most are insignificantly different from zero. In 
other words, there is systematic movement with the mean and average cumulative residuals 
being randomly distributed around zero during the full event window.  
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However, it is worth nothing that the iron ore subsector suffers a few statistically 
significant abnormal losses post passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill. These abnormal 
losses amount to about 2.97% following the day of the passage of the bill, and about 2.28% 
seven days past that event. This is reflected in a post-announcement cumulative abnormal 
return downward drift (see Figure 7.10). A possible explanation is that this post-
announcement negative drift arose from the announced increased in state royalties for iron 
and ore commodities as well as the removal of the concessional royalty rate (Hawker 
Britton Group 2011; Murray 2016). Indeed, a repeal of the MRRT signifies that companies 
involved in the exploitation of iron and ore resources would no longer receive any state 
royalty credits and be liable not only for state royalty payments but for any rate increase. 
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Figure 7.10: Percentage Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 2013 Federal Election 
Figure7.10 shows the overall sample ‘all subsector’ average cumulative returns as well as those of each individual subsector for the 41 days period within the 
event window surrounding the 2013 federal election. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days 
through to +20 days relative to the 2013 federal election day. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 633 firms listed on the ASX, of which 100 belong to the 
exploration and production subsector, 295 to the general mining subsector, 28 to the coal subsector, 95 to the gold mining subsector, 69 to the nonferrous metals 
subsector and 30 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis 
of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as described in Chapter 6 where 
Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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Table 7.7: Market Reaction to the 2013 Federal Election 
Table 7.7 shows the different subsectors’ average abnormal and cumulative returns for each given day within the event window surrounding the 2013 Federal 
election. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days 
through to +20 days relative to the 2013 federal election day. The sample size consists of 633 firms listed on the ASX, of which 100 belong to the exploration and 
production subsector, 295 to the general mining subsector, 28 to the coal subsector, 95 to the gold mining subsector, 69 to the nonferrous metals subsector and 30 
to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis of their subsector 
of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in the previous chapter where Nwi /1= . 
The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in 
Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in 
parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that 
the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test 
statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=633) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=100) 
General Mining  
(N=295) 
Coal  
(N=28) 
Nonferrous 
Metals (N=69) 
Gold Mining  
(N=95) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=30) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 -0.98 
(-0.928) 
-0.98 
(-0.928) 
-0.23 
(-0.476) 
-0.23 
(-0.476) 
-1.21 
(-1.078) 
-1.21 
(-1.078) 
-1.88 
(-2.291)** 
-1.88 
(-2.291)** 
-1.52 
(-1.039) 
-1.52 
(-1.039) 
-0.29 
(-0.249) 
-0.29 
(-0.249) 
-1.48 
(-1.377) 
-1.48 
(-1.377) 
-19 -0.56 
(-0.509) 
-1.54 
(-1.095) 
-0.75 
(-0.403) 
-0.98 
(-0.681) 
-0.77 
(-0.627) 
-1.98 
(-1.230) 
-1.50 
(-1.206) 
-3.39 
(-2.186)** 
-0.33 
(-0.156) 
-1.86 
(-0.894) 
-0.37 
(-0.382) 
-0.66 
(-0.569) 
-0.53 
(-0.487) 
-2.02 
(-1.315) 
-18 0.67 
(0.686) 
-0.87 
(-0.491) 
1.72 
(1.844)* 
0.73 
(0.490) 
0.47 
(0.345) 
-1.51 
(-0.724) 
-0.09 
(0.083) 
-3.48 
(-1.723)* 
0.30 
(0.267) 
-1.56 
(-0.759) 
0.43 
(0.619) 
-0.22 
(-0.184) 
1.50 
(0.901) 
-0.51 
(-0.279) 
-17 0.35 
(0.456) 
-0.51 
(-0.170) 
1.06 
(0.976) 
1.80 
(0.998) 
-0.17 
(0.013) 
-1.69 
(-0.654) 
0.53 
(0.763) 
-2.94 
(-1.114) 
1.36 
(0.704) 
-0.20 
(-0.116) 
0.39 
(0.211) 
0.17 
(-0.058) 
2.90 
(1.638) 
2.38 
(0.642) 
-16 0.51 
(0.287) 
-0.00 
(-0.032) 
0.65 
(0.569) 
2.46 
(1.227) 
0.46 
(0.171) 
-1.22 
(-0.541) 
0.07 
(0.309) 
-2.86 
(-0.875) 
0.41 
(0.082) 
0.21 
(-0.055) 
0.62 
(0.313) 
0.79 
(0.110) 
0.18 
(-0.332) 
2.57 
(0.643) 
-15 0.76 
(0.839) 
0.75 
(0.334) 
1.85 
(1.134) 
4.31 
(1.687)* 
0.46 
(0.811) 
-0.76 
(-0.152) 
1.42 
(0.835) 
-1.44 
(-0.556) 
0.33 
(0.297) 
0.54 
(0.078) 
0.43 
(0.202) 
1.22 
(0.199) 
2.08 
(2.663)** 
4.65 
(1.317) 
-14 0.31 
(0.413) 
1.06 
(0.471) 
0.55 
(0.542) 
4.87 
(1.941)* 
-0.21 
(0.012) 
-0.97 
(-0.126) 
0.42 
(0.376) 
-1.01 
(-0.444) 
1.51 
(1.029) 
2.06 
(0.500) 
0.47 
(0.418) 
1.70 
(0.351) 
0.58 
(1.052) 
5.24 
(1.509) 
-13 0.08 
(-0.053) 
1.15 
(0.416) 
-1.16 
(-1.032) 
3.70 
(1.559) 
0.25 
(0.011) 
-0.71 
(-0.109) 
0.04 
(0.248) 
-0.97 
(-0.229) 
-0.63 
(-0.364) 
1.43 
(0.330) 
0.49 
(0.546) 
2.19 
(0.497) 
-0.19 
(-0.224) 
5.05 
(1.506) 
-12 0.33 
(0.208) 
1.48 
(0.477) 
0.74 
(0.463) 
4.45 
(1.688)* 
0.52 
(0.379) 
-0.19 
(0.028) 
0.69 
(0.228) 
-0.27 
(-0.122) 
0.49 
(0.455) 
1.92 
(0.487) 
-0.87 
(-0.488) 
1.31 
(0.151) 
0.25 
(0.190) 
5.31 
(1.499) 
-11 0.16 
(0.190) 
1.64 
(0.524) 
-0.33 
(0.071) 
4.11 
(1.596) 
0.14 
(0.176) 
-0.05 
(0.080) 
-0.71 
(-0.634) 
-0.98 
(-0.295) 
1.06 
(0.536) 
2.99 
(0.643) 
0.19 
(0.068) 
1.51 
(0.164) 
0.56 
(0.933) 
5.87 
(1.596) 
-10 0.22 
(0.258) 
1.86 
(0.578) 
1.52 
(0.956) 
5.63 
(1.863)* 
0.05 
(0.039) 
0.00 
(0.088) 
0.23 
(0.987) 
-0.75 
(-0.085) 
0.30 
(0.130) 
3.30 
(0.612) 
0.11 
(0.097) 
1.63 
(0.178) 
0.68 
(1.003) 
6.56 
(1.790)* 
-9 0.59 
(0.374) 
2.45 
(0.689) 
0.96 
(0.465) 
6.59 
(2.062)** 
0.32 
(0.191) 
0.32 
(0.145) 
0.39 
(0.195) 
-0.35 
(-0.036) 
1.11 
(0.817) 
4.41 
(0.919) 
0.92 
(0.347) 
2.55 
(0.264) 
0.39 
(0.599) 
6.95 
(1.821)* 
-8 -0.08 
(-0.215) 
2.37 
(0.612) 
-0.70 
(-0.660) 
5.89 
(1.781)* 
0.06 
(-0.132) 
0.38 
(0.110) 
1.01 
(1.207) 
0.65 
(0.234) 
-0.24 
(-0.157) 
4.17 
(0.623) 
-0.19 
(-0.403) 
2.36 
(0.168) 
0.49 
(1.235) 
7.45 
(2.040)* 
-7 -0.36 
(-0.198) 
2.01 
(0.507) 
0.61 
(0.585) 
6.50 
(1.833)* 
-0.35 
(-0.218) 
0.02 
(0.022) 
-0.72 
(-0.867) 
-0.06 
(0.007) 
-0.75 
(-0.498) 
3.42 
(0.451) 
-1.04 
(-0.647) 
1.32 
(-0.034) 
0.19 
(0.364) 
7.64 
(2.034)* 
-6 -0.25 
(-0.326) 
1.75 
(0.389) 
-0.11 
(0.079) 
6.39 
(1.790)* 
-0.21 
(-0.280) 
-0.18 
(-0.060) 
-2.32 
(-1.837)* 
-2.38 
(-0.518) 
-1.62 
(-1.095) 
1.80 
(0.145) 
0.22 
(0.207) 
1.55 
(0.020) 
-0.22 
(-0.613) 
7.41 
(1.847)* 
-5 0.21 
(0.343) 
1.97 
(0.470) 
2.58 
(1.597) 
8.97 
(2.147)** 
-0.45 
(-0.059) 
-0.63 
(-0.075) 
0.97 
(0.675) 
-1.41 
(-0.253) 
-0.17 
(0.140) 
1.62 
(0.184) 
-0.00 
(-0.030) 
1.54 
(0.013) 
0.41 
(1.211) 
7.83 
(1.969)* 
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-4 -0.97 
(-0.902) 
0.99 
(0.181) 
-1.82 
(-1.793)* 
7.15 
(1.614) 
-0.48 
(-0.664) 
-1.12 
(-0.262) 
0.33 
(-0.261) 
-1.07 
(-0.329) 
-2.39 
(-0.938) 
-0.76 
(-0.133) 
-1.31 
(-0.669) 
0.22 
(-0.221) 
-0.19 
(-0.946) 
7.64 
(1.743)* 
-3 -0.26 
(-0.329) 
0.73 
(0.092) 
-0.80 
(-0.561) 
6.35 
(1.477) 
-0.04 
(-0.232) 
-1.17 
(-0.315) 
-1.41 
(-1.529) 
-2.49 
(-0.612) 
0.64 
(0.232) 
-0.12 
(-0.070) 
-1.11 
(-0.951) 
-0.88 
(-0.451) 
0.24 
(0.599) 
7.88 
(1.778)* 
-2 -0.16 
(-0.324) 
0.57 
(0.010) 
0.67 
(0.595) 
7.03 
(1.647) 
-0.18 
(-0.358) 
-1.35 
(-0.407) 
-0.76 
(-0.748) 
-3.26 
(-0.820) 
-0.72 
(-0.481) 
-0.84 
(-0.169) 
-0.67 
(-1.037) 
-1.56 
(-0.646) 
0.55 
(0.275) 
8.43 
(1.793)* 
-1 0.33 
(0.406) 
0.90 
(0.096) 
0.18 
(0.285) 
7.21 
(1.708)* 
0.22 
(0.408) 
-1.13 
(-0.307) 
0.57 
(0.580) 
-2.68 
(-0.676) 
0.51 
(0.240) 
-0.32 
(-0.107) 
0.63 
(0.585) 
-0.93 
(-0.534) 
-0.16 
(-0.365) 
8.27 
(1.739)* 
0 -0.08 
(0.019) 
0.81 
(0.098) 
1.07 
(1.026) 
8.29 
(1.889)* 
-0.31 
(-0.109) 
-1.44 
(-0.327) 
-0.73 
(-0.599) 
-3.42 
(-0.947) 
-0.57 
(-0.278) 
-0.90 
(-0.180) 
-0.41 
(-0.406) 
-1.34 
(-0.593) 
0.46 
(0.269) 
8.73 
(1.748)* 
1 0.34 
(0.290) 
1.15 
(0.158) 
2.01 
(1.630) 
10.30 
(2.199)** 
0.22 
(0.172) 
-1.21 
(-0.287) 
-0.16 
(-0.561) 
-3.58 
(-1.020) 
1.03 
(0.477) 
0.12 
(-0.095) 
-0.49 
(-0.784) 
-1.83 
(-0.693) 
0.15 
(-0.092) 
8.88 
(1.852)* 
2 0.76 
(0.693) 
1.92 
(0.291) 
1.08 
(1.069) 
11.38 
(2.386)** 
0.68 
(0.427) 
-0.53 
(-0.204) 
-0.03 
(-0.165) 
-3.61 
(-1.027) 
1.36 
(0.805) 
1.49 
(0.069) 
0.29 
(0.182) 
-1.53 
(-0.657) 
0.24 
(0.997) 
9.13 
(1.944)* 
3 -0.59 
(-0.718) 
1.32 
(0.151) 
0.21 
(0.000) 
11.60 
(2.296)** 
-0.73 
(-0.793) 
-1.26 
(-0.361) 
-0.92 
(-0.375) 
-4.54 
(-1.309) 
-0.73 
(-0.645) 
0.75 
(-0.057) 
-0.71 
(-0.871) 
-2.25 
(-0.786) 
0.26 
(-0.099) 
9.40 
(1.875)* 
4 -0.16 
(-0.301) 
1.16 
(0.083) 
1.12 
(0.580) 
12.72 
(2.317)** 
-0.67 
(-0.712) 
-1.94 
(-0.505) 
1.64 
(1.307) 
-2.90 
(-0.793) 
-0.13 
(-0.149) 
0.62 
(-0.081) 
-0.37 
(-0.694) 
-2.63 
(-0.867) 
0.13 
(0.069) 
9.53 
(1.723)* 
5 0.78 
(0.385) 
1.94 
(0.211) 
0.52 
(0.495) 
13.25 
(2.276)** 
0.70 
(0.202) 
-1.23 
(-0.362) 
1.00 
(0.891) 
-1.90 
(-0.404) 
0.00 
(0.079) 
0.62 
(-0.064) 
1.27 
(1.424) 
-1.35 
(-0.659) 
0.75 
(0.267) 
10.28 
(1.787)* 
6 -1.03 
(-0.937) 
0.90 
(0.029) 
-1.05 
(-1.001) 
12.19 
(1.946)* 
-1.45 
(-1.095) 
-2.68 
(-0.594) 
0.09 
(-0.352) 
-1.80 
(-0.501) 
-0.82 
(-0.763) 
-0.20 
(-0.196) 
-0.68 
(-0.524) 
-2.03 
(-0.749) 
-0.94 
(-1.044) 
9.33 
(1.567) 
7 -1.00 
(-1.038) 
-0.09 
(-0.160) 
-2.06 
(-1.740)* 
10.13 
(1.697)* 
-0.97 
(-1.039) 
-3.65 
(-0.769) 
-1.01 
(-0.896) 
-2.81 
(-0.702) 
-0.50 
(-0.654) 
-0.70 
(-0.298) 
-1.24 
(-1.247) 
-3.27 
(-0.984) 
-0.38 
(0.249) 
8.95 
(1.543) 
8 -0.14 
(-0.268) 
-0.24 
(-0.206) 
0.23 
(-0.152) 
10.36 
(1.672)* 
-0.20 
(-0.420) 
-3.85 
(-0.826) 
-0.78 
(-0.364) 
-3.59 
(-0.806) 
0.39 
(0.455) 
-0.31 
(-0.155) 
-0.73 
(-0.930) 
-4.01 
(-1.086) 
-0.66 
(-0.874) 
8.29 
(1.401) 
9 0.85 
(0.667) 
0.61 
(-0.076) 
0.85 
(0.604) 
11.21 
(1.767)* 
0.72 
(0.536) 
-3.12 
(-0.701) 
0.36 
(0.235) 
-3.23 
(-0.725) 
0.71 
(0.396) 
0.39 
(-0.070) 
1.43 
(1.155) 
-2.58 
(-0.899) 
1.48 
(0.966) 
9.77 
(1.519) 
10 0.32 
(0.261) 
0.93 
(-0.019) 
-0.34 
(-0.179) 
10.87 
(1.767)* 
0.07 
(0.215) 
-3.05 
(-0.667) 
-1.12 
(-0.738) 
-4.35 
(-0.948) 
0.64 
(0.266) 
1.04 
(-0.019) 
2.08 
(0.596) 
-0.50 
(-0.744) 
0.79 
(1.531) 
10.57 
(1.715)* 
11 -0.20 
(-0.179) 
0.73 
(-0.055) 
-0.06 
(-0.314) 
10.81 
(1.693)* 
0.19 
(0.155) 
-2.86 
(-0.632) 
1.20 
(0.431) 
-3.15 
(-0.799) 
-0.60 
(-0.389) 
0.44 
(-0.112) 
-1.29 
(-0.690) 
-1.80 
(-0.853) 
-1.76 
(-1.503) 
8.80 
(1.450) 
12 -0.78 
(-0.769) 
-0.05 
(-0.190) 
-1.05 
(-1.129) 
9.75 
(1.549) 
-0.42 
(-0.267) 
-3.28 
(-0.668) 
-0.08 
(-0.281) 
-3.24 
(-0.745) 
-1.86 
(-1.078) 
-1.42 
(-0.267) 
-0.91 
(-1.400) 
-2.71 
(-1.021) 
-1.45 
(-1.994)* 
7.35 
(1.225) 
13 -0.31 
(-0.479) 
-0.36 
(-0.271) 
-0.26 
(-0.362) 
9.49 
(1.469) 
-0.32 
(-0.460) 
-3.61 
(-0.738) 
-0.58 
(-0.827) 
-3.82 
(-0.851) 
-0.35 
(-0.259) 
-1.77 
(-0.304) 
-0.60 
(-0.820) 
-3.32 
(-1.149) 
0.01 
(-0.335) 
7.37 
(1.130) 
245 
14 -0.28 
(-0.360) 
-0.65 
(-0.335) 
-1.46 
(-1.654) 
8.03 
(1.233) 
0.02 
(-0.087) 
-3.58 
(-0.744) 
-0.90 
(-0.333) 
-4.73 
(-0.978) 
-0.86 
(-0.613) 
-2.64 
(-0.389) 
0.37 
(0.451) 
-2.95 
(-1.084) 
0.69 
(0.236) 
8.07 
(1.176) 
15 -0.02 
(-0.011) 
-0.67 
(-0.338) 
-0.67 
(-1.013) 
7.35 
(1.062) 
-0.52 
(-0.494) 
-4.11 
(-0.826) 
1.86 
(1.523) 
-2.87 
(-0.637) 
1.12 
(1.062) 
-1.52 
(-0.271) 
0.30 
(0.586) 
-2.64 
(-1.013) 
0.54 
(0.936) 
8.61 
(1.242) 
16 -0.61 
(-0.609) 
-1.29 
(-0.442) 
-0.28 
(-0.052) 
7.06 
(1.036) 
-0.70 
(-0.689) 
-4.81 
(-0.963) 
-0.33 
(-0.353) 
-3.21 
(-0.677) 
-0.90 
(-0.563) 
-2.43 
(-0.356) 
-0.40 
(-0.528) 
-3.05 
(-1.056) 
0.03 
(-0.089) 
8.64 
(1.237) 
17 0.03 
(-0.112) 
-1.26 
(-0.452) 
-0.12 
(-0.528) 
6.94 
(0.900) 
-0.07 
(-0.089) 
-4.88 
(-0.958) 
0.19 
(-0.073) 
-3.02 
(-0.692) 
-0.04 
(-0.111) 
-2.47 
(-0.361) 
-0.25 
(-0.123) 
-3.30 
(-1.084) 
0.55 
(1.071) 
9.19 
(1.316) 
18 -0.26 
(-0.041) 
-1.53 
(-0.452) 
0.12 
(0.194) 
7.06 
(0.960) 
0.09 
(0.231) 
-4.78 
(-0.898) 
-1.01 
(-0.279) 
-4.03 
(-0.776) 
-0.13 
(0.035) 
-2.61 
(-0.343) 
-0.70 
(-0.616) 
-4.01 
(-1.127) 
0.17 
(0.191) 
9.37 
(1.357) 
19 0.22 
(-0.108) 
-1.30 
(-0.462) 
-0.46 
(-0.622) 
6.60 
(0.841) 
0.17 
(-0.038) 
-4.61 
(-0.905) 
-0.52 
(-0.361) 
-4.55 
(-0.835) 
0.74 
(0.481) 
-1.86 
(-0.261) 
-0.16 
(-0.664) 
-4.17 
(-1.186) 
1.00 
(0.378) 
10.37 
(1.361) 
20 -1.38 
(-0.866) 
-2.68 
(-0.637) 
-0.77 
(-0.998) 
5.83 
(0.664) 
-1.68 
(-0.833) 
-6.29 
(-1.069) 
-0.37 
(-0.557) 
-4.92 
(-0.917) 
-0.50 
(-0.100) 
-2.37 
(-0.277) 
-1.80 
(-0.834) 
-5.97 
(-1.401) 
-1.87 
(-1.915)* 
8.50 
(1.054) 
 
  
246 
Figure 7.11: Percentage Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns MRRT Repeal 
Figure 7.11 shows the overall sample ‘all subsector’ average cumulative returns as well as those of each individual subsector for the 41 multi-day period within 
the event window surrounding the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days 
through to +20 days relative to the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill. The ‘all subsector’ sample size consists of 473 firms listed on the ASX, of which 78 
belong to the exploration and production subsector, 216 to the general mining subsector, 21 to the coal subsector, 69 to the gold mining subsector, 50 to the 
nonferrous metals subsector and 25 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into 
portfolios on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as described 
in Chapter 6 where Nwi /1= . MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. 
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Table 7.8: Market Reaction to the Repeal of the MRRT 
Table 7.8 shows the different subsectors’ average abnormal and cumulative returns for each given day within the event window surrounding the passage of the 
Mining Tax Repeal Bill in both Houses of Parliament. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as: 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR  are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
 correspond to firm i OLS parameter 
estimates from the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in Chapter 6. The event window is defined as -20 days 
through to +20 days relative to the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill. The sample size consists of 473 firms listed on the ASX, of which 78 belong to the 
exploration and production subsector, 216 to the general mining subsector, 21 to the coal subsector, 69 to the gold mining subsector, 50 to the nonferrous metals 
subsector and 25 to iron and steel, as classified by the industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolios on the basis 
of their subsector of belonging as defined in Chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as defined in the previous chapter 
where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess 
return as defined in Chapter 6. 
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and 
CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardised cross-sectional methods as defined in Chapter 6. The null hypothesis for the AARs 
test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis 
for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
  
249 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=473) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=78) 
General Mining  
(N=216) 
Coal  
(N=21) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=50) 
Gold Mining  
(N=69) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=25) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
-0.09 
(-0.373) 
-0.09 
(-0.373) 
0.42 
(0.855) 
0.42 
(0.855) 
-0.63 
(-0.802) 
-0.63 
(-0.802) 
-2.54 
(-1.204) 
-2.54 
(-1.204) 
2.79 
(1.044) 
2.79 
(1.044) 
-1.13 
(-0.867) 
-1.13 
(-0.867) 
0.94 
(1.346) 
0.94 
(1.346) 
-19 
-0.91 
(-1.432) 
-1.01 
(-1.384) 
-0.54 
(-1.456) 
-0.12 
(-0.631) 
-0.73 
(-0.646) 
-1.36 
(-1.102) 
0.33 
(0.580) 
-2.21 
(-0.944) 
-1.97 
(-1.945)* 
0.82 
(-0.424) 
-1.28 
(-0.791) 
-2.41 
(-1.240) 
-0.49 
(-1.064) 
0.44 
(0.407) 
-18 
0.70 
(1.360) 
-0.31 
(-0.335) 
-0.32 
(-0.818) 
-0.44 
(-1.110) 
1.03 
(1.753)* 
-0.33 
(0.142) 
1.26 
(1.483) 
-0.94 
(0.011) 
0.37 
(0.745) 
1.19 
(0.200) 
1.61 
(1.574) 
-0.80 
(-0.261) 
-0.68 
(-1.148) 
-0.24 
(-0.223) 
-17 
0.28 
(0.616) 
-0.02 
(0.073) 
0.37 
(0.603) 
-0.07 
(-0.715) 
-0.13 
(-0.125) 
-0.46 
(0.033) 
0.25 
(0.364) 
-0.69 
(0.285) 
-0.28 
(-0.550) 
0.90 
(-0.115) 
2.07 
(1.883)* 
1.26 
(0.520) 
0.56 
(1.305) 
0.32 
(0.621) 
-16 
-0.56 
(-0.678) 
-0.58 
(-0.382) 
-0.07 
(0.045) 
-0.14 
(-0.624) 
-0.89 
(-1.317) 
-1.35 
(-0.620) 
-0.59 
(-1.436) 
-1.29 
(-0.550) 
0.17 
(-0.128) 
1.07 
(-0.163) 
-0.59 
(-0.422) 
0.66 
(0.214) 
-0.94 
(0.125) 
-0.62 
(0.274) 
-15 
-1.05 
(-1.160) 
-1.64 
(-1.015) 
-0.44 
(-0.399) 
-0.59 
(-0.900) 
-0.82 
(-0.507) 
-2.18 
(-0.909) 
-1.63 
(-0.886) 
-2.92 
(-1.060) 
-1.53 
(-0.941) 
-0.45 
(-0.826) 
-1.80 
(-1.072) 
-1.13 
(-0.358) 
-2.51 
(-2.637)** 
-3.14 
(-0.301) 
-14 
0.25 
(0.450) 
-1.38 
(-0.763) 
1.24 
(1.735)* 
0.64 
(0.194) 
-0.45 
(-0.609) 
-2.64 
(-1.139) 
1.25 
(0.425) 
-1.67 
(-0.595) 
0.17 
(0.334) 
-0.27 
(-0.753) 
1.12 
(0.656) 
-0.00 
(-0.019) 
1.15 
(0.549) 
-1.98 
(-0.170) 
-13 
0.74 
(0.925) 
-0.63 
(-0.360) 
0.68 
(1.072) 
1.33 
(0.647) 
1.09 
(1.022) 
-1.54 
(-0.686) 
1.27 
(1.822)* 
-0.40 
(0.405) 
-0.42 
(-0.236) 
-0.70 
(-0.831) 
0.86 
(0.402) 
0.85 
(0.167) 
-0.68 
(-1.275) 
-2.66 
(-0.383) 
-12 
0.59 
(0.877) 
-0.03 
(0.070) 
-0.14 
(-0.586) 
1.18 
(0.223) 
0.94 
(1.138) 
-0.59 
(-0.040) 
-0.18 
(-0.523) 
-0.58 
(0.185) 
0.17 
(0.463) 
-0.53 
(-0.643) 
0.16 
(0.416) 
1.01 
(0.332) 
3.34 
(1.865)* 
0.67 
(0.128) 
-11 
0.22 
(0.209) 
0.18 
(0.188) 
1.50 
(0.753) 
2.69 
(0.777) 
-0.13 
(-0.230) 
-0.72 
(-0.141) 
-1.98 
(-0.942) 
-2.56 
(-0.298) 
3.17 
(1.316) 
2.64 
(0.352) 
-0.87 
(-0.757) 
0.13 
(0.016) 
-1.92 
(-1.882)* 
-1.25 
(-0.298) 
-10 
0.71 
(0.666) 
0.90 
(0.427) 
0.81 
(0.958) 
3.50 
(0.981) 
1.14 
(0.337) 
0.41 
(0.015) 
0.10 
(0.195) 
-2.46 
(-0.189) 
0.90 
(1.098) 
3.54 
(0.843) 
-0.34 
(-0.201) 
-0.20 
(-0.081) 
0.25 
(1.039) 
-0.99 
(-0.072) 
-9 
-0.15 
(-0.673) 
0.74 
(0.189) 
-0.03 
(-0.356) 
3.47 
(0.965) 
-0.35 
(-0.736) 
0.05 
(-0.263) 
0.19 
(0.693) 
-2.26 
(0.144) 
0.10 
(0.066) 
3.64 
(0.868) 
-0.31 
(-0.458) 
-0.52 
(-0.269) 
1.21 
(-0.204) 
0.21 
(-0.126) 
-8 
0.24 
(0.341) 
0.99 
(0.306) 
0.69 
(1.058) 
4.16 
(1.215) 
0.45 
(0.485) 
0.51 
(-0.072) 
-0.00 
(0.186) 
-2.26 
(0.248) 
-1.97 
(-1.271) 
1.67 
(0.426) 
-0.01 
(-0.189) 
-0.53 
(-0.359) 
2.11 
(0.218) 
2.33 
(-0.023) 
-7 
0.17 
(0.421) 
1.16 
(0.418) 
0.52 
(1.079) 
4.68 
(1.476) 
0.23 
(0.113) 
0.75 
(-0.032) 
0.76 
(1.651) 
-1.49 
(0.652) 
0.22 
(0.297) 
1.89 
(0.481) 
-0.13 
(0.168) 
-0.67 
(-0.295) 
-1.07 
(-1.032) 
1.25 
(-0.246) 
-6 
-0.22 
(-0.522) 
0.93 
(0.220) 
0.56 
(1.372) 
5.25 
(1.707)* 
-0.01 
(-0.812) 
0.73 
(-0.281) 
-1.76 
(-1.394) 
-3.26 
(0.109) 
-2.50 
(-1.434) 
-0.61 
(-0.093) 
0.43 
(0.036) 
-0.24 
(-0.247) 
-0.09 
(-0.807) 
1.15 
(-0.499) 
-5 
-0.24 
(-0.927) 
0.69 
(-0.040) 
0.03 
(-0.797) 
5.29 
(1.473) 
-0.01 
(-0.532) 
0.72 
(-0.425) 
1.74 
(0.424) 
-1.51 
(0.297) 
-1.05 
(-0.851) 
-1.66 
(-0.304) 
-0.79 
(-0.680) 
-1.04 
(-0.516) 
-1.94 
(-1.453) 
-0.78 
(-0.893) 
250 
-4 
0.40 
(0.448) 
1.09 
(0.102) 
-0.00 
(-0.094) 
5.28 
(1.364) 
0.24 
(0.249) 
0.97 
(-0.324) 
0.49 
(0.715) 
-1.02 
(0.640) 
0.11 
(-0.283) 
-1.54 
(-0.446) 
1.39 
(1.237) 
0.35 
(-0.124) 
0.85 
(0.317) 
0.07 
(-0.766) 
-3 
-0.17 
(-0.607) 
0.92 
(-0.074) 
-0.54 
(-1.156) 
4.74 
(1.041) 
-0.33 
(-0.559) 
0.63 
(-0.475) 
2.91 
(2.459)** 
1.89 
(1.496) 
1.00 
(0.249) 
-0.54 
(-0.343) 
-0.49 
(-0.270) 
-0.14 
(-0.204) 
-1.16 
(-1.645) 
-1.09 
(-1.026) 
-2 
0.46 
(0.989) 
1.38 
(0.191) 
0.81 
(1.417) 
5.56 
(1.310) 
-0.29 
(-0.306) 
0.33 
(-0.553) 
2.63 
(1.599) 
4.52 
(1.898)* 
0.80 
(0.918) 
0.26 
(-0.059) 
0.98 
(0.756) 
0.84 
(0.048) 
1.27 
(1.138) 
0.18 
(-0.838) 
-1 
-0.58 
(-1.043) 
0.80 
(-0.063) 
-0.67 
(-1.133) 
4.88 
(1.051) 
-0.65 
(-0.915) 
-0.31 
(-0.760) 
-0.49 
(0.393) 
4.02 
(1.981)* 
-0.18 
(-0.347) 
0.07 
(-0.185) 
-0.29 
(-0.115) 
0.54 
(0.015) 
-0.82 
(-1.090) 
-0.64 
(-0.969) 
0 
-0.19 
(-0.469) 
0.60 
(-0.183) 
0.13 
(0.638) 
5.02 
(1.137) 
0.05 
(-0.400) 
-0.26 
(-0.852) 
0.22 
(-0.569) 
4.24 
(1.684) 
-0.57 
(0.433) 
-0.49 
(-0.006) 
-1.40 
(-1.029) 
-0.85 
(-0.363) 
0.16 
(-0.653) 
-0.47 
(-1.038) 
1 
-0.40 
(-1.364) 
0.20 
(-0.501) 
1.47 
(0.563) 
6.50 
(1.286) 
-0.84 
(-1.624) 
-1.11 
(-1.208) 
-0.07 
(-0.042) 
4.17 
(1.604) 
0.61 
(0.280) 
0.11 
(0.079) 
-0.94 
(-1.261) 
-1.80 
(-0.726) 
-2.97 
(-3.074)*** 
-3.44 
(-1.585) 
2 
0.39 
(0.651) 
0.60 
(-0.325) 
0.05 
(0.523) 
6.56 
(1.351) 
0.45 
(0.255) 
-0.65 
(-1.124) 
-0.92 
(-0.403) 
3.24 
(1.287) 
1.53 
(1.722)* 
1.64 
(0.713) 
-0.09 
(0.133) 
-1.89 
(-0.679) 
0.28 
(0.323) 
-3.15 
(-1.594) 
3 
-0.13 
(-0.530) 
0.47 
(-0.426) 
0.62 
(0.326) 
7.18 
(1.421) 
-0.20 
(-0.911) 
-0.86 
(-1.278) 
-0.54 
(-0.530) 
2.69 
(1.226) 
1.44 
(1.307) 
3.09 
(1.015) 
-1.53 
(-0.962) 
-3.43 
(-0.903) 
0.40 
(0.069) 
-2.75 
(-1.522) 
4 
-0.20 
(-0.107) 
0.27 
(-0.431) 
-1.00 
(-2.191)** 
6.18 
(1.018) 
-0.51 
(-0.486) 
-1.37 
(-1.401) 
0.90 
(0.825) 
3.60 
(1.352) 
1.27 
(1.137) 
4.36 
(1.192) 
0.55 
(0.460) 
-2.87 
(-0.795) 
-0.83 
(-0.498) 
-3.58 
(-1.586) 
5 
-0.18 
(-0.593) 
0.08 
(-0.563) 
0.46 
(0.478) 
6.65 
(1.082) 
-0.36 
(-0.533) 
-1.73 
(-1.494) 
1.33 
(0.859) 
4.93 
(1.430) 
-0.00 
(-0.766) 
4.35 
(1.144) 
-0.28 
(-0.591) 
-3.16 
(-0.884) 
-0.71 
(-1.403) 
-4.29 
(-1.706) 
6 
0.09 
(-0.612) 
0.17 
(-0.688) 
-1.08 
(-1.732)* 
5.56 
(0.801) 
0.16 
(-0.287) 
-1.56 
(-1.510) 
-0.49 
(-1.915)* 
4.44 
(1.126) 
-0.76 
(-0.629) 
3.59 
(1.092) 
1.89 
(1.484) 
-1.26 
(-0.601) 
-0.56 
(-1.537) 
-4.86 
(-1.965)* 
7 
-0.13 
(-0.002) 
0.03 
(-0.675) 
1.15 
(1.481) 
6.72 
(1.011) 
-0.08 
(0.183) 
-1.65 
(-1.486) 
-2.36 
(-1.842)* 
2.07 
(0.679) 
0.32 
(0.358) 
3.92 
(1.060) 
-0.66 
(-0.230) 
-1.92 
(-0.657) 
-2.28 
(-2.462)** 
-7.15 
(-2.269)** 
8 
0.28 
(0.526) 
0.32 
(-0.569) 
-0.50 
(-0.618) 
6.21 
(0.906) 
-0.03 
(0.276) 
-1.68 
(-1.412) 
2.29 
(1.620) 
4.37 
(1.086) 
0.06 
(-0.308) 
3.99 
(1.002) 
1.31 
(0.600) 
-0.61 
(-0.525) 
0.67 
(1.139) 
-6.47 
(-2.129)** 
9 
-0.01 
(-0.301) 
0.30 
(-0.636) 
0.32 
(-0.359) 
6.54 
(0.831) 
0.06 
(-0.136) 
-1.61 
(-1.445) 
-2.18 
(-2.543)** 
2.19 
(0.428) 
-0.52 
(-1.064) 
3.46 
(0.796) 
1.02 
(0.934) 
0.41 
(-0.286) 
-1.61 
(-0.149) 
-8.09 
(-2.106)** 
10 
-0.99 
(-1.115) 
-0.69 
(-0.889) 
-0.78 
(-0.440) 
5.75 
(0.724) 
-1.34 
(-1.638) 
-2.95 
(-1.888)* 
0.19 
(1.121) 
2.38 
(0.711) 
-1.80 
(-1.631) 
1.66 
(0.483) 
-0.48 
(-0.420) 
-0.07 
(-0.359) 
0.31 
(1.109) 
-7.77 
(-1.962)* 
11 
0.40 
(1.114) 
-0.28 
(-0.659) 
0.57 
(0.976) 
6.33 
(0.876) 
0.28 
(1.024) 
-2.67 
(-1.688)* 
-0.40 
(-0.280) 
1.98 
(0.608) 
1.56 
(1.215) 
3.23 
(0.727) 
0.13 
(0.623) 
0.06 
(-0.223) 
1.03 
(0.632) 
-6.73 
(-1.897)* 
12 
-0.58 
(-0.872) 
-0.87 
(-0.834) 
0.14 
(0.651) 
6.47 
(0.993) 
-0.52 
(-0.796) 
-3.20 
(-1.824)* 
-0.44 
(-0.999) 
1.54 
(0.426) 
0.37 
(0.542) 
3.61 
(0.754) 
-2.01 
(-1.686)* 
-1.94 
(-0.565) 
-2.36 
(-1.314) 
-9.10 
(-2.120)** 
13 
-0.30 
(-0.628) 
-1.18 
(-0.957) 
0.68 
(1.422) 
7.16 
(1.183) 
-0.54 
(-0.970) 
-3.74 
(-2.072)** 
-1.46 
(-1.150) 
0.08 
(0.261) 
0.49 
(0.330) 
4.10 
(0.834) 
-0.98 
(-0.736) 
-2.93 
(-0.781) 
-0.83 
(-1.326) 
-9.93 
(-2.265)** 
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14 
-0.87 
(-1.464) 
-2.06 
(-1.272) 
-0.19 
(-0.049) 
6.97 
(1.165) 
-0.00 
(-0.297) 
-3.74 
(-2.084)** 
-2.80 
(-1.701) 
-2.71 
(-0.284) 
-3.61 
(-3.121)*** 
0.49 
(0.251) 
-0.98 
(-0.926) 
-3.92 
(-1.007) 
-0.99 
(-1.074) 
-10.92 
(-2.471)** 
15 
-1.00 
(-1.758)* 
-3.07 
(-1.673)* 
-1.85 
(-2.538)** 
5.12 
(0.745) 
-1.12 
(-1.318) 
-4.87 
(-2.354)** 
-0.42 
(-0.398) 
-3.14 
(-0.427) 
0.16 
(-0.686) 
0.65 
(0.127) 
-1.20 
(-0.908) 
-5.12 
(-1.179) 
-0.78 
(-1.335) 
-11.70 
(-2.561)** 
16 
-0.48 
(-0.674) 
-3.55 
(-1.821)* 
-0.12 
(-0.764) 
4.99 
(0.606) 
-0.66 
(-0.711) 
-5.53 
(-2.535)** 
1.44 
(0.275) 
-1.69 
(-0.339) 
-1.55 
(-1.101) 
-0.90 
(-0.125) 
0.01 
(0.105) 
-5.10 
(-1.160) 
-0.13 
(0.597) 
-11.84 
(-2.631)** 
17 
-0.00 
(-0.321) 
-3.56 
(-1.875)* 
-1.02 
(-2.015)** 
3.97 
(0.360) 
0.33 
(0.043) 
-5.20 
(-2.479)** 
-0.79 
(-0.151) 
-2.49 
(-0.399) 
1.01 
(1.255) 
0.10 
(0.092) 
-0.17 
(-0.085) 
-5.28 
(-1.146) 
-0.56 
(-1.465) 
-12.40 
(-2.704)** 
18 
0.00 
(0.140) 
-3.55 
(-1.838)* 
-0.63 
(-0.730) 
3.34 
(0.227) 
-0.19 
(-0.059) 
-5.39 
(-2.540)** 
0.51 
(1.538) 
-1.97 
(-0.168) 
0.85 
(0.631) 
0.95 
(0.196) 
0.83 
(0.428) 
-4.45 
(-0.970) 
-0.86 
(-0.357) 
-13.27 
(-2.724)** 
19 
-0.15 
(-0.262) 
-3.71 
(-1.840)* 
1.42 
(1.817)* 
4.77 
(0.516) 
-0.28 
(-0.264) 
-5.68 
(-2.484)** 
0.88 
(0.903) 
-1.09 
(-0.027) 
-0.28 
(-0.592) 
0.67 
(0.093) 
-1.31 
(-1.014) 
-5.76 
(-1.164) 
-1.44 
(-0.851) 
-14.72 
(-2.797)*** 
20 
-0.75 
(-1.614) 
-4.47 
(-2.110)** 
-0.55 
(-1.083) 
4.22 
(0.342) 
-0.53 
(-1.420) 
-6.21 
(-2.758)*** 
-2.75 
(-1.224) 
-3.85 
(-0.312) 
-0.30 
(-0.023) 
0.37 
(0.083) 
-1.21 
(-0.746) 
-6.97 
(-1.335) 
-0.03 
(-0.576) 
-14.75 
(-2.792)** 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated and quantified the equity market reaction to the announcement 
of the RSPT and MRRT. The empirical evidence in this chapter indicates that the two 
proposed resource taxes had a measurable effect on the equity securities of potentially 
affected companies, be it negative when the RSPT was announced or slightly positive 
when its replacement, the MRRT, was anticipated. These observed securities price 
revaluations are attributable to the expected consequences the RSPT and MRRT were 
believed to have on managerial behaviour (such as project revaluations and investment 
and production decisions) as well as the costs that would have had to be endured by the 
affected firms and their security holders. 
While it appears that market participants viewed the MRRT as less value destructive 
than the RSPT, overall, the net effect of a proposed resource tax reform (RSPT + 
MRRT) was negative. As expected, this confirms the presence of a negative income 
effect (see Chapters 3, and 6). Further, this suggests that market participants perceived a 
switch from an output-based tax to a profit-based tax to be value destructive. 
This chapter also provides evidence of an apparent differentiated stock price reaction to 
the proposed resource tax announcements across the various subsectors investigated. 
Since the response to both the MRRT and RSPT announcements was not uniform, this 
suggests the existence of a differential tax effect (i.e., substitution effect). Such effect 
may be related to the relationship between firm/subsector specific characteristics and 
the design and features of the RSPT and MRRT. The presence of a substitution effect is 
investigated further in the next chapter. 
Finally, the idea of a possible repeal of the MRRT as well as its actual repeal appear to 
have no effects on market participants. Although, it should be noted that iron ore firm’s 
equity investors seemed to perceive the actual repeal of the MRRT as being rather value 
destructive as statically significant a post-announcement negative drift is observed. This 
effect possibly arises from the announced increased in state royalties for iron and ore 
commodities as well as the removal of the concessional royalty rate. 
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 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Investigation of a 
Substitution Effect 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a negative equity market reaction (income effect) 
was observed around the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT. In addition, 
a differentiated share price reaction was noticed across different subsectors investigated. 
This suggests that the proposed new resource taxations created a substitution effect. The 
objective of this chapter is to empirically investigate the existence of such effect, in 
other words, it investigates whether the proposed resource taxes (RSPT and MRRT) 
were neutral. 
First, this chapter provides a brief review of the theoretical background discussed in 
Chapter 3 and 4 and restates the conditions for neutral resource taxation.  It theoretically 
analyses and evaluates the designs, features and characteristics of the proposed RSPT 
and MRRT (discussed in chapter 5) against the tax neutrality conditions (discussed in 
chapter 3 and 4). Then, from this, results the development of hypotheses to investigate 
whether these announced resources tax reforms created a substitution effect. 
These hypotheses are then empirically investigated by regressing the average 
cumulative abnormal returns from Chapter 7 (dependent variables) against firms’ 
specific characteristics. The latter are proxies for the identified potential sources of non-
neutrality in the designs and features of the proposed RSPT and MRRT. 
8.2 Review of Theoretical Background 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a neutral tax is one that while generating a negative income 
effect, does not create any substitution effect. The negative income effect arises with the 
imposition and/or increase of a tax that leads to a reduction in an economic unit’s 
disposable income.  
Chapters 3 and 4 further showed that in a theoretical/textbook world, under certain 
conditions, resource taxation can achieve tax neutrality; that is, absence of unrecouped 
losses, uplift rate set at LTBR, no imposition of capital levy and asymmetric 
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application. It was also shown that the interaction between royalty tax, corporate income 
tax and profit rent-based resource taxation may create distortive effects on investment 
decisions. 
Further, as recognised in the asset pricing model literature, any changes in a 
corporation’s disposable income is projected to flow through to a one-off adjustment in 
the corporation share price (see Chapter 6). It is hence reasonable to assert that 
companies subject to the new proposed tax reforms would experience a one-off windfall 
drop in their share price (i.e., the negative income effect). This occurs because of market 
participants’ perceptions that these new proposed resource taxes would reduce the rent 
value of the resource, and therefore, mining company disposable income available for 
retained earnings or dividends (Cutler 1988; Freebairn 2015; Freebairn & Quiggin 
2010; Parmenter, Breckenridge & Gray 2010). 
As discussed in chapter 3, a neutral tax does create a negative effect but no substitution 
effect. Hence, if the 2010 resource tax reforms are neutral, then, while the 
announcement of the tax reforms should be negatively related to companies’ abnormal 
returns (the income effect), pre-tax reform announcement aspect of companies should 
not influence abnormal returns (i.e., no substitution effect). In other word, no variables 
other than the income effect should influence companies' abnormal returns. Therefore, 
no cross companies heterogenous equity market reaction to the tax reforms should be 
produced with respect to pre-tax reform announcement aspect of companies (Smith et al 
1986; Cutler 1988; Jang 1994; Lang &Shackelford 2000; Auerbach and Hasset 2005). 
The following section examines the design and features of both proposed resource taxes 
(RSPT and MRRT) and assesses whether the neutrality conditions were met. It then 
develops hypotheses to examine the cross-sectional equity market reaction to the 
proposed tax reforms, to investigate whether these create any substitution effects. 
8.3 Hypothesis Development 
In this section, the relationship between the design and features of both proposed 
resource tax reforms (RSPT and MRRT), tax neutrality conditions and average 
abnormal returns are analysed, and hypotheses concerning these relationships 
developed. 
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8.3.1 Direct exposure (relationship) to the RSPT and MRRT 
8.3.1.1 RSPT 
As noted in Chapter 5, the proposed RSPT was to be imposed on the profit generated 
from the exploitation of mineral and petroleum resources in Australia. That is, while 
resource companies with profit generated from mining deposits located in Australia 
were to be subject to the RSPT, profit generated from foreign projects were effectively 
exempt from the proposed new resource rent impost. As a result, Mayo (2013), 
McLaren and Passant (2015), Kellow (2016), Valle de Souza, Dollery and Kortt (2017), 
Parmenter, Breckenridge and Gray (2010) and Murray (2016) contended that 
commercial attractiveness of domestic projects (i.e., projects subject to the RSPT) as 
reflected by their NPVs could be reduced relative to mineral projects not subject to the 
RSPT (overseas mining projects/deposits). As a result, the screening or ranking of 
potential investments/projects could be affected because the pre-tax ranking of net 
discounted values would be altered, violating an essential tax neutrality condition (i.e., 
asymmetric application), as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Another potential distortionary effect arising from the RSPT design and features 
pertains to the treatment of state royalty tax payments. Although the RSPT was to 
provide full refundable credits for the payment of state royalties (as discussed in 
Chapter 4, such design is consistent with tax neutrality), their crediting was to be 
limited to their rate level prior to the announcement of the RSPT (as well as any 
planned increases at the time of the announcement of the RSPT).123 By restricting 
royalty payment credit refunds, this measure enabled states to retain their ability to 
increase royalty payments, for which no increased corresponding credit refunds were to 
be provided. This directly violates the full unrestricted refund royalty payment 
neutrality condition discussed in Chapter 4, thereby introducing a distortionary effect 
caused by royalty tax. Once again, this could be perceived by investors as a reduction in 
the attractiveness of mineral resources projects located in Australia relative to overseas 
projects. 
The interaction between a corporate income tax and a resource rent tax was shown to 
potentially cause other distortionary effects (see Chapter 4), particularly when, as under 
                                                 
123 Plus, an allowance for inflation (i.e., indexation factor). 
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the RSPT, tax payments are deductible for corporate income tax purposes. Indeed, as 
suggested by numerous academic authors and commentators, to ensure that corporate 
income tax distortions are minimised, corporate income tax payments should be 
deductible for profit rent-based resource tax purposes, rather than the latter being 
recognised as a deductible cost under the former (Garnaut 2010; Mayo 2013; Murray, 
2016). Once more, mineral and petroleum resources companies directly impacted by 
such interaction (subject to the RSPT) could be seen as less attractive to investors. 
8.3.1.2 MRRT 
As noted in Chapter 5, although both the RSPT and MRRT were similar in many 
aspects, there were key differences in their design, features and coverage. In fact, as 
Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010) asserted, the MRRT had several of the inefficiencies 
of the RSPT but also added further distortionary effects of its own. For instance, the 
decision by the government to provide a tax rebate for state royalty payments instead of 
offering a full refund (as under the RSPT) not only maintained the inefficiency 
associated with the treatment of state royalty payments,124 but further added the 
inefficiency of a profit rent-based resource tax.125 The lack of refundability suggested 
that the MRRT was ‘layered on the top of royalties’ (Kompo-Harms & Sanyal, 2011, p. 
7).126 
Another distortionary effect was with respect to coverage. As mentioned in Chapter 5, 
one of the essential differences between the designs of the latest version of the resource 
rent tax (the MRRT and extension of the PRRT) and its predecessor (the RSPT) 
pertained to respective coverage. Unlike the RSPT, which was to apply to the 
production of all mining resources in Australia, the MRRT and PRRT only applied to 
the production of bulk commodities (iron ore and coal) and oil and gas. This 
asymmetric application of the MRRT fails to meet one of the tax neutrality conditions 
discussed in Chapter 4. Indeed, in that chapter, it was shown that if applied to the whole 
mining sector, resource rent taxation would not affect investment decisions when 
consideration of a project is based on the NPV probability function (Mayo 1979, 2013). 
This is further supported by Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), McLaren and Passant 
(2015) and Parmenter, Breckenridge and Gray (2010), who argued that the asymmetric 
                                                 
124 Associated with the restricting of the royalty payment rebate. 
125 See Chapter 4 for a theoretical discussion on resource taxes. 
126 The RSPT was considered a replacement for the state and territory royalties. 
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application of the MRRT could well render investment in coal and iron ore projects less 
attractive, and as such, create a reallocation of mining expenditure away from iron ore 
and coal and towards the other commodities not subject to the MRRT. This would be 
the case as mining firms strive to avoid MRRT liabilities, shifting their investment to 
resources excluded from the MRRT and projects that do not attract the MRRT. Hence, 
as Murray (2016) contended, the tax burden for companies involved in the production 
of onshore oil and gas, coal and iron ore resources is likely to be greater than for 
companies involved in the mining of commodities excluded from the MRRT. As a 
result, the MRRT is likely to be detrimental in the eyes of shareholders of companies 
with greater operational focus on bulk commodities and onshore oil and gas resources 
relative to other mining companies. 
A final point to note is that although the RSPT was symmetric in its 
application/coverage, many economists and commentaries suggested that oil and gas, as 
well as bulk commodities, were the real targeted commodities of the initial proposed 
resource tax reform (RSPT) (Brown et al. 2012; Burrell 2010; Valle de Souza, Dollery 
& Kortt 2017; Freebairn 2015; Hausman 2010; Kellow 2016; McLaren & Passant 2015; 
Murray 2016; Phaceas 2010; Shanahan & Franklin, 2010; Thomson 2010).127 This was 
confirmed in the Australian Government MRRT fact sheet which, stating that “The new 
resource tax arrangements focus on our biggest and most profitable commodities: iron 
ore, coal, oil and gas” (Australian Government 2011, p. 1). 
The above discussion suggests the following hypothesis to investigate the direct 
exposure effect of the announcement of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT: 
H1: The greater the proportion of a resource company’s revenue is derived 
from its Australian operations (relative to the company’s total revenue), the 
larger the negative market reaction to the RSPT announcement. 
H1b): The greater the proportion of a resource company’s revenue is derived 
from its Australian operations (relative to the company’s total revenue), the 
larger the negative market reaction to the MRRT announcement. 
                                                 
127 As these commodities (bulk and oil and gas) are generally more profitable to exploit relative to base 
metal resources (copper, silver, lead and nickel, among others). 
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H2: Companies involved in the exploitation of bulk commodities (iron ore and 
coal) and oil and gas are worse off than under the RSPT. 
H2b: Companies involved in the exploitation of bulk commodities (iron ore 
and coal) and oil and gas participants are worse off under the MRRT 
8.3.2 Indirect exposure (relationship) to the RSPT and MRRT 
8.3.2.1 Size 
Other inefficiencies associated with design features of the RSPT and MRRT were 
identified by Freebairn and Quiggin (2010), Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), Garnaut 
(2010) and McLaren and Passant (2015). Specifically, these authors asserted that the 
treatment of existing projects and transfer of credit rules benefited large mining 
companies. For instance, in recognition of past investment, mining companies with 
interests in existing operations/projects at the time of the announcement and/or 
proposed commencement date of the RSPT were permitted to enter the RSPT regime 
with an RSPT starting base. The RSPT starting base was to be measured as 100% of the 
accounting book value of existing asset, and deducted against resource rent tax 
liabilities. When the MRRT replaced the RSPT, a similar allowance was provided. 
Under the MRRT regime, mining companies had the option to determine the stating 
base at either the market value of the company’s exiting project assets or at their book 
value. This specific RSPT and MRRT provision created a tax discrimination against 
smaller mining companies, because mining projects of large resource companies 
generally have a higher market/book value relative to smaller companies. Hence, larger 
mining companies have the ability to reduce their Australian resource rent tax liability 
to a greater extent than smaller companies, reducing their Australian tax payments. 
Further inefficiency was also identified with regards to the treatment of resource rent 
taxation credit and losses. Specifically, both the RSPT and MRRT facilitated the 
transfer of tax credits and losses within company group and/or entity. Larger mining 
firms are likely to have multiple projects in their portfolios, making it easier for them to 
use losses from one mining project to offset profits generated from another. As 
suggested by Freebairn and Quiggin (2010), Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), 
Garnaut (2010) and McLaren and Passant (2015), these loss/credit transfer provisions 
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disadvantaged smaller companies or companies with a single mining project, as these 
were effectively unlikely to be able to access any tax credit. 
On balance, this thesis favours the interpretation or hypotheses that: 
H3: Larger companies experienced on average lower negative abnormal 
returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H3b): Larger companies experienced on average lower negative abnormal 
returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.2 Maturity 
As asserted by Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), Freebairn (2015) and Garnaut 
(2010), resource companies with interests in mature projects benefit from the proposed 
resource rent taxes. This is the case as mature projects generally have a lower required 
rate of return. In fact, these authors further argued that mature projects may have a 
required rate of return lower than the proposed RRT threshold rate, and particularly so 
for the MRRT (the MRRT threshold rate was higher (LTBR plus 7%) than that of the 
RSPT (bond rate)). This is the case as companies with mature projects are more likely 
to have gained information about the size of a mineral deposit (through exploration and 
development). Therefore, the uncertainty about possible outcomes tends to be reduced. 
This in turn results in a reduction of the risk premium component of an investor risk 
weighted discount rate (Boadway & Keen 2010; Hogan, 2003, 2007; Mayo 2013). 
This suggested the following hypotheses: 
H4: More mature mining companies experienced lower abnormal negative 
returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H4b): More mature mining companies experienced lower abnormal negative 
returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
However, as previously discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, for a resource rent tax system to 
be efficient, it should aim at taxing only pure rent while avoiding taxing quasi rent.128 In 
other words, an efficient resource rent tax is one that falls on revenue that is pure rent 
                                                 
128 It should be noted that as asserted in Chapter 4, that distinguishing quasi rent from rent is key in 
resource taxation design as taxing the former creates distortions. 
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only and not on revenues that are quasi rent. Freebairn and Quiggin (2010), Freebairn 
(2015), Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010) and Garnaut (2010) strongly argued that by 
being imposable on existing mineral projects, both the RSPT and MRRT created 
distortions, as they not only fell on pure rent (as they should) but on quasi rent. In other 
words, while the risk-sharing characteristics of a profit-based tax has value for the 
prospective mining venture, its retrospective aspect amounts to taxing successful 
projects and to ‘a partial expropriation of the value of existing’ mineral projects (Ergas, 
Harrison & Pincus 2010, p. 8).129 
These authors (all authors mentioned in the previous paragraph) further argued that by 
allowing only accounting book value of existing assets to form the resource rent tax 
starting base (rather than market value, as under the MRRT), the RSPT would fall more 
heavily on quasi rent than the MRRT, creating a higher capital levy effect. 
All investor decisions would be affected by a tax base that fails to accurately reflect 
pure rent; that is, one that instead on being borne only by pure rent, taxes part of the 
quasi rent (Boadway & Keen, 2010; Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010). The larger the 
share of quasi rent included in the resource rent tax base, the more heavily the tax will 
fall on revenue from quasi rent and the larger the distortion will be. In addition, the 
distortion will be more pronounced, the higher the tax rate is. 
A final essential point is that, unlike an output-based tax, a profit rent-based tax does 
not collect any tax revenue in the initial years of a mining project (Hogan 2008). It is 
important to note that more established/mature firms are more likely to have a larger 
portfolio of mature mining projects relative to younger, growing mining companies 
(Brown et al.2014; Cutler 1988; Garnaut 2010). 
This therefore suggests the following hypotheses: 
H5: Firm maturity level has a diminishing marginal influence on average 
abnormal returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H5b): Firm maturity level has a diminishing marginal influence on average 
abnormal returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
                                                 
129 Because no subsidies are provided for previous losses (unsuccessful exploration and development). 
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8.3.2.3 RSPT and MRRT threshold rate relative to tax threshold rate 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, in theory, under a cash flow taxation incorporating a 
delayed full loss offset design (like the RSPT), a tax threshold rate set at the LTBR 
would not violate the tax neutrality condition. Under cash flow taxation incorporating 
anything less than delayed full loss offset design (like the MRRT), tax neutrality is 
unlikely to be maintained, although, setting the threshold rate equal to the investor 
discount rate in some cases may reduce the distortionary effect associated to non-
neutrality (i.e. unrecouped losses). While theoretically feasible, asymmetric information 
renders such a design impossible in practice. As a result, to minimise the distortionary 
effect that may arise due to the possibility of unrecouped losses (see Chapter 3 and 4), 
Fane (1987), Fane and Smith (1986), Mayo (1984, 2013) and Henry (2010) argued that 
a loading of the tax threshold rate above the LTBR is appropriate. Nevertheless, the 
RSPT threshold rate was set at the LTBR and the MRRT threshold rate at the LTBR 
plus 7 percentage points.130 
However, following the announcements of the RSPT and MRRT and their design and 
features, several economists/experts (Davidson 2010; Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010; 
Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Garnaut 2010; Parmenter, Breckenridge & Gray 2010) as 
well as mining companies, commentaries and reports in the news (Burrell 2010; 
Hausman 2010; Phaceas 2010; Thomson 2010; Shanahan & Franklin 2010), argued that 
both the RSPT and MRRT threshold rates were set at inappropriate levels. The main 
concern raised was that these tax threshold rates were too low relative to mining 
companies’ average cost of capital (WACC)131 and could result in mineral projects 
being cancelled and/or disapproved.132 Indeed, as seen in Chapter 3 and 4, the lower the 
tax threshold rate, the lower the value of accumulated depreciation and losses and the 
lower the rate at which the tax is triggered. More importantly, losses and depreciation 
are more likely to be compounded forward at a rate lower than that of the investment 
                                                 
130 The 7% premium in excess of the LTBR was to compensate for the possibility of unrecouped loss 
under the MRRT. 
131 Firms’ WACCs are widely used by investors, security analysts and company directors as a proxy for 
the company’s discount rate (Fernández 2010; Frank & Shen, 2016; García 2017; Krüger, Landier & 
Thesmar 2015; Luehrman 1997; Truong, Partington & Peat 2008; Murray & Tao 2016, Vélez-Pareja, & 
Tham 2000). 
132 It should be remembered that a neutral tax was defined in Chapter 3 and 4 as one that does not affect 
the screening of prospective investments nor alters their ordering with respect to expected profitability. 
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pre-tax return (Valle de Souza, Dollery & Kortt 2017; Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010; 
Hogan 2007; Mayo 1979, 1984, 2013).  
Hence, given the above discussion, the following hypotheses are suggested: 
H6: Mining firms with a WACC higher than the RSPT would have negative 
effects on average abnormal returns. 
H6b): Mining firms with a WACC higher than the MRRT would have 
negative effects on average abnormal returns. 
8.3.2.4 Operating profit 
As shown in Chapter 2, mineral project profitability is likely to vary from one mineral 
deposit to another, reflecting differences in cost structures. In particular, it was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 that lower cost mineral deposits (i.e., on the bottom of the 
cost curve) earn larger economic rent than mineral deposits with less favourable natural 
attributes (requiring higher capital costs). It was also demonstrated in Chapter 4 that 
output-based taxes tend to undertax highly profitable mineral projects while overtaxing 
low profit mining projects. On the contrary, a profit-based tax is designed to vary the 
resource rent generated by mineral project (i.e., project profitability). It therefore can be 
concluded that, in theory, under a profit-based tax, the tax burden would be relatively 
larger for mineral projects generating larger economic rent and reduced to close to zero 
for marginal mineral projects (i.e., those earning little resource rent). All the 
aforementioned suggests that the replacement of an output-based tax with a profit-based 
tax would result in a one-off windfall capital gain for shareholders of relatively high 
cost mineral/less profitable/marginal projects and a one-off capital loss for shares in 
highly profitable/low cost mineral projects. 
However, it is important to note that, as mentioned in previous sections, the treatment of 
state royalty payments under the MRRT created distortionary effects, and these effects 
were accented by the design of the MRRT (see previous sections). Specifically, the fact 
that existing royalty credits were neither refundable nor transferable under the MRRT 
resulted in a higher distortion at the lower end of the mineral project distribution. This 
in turn meant that the introduction of the MRRT conceivably augmented the level of tax 
payments for the least profitable mineral projects. This is because the return on low 
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profit mineral projects or marginal projects is less likely to exceed the MRRT threshold 
rate. Therefore, these mineral projects were more likely to lack the MRRT liabilities 
against which to credit state royalty payments, and pay existing state royalties in full. 
Hence, as a result of the non-refundability/transferability of royalty credits, under the 
MRRT, relatively less profitable mineral projects were disadvantaged. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, another key aspect with regards to the treatment of 
royalty credits was that these were limited to their rate prior to the announcement of the 
respective resource rent tax reforms (as well as any planned increases at the time of the 
announcement). Hence, while the MRRT might have possibly augmented the tax burden 
for the least profitable mineral projects, it is to the extent that the increase (planned 
and/or unplanned) in royalty taxes is selectively done for the more profitable mineral 
projects. If this is the case, then the distortion associated with royalty taxes would most 
likely remain at the higher end of the mineral project distribution, and act as a top-up 
tax on the more profitable mineral projects in addition to any profit-based tax.  
In fact, as asserted by Murray (2016), the incentive for states to increase their royalty 
tax rate for profitable mineral projects is considerable, as this would enable them to 
divert some part of resource rent revenue to themselves.  
Given the above discussion, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H7: The more profitable a mining company, the higher the negative abnormal 
returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H7b): The more profitable a mining company, the higher the negative 
abnormal returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.5 Number of segments 
Once again, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, an efficient tax regime should aim at 
taxing pure rent only (arising from the exploitation of mineral resources, in the case of 
mining) and avoid taxing any revenue that is not pure rent (i.e., quasi rent). This 
requires the return generated by mining resources (i.e., pure rent) to be differentiated 
from the return earned by other activities involved in converting mining resources into a 
saleable or marketable commodity (processing and transporting, among others). If other 
activities in the downstream sequence are brought into the tax net, distortions are likely 
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to arise. As shown in Mayo (2013) and Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), a method to 
remedy or lower such distortions (i.e., taxing pure economic rent only) is to define/bring 
the mineral resource’s taxing point as close as possible to the well head or mining gate. 
In other words, ‘the further the taxation point is moved upstream in the production 
process’, the lower the distortion effect (Mayo 2013, p. 115). 
By imposing the RSPT and MRRT on profit assessed at the well head or mine gate, the 
Australian Government affirmed its intention to achieve a tax neutral outcome, at least 
with regards to the selection/specification of the taxing point. However, as identified by 
Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010), Freebairn (2015) and McLaren and Passant (2015), 
a distortionary effect still arises because of transfer pricing problems; in particular, in 
the case of mineral resources exploited by vertically integrated firms. Specifically, 
while the RSPT and MRRT were intended to be imposed on revenue generated from 
upstream activities only, it was the mining companies themselves that determined the 
allocation of income and expenses allocated to associated mining operations (i.e., 
downstream and/or upstream activities). As suggested by Freebairn (2015), this 
inevitably results in either an over or underestimate of the pure rent generated by 
upstream activities. 
On balance, this thesis favours the idea that the greater the number of operating 
segments a mining company is involved in, the more opportunity and incentive it has to 
inflate (deflate) the value of the cost (revenue) associated with its upstream activities.133 
The following hypotheses are therefore suggested: 
H8: The more segments a mining firm has, the lower the abnormal negative 
returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H8b: The more segments a mining firm has, the lower the abnormal negative 
returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.6 Exploration and development 
Mining is a risky activity that involves various phases/processes. The main stages of 
activity are (in sequential order) exploration, development and production.134 Through 
                                                 
133 In bid to reduce their resource rent tax liabilities. 
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the first two stages, further information is gained about the size of the mineral deposit 
and therefore uncertainty is reduced. Special skills, knowledge and expertise 
(Schumpeterian/quasi rent) are required for the exploration and development stages, and 
generally, resource companies combine/conduct all these activities (Boadway & Keen 
2010; Garnaut 2010; Hogan 2007). 
As discussed in previous sections as well as in Chapters 3 and 4, one of the major issues 
in the taxation of non-renewable energy is to accurately measure resource rent. If not 
accurately measured, as demonstrated earlier, a resource rent tax may impose a tax 
burden not only on pure resource rent (Ricardian rent) but on other forms of economic 
rent (such as Schumpeterian) (Boadway & Keen 2010; Hogan 2012). As Mayo (2013) 
asserted, ‘Resource rent taxation should only apply to pure economic rent of mineral 
resources, not downstream processing and transportation, and should not apply to 
returns to innovation and special expertise in the extraction process itself’ (2013, p. 
114). 
Such inaccuracy in the measure of the residual pure rent was reduced under the MRRT. 
In effect, while perhaps arbitrary, a 25% extraction allowance was provided under the 
MRRT. This extraction factor was to recognize miners’ special expertise in their 
employment of factors of production in the exploitation of mineral resources and 
reduced the taxable profit subject to the MRRT (Kompo-Harms & Sanya 2011; Passant 
2012, 2014; McLaren 2011; Australian Government the Treasury 2011; Gillard et. 
al.2011). In fact, as noted in a report prepared for the MCA by Deloitte Access 
Economics (2011), such extraction allowance was an indirect way to acknowledge the 
fact that the different forms of rent are nearly impossible to separately identify. It 
further recognised that a resource rent tax inevitably taxes more than just the rent 
generated by resources (i.e., an incidental side effect that taxes a miner’s entrepreneurial 
effort). 
Nevertheless, while reducing the tax burden on quasi rent to some extent, this extraction 
allowance failed ‘to account for heterogeneity among miners in terms of their technical 
and entrepreneurial expertise’ (Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2011, p. 8) and therefore 
potentially disadvantaged more exploration and development focused resource 
companies. Such extraction allowance may have benefited more production-focused 
                                                                                                                                               
134 To these can be added processing and clean up and shutdown. 
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mining companies, since the extraction allowance meant that the effective MRRT tax 
rate was reduced for these companies too (Freebairn & Quiggin 2010; Murray 2016). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H9: The more exploration and development focus a resource company has, the 
larger the abnormal returns following the announcement of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.7 Risk 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, because of its risk-sharing characteristics, a cash flow 
tax design incorporating full loss offset reduces the risk premium required by investors 
and therefore its discount rate.135 In contrast, under an output-based tax (i.e., specific 
and ad valorem royalties), the risk premium tends to augment. In fact, Hogan (2003, 
2007, 2012) showed that the risk premium required by investors is consistently lower 
after a cash flow tax design incorporating full loss offset. In addition, it is important to 
recall that an output-based tax generally discourages investment in risky mining projects 
(exploration and development) as it taxes successful outcomes only 
(extraction/production) (Boadway & Keen 2010; Daniel, Keen & McPherson 2010). 
It can therefore be argued that the announcement of the proposed RSPT (i.e., a switch 
from an output-based to a profit-based tax) could be perceived by stock market 
participants to be more beneficial to these companies holding a portfolio of riskier 
mining projects/investments. It is hence apparent that the riskiness of a mining 
company’s projects is an important factor to consider when investigating the 
shareholder wealth effect of the announcement of the proposed resource profit-based 
taxes.  
As showed in Mayo (2013), Hogan (2003, 2007, 2012) and Garnaut (1979, 2010), one 
of the main variables used in assessing the viability of a mining project is the investor 
discount rate. These authors asserted that an investor discount rate generally reflects 
investor perceived risk of a mining project. When investigating the relationship between 
a company expected return and risk, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is not only 
‘the state of the art’ (Berk & Binsbergen 2017, p. 25) but the most widely used model 
                                                 
135 As previously discussed, the risk premium component of an investor discount rate is that additional 
return required as compensation for an investment’s amount of perceived risk by an investor. 
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(Berk & Binsbergen 2017; Graham & Harvey 2001). In addition, as demonstrated by 
Treynor (1961, 1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), a key 
component for the calculation of the CAPM is a risk measure called beta. It is therefore 
reasonable to assert that beta indicates the risk level of a mining project. The riskier a 
mining project, the higher the beta and the higher the discount rate used in assessing the 
viability of a mining project.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H10: The higher the beta of a company, the lower the negative abnormal 
returns following the announcement of the RSPT. 
In contrast, the latest version of the resource profit-based tax (the MRRT) was 
extremely more distorting and more inefficient than its former version (the RSPT) with 
respect to the treatment of risk, and more specifically, the possibility of unrecouped 
losses. That is, as demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, a resource tax design such as that 
of the MRRT imposes an asymmetrical effect on probability distributions (i.e., NPV and 
IRR).136 This effect arises because the tax design reduces positive NPVs in equal 
proportion to the tax rate while leaving unchanged negative present values. Hence, it 
can be concluded that it would reduce risky projects’ expected rates of return by more 
than less risky projects. In other words, as asserted by Pincus (2011), in such a scheme, 
the realised tax rate is higher on riskier projects.137 Further, because mineral resource 
tax rent design (such as that of the MRRT) entertains the possibility of unrecouped 
losses (see Chapters 3 and 4), as asserted by Mayo (2013), the risk of unrecouped loss is 
higher the riskier the mineral project. 
Hence, overall, the MRRT was more likely to penalise high-risk projects relative to 
low-risk projects. The following hypothesis is therefore suggested: 
H10b: The higher the company beta, the higher the negative abnormal returns 
following the announcement of the MRRT. 
                                                 
136 Unlike a pure cash flow tax (i.e., RSPT), which has a symmetrical effect (see Chapter 3 and 4). 
137 This is because investors require a higher rate of return for riskier projects. Hence, if a risky project is 
successful, it will be subject to a greater resource tax liability. 
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8.3.2.8 Financial/fundamental ratios 
This section investigates the relationships between financial/fundamental ratios and the 
market reaction to the proposed resource rent tax reforms, including cash holdings, 
dividend pay outs, financial leverage, return on equity, return on assets and asset 
turnover. Those specific ratios were chosen as they were identified in the literature and 
mentioned in news/commentaries following the announcement of the proposed RSPT 
and MRRT. 
8.3.2.8.1 Cash 
The reasons for and ramifications of a company holding a certain level of cash are 
debated in the literature. For instance, Ferguson et al. (2011a) analysed the Australian 
mining industry structure and factors associated with resource company failure. They 
asserted that mining firms with relatively higher levels of cash on hand are able to 
survive longer in the face of exogenous shocks such as the global financial crisis or tax 
reforms, without the need to generate funds internally or return to the equity market.138 
However, a high level of cash holdings might also indicate that a firm has relatively 
higher external financing costs (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith & Servaes 2003). Furthermore, 
Almeida, Song & Grant (2002) affirmed that financially constrained companies 
(restricted access to external source of funds) hold greater cash reserves relative to 
unconstrained companies. This was further evidenced in Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson 
(2006) and Faulkender and Wang (2006), who established that financially unconstrained 
companies place a lower value on assets held in cash than financially constrained 
companies. In addition, Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes 
(2003) showed that a higher holding cash level may be an indication of a company’s 
greater cash flow volatility increasing the risk of cash shortfalls.  
Hence, given the competing arguments in the above discussion, no sign is specified on 
the level of firm cash holdings. Companies with higher cash holding levels may 
experience higher (lower) positive (negative) average abnormal returns following the 
announcement of the proposed resource tax reforms due its ability to sustain tax 
exogenous shocks. On the other hand, the reverse may be observed, as higher cash on 
                                                 
138 Funding methods that can be both costly and difficult (Ferguson et al. 2011a, b; Ferguson & Lam 
2016). 
269 
hand could be associated with higher external financing costs, financial constraints and 
cash volatility. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses are advanced: 
H11: Companies with cash holdings experience average abnormal returns 
following the announcement of the RSPT. 
H11b: Companies with cash holdings experience average abnormal returns 
following the announcement of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.8.2 Dividend pay out 
In any corporation, dividend policy is among the most crucial policy decisions faced by 
corporate directors. This is the case as dividends are an important selection criterion for 
a current or potential investor. Not only do dividends provide signals about the state of a 
company, they are important to market participants (for instance, value growth 
investors) contemplating regular income (Gill, Biger & Tibrewala 2010) In fact, Lintner 
(1956) argued that on average corporate managers are more inclined to raise dividends 
than to reduce their level, as increases provide positive signals to investors about the 
future prospects of a company, while decreases are seen as negative signals. In addition, 
as suggested in the literature on the principal-agent problem, equity shareholders 
typically favour and value dividend income more than retained earnings (Easterbrook 
1984; Gomes 2000; Jensen 1986; La Porta et al. 2000). 
This argument validates the idea that equity shareholders care about dividends, and this 
is important in the context of mining taxation. Indeed, as indicated by Freebairn (2015) 
and Kellow (2016), a profit rent-based mining tax might tax profits that could be 
otherwise re-invested. However, under such a scheme, the tax burden is likely to be 
mostly borne by equity shareholders rather than by mining producers, as it is probable 
that the latter will pass the tax to the former by reducing dividend pay outs.  
Hence, it is reasonable to suggest that market participants are likely to associate the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT with a reduction in mining companies’ future 
dividend pay outs. In fact, higher paying dividend companies are likely to be perceived 
as more sensitive to resource tax reform. Indeed, it is suggested that investors would be 
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less confident as to the ability to maintain high dividend payouts for companies with 
more generous dividend policies relative to companies offering lower dividend payouts. 
The following hypothesis is therefore suggested: 
H12: Firm payout dividends are negatively associated with the proposed 
RSPT. 
H12b: Firm payout dividends are negatively associated with the MRRT. 
8.3.2.8.3 Leverage 
The fact that financial expenses, and more specifically, interest on debt, were not 
deductible under the RSPT and the MRRT generated much attention among economists 
and media commentators. For instance, as noted in Kompo-Harms and Sanyal (2011), 
the non-deductibility of interest payments creates a discriminatory cost on mining firms 
requiring debt funding. Further, Ergas, Harrison and Pincus (2010) asserted that due to 
the non-deductibility of interest payments, the implied tax rate of the resource rent tax 
could be greater for highly leveraged mining companies, further arguing that, as a result, 
the entire burden of the resource rent tax was likely to fall on company equity interest 
and could, under certain circumstances, potentially drive highly leveraged mineral 
projects into insolvency.139 It is also important to note that proponents of the non-
deductibility of financial expenses, Garnaut (2010), Henry (2010) and Mayo (2013), 
argued that allowing for deductibility of interest on debt would reduce the tax burden 
for projects financed by debt relative to those financed by equity. 
While the relationship between the non-deductibility of financial expenses and the level 
of financial leverage is essential to investigate the existence or otherwise of a 
substitution effect, the relationship between financial leverage and risk is important to 
consider. For instance, Matemilola, Bany-Ariffin and Azman-Saini (2013) and 
Muradoğlu and Sivaprasad (2012) showed that the level of financial leverage is an 
important risk factor and is value relevant in equity valuation, while George and Hwang 
(2007) validated the fact that equity investors are sensitive to the amount of financial 
leverage. This is the case because, as shown by Matemilola, Bany-Ariffin and Azman-
Saini (2013) and George and Hwang (2007), the use of high leverage augments the 
                                                 
139 When the value of the firm becomes lower than its debt value (Ergas, Harrison & Pincus 2010). 
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likelihood of financial distress, which can lead to bankruptcy. This in turn may 
adversely affect the value of shareholder investments. 
Therefore, given the above discussion, the announcement of the proposed tax reform is 
likely to be seen by equity investors as an additional tax burden/cost for higher 
leveraged minerals, therefore potential affecting the ability of resource companies to 
service their debt obligations and hence increasing the probability of financial distress. 
The following hypotheses are therefore suggested: 
H13: Firm level of leverage is negatively associated with the announcement of 
the RSPT. 
H13b: Firm level of leverage is negatively associated with the announcement 
of the MRRT. 
8.3.2.8.4 Profitability ratio 
As discussed earlier, firm profitability is important to consider when investigating the 
equity reaction to the announcement of both the RSPT and the MRRT (i.e., profit-based 
taxes). Hence, to provide robustness for earlier hypotheses (operating profit), return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and asset turnover are used to capture the 
presence or otherwise of differences in average abnormal returns across different firm 
profitability ratios. These ratios are standard profitability ratios used in the literature 
(Ferguson et al. 2011b; Haveman et al. 2017; Hogan 2007; Land & Shackelford 2000). 
Subsequent to the suggested hypotheses regarding operating profit, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H14: ROE is negatively associated with average abnormal returns following 
the announcement the RSPT. 
H14b: ROE is negatively associated with average abnormal returns following 
the announcement of the MRRT. 
H15: ROA is negatively associated with average abnormal returns following 
the announcement of the RSPT.  
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H15b: ROA is negatively associated with average abnormal returns following 
the announcement of the MRRT. 
H16: Asset turnover is negatively associated with average abnormal returns 
following the announcement of the RSPT.  
H16b: Asset turnover is negatively associated with average abnormal returns 
following the announcement of the MRRT. 
From this section, it appears that, theoretically, the design and features of both the 
proposed RSPT and MRRT do not meet some of the tax neutrality conditions discussed 
earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3 and 4. These are mainly with respect to their 
respective coverage, the treatment of existing projects, transfer of tax credit and loss 
rules, the level of the tax threshold and the treatment of state royalties and corporate 
income tax and resources projects possible unrecouped losses. The subsequent section 
discusses the data sources and sample of interest, as well as the methodology used for 
testing the hypotheses formulated in this section. 
8.4 Data and Methodology 
8.4.1 Data source and sample of interest 
As previously stated, the objective of this chapter is to investigate and explain the 
findings of Chapter 7, in which statistically significant average abnormal returns were 
associated with the announcement of the proposed resource tax reforms (RSPT and 
MRRT).  
Particularly, this chapter uses firm-specific characteristics to explain differential effects 
in average abnormal returns (i.e., substitution effect). This is achieved through the use 
of OLS cross-section regressions. In other words, this chapter examines whether the 
equity market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT varies by 
firm-specific characteristics (as discussed in the hypothesis development section). 
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In addition to average cumulative abnormal returns data from Chapter 7 (the sample 
companies associated with the ‘combined RSPT & MRRT’ dataset),140 firm-specific 
accounting, financial and operational variables are used (see Tables 8.1 and 8.3). 
The cumulative average abnormal returns used for this chapter’s cross-sectional analysis 
are those computed over the RSPT announcement three-day periods (0; 2) and (11; 14) 
and MRRT announcement two-day period (-1; 0),141 as these were found to be the most 
statistically significant event window periods in Chapter 7. Further, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, these particular event windows capture/correspond to the impact of the 
proposed announcement as well as any re-valuation and adjustment periods. Because 
the objective of this chapter is to explain any difference in abnormal returns, these 
windows are the most relevant. 
All data used are sourced from DataStream Thomson Reuters and Eikon Thomson 
Reuters.142 Data not available from these two sources were directly collected from 
companies’ annual reports. All variables collected and constructed, except for size, 
RSPT threshold, MRRT threshold and risk, are for the fiscal year end before the 
announcement of each proposed tax reform. Values for the variables mentioned above 
were computed at the end of the estimation period, that is, 21 days before the 
announcement of each proposed tax reform. 
The following steps were followed to arrive at the final sample of interest: 
1. The process commenced with assembling the cumulative abnormal returns for 
all 706 companies (final sample size in ‘combined RSPT & MRRT’) used in the 
event study analysis in Chapter 6. From this point, the dependent variables were 
constructed as the RSPT CAR (0 to 2), RSPT CAR (11 to14) and MRRT CAR (-
1 to 0).143 
2. To form and perform the regression analyses for the different equations, the next 
step involved identifying firms with common sample accounting data. That is, to 
be included in the final sample, not only did companies have to have available 
accounting data for the construction of the required variables, but these must 
                                                 
140 This allows us to follow the same companies across both proposed resource rent tax announcements.  
141 Because of the insignificant abnormal returns within other window periods around the MRRT, no 
other window periods were used. 
142 These were defined and described in Chapter 6. 
143 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
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also have been available to perform the different cross-sectional analysis 
equations. For instance, to be included in the final sample for Equation 1, a 
company must have all the size data for the construction of Australian revenue, 
iron ore, coal and Oil and Gas. This leaves the Equation 1 final ‘common 
sample’ at 263 companies. This process was followed and repeated for all other 
equations. 
8.4.2 Variable discussion and construction 
While most variables required to investigate the different hypotheses discussed earlier 
were directly observable, a few had to be constructed. In addition, although the choices 
of most of the explanatory variables are in line with previous studies, some of the 
variables used necessitate a more detailed discussion than just a simple data table 
description. 
The following, therefore, discusses the choice and construction of some for the main 
explanatory variables used in this chapter: risk, RSPT and MRRT threshold rate, 
number of segments and Australian revenue exposure. 
8.4.2.1 RSPT and MRRT threshold relative to tax threshold 
As can be seen in Tables 8.1 and 8.3, these variables, used to test hypotheses H6 and 
H6b, represent binary variables equal to 1 when WACC is above the respective tax 
threshold level and a value of zero otherwise. As previously discussed, a company’s 
WACC is often used as a proxy for the discount rate. The WACC was computed in the 
standard way,144 as follows:  
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  (
𝐸
𝑉
∗ 𝐾𝑒) + (
𝐷
𝑉
∗ 𝐾𝑑(1 − 𝑡𝑐)) (1) 
Where: 
𝐾𝑒 = Cost of equity 
𝐾𝑑 = Cost of debt 
𝑡𝑐 = Company tax rate 
                                                 
144 Baurens (2010), Farber, Gillet and Szafarz (2006), Luehrman (1997) and Truong, Partington and Peat 
(2008), Vélez-Pareja and Tham (2000). 
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𝐸
𝑉
 = Proportion of company funded by equity 
𝐷
𝑉
 = Proportion of company funded by debt 
The cost of equity is computed using the CAPM (see Chapter 6), as: 
𝐾𝑒 = 𝑅𝑓 +  𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓) (2) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑓 = Rate of return on 3 months Australia Treasury Bill rate.
145 
𝑅𝑀 = Rate of return on the S&P/ASX 200 index.
146 
𝛽 = Beta of the firm.  
It is important to note that, while all accounting variables used for the computing of the 
WACC refer to the last available fiscal year before the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT, the cost of equity was computed as of 21 days before the announcement of the 
RSPT.147 
8.4.2.2 Risk 
In line with Treynor (1961, 1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), 
beta from the CAPM (above equation) was used to proxy for company risk exposure. 
8.4.2.3 Australian revenue relative to total revenue (Australian revenue exposure) 
To proxy for a company’s proportion of revenue derived from Australian interests 
relative to its total revenue, a similar approach to Brown, Clout & Ferguson (2012), 
Ferguson et al. (2011b) and Ferguson and Lam (2016) was followed. That is, from each 
company annual report,148 a search of total revenues from every Australian location was 
conducted. The sum of all revenues derived from Australian locations was then divided 
by the total geographical revenue to capture the proportion of Australian revenues. As 
                                                 
145 Proxy used for the risk-free rate (Faff 2001, 2004). 
146 The S&P/ASX 200 is one of the most widely used benchmarks for institutional investors (Brailsford, 
Gaunt & O’Brien 2012) and is ‘designed to be the primary gauge for the Australian equity market’ (S&P 
website).  
147 This reflects the most current market sentiment before the announcement of the RSPT. This further 
represents the last day before the event window period (-20; +20). Hence this removes any issues 
associated with confounding effect/bias. 
148 As previous mentioned, accounting and operation variables refer to the last period end fiscal year 
before the announcement of the RSPT. 
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discussed in the hypothesis development section, the greater the proportion of 
Australian revenue, the larger the expected negative share market reaction associated 
with the announcement of the proposed RRT reforms. 
8.4.2.4 Number of segments 
To compute the total number of segments for each company, a search of each firm’s 
business intersegment revenue from annual operation reports was conducted. Each 
different/unique segment was totalised with this number, representing the final number 
of unique segments. A similar approach was taken to gain geographical information 
about uranium companies in Australia in Ferguson and Lam (2016). 
8.4.2.5 Iron ore, coal and oil and gas 
Iron ore, coal and oil and gas were used as proxies for a firm’s exposure to these 
commodities. For instance, if a company is involved in the production of iron ore as 
defined by its ICB classification (see Section 6.5.1), then this company takes a value of 
1; otherwise, zero. The same process is followed for exposure to oil and gas and coal. A 
similar approach was used in Brown, Clout and Ferguson (2012) to measure a 
company’s exposure to energy resources. 
8.4.2.6 Exploration and development (E & D) 
Based on Ferguson et al. (2011a, 2011b), a focus on exploration and development is 
defined as operating revenue representing less than 5% of market capitalisation. Hence, 
E&D is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when operating revenue is below the 5% 
threshold and zero otherwise. This variable was used to proxy company exploration and 
development focus and to test Hypothesis H9. 
8.4.3 Variable description and summary statistics 
Table 8.1 presents complete description, definition and summary statistics of all 
variables used in the analysis of the cross-sectional variations of the average cumulative 
abnormal returns following the announcement of the proposed RSPT (Equations 1–6). 
Table 8.2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients among these variables. 
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Table 8.3 presents complete description, definition and summary statistics of all 
variables used in the analysis of the cross-sectional variations of the average cumulative 
abnormal returns following the announcement of the proposed MRRT (Equations 7–9). 
Table 8.4 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients among these variables. 
It is important to recall that the sample data for Equations 8 and 9 (Table 8.7) represent 
only companies involved in the iron ore, coal and oil and gas subsectors (see 
methodology section below). Not surprisingly, these sectors appear to be more 
profitable and/or less unprofitable, at least in the last fiscal year preceding the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT (see Tables 8.1 and 8.3) For instance, the average 
minimum and maximum operating profit/or earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) in 
Table 8.3 are respectively -$1,438,858 and -$8,071,570, and $3,973,860 versus -
$1,560,277 and -$8,071,570 versus $3,973,860 in Table 8.1. Other measures of 
profitability (ROE, ROA and asset turnover ratio) validate this observation. These 
statistics provide evidence that confirms some of the justifications in the MRRT 
explanatory memorandum to impose a resource rent tax on these particular commodities 
only (i.e., the most profitable resources). An interesting fact is that the average value of 
most profitability measures are negative (ROE, ROA and asset turnover). 
In addition, it can be observed that average revenue exposure to the proposed resource 
taxes, mean size, age and number of segments are all greater for companies involved in 
the iron ore, coal and oil and gas subsectors (see Tables 8.1 and 8.3). 
Finally, examination of the variance inflation factors (VIF) in both tables does not 
reveal any particular problems of multicollinearity between the variables. Except for age 
and age^2, all VIF values are well below the critical value of 10 (Neter, Wasserman & 
Kutner 1989).149 Similarly, pairwise correlations from Tables 8.2 and 8.4 do not raise 
any concerns. 
 
                                                 
149 By construction, age and age^2 will exhibit multicollinearity. 
 8.4.3.1 RSPT 
Table 8.1: Description, Definition and Summary Statistics (RSPT) 
Table 8.1 provides a subsector breakdown and description of the sample firm-specific characteristic variables used in the analysis of the market reaction to the announcement 
of the RSPT. These were used for the cross-sectional analysis of Equations 1–6 and refer to the fiscal year end before the announcement of RSPT. All data are sourced from 
DataStream Thomson Reuters and Eikon Thomson Reuters. Data not available from these two sources were directly collected from companies’ annual reports. 
  
 Variables-Equation model Definition N VIF Mean SD Min Max 
Australian revenue exposure– (1) (4) Australian Revenue/Total Revenue 263 1.43 0.47 0.46 0150 1 
Iron ore – (1) (4) Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to iron ore 
sector, otherwise 0 263 1.02 
0.04 0.20 0 1 
Coal – (1) (4) Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to coal 
sector, otherwise 0 
263 
 
1.06 0.07 0.27 0 1 
Oil and gas – (1) (4) Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to the oil 
and gas sector, otherwise 0 
263 1.08 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Size - (2) (5) Natural logarithm of market value 137 2.42 18.02 2.15 14.50 25.73 
Age – (2) (5) 
Number of years listed on the ASX stock Exchange 
until announcement of the RSPT 137 11.15 10.96 7.76 2.26 37.25 
Age^2- (2) (5) Squared value of Age 137 13.34 179.94 263.61 5.09 1387.36 
Threshold- (2) (5) 
Dummy variable, 1 if WACC >RSPT Threshold, 
otherwise 0 137 1.22 0.94 0.24 0 1 
Operating profit- (2) (5) Gross profit-operating expenses 137 1.22 -1560277 3958547 -8071570 3973860 
Number of Segment – (2) (5) Number of business intersegment revenue 137 2.25 1.94 1.47 1.00 11.00 
Risk - (2) (5) 
Estimated beta from CAPM 137 2.66 0.67 0.66 -1.30 7.38 
ROE – (3) (6) 
EBIT over the book value of common equity 531 2.27 -35.98 38.33 -117.37 5.00 
ROA – (3) (6) EBIT/Total Assets 531 2.48 -0.21 0.25 -0.81 0.05 
Cash – (3) (6) Cash and marketable securities over total assets 531 2.06 0.26 0.25 0 0.98 
Payout – (3) (6) Dividend per share over earning per share 531 1.41 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.51 
Leverage - (3) (6) Total debt over total assets 531 2.20 39.90 51.27 2.29 171.34 
Asset Turnover – (3) (6) Sales over total asset 531 1.64 0.09 0.15 0.00151 0.50 
                                                 
150 Actual number is 0.00094. 
151 Actual number is 0.001124. 
 Table 8.2: Pairwise Correlations of Companies’ Specific Characteristics (RSPT) 
Table 8.2 displays the pairwise correlations between all variables used in the cross-sectional analysis surrounding the announcement of the RSPT. The cumulative average 
abnormal return is computed in the three-day period (0; +2) around the RSPT announcement. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CAR- 3 Days              
(2) Tax Threshold -0.17*** 
            
(3) Australian revenue exposure -0.23*** 0.31*** 
           
(4) Size 0.11*** -0.54*** -0.29*** 
          
(5) Age 0.13*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 0.39*** 
         
(6) Operating profit -0.03 0.35*** -0.04 0.04 0.16*** 
        
(7) Number of Segment 0.18** -0.04 -0.27** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.61*** 
       
(8) ROE -0.01 0.04 -0.12* 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.18** 
      
(9) ROA 0.01 -0.15*** -0.21*** 0.35*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.74**** 
     
(10) Cash -0.14*** 0.31*** 0.24*** -0.29*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.43*** 
    
(11) Payout 0.08** -0.03 -0.12** 0.39*** 0.24*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.22*** 0.21*** -0.17*** 
   
(12) Risk -0.13** 0.11* 0.21** 0.13** -0.14** -0.07 -0.10 -0.35*** -0.48*** 0.38*** -0.04 
  
(13) Leverage -0.22*** 0.27*** 0.36*** -0.04 -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.22*** 0.03 -0.08** 0.32*** -0.15*** 0.53*** 
 
(14) Asset Turnover 0.15*** -0.23*** -0.28*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.06 0.14*** -0.18*** 0.42*** -0.09 -0.33*** 
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level. 
  
 8.4.3.2 MRRT 
Table 8.3: Description, Definition and Summary Statistics (MRRT) 
Table 8.3 provides a subsector breakdown and description of the sample firms specific characteristics variables used in the analysis of the market reaction to the 
announcement of the MRRT. These were used for the cross-sectional analysis of Equations 7 and 8 and refer to the fiscal year end before the announcement of MRRT. All 
data are sourced from DataStream Thomson Reuters and Eikon Thomson Reuters. Data not available from these two sources were directly collected from companies’ annual 
reports. 
  
 Variables -Equation model Definition N VIF Mean SD Min Max 
Iron ore – (7)  Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to iron ore 
sector, otherwise 0 706 1.01 
0.05 0.22 0 1 
Coal – (7)  Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to coal 
sector, otherwise 0 
706 
 
1.01 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Oil and gas – (7)  Dummy variable, 1 if company belongs to the oil and 
gas sector, otherwise 0 
706 1.02 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Australian revenue exposure – (8) Australian Revenue/Total Revenue 70 2.51 0.49 0.45 0152 1 
Size – (8) Natural logarithm of market value 70 6.32 18.43 2.44 15.06 25.72 
Age – (8) 
Number of years listed on the ASX stock Exchange 
until announcement of the RSPT 70 16.38 11.67 8.12 2.30 37.24 
Age^2- (8) Squared value of Age 70 26.68 201.49 293.59 5.30 1387.35 
MRRT Threshold- (8) 
Dummy variable, 1 if WACC >MRRT Threshold, 
otherwise 0 70 1.48 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Operating profit- (8) Gross profit-operating expenses 70 1.22 -1438858 4405688 -8071570 3973860 
Number of Segment – (8) Number of business intersegment revenue 70 5.35 2.24 1.83 1.00 11.00 
Risk - (8) 
Estimated beta from CAPM 70 2.54 0.85 0.54 -0.19 2.86 
E&D – (8) Dummy variable ,1 if operating revenue less than 5 
percent of market capitalisation, otherwise 0 70 1.56 0.34 0.47 0 1 
ROE – (9) 
EBIT over the book value of common equity 120 2.31 -26.49 35.17 -117.36 5.00 
ROA – (9) EBIT/Total Assets 120 2.42 -0.15 0.23 -0.80 0.05 
Cash – (9) Cash and marketable securities over total assets 120 1.43 0.31 0.27 0 1.11 
Payout – (9) Dividend per share over earning per share 120 1.22 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.51 
Leverage – (9) Total debt over total assets 120 1.28 50.98 54.39 2.28 171.34 
Asset Turnover – (9) Sales over total asset 120 1.12 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.50 
                                                 
152 Actual number is 0.000436. 
 Table 8.4: Pairwise Correlations of Companies’ Specific Characteristics (MRRT) 
Table 8.4 displays the pairwise correlations between the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. The cumulative average 
abnormal returns are computed within the two-day period (-1; 0) of the MRRT announcement. 
    (1) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) CAR - 2 days               
(2) 
Australian 
revenue 
exposure 
-0.12**              
(3) Size 0.24*** -0.29*** 
            
(4) Age 0.12*** -0.31*** 0.39*** 
           
(5) E&D 0.10*** -0.18*** 0.36*** -0.13*** 
          
(6) Tax threshold 0.14*** -0.18*** 0.52*** 0.40*** 0.14*** 
         
(7) 
Operating 
profit 
0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.16*** 0.09** 0.26***         
(8) # of segments 0.17** -0.27** 0.43*** 0.41*** 0.13* 0.61*** 0.30*** 
       
(9) ROE 0.10** -0.12* 0.32*** 0.16*** 0.64*** 0.17*** 0.35*** 0.18** 
      
(10) ROA 0.12*** -0.21*** 0.35*** 0.20*** 0.62*** 0.18*** 0.41*** 0.21*** 0.74*** 
     
(11) Cash -0.11*** 0.24*** -0.29*** -0.22*** -0.37*** -0.20*** -0.03 -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.43*** 
    
(12) Payout 0.13*** -0.12** 0.39*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.22*** 0.21*** -0.17*** 
   
(13) Risk -0.11* 0.21** 0.13** -0.14** -0.40*** -0.07 -0.16** -0.10 -0.35*** -0.48*** 0.38*** -0.04 
  
(14) Leverage 0.10** 0.36*** -0.04 -0.23*** 0.00 -0.15*** -0.02 -0.22*** 0.03 -0.08** 0.32*** -0.15*** 0.53*** 
 
(15) Asset turnover 0.21*** -0.28*** 0.34*** 0.26*** 0.02 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.06 0.14*** -0.18*** 0.42*** -0.09 -0.33*** 
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level. 
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8.5 Methodology 
As previously discussed, the objective of this chapter is to investigate the relationship 
between the cumulative abnormal returns found in Chapter 7 and firm-specific 
characteristics (discussed and described in the hypothesis and data sections above). 
More specifically, it is to provide evidence or otherwise of any cross-sectional variation 
in average cumulative abnormal returns.  
To do so, this chapter uses multivariate OLS regression analysis (i.e., cross-sectional 
regressions), by regressing resource company average cumulative excess returns on a 
combination of specific accounting and operational data variables as well as subsector 
variables. The dependent variables for all regressions are the aggregated cumulative 
average excess returns over RSPT CAR (0; +2), RSPT CAR (+11; +14) and MRRT 
CAR (-1; 0).153 
Conducting cross-sectional regression analysis allows the estimation of partial 
coefficients (associated with respective explanatory variables) that are net of effect from 
other variables in the regression. This analysis is conducted to assess the statistical 
significance of the various hypotheses discussed earlier, determining whether equity 
market participants perceived these proposed resource rent taxes to be neutral. That is, if 
equity market participants perceived these proposed taxes as tax neutral, all coefficients 
associated with the explanatory variables used in the equations (described in the next 
section) should be statistically insignificant.  
However, if these coefficients are found to be significantly different from zero, that 
would suggest a substitution effect, which would imply that the proposed resource taxes 
were perceived by market participants as distortionary (i.e., non-neutral). 
Finally, it should be noted that all equations were tested for non-spherical disturbance 
(i.e., heteroskedasticity and serial correlation) using White’s specification test. When 
non-spherical disturbance was found, appropriate correction was made using the 
Newey-West correction (White 1980, 1982). 
The following section specifies all OLS regression equations used in this chapter. 
                                                 
153 See earlier section on data sources and sample of interest. 
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8.5.1 Equation construction 
Each of the following equations are used to investigate the potential existence of a 
substitution effect. Equations 1–6 investigate any differential effect following the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT, while Equations 7–9 analyse any differential 
effect surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. To ensure robustness in the results, 
most equations combine various sets of explanatory and dependent variables. 
8.5.1.1 RSPT 
8.5.1.1.1 Equation 1 
Equation 1 investigates a differential effect in a two-day event window surrounding the 
announcement of the RSPT. The dependent variable is the RSPT CAR (0; +2) and the 
explanatory variables are Australian revenue exposure, oil and gas, iron ore and coal. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛿 𝑂 & 𝐺 + 𝜑𝐼𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑟𝑒 + 𝜓 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙
+ 𝜀𝑗 
 (1) 
Where 
GO & =  {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                  
0  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
 
IronOre  =  {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                         
0 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
 
Coal  =  {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                                   
0 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                              
8.5.1.1.2 Equation 2 
Equation 2 uses the same dependent variable as Equation 1 but a different set of 
explanatory variables: size, age, age^2, RSPT, operating profit, number of segments and 
risk. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑔𝑒
2 + 𝛾𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑇 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗 (2) 
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Where 
RSPT ={
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 > 𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑇 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 < 𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑇 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  
8.5.1.1.3 Equation 3 
Equation 3 uses the same dependent variable as Equations 1 and 2 but a different set of 
explanatory variables: ROE, ROA, cash, payout, leverage and asset turnover. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛽6  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀𝑗 (3) 
8.5.1.1.4 Equations 4, 5 and 6 
Equations 4, 5 and 6 use the same explanatory variables as equation 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, but the RSPT CAR (+11; +14) as the dependent variable. 
8.5.1.2 MRRT 
8.5.1.2.1 Equation 7 
Equation 7 investigates a differential effect within the two-day event window 
surrounding the announcement of the MRRT. The dependent variable is MRRT CAR (-
1; 0) and the explanatory variables are oil and gas, iron ore and coal. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼1 + 𝛿 𝑂 & 𝐺 + 𝜑𝐼𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑟𝑒 + 𝜓 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙 + 𝜀𝑗 
 (7) 
Where 
GO & = {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                  
0  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
 
IronOre  = {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑟𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                         
0 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                             
 
Coal = {
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟                                   
0 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                              
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8.5.1.2.2 Equation 8 
Equation 8 uses the same dependent variable as Equation 7 and the same explanatory 
variables as Equation 2 and 4, except RSPT is replaced by MRRT and E&D and 
Australian Revenue Exposure added. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑒
2 + 𝛾𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑇 + 𝛽4 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝜈 𝐸 & 𝐷 + 𝜀𝑗 
 (8) 
Where 
MRRT ={
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 > 𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑇 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 < 𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑇 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑  
DE & ={
1  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 < 5% 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 > 5% 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛    
8.5.1.2.3 Equation 9 
Equation 9 uses the same dependent variable as equation 7 and 8 and the same 
explanatory variables as Equations 3 and 6  
jerAssetTurov
LeveragePayoutCashOAROECAR
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8.6 Results 
8.6.1 RSPT 
8.6.1.1 Equations 1, 2 and 3 results RSPT CAR (0; +2) 
Table 8.5: Equations 1, 2 and 3 Cross-Sectional Results 
Table 8.5 presents the results of the OLS regression for Equations 1, 2 and 3 on the two-day cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the 
proposed RSPT (CAR (0; +2)). Cars are computed using the market model (see Chapter 6). All equations cover the sample data discussed in Section 8.4 and Table 8.1. To 
avoid results being influenced by extreme outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorised at the 2% level. The t-statistics are derived from the standard OLS estimates and 
their associated p-values are presented in parenthesis. The latter are computed using the Newey-West correction. 
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 Equation (1) 
 
 Equation (2)   Equation (3)  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Constant -0.0524 -4.9335***  -0.268 -3.3623***  -0.0532 -7.7934*** 
Australian Revenue Exposure -0.0307 -2.6128***    
 
  
Iron Ore -0.0282 -1.1015       
Coal -0.0183 -0.9499       
O&G -0.0046 -0.3678       
Size   
 0.0101 2.2850**    
Age   
 0.0065 2.3973**    
Age^2   
 -0.0001 -2.0013*    
RSPT    
 -0.0343 -1.0893    
Operating profit   
      0.0000154 -0.0058    
Number of Segment   
 0.0051  0.0821    
Risk   
 0.0045 0.2722    
Cash   
 
  
 -0.0101 -0.7367 
Payout   
 
  
 0.0191 0.6686 
Leverage   
 
  
 -0.0002 -4.4756** 
ROA   
 
  
 -0.0216 -1.0024 
ROE            0.0000155 0.2459 
Asset Turnover       0.0493 2.2243** 
         
N 263  
 137  
 531  
F-Statistic 6.0567***  
 2.6222**  
 7.4024***  
Adj. R2 0.0880  
 0.0770  
 0.0569  
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.   
                                                 
154 Actual number is -1.09E-11.  
155 Actual number is 3.38E-05. 
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8.6.1.2 Equations 4, 5 and 6 results RSPT CAR (+11; +14) 
Table 8.6: Equations 4, 5 and 6 Cross-Sectional Results 
Table 8.6 presents the results of the OLS regression for Equations 4, 5 and 6 on the three-day cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the 
proposed RSPT (CAR (+11; +14)). Cars are computed using the market model (see Chapter 6). All equations cover the sample data discussed in Section 8.4 and Table 8.1. To 
avoid results being influenced by extreme outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorised at the 2% level. The t-statistics are derived from the standard OLS estimates and 
their associated p-values are presented in parenthesis. The latter are computed using the Newey-West correction. 
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 Equation (4) 
 
 Equation (5)   Equation (6)  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Constant -0.0690 -6.9415***  -0.1477 -1.8295*  -0.0640 -7.3969*** 
Australian Revenue Exposure -0.0128 -1.251    
 
  
Iron Ore -0.0182 -0.6384       
Coal 0.0046 0.2196       
O&G 0.0335 2.3730**       
Size   
 0.0081 1.8047*    
Age   
 0.0023 0.7833    
Age^2   
    -0.0000156 -0.7981    
RSPT    
 -0.0752 -2.3438**    
Operating profit   
     0.0000157  1.1639    
Number of Segment   
 -0.0047 -0.6822    
Risk   
 0.0149 0.8759    
Cash   
 
  
 -0.0049 -0.2866 
Payout   
 
  
 0.0567 1.6078 
Leverage   
 
  
 -0.0002 -2.5702** 
ROA   
 
  
 0.0418 1.6393 
ROE       0.0001 0.6257 
Asset Turnover   
 
  
 0.0391 1.3874 
         
N 263  
 137  
 531  
F-Statistic 1.8445  
 1.8302*  
 4.0597***  
Adj. R2 0.0158  
 0.0409  
 0.0280  
Notes: *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.  
                                                 
156 Actual number is -8.04E-05. 
157 Actual number is 5.94E-12. 
 8.6.2 MRRT 
8.6.2.1 Equations 7, 8 and 9 results MRRT CAR (-1; 0) 
Table 8.7: Equations 7, 8 and 9 Cross-Sectional Results 
Table 8.7 presents the results of the OLS regression for Equations 7, 8 and 9 on the two-day cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the 
proposed MRRT (CAR (-1;0)). Cars are computed using the market model (see Chapter 6). All equations cover the sample data discussed in Section 8.4 and Table 8.3. To 
avoid results being influenced by extreme outliers, all explanatory variables are winsorised at the 2% level. The t-statistics are derived from the standard OLS estimates and 
their associated p-values are presented in parenthesis. The latter are computed using the Newey-West correction. 
  
 Notes: Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.  
                                                 
158 Actual number is -2.79E-09. 
 Equation 7 
 
 Equation 8   Equation 9  
Variable Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 0.0347 9.5202***  0.0291 3.0456***  0.0474 2.9256*** 
Iron Ore 0.0200 1.4167       
Coal 0.0014 0..1379       
O&G 0.0006 0.0754       
Size   
 0.0230     2.1672**    
Age   
 0.0104 1.6249    
Age^2   
 -0.0002 -1.2550    
MRRT    
 -0.0100 -0.1947    
Operating profit         0.0000158 -1.1422    
Number of Segment   
 0.0093 0.8498    
Risk   
 -0.0730    -1.9336**    
Australian Revenue Exposure    -0.0056 -0.3417    
E & D   
 -0.0679    -1.9989**    
Cash   
 
  
 -0.0569 -1.5639 
Payout   
 
  
 -0.0633 -0.6262 
Leverage   
 
  
 -0.0002 -1.2208 
ROA       -0.0734 -1.3812 
ROE       -0.0003 -1.0418 
Asset Turnover   
 
  
 -0.0603 -1.1398 
   
 
  
 
  
N 706  
 70  
 120  
F-Statistic 1.1848   2.2608**   2.5061**  
Adj. R2 0.0035  
 0.1259  
 0.0705  
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8.7 Results Discussion 
8.7.1 RSPT 
8.7.1.1 Equations 1 and 4 (H1 and H2) 
Equations 1 and 4 investigate whether there is a differential tax effect across companies’ 
revenue direct exposure to the RSPT (i.e. proportion of revenue derived from Australian 
resources activities relative to the total revenue) as well as across specific subsectors within 
the three-day event window (0; +2) and four-day window (+11; +14).159 
In both equations, the intercept was negative and statistically significant. This therefore 
validates not only the theoretical discussion from Chapter 3 and 4, but the results of 
Chapter 7. That is, the RSPT does create a negative income effect. More specifically, on 
average, the mineral and petroleum resources sector suffers a cumulative loss of a little 
over 5% during the three days following the announcement of the proposed RSPT (0; +2), 
and almost 7% during the four-day event window (+11; +14). These results validate those 
of Chapter 7, in that there seems to be, on average, a readjustment/revision of the likely 
negative impact of the RSPT in the (+11; +14) event window as further explanations and 
comments about the design and features of the RSPT as well analysis/discussions of the 
possible ramifications on shareholder wealth are released in the news (see Chapter 7). 
Second, the results show that on average resource companies with greater revenue exposure 
to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derive from Australian resources 
activities relative to the total revenue) are statistically more likely to generate larger 
abnormal losses (about just above 3% (3.07%)) over the three-day period (0; +2). While 
still depicting such a relationship over the four-day period (+11; +14), abnormal losses 
appear to be insignificant in this event window. A probable explanation is that the full 
ramifications of a firm’s revenue exposure to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of 
revenue derived from Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) on 
shareholder wealth was well understood and priced by market participants within the (0, 
                                                 
159 Recall from previous discussion, these specific event windows were chosen because they were found to be 
the most significant reaction to the RSPT announcement. 
295 
+2) event window and that no further re-evaluation, adjustment or re-pricing was needed 
after the two-day post period following the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
Although the RSPT was symmetric in its application (and hence tax neutral, at least in this 
specific aspect), Equations 1 and 4 investigate whether a differential tax effect is perceived 
by equity investors across subsectors. These subsectors are iron ore, oil and gas and coal. 
These specific subsectors are analysed because, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
proposed RSPT was anticipated to mostly target oil and gas as well as bulk commodities. 
The results from Equations 1 and 4 suggest that companies involved in iron ore and coal 
mining seemed not to experience any tax differential effect following the announcement of 
the proposed RSPT.160 In fact, these findings imply that the involvement of a mining 
company in either bulk or coal commodities was value irrelevant and not taken into 
consideration when assessing the impact of the proposed RSPT. The lack of statistical 
significance may also be because the relationship between a company’s exposure to these 
subsectors and any market reaction to the proposed RSPT had already been priced in the 
pre-RSPT announcement period (i.e., anticipated). 
This is evident given that bulk commodities and oil and gas not only account for the vast 
majority of the value of Australia’s production and exports but generate higher resource 
rent and industry profitability (as measured by returns on funds and assets) relative to other 
natural resources (ABARES 2010, 2011; ABS 2008, 2011; Hogan 2007, 2012). For these 
reasons, resource royalty payments have generally been primarily sourced from these 
commodities. In fact, royalty rate levels and the distribution of mining industry profits to 
government has historically always been higher for these commodities (ABARES 2010, 
2011; ABS 2008, 2011; Hogan 2007, 2012). As Hogan and Goldsworthy (2010) noted, 
royalty rates and any other such instruments that directly target rent are generally higher the 
larger the size of the available rent. Hence, it can be argued that whether it is under an 
output-based or a profit rent-based tax, these particular resources would always be targeted 
and face higher tax burdens. This therefore explains the fact that no special reaction is 
observed by these sectors within the car (-1; 0). 
                                                 
160 Although all three subsectors suffer cumulative abnormal losses within the three-day event period (0; +2), 
these are statistically insignificant. 
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Surprisingly, companies involved in the exploitation of oil and gas appear to be differently 
affected in the four-day period post RSPT announcement (+11; +14). That is, equity 
investors seem to positively value the impact of the RSPT for these specific companies, 
with an average associated reduction in cumulative average abnormal losses of about 3.35 
% over the four-day period. A suggested explanation for such a positive relationship is that 
market participants anticipated the extension of the PRRT to onshore petroleum projects. 
Hence, the (+11; +14) window was used to re-valuate the impact of such possibility. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the PRRT was more generous in terms of threshold rate and deductions 
than the RSPT. 
Equations 1 and 4 suggest that there was a differential tax effect across companies’ revenue 
direct exposure to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derived from 
Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) and across subsectors (oil and 
gas). These findings therefore validate hypotheses H1 to H2b. These however indicate that 
equity investors believed that the proposed RSPT would not affect mining companies 
involved in the exploitation of iron ore and coal differently. 
8.7.1.2 Equations 2 and 5 (H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8 and H10) 
Equations 2 and 5 investigate the equity market reaction to the proposed RSPT across size, 
maturity level, discount rate level relative to RSPT threshold level, number of segments, 
operating profit level as well as exposure to riskier mining/mineral projects and/or activities 
within the three-day (0; +2) and four-day (+11; +14) window periods. 
Once again, the results indicate the presence of a negative income effect in both multi-day 
event windows, with the intercept in both equations being negative and statistically 
significant. These findings validate those of Chapter 7. 
With regards to the presence of a differential tax effect across size, the results in the three-
day event window (0; +2) show that size is significantly related to average abnormal 
returns. The findings reveal that larger firms (as measured by market capitalisation) on 
average suffer lower abnormal losses following the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
The coefficient estimate indicates that a 1% increase in size results in about a 1% decrease 
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in the average abnormal loss during the three-day period post RSPT announcement. 
Another noteworthy fact with regards to size is that its positive relationship with average 
abnormal returns remains significant across the three-day event period (+11; +14). This 
reinforces the idea that market participants perceived the design of the tax to benefit larger 
mining companies. To a lesser extent, relative to the (0; +2) window, Equation 5 shows that 
larger resource firms suffer a lower abnormal loss (coefficient estimate of about 0.08). 
Regarding firm maturity level, as expected, the results indicate that while the level of 
maturity is significant and positively related to the average abnormal return, it seems to 
have a diminishing marginal influence on average abnormal returns. This implies that as the 
maturity level of a firm increases, its positive effect becomes much less prominent. In fact, 
the coefficient estimate of age^2 suggests that after a certain level, maturity becomes 
negatively associated with average abnormal returns. For instance, during the three-day 
period surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT (0; +2), more mature firms on 
average suffered lower abnormal losses: for a 1% increase in the level of maturity, average 
abnormal gains increased by about 0.6%. However, the coefficient estimates of age^2 
indicate that after a certain level of maturity, a further increase of 1% results in an increase 
in average abnormal losses of about 0.01%. Hence, these findings reveal that within the 
two-day event window (0; +2), the overall impact of a firm’s maturity level remains on 
average positive, in that more mature firms on average suffered lower abnormal losses 
following the announcement of the proposed RSPT. Once again, the results from Equation 
5 confirm the results from Chapter 7, in that market participants use the four-day post-
announcement period (+11; +14) to re-evaluate/re-assess the likely impact of the RSPT. 
Indeed, while firm maturity level was found significant during the (0; +2) period, the 
results in Equation 5 suggest that maturity level is not taken into consideration when 
valuing the impact of the RSPT, with both age and age^2 found to be statistically 
insignificant. The most likely explanation for this lack of significance is that the effect of 
the RSPT across maturity levels is well understood, evaluated and priced during the (0; +2) 
period, and that no further readjustment or re-evaluation is needed during the (+11; +14) 
event window. 
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A similar re-evaluation /readjustment process is evidenced when investigating the effect of 
the level of a company’s WACC relative to the RSPT threshold rate. For instance, while on 
average, the level of a company’s WACC relative to the RSPT threshold does not appear to 
play a major role in evaluating the impact of the RSPT during the three-day period (0;+2) 
(i.e., statically insignificant), its role becomes much more evident during the four-day event 
window (+11; +14). In fact, the results show that during the last event window (+11; +14), 
mining firms with a higher WACC level relative to the tax threshold suffer larger abnormal 
losses (statistically significant estimated coefficient of about 0.07). This result could be 
attributed to the fact that during the three-day periods (0; +2), market participants fail to 
fully understand the relationship between the RSPT tax threshold and companies’ WACC. 
However, as further information, commentaries and new reports on the tax design and 
particularly the threshold level and its possible effect on mining companies began to 
emerge, market participants revised their expectations about the full ramifications of the tax 
threshold level relative to companies’ WACC.  
Finally, none of the other firm-specific characteristics investigated are significant. While, in 
theory, these are important to understand the equity market reaction to the proposed RSPT, 
in the eyes of market participants, these specific characteristics seem not to play a major 
role when assessing/determining the impact of the proposed RSPT on shareholder wealth. 
Equations 2 and 5 therefore reinforce the result from Equations 1 and 2, in that there exists 
a substitution effect as a result of the announcement of the RSPT. In this case, a differential 
tax effect is observed across size, level of maturity and WACC level relative to the tax 
threshold level. 
8.7.1.3 Equation 3 and 6 (H11, H12, H13, H14, H15 and H16) 
Equations 3 and 6 investigate the presence or otherwise of a RSPT differential effect across 
cash, payout, leverage, ROA, ROE and asset turnover. The results show that in both event 
windows, the financial leverage level of a company appears to be important (statistically 
significant in both event windows) in evaluating the impact of the RSPT. For instance, it 
can be seen that firms with higher levels of financial leverage suffer higher abnormal losses 
during and post RSPT announcement. A 1% increase in the level of financial leverage 
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(during both multi-day post-announcement periods) results in about a 0.02% increase in 
average abnormal losses. This validates the suggestion/discussion in the hypothesis 
development section that the more highly financially leveraged mining companies are 
perceived by market participants to be more negatively affected by the new proposed 
RSPT. 
The results further indicate that during the three-day period (0; +2), there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between companies’ asset turnover ratio level and average 
abnormal returns. That is, a 1% increase in asset turnover ratio level results on average in a 
just under 5% decrease in abnormal losses. This relationship is surprising, given the 
theoretical discussion and comparison between output and profit-based taxes (see Chapter 4 
and hypothesis section on operating profit). However, this relationship seems to become 
insignificant during the four-day event period (+11; +14). A suggested explanation is that a 
deeper/better understanding of the true relationship between the asset turnover ratio and the 
proposed RSPT is not reached until 11 days post the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
Once the full ramifications of a profit rent-based tax are understood, the asset turnover ratio 
becomes irrelevant. 
In conclusion, this section validates some of the hypothesis developed earlier and shows the 
existence of a differential tax effect across several variables. These findings therefore 
suggest that market participants perceived the tax to be non-neutral. For instance, a smaller 
or less matured resource company or a resource firm with more revenue exposure to the 
RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derive from Australian resources activities 
relative to the total revenue), or higher WACC relative to the RSPT threshold level or more 
financially constrained, all else being equal, appear to be more negatively affected by the 
RSPT.  
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that investors perceived the switch from an output-based 
tax to a profit rent-based tax (incorporating the RSPT designs) as being more value 
destructive and more distortionary with regards to these firms’ specific characteristics. 
These findings also support the results found in chapter 7 (i.e. negative income effect 
associated with the announced proposed RSPT, suggesting that equity investors perceive a 
switch from an output-based tax to a profit-based tax as being value destructive). 
300 
8.7.2 MRRT 
Equation 7 investigates whether there is a differential tax effect across coal, iron ore and oil 
and gas subsectors within the two-day event window (-1; 0) surrounding the announcement 
of the MRRT. That is, it tests H2b. 
Equation 8 analyses the equity market reaction to the proposed MRRT across size, maturity 
level, discount rate level relative to MRRT threshold level, number of segments, operating 
profit level, exploration and development level, exposure to riskier mining/mineral projects 
or activities and revenue exposure to the MRRT (as measured by the proportion of revenue 
derive from Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) during the multi-
event window (-1; 0) relative to the announcement of the MRRT. That is, it tests 
hypotheses H1b, H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b, H7b, H8b, H9 and H10b. 
Finally, Equation 9 examines whether there exists a MRRT differential effect across cash, 
payout, leverage, ROA, ROE and asset turnover in the (-1; 0) event period. In other words, 
tests hypotheses H11b, H12b, H13b, H14b, H15b and H16b. 
The first point to note is that Equations 7, 8 and 9 show a positive and statistically 
significant intercept. This validates the results of Chapter 7 in that the repeal of the RSPT 
and its replacement by the MRRT was on average perceived as positive news (positive 
average cumulative abnormal returns) by market participants. 
As noted in previous sections and chapters, a crucial difference between the RSPT and the 
MRRT is that the latter was confined to iron ore, coal and oil and gas resources. In theory, 
the tax burden for these specific sectors was likely to be increased, and this asymmetric 
application to create a substitution effect (see Chapter 3, 4 and earlier sections in this 
chapter). However, Equation 7 shows no existence of any differential effect across the 
‘affected’ sectors (iron ore, coal and oil and gas). That is, none of the dummy variables 
used to proxy for exposure to these sectors are statistically significant. A possible 
explanation is that market participants anticipated bulk commodities and oil and gas 
producers to be the real target of the original resource tax reform (RSPT). Therefore, the 
fact that all other resources but these three were excluded from the MRRT coverage did not 
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come as a surprise to the market. These findings confirm the results found earlier (see 
previous section). 
Another important/interesting result is that only size, risk and E&D are statistically 
significant (Equation 8). This result suggests that market participants anticipate the MRRT 
to affect mining companies differently based on these three firm-specific attributes.  
Specifically, these findings show that the size of a resource company is perceived by 
market participants to be positively related with the market reaction to the MRRT. For 
instance, on average, a 1% increase in size results in an abnormal gain increase of about 
2.3%. This indicates that market participants seem to perceive a replacement of the RSPT 
by the MRRT as value creative for larger firms. Since the previous section showed that size 
was positively related with the market reaction to the RSPT (abnormal losses were lower 
for larger mining firms), this confirms that a switch from an output-based tax to a profit 
rent-based tax (RSPT or MRRT) is perceived to be less value destructive for larger mining 
firms. Those results are consistent with the theory and hypothesis development discussed 
previously. 
The fact that both risk and E&D are statistically significant is noteworthy too. These 
findings imply that some of the differences in design and features between the RSPT and 
MRRT were taken into consideration and valued by market participants.  
For instance, while the exposure to riskier mining projects and or mineral activities of a 
mining company did not seem to matter in evaluating the impact of the RSPT (certainly 
because of the risk-sharing characteristics of the tax design), such characteristic appears to 
be significant under the MRRT. In fact, Equation 8 shows that companies holding riskier 
mining/mineral projects and/or undertaking riskier mining activities suffered relatively 
further abnormal losses: on average, a 1% increase in a company exposure to riskier mining 
activities results in an increase in abnormal losses of about 7.3%. This validates the earlier 
suggestion that the treatment of risk and more specifically the possibility of unrecouped 
losses (the MRRT design did not incorporate full loss offset) is seen by market participants 
as having a negative impact on the value of riskier mining companies. 
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Further, a statistically significant negative relationship between E&D and average abnormal 
returns can be observed. As can be seen, a 1% increase in the level of mining companies’ 
exploration and development is associated with a 6.7% decrease in average abnormal 
returns. This suggests that market participants anticipated these firms to be more negatively 
impacted by the MRRT (or by the extraction allowance entitlement) than the production-
focused companies, validating Hypothesis 9. 
It is important to mention that none of the other firm-specific characteristic variables 
investigated seem to matter to market participants when examining the impact of the 
MRRT. A likely explanation is that the change in design and features between the RSPT 
and the MRRT was not perceived by market participants as directly influencing shareholder 
wealth. Alternatively, it could be argued that these changes and their likely effects were 
anticipated and already priced/valued before the announcement of the MRRT. It could also 
be the case that equity investors failed to truly understand the full impact and effect 
associated with these modifications. 
In conclusion, this section shows the existence of a differential tax effect across several 
variables. These findings hence indicate that market participants perceived the MRRT to be 
non-neutral. For instance, larger resource companies or companies with less exploration 
and development focus or with lower exposure to riskier mining/mineral projects and or 
activities appear to be less negatively affected by the MRRT. These results suggest that 
investors perceived the MRRT to be less value destructive than the RSPT for the 
shareholders of firms displaying these specific attributes. It is also reasonable to assert that 
these findings indicate that the switch from an output-based tax to a profit rent-based tax 
incorporating the design of the MRRT is seeing by investors as less value destructive with 
regards to these firm-specific characteristics.  
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter began with a brief review of the theoretical framework on tax neutrality 
conditions and neutral resource taxations discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. It then evaluated 
and analysed the features and designs of the proposed RSPT and MRRT discussed in 
Chapter 5 with respect to the conditions to achieve neutral taxation. Although the Henry tax 
303 
review advocated the neutrality of the RSPT and the Australian Government promoted the 
RSPT and MRRT as being tax neutral, some of the features and design of both proposed 
resource taxes were identified as violating neutrality conditions.  
For instance, both RSPT and MRRT treatment of state royalty payments, their interaction 
with corporate income tax and their treatment of tax credits and losses were found to create 
distortionary effects. The treatment of mineral and unrecouped losses, of existing mining 
projects, the threshold tax level and the asymmetric application of the MRRT were also 
identified as not meeting tax neutrality conditions. The impacts on equity market of these 
areas of non-neutrality were hypothesised and various variables were collected and 
constructed to proxy for these identified areas of distortions  
Cross-sectional analysis was conducted by regressing average abnormal returns (results 
from Chapter 7) against these variables (firm-specific characteristics) to investigate the 
statistical significance of these hypotheses.  
The empirical results indicate that equity market participants perceived the proposed 
resource taxations to impact companies differently (i.e., the presence of a substitution 
effect). For instance, smaller, younger companies, firms with more revenue exposure to the 
RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derive from Australian resources activities 
relative to the total revenue) or higher WACC relative to the RSPT threshold level or more 
financial constraints appear to be more negatively affected by the RSPT. This results also 
indicates that a switch from an output base tax to a profit-based tax incorporating the design 
of the RSPT is seeing by investors as being value destructive for the shareholders of firms 
presenting these specific attributes. 
In regard to the MRRT, equity investors seemed to perceive that on average, larger 
companies or firms with less exploration and development focus, less exposure to riskier 
mining/mineral projects and/or activities were less negatively affected by the MRRT, 
therefore indicating that the MRRT created of a substitution effect.  
These findings suggest that the MRRT was seen by market participants as less value 
destructive than the RSPT for the shareholders of companies displaying these particular 
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characteristics. It further indicates that a change from an output-based tax to a profit-based 
tax incorporating the MRRT designs (but also the MRRT replacement for the RSPT) were 
perceived as less value destructive with regards to these company specific attributes. 
Hence, while the Australian Government promoted these proposed profit rent-based tax 
(RSPT and MRRT) as being tax neutral, the results from this chapter show that the 
proposed tax reforms were not only theoretically non-neutral in some aspects of their 
designs and features, but that the failure to meet several tax neutrality conditions was 
recognised by the equity market (i.e., existence of substitution effects).  
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 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis was motivated by the 2010 Australian Government announcements of the 
imposition of a uniform profit-based tax on the exploitation of all-natural non-renewable 
resources in Australia, namely the RSPT and its replacement the MRRT (now repealed). As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, such reforms were announced as a response to the 
Australia’s Future Tax System Review (or Henry Tax Review) and were the biggest 
proposed resource taxation reforms in Australia since the introduction of the PRRT in 
1984. The RSPT and MRRT were intended to replace the existing output-based resource 
taxations which were found by the Henry Tax Review to be complex, inconsistent and, 
theoretically, inferior to profit-based taxations in terms of economic efficiency and in 
capturing an adequate share of the economic rent generated by exhaustible natural 
resources (resource rent). In fact, these proposed profit-based taxes were promoted by the 
Australian Government as being tax neutral, that is, being able to generate revenue (i.e., an 
income effect) without distorting economic incentives (i.e., no substitution effect). 
Not only does the resource sector play a major role in the Australian economy but expected 
tax revenues from the proposed profit-based taxes were to be used to fund other tax 
measures, for example, a reduction in the company tax rate to make the Australian 
corporate tax rate internationally competitive. Thus, the effect of taxation on the resource 
sector is expected to have a significant effect on the performance of the whole economy. 
Therefore, it was important that a better understanding and appreciation of the likely effect 
(and the actual tax incidence) of these kinds of taxes and resource tax reforms be gained. 
This thesis not only offered the opportunity to theoretically analyse, understand and 
evaluate the motivation, justification, designs and features of the Australian 2010 resource 
tax reforms but provided the possibility to empirically examine, comprehend and quantify 
their effects on the Australian equity market within the resources sector. Finally, this thesis 
presented the occasion to theoretically and empirically investigate whether the RSPT and 
MRRT were neutral taxes as argued and promoted by the Australian Government.  
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The following sections provide a summary of each chapter, ending with a discussion 
addressing the limitations of this thesis and possible avenues for future research. 
9.2 Chapter 2 Summary 
As stated briefly in Chapter 1 and in detail in Chapter 5, an implicit and key assumption 
made in the Henry Tax Review was the presence of economic rent in the mineral and 
resource industry (i.e., resource rent). The primary objective of Chapter 2 was, therefore, to 
examine the notion and concept of economic rent. This chapter showed that the term rent 
originated in classical economics as the return derived from land, while the term economic 
rent is used in modern economics to represent the total return to a factor of production in 
excess of the minimum return required to induce the use of that factor or to retain its 
current employment. 
From the economists discussed in Chapter 2, it appeared there are opposing views 
regarding the nature and principles that establish rent. Classical economists assert that rent 
is unearned income arising from inelastic supply (scarcity rent) and heterogeneous quality 
of a factor of production (differential rent). Economists such as Schumpeter (1954), Mises 
(1949) and Davidson (2010) reject such a premise and assert that rent is the return to 
entrepreneurial function and ability to combine factors of production to create economic 
value. Meanwhile, economists such as Marshall (1890) and Stigler (1952) acknowledge the 
presence of rent but only in the short run (i.e., quasi rent). 
Chapter 2 also demonstrated the application of the concept of economic rent to the mining 
industry and showed that resource rent exists and represents the value of production of a 
natural resource after all necessary costs have been deducted. It further showed that 
resource rent persists in the long run because of the quality and scarcity value of different 
mining deposits (Ricardian rent). Finally, it explained that in the mining industry resource 
rent may not be the lone source of economic rent. In fact, economic rent may be greater 
than resource rent, in the presence of Schumpeterian rent for instance (i.e., 
managerial/entrepreneur skills). 
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9.3 Chapter 3 Summary 
Chapter 3 began with a discussion on the concept of tax neutrality and showed that neutral 
taxation means that decisions taken by companies or individuals are purely based on 
economic reasons rather than being influenced by tax considerations. It showed that while 
the main purpose of taxation is to enable government to raise the necessary revenue to 
support its expenditure programmes, the primary goal is to preserve the principle of tax 
neutrality. This is important because failing to maintain tax neutrality leads to allocative 
inefficiency, creating a deadweight loss. The latter can result not only in loss of income but 
discourage investment and growth, thus impeding the productive capacity of the economy. 
Chapter 3 then demonstrated that the introduction of a tax normally creates a negative 
income effect but can also generate a substitution effect. It explained that the negative 
effect is because of a reduction in taxpayer disposable income or real purchasing power, 
while the substitution effect is because of changes in relative prices of goods and services. 
It explained that the negative income effect leads to a reduction in the demand for all goods 
and services, whereas the substitution effect results in a reduction in the quantity demanded 
of the taxed good or service relative to other goods and services. It then explained that 
while all taxation creates a negative income effect, a substitution effect will only be present 
when a tax is not neutral. It is the latter effect that measures the magnitude of the 
deadweight loss, that is, the inefficiency created by the tax. 
Chapter 3 introduced another interpretation and definition of tax neutrality; rather than 
focusing on the macroeconomic level, it defined tax neutrality at the microeconomic level. 
That is, a neutral tax was defined as one that does not affect the screening of prospective 
investments nor alters their ordering with respect to expected profitability. In other words, 
for an investor, a tax is perceived as neutral if it maintains the investment pre-tax ranking 
(i.e., affects neither the pre-tax investment IRR nor its risk as reflected by shape of the 
probability distributions of the NPVs or IRR). This definition was used for the investigation 
of the presence of a substitution effect in Chapter 8. 
Since the proposed RSPT and MRRT are cash flow taxes types or equivalent, Chapter 3 
focused on the main types of cash flows taxation and established the conditions for these to 
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meet tax neutrality. It demonstrated that, when applied to the whole economy, tax neutrality 
can be achieved by taxing the investment net cash flow and incorporating either immediate 
expensing of capital expenditure with immediate or delayed full loss offset design and 
delayed write-off of all capital expenditure accompanied by delayed full loss offset. It also 
showed that any cash flow tax scheme failing to incorporate full loss offset designs 
imposed an asymmetrical effect on the NPV and rate of return probability distributions by 
negatively skewing both these distributions. This, in turn, may reduce or increase a 
project’s expected internal rate of return and its net present value, impeding tax neutrality. 
Chapter 3 ended by demonstrating that the investment neutrality benefits of cash flow 
taxation are due to the fact that such a tax scheme theoretically falls only on economic rent 
(i.e., immobile factor of productions), asserting that, in theory, the more the taxation can be 
concentrated on economic rent or these immobile factor of productions the greater tax 
revenue can be generated without incurring deadweight losses, thus moving towards 
achieving tax neutrality.  
9.4 Chapter 4 Summary 
It was logical for Chapter 4 to follow from Chapter 3 by considering the application of the 
concept of tax neutrality to mineral resources. Thus, the main goal of Chapter 4 was to 
combine the concept of resource rent (discussed in Chapter 2) with the concept of tax 
neutrality (discussed in Chapter 3) and apply these concepts to the taxation of mineral 
resources. Consequently, Chapter 4 began with a discussion on resource taxation 
arrangements and showed that these are categorised as either output-based or profit-based 
taxes. 
It was asserted that profit-based taxes generally impose a constant tax rate on either some 
measure of a resource project’s net cash flow in the case of a profit rent–based tax or on 
some measure of a resource project’s accounting profit in the case of profit income–based 
tax. 
Because the 2010 government resource tax reform focused on the implementation of profit 
rent–based taxes to replace output-based taxes, Chapter 4 concentrated on three profit rent–
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based taxes—the Brown tax, the allowance for corporate capital resource rent tax and the 
Garnaut and Clunies-Ross resource rent tax. This was because these underpin the proposed 
RSPT, MRRT and current PRRT, and any other forms of profit rent–based tax are either 
modifications or hybrids of these three. Chapter 4 showed that these profit rent–based taxes 
are in fact cash flow taxes or equivalent cash flow taxes similar to those discussed in 
Chapter 3, but, rather than being applied at a corporate level, they are imposed at a mineral 
resource project level. 
Chapter 4 asserted that output-based taxes are the most common form of resource taxation 
and are generally imposed as either a flat fiat currency quantity per physical unit of 
production from a resource project (specific royalties) or as a flat percentage of the value of 
production (ad valorem royalty), with the former mostly imposed on low-value, high-
volume mineral resources. 
The chapter then defined the key criteria used in the assessment of resource taxation—
economic efficiency, rent collection, revenue stability and compliance and administration 
cost. Where economic efficiency assesses tax neutrality or otherwise, rent collection 
indicates the capacity to collect an adequate share of the resource rent under a range of 
different economic and geological conditions, and revenue stability represents the extent to 
which a resource tax arrangement offers relatively predictable and stable revenue stream. It 
was then asserted that a profit-based tax, and particularly a rent-based taxation 
arrangement, is generally ranked more highly than output-based tax arrangements in terms 
of rent collection and economic efficiency. However, output-based taxes rank higher on the 
revenue stability and compliance and administration costs criteria. 
Then, using the traditional partial equilibrium analysis in a supply–demand framework, 
Chapter 4 combined the idea of risk-neutral and risk-averse investors and resource rents 
discussed in Chapter 2 with the principle of neutral taxation discussed in Chapter 3 to 
investigate the effect of resource profit-based and output-based taxes on tax neutrality. In 
doing so, it demonstrated that output-based taxes are distortionary because these result in a 
reduction in the industry level of quantity produced. In contrast, a profit rent–based tax was 
shown to be neutral because the total levels of output produced remain unchanged from the 
pre-tax outcome. It concluded that a profit rent–based tax is not only superior to an output-
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based tax in capturing an adequate and steady share of resource rent generated from the 
exploitation of mineral resources, but it is also less distortionary than an output-based tax 
with respect to investment and production decisions. 
It was further shown that both types of taxes may generate a distortionary effect with 
respect to investor risk premium. For instance, a profit-based tax could see a reduction in 
the risk premium, while an output-based tax could see an increase in the risk premium. This 
is distortionary because a change in risk premium leads to a change in industry output 
level—that is, higher (lower) output produced in the case of resource rent (output-based 
tax). 
Chapter 4 then illustrated the practical operations and applications of the different corporate 
cash flow taxes discussed in Chapter 3 by using two hypothetical mineral resource projects. 
The purpose was to investigate their effect on tax neutrality in the discounted cash flow 
analysis framework. The results from these investigations validated the theoretical 
discussion on the use of cash flow taxation, the taxation of economic rent and tax neutrality 
from Chapter 3. That is, as long as any of the cash flow tax designs provide either an 
immediate full loss offset design, or a delayed full loss offset provision with an uplift rate 
set at the LTBR, resource tax neutrality can be achieved. 
Chapter 4 ended with special issues to consider when imposing a profit rent–based tax 
which, under certain conditions, could hinder investment neutrality properties. For instance, 
if such a tax is unexpectedly and immediately introduced or the design of existing tax 
changes, current investors could face a capital levy effect. This effect would occur if, at the 
time of the unexpected and immediate introduction or modification of the tax, the market 
value of existing assets is not allowed as a tax deduction. In addition, it was asserted that 
the interaction between the introduction and/or modification of profit rent–based tax and 
state royalties and corporate income tax could give rise to distortionary effects. For 
example, it was demonstrated that when introducing a new profit rent–based tax on mineral 
resources already subject to state royalties, the latter must be either removed entirely or, if 
maintained, fully refundable credits for unrestricted state royalty payments must be 
provided for tax neutrality to be maintained. 
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Chapter 4 emphasised that although profit rent–based taxation and corporate income tax 
can achieve tax neutrality when imposed in isolation, their combined imposition can create 
an overall distortionary effect. It was asserted that when any form of profit rent–based 
taxation is imposed prior to corporate income taxation, the income tax treatment of the 
mining project capital expenditure can violate investment neutrality conditions. For 
instance, a wedge between the pre-tax and post-tax investor discount rate can be imposed if 
depreciation allowance is determined from the mining project capital expenditure gross of 
cash rebates provided from prior cash flow taxation. This can, in turn, affect potential 
mining project/investment assessments and, consequently, investment decisions. However, 
if depreciation allowance is determined net of cash flow taxation cash rebates and with the 
mining project’s net receipts assessed for income tax purposes net of prior cash flow 
taxation, then, under a cash flow taxation scheme incorporating full loss offset provisions, 
overall tax neutrality can be achieved. 
9.5 Chapter 5 Summary 
Chapter 5 opened with a brief discussion on the European discovery and colonisation of 
Australia, showing that these events played a major role in the development of modern 
mining in Australia, for example, with the formation of the Australian Agricultural 
Company. It further showed that it was the gold rush that led to the development of mining 
legislation. 
Chapter 5 explained that mining acts are the main legislation in the mining industry and 
cover all matters relating to mining activities—leases, licences and permits; royalties and 
taxes; and the control, management and ownership of mineral resources. These historical 
events and developments were important to acknowledge and comprehend when analysing 
the impact of the recent proposed resource tax reforms since there is a high degree of 
dependency between royalties and resource taxation on one hand and mining rights on the 
other, all of which can affect the mining industry. 
One section in Chapter 5 emphasised the taxation of non-renewable resources in Australia, 
starting with a brief discussion on early taxation in Australia. This section showed that, in 
addition to its contribution to the development of mining legislation, the gold rush led to 
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the first form of mineral taxation in Australia with the introduction of licence fees imposed 
on the mining of gold in New South Wales. It also showed that these licence fees were 
followed by the first profit- and output-based taxes specific to the mining industry, with the 
introduction of a 5% duty on profits made by mining companies in Western Australia in 
1899 and a 10% royalty imposed on gold gross output in the colony of New South Wales in 
1851. Chapter 5 further showed that there was however no real logical rational for the 
charging of royalties except for the regalian system of ownership—minerals were the 
personal property of the sovereign and it was deemed a privilege to mine. For that 
privilege, a payment to the sovereign was required, thus the term royalty. Chapter 5 showed 
that, thereafter, the prime justification in modern mineral resource taxation was that 
exhaustible resources generate resource rent that can be taxed without changing production 
and investment decision and the community owns all natural resources and governments 
should, on behalf of the community, seek an appropriate return for the exploitations of 
natural resources by taxing resource rent. 
The chapter then examined what is considered in the literature as the first reform of the 
taxation of non-renewable resources in Australia—the first application of a profit rent–
based tax via the imposition of the PRRT to offshore petroleum projects. Chapter 5 stated 
that the PRRT is based on the classical view that resource rent is considered an unearned 
income which can theoretically be taxed at 100% and generate a large amount of tax 
revenue without creating any distorting effect. It then asserted that, in addition to the 
aforementioned justification for the taxation of non-renewable resources, the PRRT was 
introduced to reduce the distorting effect associated with output-based royalties (i.e., to 
gain efficiency) and capture a more adequate share of resource rent as output-based 
royalties generally failed to do so. 
Subsequently, the chapter provided an overview of the current resource taxation 
arrangements in Australia prior to the 2010 resource tax reforms and showed that resource 
taxation in Australia is a very complex arrangement of various taxes differing not only 
across but within states and from mineral to mineral, all with very little consistency. It 
further asserted that, except for the PRRT, exhaustible resource taxation arrangements 
levied in Australia are mainly output based. This was followed by a brief discussion on 
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other general taxes imposed on resource companies to provide an overview of some of the 
main general features of the Australian taxation system. It was shown that, like most other 
industries, the mining industry in Australia is subject to a variety of general taxes, some of 
which are direct taxes (e.g., company tax) and others indirect taxes (e.g., sales tax). 
Chapter 5 then discussed the 2010 resource tax reforms—the RSPT and MRRT—including 
the reasons, motivations and economic justifications for the reform of resource taxation in 
Australia. It showed that such reform was recommended by the Henry Tax Review and that 
the rationale and economic justification were very similar to those associated with the 
introduction of the PRRT—that is, based on the economic efficiency and rent collection 
criteria, existing royalty regimes are theoretically inferior to the proposed RSPT and 
MRRT. However, the chapter further showed that such reforms also aimed to provide the 
opportunity to move away from the taxation of normal return to the taxation of economic 
rent, address the imbalance in the Australian economy (between parts of the economy 
beneficiating from the resource boom and the other parts suffering from it) and render 
Australian company tax internationally competitive. 
The chapter followed with a discussion on the design and features of both proposed 
resource taxes. It was shown that, although both were profit rent–based taxes, they differed 
in some respects. For instance, the MRRT’s tax rate, threshold rate, extraction allowance 
uplift rate and coverage were all scaled down from the preceding RSPT. 
Chapter 5 concluded with a discussion on the repeal of the MRRT. It reported that, after the 
repeal of the MRRT, the extension of the PRRT to cover onshore petroleum resources was 
retained while mineral resource taxation arrangements reverted to those in places pre-
MRRT.  
9.6 Chapter 6 Summary 
Chapter 6 began with demonstrating that a price-based event study was an ideal empirical 
technique to appraise the impact of the proposed resource tax reform announcements on 
equity shareholder wealth and, therefore, of the income effect associated with the proposed 
resource tax reforms. This is because stocks are assumed to be priced rationally, which 
314 
implies that the effect of unanticipated events should instantaneously be reflected in asset 
prices. Therefore, any unanticipated change in taxation arrangements (i.e., the 
announcement of the RSPT and to a lesser extent the MRRT) are predicted to affect a 
firm’s future expected cash flow, causing a one-off revision in its security price—that is, 
abnormal price performance around the time of the unanticipated event. This thesis’s focus 
on the short-term effect of the proposed resource tax reforms was justified on the basis that 
short-term event studies are argued to provide a more consistent and accurate measure of 
securities abnormal performances caused by unanticipated events than a long-run event 
studies. The chapter also revealed that very few studies had investigated the equity market 
reaction of resource taxations reforms. 
Chapter 6 then described and explained the methodology and data set used in the analysis 
of the income effect (conducted in Chapter 7) and in the investigation of the presence or 
otherwise of a substitution effect (conducted in Chapter 8). It provided a discussion and a 
description of the different models used in event studies and the issues faced when using 
the technique. It showed that the most critical issues to consider are infrequently traded 
securities (thin trading), presence of announcements or events during the event period that 
might affect security prices (confounding effects), the choice of weighting schemes to 
proxy the market index when computing expected returns and aggregating abnormal returns 
across firms and events of interest investigated clustered in calendar time and by industry. 
It demonstrated that all these issues could cause econometric misspecification and lead to 
inaccurate inferences. However, the chapter asserted that these can be a dealt with to 
provide robust results. For instance, by using test statistics that incorporate adjustments for 
cross-sectional correlation, event-induced variance, unequal variances across securities, 
confounding effects and nonsynchronous security trading. 
Chapter 6 further asserted that, given the nature of the analysis and the statistical properties 
of the dataset—that is, daily returns and excess performances slightly skewed to the right 
with a leptokurtic distribution—the most robust model to use was the market model with 
the Scholes-Williams beta to generate the expected return or normal return earned by 
security holders unconditional on the event (the proposed resource tax). It further 
explicated and established that an adjusted standardised cross-sectional test statistic is the 
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most appropriate statistical test to draw accurate inferences on the significance of the 
abnormal performance. 
The data set consisted of all mining, oil and gas producers and industrial metals and mining 
companies listed on the ASX—selected for analysis based on them being the most likely to 
be affected by the proposed resource tax. Daily share price data were obtained from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream over the sample periods 3 April 2009 to 30 July 2010, 13 
August 2012 to 7 October 2013 and 6 August 2013 to 30 September 2014. The first sample 
period was used for investigation of the equity market reaction to the announcements of the 
proposed RSPT and MRRT. While not the main focus of this thesis, the latter two sample 
periods were used for the analysis of the equity market reaction to the 2013 federal election 
results (won by the Liberal Party of Australia) and to the passage of the Mining Tax Repeal 
Bill in both Houses of Parliament respectively. 
9.7 Chapter 7 Summary 
As demonstrated in Chapters 3, 4 and 6, it is reasonable to assume that firms subject to the 
new proposed resource tax reforms would experience abnormal prices performances 
(income effect) around the time of their announcements (one-off adjustment in the affected 
corporations share price reflecting changes in the affected corporations disposable income). 
The main goal of Chapter 7 was to examine, quantify and present the resources sector 
equity market reaction to the announced proposed resource sector tax reforms. That is, to 
gain additional insights into the magnitude, sign and significance of the various subsectors’ 
excess returns and, therefore, of the income effect. Other minor empirical investigations 
were also conducted to analyse the effect of the 2013 federal election outcome and the 
passage of the Mining Tax Repeal Bill. These were investigated as it was natural to analyse 
the market reaction to the idea of a repeal of the MRRT as well as its actual repeal. 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 7 indicated that the two proposed resource 
taxes had a measurable effect on the equity securities of potentially affected companies, 
negative when the RSPT was announced and slightly positive when its replacement, the 
MRRT, was anticipated. While it appeared that market participants viewed the MRRT as 
less value destructive than the RSPT, overall, the net effect of proposed resource tax reform 
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(RSPT and MRRT) was negative. As expected, this confirmed the presence of a negative 
income effect. 
Further, this suggested that market participants perceived a switch from an output-based tax 
to a profit rent–based tax to be value destructive. This chapter also provided evidence of an 
apparent differentiated stock price reaction to the proposed resource tax announcements 
across various subsectors investigated. Since the response to both the MRRT and RSPT 
announcements was not uniform, this suggests the existence of a differential tax effect (i.e., 
substitution effect). This effect may be related to the relationship between firm/subsector 
specific characteristics and designs and features of the RSPT and MRRT. The presence of a 
substitution effect was investigated further in Chapter 8. 
Finally, the idea of a possible repeal of the MRRT, and its actual repeal, seemed to have 
had no effects on equity market participants. A negative drift was, however, observed for 
companies involved in the exploitation of iron ore after the actual repeal of the MRRT. It 
was suggested that this effect arose from the announced increased in state royalties for iron 
and ore commodities and the removal of the concessional royalty rate. 
9.8 Chapter 8 Summary 
The objective of Chapter 8 was to empirically investigate whether the announcement of the 
proposed new resource taxations (RSPT and MRRT) created a substitution effect on the 
affected subsectors of the stock market—that is, whether these were tax neutral (as argued 
and promoted by the Australian Government). First, the chapter provided a brief review of 
the theoretical framework on tax neutrality conditions and the taxation of natural 
exhaustible resources (discussed in Chapter 3 and 4) and restated the conditions for a 
resource tax to be neutral. It then evaluated the features, designs and characteristics of the 
proposed RSPT and MRRT to assess whether these met the neutrality conditions. In doing 
so, the chapter identified some features and designs that did not meet neutrality 
conditions—both the RSPT and MRRT treatment of state royalty payments, interaction 
with corporate income tax and respective treatment of tax credits and losses were found to 
not meet tax neutrality conditions. The treatment of unrecouped losses, existing mining 
projects, the threshold tax level and the asymmetric application of the MRRT were also 
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identified as violating tax neutrality conditions. The effects on the equity market of the 
violation of the tax neutrality conditions were then hypothesised, leading to the 
development of various hypotheses to investigate the neutrality or otherwise of these 
resource tax reforms. To proxy for the identified areas of non-neutrality in the design of the 
RSPT and MRRT, various companies’ specific variables were collected and constructed 
and the statistical significance of the developed hypotheses was then investigated, using a 
cross-sectional analysis, by regressing average excess performance found in Chapter 7 
against these variables. 
A different market reaction to the announced proposed RSPT was found across company 
specific characteristics. For instance, smaller or younger firms, or companies with higher 
revenue exposure to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derive from 
Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) or a higher WACC level 
relative to the RSPT threshold level or more financial constrains were, on average, more 
negatively affected by the announced proposed RSPT. These findings demonstrated that the 
RSPT created a substitution effect. They also indicated that stock market investors 
perceived a change from an output-based tax regime to a profit-based tax regime 
incorporating the design of the RSPT as more value destructive for companies displaying 
these specific characteristics. 
Further, the chapter showed that the announcement of the MRRT affected firms differently. 
For example, equity market investors seemed to have perceived larger companies, or firms 
with less exploration and development focus or less exposure to riskier mineral/mining 
projects and/or activities, as less negatively affected by the MRRT. These results indicated 
that the MRRT created a substitution effect. The chapter further demonstrated that equity 
market participants perceived the change from an output-based tax regime to a profit-based 
tax regime incorporating the design of the MRRT (and the fact that the MRRT was to 
replace the RSPT) as less value destructive for firms presenting these particular attributes. 
Therefore, while the proposed profit-based tax reforms (both the RSPT and MRRT) were 
promoted and argued as being tax neutral by the Australian Government, the findings from 
Chapter 8 indicated otherwise. Importantly, it was shown that not only were some aspects 
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of their designs and features theoretically non-neutral but that this was recognised by the 
equity market (i.e., existence of substitution effects). 
9.9 Conclusion 
Australia is endowed with large reserves of petroleum and mineral resources and federal, 
state and territories governments have traditionally been responsible for the control and 
management of these resources. These resources are generally expected to generate 
economic rent and, through the use of taxation, governments aim to collect a reasonable 
share of this rent while maintaining the principle of tax neutrality, that is, without incurring 
deadweight losses (i.e., no substitution effect). Tax neutrality is important in the 
development of any taxation policy as deviation from it can impede the productive capacity 
of an economy. In the context of petroleum and mineral resources, a non-neutral tax system 
can discourage investment in resource exploration and development and lead to premature 
petroleum and mineral projects, all of which result in a reduction of the resource tax being 
collected, hindering government revenues. 
In theory, a resource profit-based tax is superior to an output-based tax scheme in terms of 
economic efficiency and rent collection and can achieve tax neutrality. Yet, with the 
exception of PRRT (a profit-based tax), output-based taxes have traditionally been the main 
instrument used in the taxation of mineral resources and onshore oil and gas in Australia. 
However, to address the economic inefficiency associated with output-based tax schemes 
and their failure to collect a reasonable share of the resource rent (following declines in 
government revenue contribution from the resources sector while petroleum and mineral 
resources companies’ profitability and profits had been increasing), the Australian 
Government proposed the replacement of the various resource output-based taxes with a 
uniform resource profit-based tax. On 2 May 2010, the proposed RSPT was announced. It 
was replaced by the MRRT on 2 July 2010. The MRRT became effective on 1 July 2012 
but was repealed on 2 September 2014. Both the RSPT and MRRT were promoted by the 
Australian Government as being tax neutral (i.e., generating an income effect without 
creating a substitution effect). 
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This thesis investigated the equity market reaction to the announcement of these resource 
tax reforms. It has contributed to various streams of literatures by measuring and 
quantifying the short-term income effect associated with the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT and MRRT on the equity market. For example, it showed that on average, mining 
and energy companies suffered abnormal losses of 1.78%, 2.24% and 2.09% on the day of 
the RSPT was announced, the day after its announcement and two days post announcement 
respectively. It further showed that the replacement of the RSPT by the MRRT was, on 
average, associated with a positive average abnormal return of 2.92% across mineral and 
petroleum resources firms the day before the MRRT was announced as a replacement for 
the RSPT. Finally, it showed that the positive market reaction to the introduction of the 
MRRT was insufficient to offset the negative income associated with the fact that a 
resource profit-based tax regime was going to replace the existing output-based resource 
taxation regime, with companies involved in the petroleum and mineral resources sector 
suffering cumulative abnormal loss of around 22% between the time the RSPT was 
announced and 20 days after the announcement of the MRRT. 
Further, this thesis showed that several aspects of the designs, features and characteristics 
of the proposed RSPT and MRRT were theoretically non-neutral. For instance, both the 
RSPT and MRRT’s interaction with corporate income tax, treatment of tax credits and 
losses and state royalty payments failed to meet tax neutrality conditions. It was also 
demonstrated that the MRRT violated tax neutrality conditions with respect to the treatment 
of unrecouped losses, existing projects, threshold tax level and its asymmetric application. 
These areas of inefficiency were hypothesised, and, using the equity market reaction to the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT, their statistical significance 
investigated. 
This thesis has contributed to the literature by showing that the equity market reaction to 
the announcement of the resource tax reforms was heterogeneous across the companies and 
sectors directly affected by these reforms, confirming the inefficiencies identified in the 
theoretical analysis and evaluation of the design and features of the RSPT and MRRT, and 
providing empirical evidence against the promoted tax neutrality benefits of these resource 
profit-based taxes. For instance, smaller or younger firms, or companies with higher 
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revenue exposure to the RSPT (as measured by the proportion of revenue derive from 
Australian resources activities relative to the total revenue) or a higher WACC level 
relative to the RSPT threshold level or more financial constrains were, on average, more 
negatively affected by the announcement of the proposed RSPT. In regard to the MRRT, 
larger companies or firms with less exploration and development focus, less exposure to 
riskier mining/mineral projects and/or activities were less negatively impacted by the 
announcement of the introduction of the MRRT. 
Therefore, while the Australian Government promoted these proposed profit rent–based 
taxes (RSPT and MRRT) as being tax neutral, this thesis showed that not only were these 
tax reforms theoretically non-neutral in some aspects of their designs and features but that 
the failure to meet several tax neutrality conditions was recognised by the equity market 
(i.e., existence of substitution effects). It is important to mention, however, that these 
findings do not suggest that the proposed RSPT and the MRRT were bad taxes, rather they 
were not tax neutral. Therefore, these results showed that while, in theory, profit-based 
taxes can achieve tax neutrality, their practical application is likely to result in some 
distortionary effects (substitution effect). 
The findings in this thesis are of practical interest not only to current and prospective 
investors in the resources sector and resource companies but to firms’ managers and 
management teams in their equity market funding decisions. The observed differential 
equity market reaction to the announcement of the RSPT and MRRT highlighted the ability 
of the equity market to identify and distinguish those companies and subsectors most likely 
to benefit and suffer from the implementation of these profit-based resource taxes, thus 
providing valuable information about the impact of these types of profit-based taxes on the 
market valuation and share price of the affected firms. 
Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, profit-based taxes are superior to output-based taxes in 
terms of economic efficiency and rent collection and, as a result, a move from output-based 
taxation arrangements towards profit-based tax regimes have become a global trend in 
resource taxation in developed and developing countries. Given such trend and the recent 
review of the current Australian PRRT, the areas of non-neutrality identified and associated 
in this thesis (both theoretically and empirically) with the proposed RSPT and the MRRT 
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are of great interest and relevance to any governments considering these types of taxes and 
resource tax reforms in Australia and overseas. These findings can assist governments in 
minimising the distortionary effects associated with the designs, features and practical 
implementation of these types of profit-based taxes. 
Finally, these findings can provide the opportunity for Australia to not only establish itself 
as a world leader and expert in the taxation of mineral and petroleum resources but assist 
other governments in the practical implementation, designs and features of future profit-
based resource tax regimes. 
9.10 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research  
9.10.1 Limitations 
This thesis conducted a price-based event study to investigate the income and substitution 
effects associated with the announcement of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT. While not 
essential for such investigation, as discussed in Chapter 6, the use of a volume-based event 
study combined with a price-based event study can not only enhance the power of 
hypotheses testing but can capture different aspect of equity market investors’ reaction to 
an event and, therefore, provide additional information. For instance, such analysis could 
offer insights into not only possible changes in the relative riskiness of firms directly 
affected by the proposed resource tax reforms but capture changes in the expectation of 
individual equity market participants. Unfortunately, analysis of the price–volume 
relationship was not conducted as the statistical properties and the characteristic of the 
dataset used in this thesis (thin trading) greatly limited the performance of a volume-based 
event study. 
Further, to investigate the neutrality or otherwise of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT 
(i.e., whether the announcement of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT created substitution 
effects), this thesis theoretically analysed and evaluated their respective designs, features 
and characteristics against tax neutrality conditions. This enabled the formulation of 
hypotheses about the associated effects on equity market of these theoretically identified 
areas of non-neutrality in the proposed RSPT and MRRT. The empirical investigation of 
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these hypotheses was then conducted by regressing average abnormal returns against 
several companies’ specific attributes. These firms’ specific characteristics were variables 
collected and constructed as proxies for the identified potential sources of non-neutrality in 
the designs and features of the proposed RSPT and the MRRT. One caveat is the lack of 
geographical location data for resources projects. Such data could provide information 
about the equity market reaction to the announced resource tax reforms across states and 
territories, providing further insight into the identified distortionary effect associated with 
the changes in the treatment of state royalty tax payments. 
However, it is important to note that the aforementioned limitations are minor as these did 
not in any way impede the empirical analysis of the income effect associated with the 
proposed RSPT and the MRRT nor did they hinder the empirical investigation of the 
theoretically identified areas of non-neutrality in the designs and features of the proposed 
resource tax reforms. Regardless of the availability of volume and individual project’s 
geographical location data, the income and substitution effects associated with the 
announced resource tax reforms was robustly investigated using the price-based event study 
methodology described and the various proxies used and described in the cross-sectional 
analysis. Volume and geographical data only provide further insights into the equity 
market’s reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT with respect to 
the changes in the relative riskiness of companies, expectation of individual equity market 
participants and the treatment of state royalty tax payments. 
9.10.2 Future Research 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, some parts of the predicted revenue from the proposed 
resource tax reforms (i.e., a switch from an output-based to profit-based tax regime) was to 
be used to fund a reduction in the Australian company corporate tax rate and small 
businesses tax breaks. A logical extension to the research conducted in this thesis would be 
to investigate the equity market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT and 
MRRT and the announcement of the repeal of the MRRT and its actual repeal across all 
other sectors and industries within the Australian economy. This would allow a full 
comparative analysis of the impact of the proposed resource tax reforms on other, non-
resources sectors and industries and provide further insights into which sectors and 
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industries benefited and suffered from the announcement of the proposed RSPT, MRRT 
and related measures but also from their announced repeal and actual repeal of the MRRT. 
In the light of the research conducted in this thesis and the implications of its findings, it is 
evident that the announcement of the proposed resource tax reforms raised concerns among 
equity market participants with regard to current and prospective resources project future 
profitability—that is, total returns available from investing within the resource sector in 
Australia was altered by the imposition of these taxes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert 
that the flow of funds could be transferred away from Australia to other countries rich in 
mineral and petroleum resources with more favourable fiscal settings, for example, Canada, 
Brazil, South Africa, India, Russia, Chile, Indonesia and Kazakhstan (Garnaut 2010; 
Parmenter, Breckenridge & Gray 2010; Kompo-Harms & Sanyal 2001; Otto et al. 2006; 
Hogan 2008). Therefore, another possible extension would be the investigation of the 
impact of the announcement of the proposed RSPT and MRRT and announced repeal and 
actual repeal of the MRRT on the equity market of the Australian resources sector’s main 
competitor countries. This would allow a comparative analysis of the effect of the 
announcement of the Australian proposed resource tax reforms and announcement of their 
repeal and actual repeal on the equity market of these countries and provide information on 
whether these events created differential tax effect across and within these countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Key Events in Australian History 
This table provides a break down summary and description of major events in Australian history that are 
associated with the European discovery and colonisation, early mining as well as mining legislation 
development early resource taxation and the 2010 resources tax reforms. 
Year Event 
1770 Part of the east coast of Australia claimed as British territory 
1788 First British settlement established at Sydney Cove 
1791 Coal was first discovered by escaped convicts at Newcastle 
1793  First free settlers arrive in New South Wales 
1799 Colonial government commenced mining of coal 
1800 First shipment of coal exported to India 
1800 First customs duties levied in the Australian colonies 
1802 First ad valorem customs duty applied in the Australian colonies 
1819 First law legislating taxes passed  
1824 Formation of the Australian Agricultural Company 
1825 The colony of Van Diemen’s Land is established in its own right; its name is officially changed 
to Tasmania on 1 January 1856 
1827 Western Australia was established 
1834 South Australia became a separate colony 
1841 Lead was the first metal to be mined and produced in Australia 
1851 New South Wales introduces first direct tax with the death duties  
1851 First reported discovery of payable gold 
1851 First Australian mining law proclaimed 
1851 New South Wales introduced a licence fee for the mining of gold 
1851  Victoria is separated from New South Wales 
1851 Victoria imposes a licence fee for the mining of gold 
1854 Eureka Stockade on the goldfield of Ballarat  
1855 Abolishment of the gold licence, substituted with an annual miner’s right 
1857 Brown coal discovered at Lal in Victoria 
1859 Copper recognised in the Cobar area of New South Wales 
1859 Queensland is separated from New South Wales 
1860 Copper discoveries at Wallaroo and Moonta in South Australia 
1880 First Australian income tax with Tasmania’s withholding tax on dividends, annuity and rents 
1884 First Australian general income and land tax introduced in South Australia 
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1890 Dividend income tax introduced in Queensland 
1894 Tasmania introduces dividend income tax 
1895 Victoria introduces general income tax and New South Wales introduces general and land 
income tax 
1899 First direct tax specific to the mining industry introduced by the colony of Western Australia, 
imposing a duty of 5% on the profits made by mining companies 
1901  Federation of Australia 
1901 Uniform national tariff introduced 
1901 Customs duty imposed on imported petroleum products  
1911  The Australian Capital Territory is established 
1915 Federal government income tax introduced 
1917 War time profit introduced by the Commonwealth 
1922 System of taxing all company profits introduced 
1926 Commonwealth customs duty imposed on imported petroleum and oil to finance roads grants to 
states 
1927 Commonwealth introduces excise duty on petroleum and oil to supplement the 1926 customs 
duty 
1929 Introduction of excise on domestically produced petrol 
1930 Wholesale Sale Tax introduced 
1934 First commercial development of mineral sands deposits at Byron Bay in New South Wales 
1937 First large-scale mining of black coal by open cut methods in Australia at Blair Athol in 
Queensland 
1940 Fuel excise rate increased, and an excise introduced on heavy fuel oil 
1941 Introduction of payroll tax 
1942 Commonwealth takes over all income tax and entertainment tax 
1951 First shipment of iron ore from Yampi Sound in Western Australia to Port Kembla steelworks in 
New South Wales 
1960s Discovery and initial development of vast iron ore resources in the Pilbara region in Western 
Australia 
1961 First commercial oil field discovered at Moonie in Queensland 
1964-67 Series of important oil and gas discoveries: oil at Barrow Island in Western Australia; gas in 
north-east South Australia and adjoining part of south-west Queensland; and the Barracouta gas 
field and Kingfish and Halibut oil fields off the Gippsland coast in Victoria Oil in Bass Strait 
1971 Discovery of North-West Shelf (WA) natural gas fields 
1975 Asprey Committee 
1985 Draft white report 
1985 Capital gains tax arrangement introduced  
1985 Introduction of a resource rent royalty on Barrow Island 
1986 First imposition of FBT 
1987 PRRT introduced to all new offshore petroleum exploration and development projects 
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1989 First LNG exports from the North-West Shelf 
2000 GST replaces Wholesale Sale Tax 
2008 Australia 2020 Summit 
2010 Announcement of RSPT and MRRT 
2012 MRRT became effective 
2014 MRRT repealed 
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Appendix 2: Chapter 7- Alternative statistical tests comparisons results 
 
RSPT Coal subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test statistics for each days’ 
individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day of the RSPT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model 
parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The coal subsector covers 35 stocks 
Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return 
for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the 
previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for 
the computation of all, but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period 
and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average excess return on day t relative to the announcement 
of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t161 average abnormal or cumulative average abnormal performances 
having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return162. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average or 
average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
161 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
162 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional163 Standardised164 
Standardised cross 
sectional165 
Crude adjustment166 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional167 
  Generalized sign168 Rank169 
AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR   AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR 
                
-20 2.38 
(2.198)** 
2.38 
(2.198)** 
2.38 
(2.689)** 
2.38 
(2.689)** 
2.38 
(2.057)** 
2.38 
(2.057)** 
2.38 
(1.854)* 
2.38 
(1.854)* 
2.38 
(1.593) 
2.38 
(1.593) 
 
2.38 
(3.063) 
2.38 
(3.063) 
2.38 
(1.903) 
2.38 
(1.903) 
-19 1.50 
(1.475) 
3.89 
(2.598)** 
1.50 
(2.253)** 
3.89 
(3.495)*** 
1.50 
(2.293)** 
3.89 
(2.827)*** 
1.50 
(1.173) 
3.89 
(2.141)** 
1.50 
(1.776)* 
3.89 
(2.190)** 
 
1.50 
(1.706) 
3.89 
(3.372) 
1.50 
(1.718) 
3.89 
(2.560) 
-18 -0.14 
(-0.171) 
3.75 
(2.022)* 
-0.14 
(0.395) 
3.75 
(3.081)*** 
-0.14 
(0.406) 
3.75 
(2.658)** 
-0.14 
(-0.112) 
3.75 
(1.683) 
-0.14 
(0.315) 
3.75 
(2.059)** 
 
-0.14 
(-0.329) 
3.75 
(2.563) 
-0.14 
(0.221) 
3.75 
(2.218) 
-17 -0.21 
(-0.179) 
3.53 
(1.661) 
-0.21 
(0.568) 
3.53 
(2.953)*** 
-0.21 
(0.373) 
3.53 
(2.919)*** 
-0.21 
(-0.168) 
3.53 
(1.373) 
-0.21 
(0.289) 
3.53 
(2.261)** 
 
-0.21 
(0.009) 
3.53 
(2.224) 
-0.21 
(-0.273) 
3.53 
(1.784) 
-16 2.25 
(1.441) 
5.79 
(2.131)** 
2.25 
(2.119)** 
5.79 
(3.589)*** 
2.25 
(1.565) 
5.79 
(3.142)*** 
2.25 
(1.753)* 
5.79 
(2.012)* 
2.25 
(1.212) 
5.79 
(2.434)** 
 
2.25 
(2.045) 
5.79 
(2.904) 
2.25 
(1.081) 
5.79 
(2.080) 
-15 2.23 
(2.150)** 
8.02 
(2.823)*** 
2.23 
(2.837)*** 
8.02 
(4.434)*** 
2.23 
(2.803)*** 
8.02 
(3.677)*** 
2.23 
(1.736)* 
8.02 
(2.546)** 
2.23 
(2.172)** 
8.02 
(2.849)*** 
 
2.23 
(1.366) 
8.02 
(3.209) 
2.23 
(1.706) 
8.02 
(2.595) 
-14 1.34 
(1.521) 
9.37 
(3.189)*** 
1.34 
(1.881)* 
9.37 
(4.816)*** 
1.34 
(1.995)* 
9.37 
(4.006)*** 
1.34 
(1.046) 
9.37 
(2.752)*** 
1.34 
(1.546) 
9.37 
(3.104)*** 
 
1.34 
(1.366) 
9.37 
(3.488) 
1.34 
(1.154) 
9.37 
(2.839) 
-13 -0.90 
(-1.751)* 
8.46 
(2.364)** 
-0.90 
(-1.348) 
8.46 
(4.029)*** 
-0.90 
(-2.256)** 
8.46 
(3.691)*** 
-0.90 
(-0.702) 
8.46 
(2.326)** 
-0.90 
(-1.748)* 
8.46 
(2.859)*** 
 
-0.90 
(0.009) 
8.46 
(3.266) 
-0.90 
(-0.674) 
8.46 
(2.417) 
-12 -0.76 
(-0.868) 
7.69 
(1.939)* 
-0.76 
(-1.437) 
7.69 
(3.319)*** 
-0.76 
(-1.883)* 
7.69 
(3.498)*** 
-0.76 
(-0.597) 
7.69 
(1.994)* 
-0.76 
(-1.459) 
7.69 
(2.710)** 
 
-0.76 
(-1.008) 
7.69 
(2.743) 
-0.76 
(-0.773) 
7.69 
(2.021) 
-11 0.43 
(0.392) 
8.13 
(1.964)* 
0.43 
(0.533) 
8.13 
(3.317)*** 
0.43 
(0.591) 
8.13 
(4.128)*** 
0.43 
(0.339) 
8.13 
(1.999)* 
0.43 
(0.458) 
8.13 
(3.198)*** 
 
0.43 
(0.348) 
8.13 
(2.712) 
0.43 
(0.181) 
8.13 
(1.975) 
                                                 
163 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
164 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
165 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
166 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
167 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
168 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
169 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional163 Standardised164 
Standardised cross 
sectional165 
Crude adjustment166 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional167 
  Generalized sign168 Rank169 
AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR   AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR 
-10 0.72 
(0.712) 
8.85 
(2.087)** 
0.72 
(0.753) 
8.85 
(3.390)*** 
0.72 
(0.720) 
8.85 
(4.107)*** 
0.72 
(0.563) 
8.85 
(2.076)** 
0.72 
(0.558) 
8.85 
(3.182)*** 
 
0.72 
(1.706) 
8.85 
(3.100) 
0.72 
(0.702) 
8.85 
(2.094) 
-9 0.65 
(0.596) 
9.51 
(2.170)** 
0.65 
(1.501) 
9.51 
(3.679)*** 
0.65 
(0.986) 
9.51 
(3.818)*** 
0.65 
(0.507) 
9.51 
(2.134)** 
0.65 
(0.764) 
9.51 
(2.957)*** 
 
0.65 
(0.009) 
9.51 
(2.971) 
0.65 
(0.150) 
9.51 
(2.049) 
-8 0.94 
(0.933) 
10.45 
(2.344)** 
0.94 
(0.718) 
10.45 
(3.734)*** 
0.94 
(0.777) 
10.45 
(3.750)*** 
0.94 
(0.734) 
10.45 
(2.254)** 
0.94 
(0.602) 
10.45 
(2.905)*** 
 
0.94 
(0.688) 
10.45 
(3.045) 
0.94 
(0.702) 
10.45 
(2.163) 
-7 0.45 
(0.330) 
10.91 
(2.347)** 
0.45 
(0.417) 
10.91 
(3.710)*** 
0.45 
(0.331) 
10.91 
(3.583)*** 
0.45 
(0.351) 
10.91 
(2.266)** 
0.45 
(0.257) 
10.91 
(2.776)*** 
 
0.45 
(-1.008) 
10.91 
(2.665) 
0.45 
(-0.290) 
10.91 
(2.007) 
-6 1.13 
(0.767) 
12.04 
(2.466)** 
1.13 
(1.293) 
12.04 
(3.918)*** 
1.13 
(1.205) 
12.04 
(3.886)*** 
1.13 
(0.878) 
12.04 
(2.416)** 
1.13 
(0.933) 
12.04 
(3.011)*** 
 
1.13 
(1.027) 
12.04 
(2.840) 
1.13 
(0.818) 
12.04 
(2.150) 
-5 -0.87 
(-0.418) 
11.16 
(2.283)** 
-0.87 
(-0.813) 
11.16 
(3.590)*** 
-0.87 
(-0.430) 
11.16 
(2.837)*** 
-0.87 
(-0.681) 
11.16 
(2.169)** 
-0.87 
(-0.333) 
11.16 
(2.198)** 
 
-0.87 
(2.045) 
11.16 
(3.261) 
-0.87 
(0.703) 
11.16 
(2.257) 
-4 0.10 
(0.141) 
11.26 
(2.249)** 
0.10 
(-0.064) 
11.26 
(3.467)*** 
0.10 
(-0.093) 
11.26 
(2.781)*** 
0.10 
(0.080) 
11.26 
(2.124)** 
0.10 
(-0.072) 
11.26 
(2.154)** 
 
0.10 
(-0.669) 
11.26 
(3.001) 
0.10 
(0.314) 
11.26 
(2.266) 
-3 -0.66 
(-0.833) 
10.60 
(1.989)* 
-0.66 
(-0.753) 
10.60 
(3.192)*** 
-0.66 
(-1.063) 
10.60 
(2.644)** 
-0.66 
(-0.514) 
10.60 
(1.943)* 
-0.66 
(-0.823) 
10.60 
(2.048)** 
 
-0.66 
(-0.329) 
10.60 
(2.839) 
-0.66 
(-0.637) 
10.60 
(2.052) 
-2 -1.76 
(-1.588) 
8.84 
(1.572) 
-1.76 
(-0.950) 
8.84 
(2.889)*** 
-1.76 
(-1.452) 
8.84 
(2.391)** 
-1.76 
(-1.373) 
8.84 
(1.576) 
-1.76 
(-1.125) 
8.84 
(1.852)* 
 
-1.76 
(0.348) 
8.84 
(2.843) 
-1.76 
(-0.673) 
8.84 
(1.843) 
-1 0.92 
(0.684) 
9.76 
(1.685) 
0.92 
(-0.191) 
9.76 
(2.773)*** 
0.92 
(-0.172) 
9.76 
(2.159)** 
0.92 
(0.716) 
9.76 
(1.696)* 
0.92 
(-0.133) 
9.76 
(1.673) 
 
0.92 
(-1.008) 
9.76 
(2.546) 
0.92 
(-0.498) 
9.76 
(1.685) 
0 -3.04 
(-4.115)*** 
6.72 
(0.746) 
-3.04 
(-3.824)*** 
6.72 
(1.871)* 
-3.04 
(-4.398)*** 
6.72 
(1.476) 
-3.04 
(-2.363)** 
6.72 
(1.140) 
-3.04 
(-3.407)*** 
6.72 
(1.143) 
 
-3.04 
(-2.705)*** 
6.72 
(1.894) 
-3.04 
(-2.964)*** 
6.72 
(0.997) 
1 -2.63 
(-4.272)*** 
4.09 
(-0.181) 
-2.63 
(-3.108)*** 
4.09 
(1.165) 
-2.63 
(-4.560)*** 
4.09 
(0.921) 
-2.63 
(-2.044)** 
4.09 
(0.677) 
-2.63 
(-3.533)*** 
4.09 
(0.713) 
 
-2.63 
(-2.026)** 
4.09 
(1.418) 
-2.63 
(-2.658)*** 
4.09 
(0.407) 
2 -1.26 
(-1.475) 
2.83 
(-0.485) 
-1.26 
(-1.258) 
2.83 
(0.877) 
-1.26 
(-1.425) 
2.83 
(0.644) 
-1.26 
(-0.980) 
2.83 
(0.458) 
-1.26 
(-1.104) 
2.83 
(0.499) 
 
-1.26 
(-0.669) 
2.83 
(1.248) 
-1.26 
(-1.041) 
2.83 
(0.181) 
3 1.13 
(0.687) 
3.96 
(-0.334) 
1.13 
(2.728)*** 
3.96 
(1.416) 
1.13 
(1.477) 
3.96 
(1.120) 
1.13 
(0.880) 
3.96 
(0.628) 
1.13 
(1.144) 
3.96 
(0.867) 
 
1.13 
(2.045) 
3.96 
(1.639) 
1.13 
(0.957) 
3.96 
(0.373) 
4 -1.32 
(-1.761)* 
2.63 
(-0.680) 
-1.32 
(-0.770) 
2.63 
(1.233) 
-1.32 
(-1.008) 
2.63 
(0.984) 
-1.32 
(-1.030) 
2.63 
(0.409) 
-1.32 
(-0.781) 
2.63 
(0.762) 
 
-1.32 
(0.009) 
2.63 
(1.608) 
-1.32 
(-0.467) 
2.63 
(0.272) 
5 0.53 
(0.604) 
3.16 
(-0.548) 
0.53 
(0.156) 
3.16 
(1.240) 
0.53 
(0.152) 
3.16 
(1.037) 
0.53 
(0.412) 
3.16 
(0.482) 
0.53 
(0.118) 
3.16 
(0.804) 
 
0.53 
(0.688) 
3.16 
(1.711) 
0.53 
(0.442) 
3.16 
(0.353) 
6 0.65 
(0.887) 
3.82 
(-0.367) 
0.65 
(0.325) 
3.82 
(1.279) 
0.65 
(0.373) 
3.82 
(1.102) 
0.65 
(0.511) 
3.82 
(0.572) 
0.65 
(0.289) 
3.82 
(0.854) 
 
0.65 
(1.706) 
3.82 
(2.008) 
0.65 
(0.334) 
3.82 
(0.411) 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional163 Standardised164 
Standardised cross 
sectional165 
Crude adjustment166 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional167 
  Generalized sign168 Rank169 
AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR   AAR  ACAR AAR  ACAR 
7 -1.77 
(-2.520)** 
2.04 
(-0.836) 
-1.77 
(-1.649) 
2.04 
(0.945) 
-1.77 
(-2.458)** 
2.04 
(0.860) 
-1.77 
(-1.380) 
2.04 
(0.301) 
-1.77 
(-1.904)* 
2.04 
(0.666) 
 
-1.77 
(-2.026)** 
2.04 
(1.589) 
-1.77 
(-1.239) 
2.04 
(0.170) 
8 0.53 
(0.632) 
2.58 
(-0.705) 
0.53 
(0.574) 
2.58 
(1.035) 
0.53 
(0.592) 
2.58 
(0.953) 
0.53 
(0.412) 
2.58 
(0.372) 
0.53 
(0.459) 
2.58 
(0.739) 
 
0.53 
(-0.669) 
2.58 
(1.437) 
0.53 
(0.125) 
2.58 
(0.190) 
9 0.05 
(0.059) 
2.63 
(-0.682) 
0.05 
(0.482) 
2.63 
(1.106) 
0.05 
(0.587) 
2.63 
(1.068) 
0.05 
(0.040) 
2.63 
(0.373) 
0.05 
(0.455) 
2.63 
(0.827) 
 
0.05 
(0.348) 
2.63 
(1.476) 
0.05 
(0.837) 
2.63 
(0.340) 
10 -2.52 
(-1.966)* 
0.11 
(-1.024) 
-2.52 
(-2.296)** 
0.11 
(0.675) 
-2.52 
(-1.921)* 
0.11 
(0.653) 
-2.52 
(-1.959)* 
0.11 
(0.015) 
-2.52 
(-1.488) 
0.11 
(0.506) 
 
-2.52 
(-1.687)** 
0.11 
(1.149) 
-2.52 
(-1.433)* 
0.11 
(0.077) 
11 -2.51 
(-3.079)*** 
-2.40 
(-1.552) 
-2.51 
(-3.301)*** 
-2.40 
(0.081) 
-2.51 
(-2.793)*** 
-2.40 
(0.079) 
-2.51 
(-1.954)* 
-2.40 
(-0.330) 
-2.51 
(-2.164)** 
-2.40 
(0.061) 
 
-2.51 
(-2.026)** 
-2.40 
(0.773) 
-2.51 
(-1.771)** 
-2.40 
(-0.237) 
12 -1.33 
(-1.216) 
-3.74 
(-1.740)* 
-1.33 
(-1.670) 
-3.74 
(-0.210) 
-1.33 
(-1.561) 
-3.74 
(-0.210) 
-1.33 
(-1.040) 
-3.74 
(-0.506) 
-1.33 
(-1.210) 
-3.74 
(-0.162) 
 
-1.33 
(0.688) 
-3.74 
(0.881) 
-1.33 
(-0.668) 
-3.74 
(-0.349) 
13 -1.04 
(-1.571) 
-4.78 
(-1.984)* 
-1.04 
(-1.714)* 
-4.78 
(-0.501) 
-1.04 
(-1.933)* 
-4.78 
(-0.506) 
-1.04 
(-0.810) 
-4.78 
(-0.637) 
-1.04 
(-1.498) 
-4.78 
(-0.392) 
 
-1.04 
(-2.026)** 
-4.78 
(0.520) 
-1.04 
(-1.378)* 
-4.78 
(-0.581) 
14 -2.69 
(-2.700)** 
-7.48 
(-2.412)** 
-2.69 
(-2.418)** 
-7.48 
(-0.903) 
-2.69 
(-2.431)** 
-7.48 
(-0.870) 
-2.69 
(-2.098)** 
-7.48 
(-0.983) 
-2.69 
(-1.884)* 
-7.48 
(-0.674) 
 
-2.69 
(-1.348)* 
-7.48 
(0.285) 
-2.69 
(-1.583)* 
-7.48 
(-0.840) 
15 -0.50 
(-0.834) 
-7.99 
(-2.517)** 
-0.50 
(-0.853) 
-7.99 
(-1.032) 
-0.50 
(-1.042) 
-7.99 
(-1.012) 
-0.50 
(-0.396) 
-7.99 
(-1.035) 
-0.50 
(-0.807) 
-7.99 
(-0.784) 
 
-0.50 
(-1.008) 
-7.99 
(0.113) 
-0.50 
(-0.706) 
-7.99 
(-0.946) 
16 -0.34 
(-0.421) 
-8.34 
(-2.552)** 
-0.34 
(-0.112) 
-8.34 
(-1.037) 
-0.34 
(-0.125) 
-8.34 
(-0.982) 
-0.34 
(-0.270) 
-8.34 
(-1.065) 
-0.34 
(-0.097) 
-8.34 
(-0.761) 
 
-0.34 
(0.348) 
-8.34 
(0.168) 
-0.34 
(0.131) 
-8.34 
(-0.911) 
17 1.46 
(1.552) 
-6.87 
(-2.266)** 
1.46 
(2.046)** 
-6.87 
(-0.691) 
1.46 
(1.972)* 
-6.87 
(-0.635) 
1.46 
(1.137) 
-6.87 
(-0.867) 
1.46 
(1.528) 
-6.87 
(-0.492) 
 
1.46 
(1.027) 
-6.87 
(0.333) 
1.46 
(0.990) 
-6.87 
(-0.739) 
18 -0.97 
(-1.157) 
-7.85 
(-2.423)** 
-0.97 
(-1.532) 
-7.85 
(-0.927) 
-0.97 
(-1.645) 
-7.85 
(-0.861) 
-0.97 
(-0.759) 
-7.85 
(-0.977) 
-0.97 
(-1.274) 
-7.85 
(-0.667) 
 
-0.97 
(-1.687)** 
-7.85 
(0.058) 
-0.97 
(-1.099) 
-7.85 
(-0.905) 
19 0.82 
(1.238) 
-7.02 
(-2.196)** 
0.82 
(0.917) 
-7.02 
(-0.771) 
0.82 
(1.024) 
-7.02 
(-0.759) 
0.82 
(0.643) 
-7.02 
(-0.863) 
0.82 
(0.793) 
-7.02 
(-0.588) 
 
0.82 
(1.706) 
-7.02 
(0.327) 
0.82 
(1.079) 
-7.02 
(-0.723) 
20 0.67 
(1.051) 
-6.34 
(-2.005)* 
0.67 
(1.665) 
-6.34 
(-0.501) 
0.67 
(2.383)** 
-6.34 
(-0.493) 
0.67 
(0.525) 
-6.34 
(-0.770) 
0.67 
(1.846)* 
-6.34 
(-0.382) 
  0.67 
(3.742) 
-6.34 
(0.908) 
0.67 
(1.624) 
-6.34 
(-0.461) 
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RSPT Coal subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test statistics 
for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The various corresponding t- statistics and 
Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the 
Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The coal subsector covers 35 stocks. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of 
their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative 
average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the 
continuously compounded return on  a the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 
trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for 
the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the 
generalized sign test is that the number of day t170 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign 
in the absence of abnormal return171. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
170 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
171 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   
Non- parametric test 
statistic 
Cross 
sectional172 
Standardised173 
Standardised 
cross sectional174 
Crude 
adjustment175 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional176 
  
Generalized 
sign177 
Rank178 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
         
car (-1 +1) -4.74 
(-4.447)*** 
-4.74 
(-4.113)*** 
-4.74 
(-3.985)*** 
-4.74 
(-2.130)** 
-4.74 
(-3.087)*** 
 
-4.74 
(-3.314)*** 
-4.74 
(-3.534)*** 
car ( -2 +2) -7.77 
(-4.815)*** 
-7.77 
(-4.286)*** 
-7.77 
(-4.326)*** 
-7.77 
(-2.702)** 
-7.77 
(-3.351)*** 
 
-7.77 
(-2.710)*** 
-7.77 
(-3.504)*** 
car (-5+5) -8.87 
(-3.722)*** 
-8.87 
(-2.689)** 
-8.87 
(-2.706)** 
-8.87 
(-2.079)** 
-8.87 
(-2.096)** 
 
-8.87 
(-0.684) 
-8.87 
(-1.966)** 
car(-20+20) -6.34 
(-2.005)* 
-6.34 
(-1.668) 
-6.34 
(-0.493) 
-6.34 
(-0.770) 
-6.34 
(-0.382) 
 
-6.34 
(0.908) 
-6.34 
(-0.461) 
car (1+5) -3.55 
(-2.780)*** 
-3.55 
(-1.007) 
-3.55 
(-1.423) 
-3.55 
(-1.235) 
-3.55 
(-1.102) 
 
-3.55 
(0.021) 
-3.55 
(-1.237) 
car (-5 -1) -2.27 
(-0.901) 
-2.27 
(-1.240) 
-2.27 
(-1.023) 
-2.27 
(-0.792) 
-2.27 
(-0.792) 
 
-2.27 
(0.172) 
-2.27 
(-0.354) 
 
 
  
                                                 
172 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
173 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
174 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
175 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), 29 and (30). 
176 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27),  (31) and (43).  
177 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
178 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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MRRT Coal subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test statistics for each days’ 
individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day of the MRRT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market 
model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The coal subsector covers 35 stocks 
Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return 
for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the 
previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for 
the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. The rank test combines the estimation period 
and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average excess return on day t relative to the announcement 
of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t179 average abnormal or cumulative average abnormal 
performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return180. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that 
the average or average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
179 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT 
180 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional181 Standardised182 
Standardised cross 
sectional183 
Crude adjustment184 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional185 
  Generalized sign186 Rank187 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
                
-20 -0.84 
(-1.099) 
-0.84 
(-1.099) 
-0.84 
(-0.774) 
-0.84 
(-0.774) 
-0.84 
(-0.977) 
-0.84 
(-0.977) 
-0.84 
(-0.601) 
-0.84 
(-0.601) 
-0.84 
(-0.671) 
-0.84 
(-0.671) 
 -0.84 
(-1.792)** 
-0.84 
(-1.792)** 
-0.84 
(-0.930) 
-0.84 
(-0.930) 
-19 -0.80 
(-1.049) 
-1.65 
(-1.519) 
-0.80 
(-0.511) 
-1.65 
(-0.909) 
-0.80 
(-0.693) 
-1.65 
(-1.241) 
-0.80 
(-0.574) 
-1.65 
(-0.831) 
-0.80 
(-0.476) 
-1.65 
(-0.852) 
 -0.80 
(0.209) 
-1.65 
(-1.119) 
-0.80 
(-0.132) 
-1.65 
(-0.752) 
-18 0.44 
(0.577) 
-1.20 
(-0.907) 
0.44 
(0.612) 
-1.20 
(-0.388) 
0.44 
(0.758) 
-1.20 
(-0.635) 
0.44 
(0.314) 
-1.20 
(-0.497) 
0.44 
(0.520) 
-1.20 
(-0.436) 
 0.44 
(0.876) 
-1.20 
(-0.408) 
0.44 
(0.470) 
-1.20 
(-0.342) 
-17 -0.73 
(-0.927) 
-1.94 
(-1.249) 
-0.73 
(-0.917) 
-1.94 
(-0.795) 
-0.73 
(-1.214) 
-1.94 
(-1.523) 
-0.73 
(-0.524) 
-1.94 
(-0.693) 
-0.73 
(-0.834) 
-1.94 
(-1.046) 
 -0.73 
(-2.125)** 
-1.94 
(-1.416)* 
-0.73 
(-1.012) 
-1.94 
(-0.802) 
-16 -0.70 
(-1.177) 
-2.64 
(-1.644) 
-0.70 
(-1.009) 
-2.64 
(-1.162) 
-0.70 
(-1.447) 
-2.64 
(-2.200)** 
-0.70 
(-0.500) 
-2.64 
(-0.843) 
-0.70 
(-0.994) 
-2.64 
(-1.511) 
 -0.70 
(-1.458)* 
-2.64 
(-1.918)** 
-0.70 
(-0.418) 
-2.64 
(-0.905) 
-15 -0.91 
(-1.424) 
-3.56 
(-2.082)** 
-0.91 
(-1.499) 
-3.56 
(-1.673) 
-0.91 
(-1.863)* 
-3.56 
(-2.973)*** 
-0.91 
(-0.653) 
-3.56 
(-1.036) 
-0.91 
(-1.279) 
-3.56 
(-2.042)** 
 -0.91 
(-2.125)** 
-3.56 
(-2.619)*** 
-0.91 
(-1.167) 
-3.56 
(-1.303)* 
-14 -0.23 
(-0.358) 
-3.79 
(-2.063)** 
-0.23 
(-0.715) 
-3.79 
(-1.819)* 
-0.23 
(-0.936) 
-3.79 
(-3.063)*** 
-0.23 
(-0.167) 
-3.79 
(-1.023) 
-0.23 
(-0.643) 
-3.79 
(-2.104)** 
 -0.23 
(-1.458)* 
-3.79 
(-2.976)*** 
-0.23 
(-0.724) 
-3.79 
(-1.480)* 
-13 -0.68 
(-0.788) 
-4.48 
(-2.209)** 
-0.68 
(-0.072) 
-4.48 
(-1.728)* 
-0.68 
(-0.088) 
-4.48 
(-3.013)*** 
-0.68 
(-0.491) 
-4.48 
(-1.130) 
-0.68 
(-0.060) 
-4.48 
(-2.070)** 
 -0.68 
(0.542) 
-4.48 
(-2.592)*** 
-0.68 
(0.238) 
-4.48 
(-1.300)* 
-12 0.85 
(1.381) 
-3.63 
(-1.622) 
0.85 
(1.177) 
-3.63 
(-1.236) 
0.85 
(1.596) 
-3.63 
(-2.181)** 
0.85 
(0.608) 
-3.63 
(-0.863) 
0.85 
(1.096) 
-3.63 
(-1.498) 
 0.85 
(-0.124) 
-3.63 
(-2.485)*** 
0.85 
(0.555) 
-3.63 
(-1.041) 
-11 1.37 
(1.522) 
-2.25 
(-1.057) 
1.37 
(1.762)* 
-2.25 
(-0.615) 
1.37 
(2.196)** 
-2.25 
(-1.123) 
1.37 
(0.983) 
-2.25 
(-0.508) 
1.37 
(1.508) 
-2.25 
(-0.772) 
 1.37 
(2.543) 
-2.25 
(-1.553)* 
1.37 
(1.489) 
-2.25 
(-0.516) 
                                                 
181 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
182 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
183 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
184 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
185 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
186 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
187 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
358 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional181 Standardised182 
Standardised cross 
sectional183 
Crude adjustment184 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional185 
  Generalized sign186 Rank187 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-10 0.62 
(0.893) 
-1.63 
(-0.739) 
0.62 
(1.221) 
-1.63 
(-0.218) 
0.62 
(1.393) 
-1.63 
(-0.375) 
0.62 
(0.442) 
-1.63 
(-0.351) 
0.62 
(0.957) 
-1.63 
(-0.258) 
 0.62 
(-0.457) 
-1.63 
(-1.619)* 
0.62 
(0.478) 
-1.63 
(-0.348) 
-9 0.40 
(0.713) 
-1.22 
(-0.501) 
0.40 
(-0.142) 
-1.22 
(-0.250) 
0.40 
(-0.276) 
-1.22 
(-0.467) 
0.40 
(0.290) 
-1.22 
(-0.252) 
0.40 
(-0.189) 
-1.22 
(-0.321) 
 0.40 
(-1.458)* 
-1.22 
(-1.971)** 
0.40 
(-0.464) 
-1.22 
(-0.467) 
-8 -1.08 
(-1.418) 
-2.31 
(-0.875) 
-1.08 
(-0.586) 
-2.31 
(-0.403) 
-1.08 
(-0.734) 
-2.31 
(-0.732) 
-1.08 
(-0.776) 
-2.31 
(-0.457) 
-1.08 
(-0.504) 
-2.31 
(-0.503) 
 -1.08 
(0.209) 
-2.31 
(-1.836)** 
-1.08 
(-0.051) 
-2.31 
(-0.463) 
-7 -0.93 
(-0.914) 
-3.24 
(-1.088) 
-0.93 
(-1.135) 
-3.24 
(-0.692) 
-0.93 
(-1.206) 
-3.24 
(-1.174) 
-0.93 
(-0.664) 
-3.24 
(-0.618) 
-0.93 
(-0.828) 
-3.24 
(-0.806) 
 -0.93 
(-0.124) 
-3.24 
(-1.802)** 
-0.93 
(-0.004) 
-3.24 
(-0.447) 
-6 0.58 
(0.943) 
-2.65 
(-0.807) 
0.58 
(1.216) 
-2.65 
(-0.354) 
0.58 
(1.436) 
-2.65 
(-0.618) 
0.58 
(0.420) 
-2.65 
(-0.489) 
0.58 
(0.986) 
-2.65 
(-0.425) 
 0.58 
(-0.457) 
-2.65 
(-1.859)** 
0.58 
(0.706) 
-2.65 
(-0.250) 
-5 -0.91 
(-1.531) 
-3.56 
(-1.164) 
-0.91 
(-0.541) 
-3.56 
(-0.478) 
-0.91 
(-1.053) 
-3.56 
(-0.868) 
-0.91 
(-0.649) 
-3.56 
(-0.636) 
-0.91 
(-0.723) 
-3.56 
(-0.596) 
 -0.91 
(-0.457) 
-3.56 
(-1.915)** 
-0.91 
(-0.066) 
-3.56 
(-0.258) 
-4 1.24 
(0.565) 
-2.32 
(-0.992) 
1.24 
(1.389) 
-2.32 
(-0.127) 
1.24 
(0.750) 
-2.32 
(-0.181) 
1.24 
(0.884) 
-2.32 
(-0.402) 
1.24 
(0.515) 
-2.32 
(-0.124) 
 1.24 
(1.209) 
-2.32 
(-1.564)* 
1.24 
(0.200) 
-2.32 
(-0.202) 
-3 -1.61 
(-1.917)* 
-3.93 
(-1.416) 
-1.61 
(-1.875)* 
-3.93 
(-0.566) 
-1.61 
(-2.224)** 
-3.93 
(-0.854) 
-1.61 
(-1.148) 
-3.93 
(-0.661) 
-1.61 
(-1.528) 
-3.93 
(-0.587) 
 -1.61 
(-0.457) 
-3.93 
(-1.628)* 
-1.61 
(-0.730) 
-3.93 
(-0.369) 
-2 -1.58 
(-1.468) 
-5.52 
(-1.716)* 
-1.58 
(-1.393) 
-5.52 
(-0.870) 
-1.58 
(-1.324) 
-5.52 
(-1.333) 
-1.58 
(-1.132) 
-5.52 
(-0.904) 
-1.58 
(-0.909) 
-5.52 
(-0.916) 
 -1.58 
(-0.124) 
-5.52 
(-1.613)* 
-1.58 
(-0.244) 
-5.52 
(-0.415) 
-1 3.69 
(2.444)** 
-1.83 
(-1.125) 
3.69 
(3.121)*** 
-1.83 
(-0.150) 
3.69 
(1.918)* 
-1.83 
(-0.243) 
3.69 
(2.633)** 
-1.83 
(-0.292) 
3.69 
(1.317) 
-1.83 
(-0.167) 
 3.69 
(1.876) 
-1.83 
(-1.153) 
3.69 
(1.516) 
-1.83 
(-0.065) 
0 0.10 
(0.161) 
-1.73 
(-1.063) 
0.10 
(0.050) 
-1.73 
(-0.136) 
0.10 
(0.068) 
-1.73 
(-0.217) 
0.10 
(0.073) 
-1.73 
(-0.269) 
0.10 
(0.046) 
-1.73 
(-0.149) 
 0.10 
(-0.791) 
-1.73 
(-1.297)* 
0.10 
(-0.062) 
-1.73 
(-0.077) 
1 0.72 
(0.639) 
-1.00 
(-0.902) 
0.72 
(2.813)*** 
-1.00 
(0.466) 
0.72 
(1.500) 
-1.00 
(0.592) 
0.72 
(0.515) 
-1.00 
(-0.153) 
0.72 
(1.031) 
-1.00 
(0.407) 
 0.72 
(1.543) 
-1.00 
(-0.939) 
0.72 
(0.840) 
-1.00 
(0.103) 
2 -0.04 
(-0.059) 
-1.05 
(-0.895) 
-0.04 
(-0.205) 
-1.05 
(0.413) 
-0.04 
(-0.236) 
-1.05 
(0.515) 
-0.04 
(-0.031) 
-1.05 
(-0.156) 
-0.04 
(-0.162) 
-1.05 
(0.354) 
 -0.04 
(-2.125)** 
-1.05 
(-1.361)* 
-0.04 
(-0.766) 
-1.05 
(-0.058) 
3 0.55 
(0.787) 
-0.49 
(-0.715) 
0.55 
(0.289) 
-0.49 
(0.464) 
0.55 
(0.350) 
-0.49 
(0.577) 
0.55 
(0.396) 
-0.49 
(-0.072) 
0.55 
(0.240) 
-0.49 
(0.396) 
 0.55 
(1.209) 
-0.49 
(-1.086) 
0.55 
(0.443) 
-0.49 
(0.032) 
4 -1.59 
(-1.581) 
-2.09 
(-1.017) 
-1.59 
(-1.584) 
-2.09 
(0.137) 
-1.59 
(-1.867)* 
-2.09 
(0.173) 
-1.59 
(-1.136) 
-2.09 
(-0.298) 
-1.59 
(-1.283) 
-2.09 
(0.119) 
 -1.59 
(-2.125)** 
-2.09 
(-1.489)* 
-1.59 
(-1.242) 
-2.09 
(-0.216) 
5 0.47 
(0.510) 
-1.62 
(-0.897) 
0.47 
(0.288) 
-1.62 
(0.191) 
0.47 
(0.316) 
-1.62 
(0.240) 
0.47 
(0.335) 
-1.62 
(-0.226) 
0.47 
(0.217) 
-1.62 
(0.164) 
 0.47 
(-1.125) 
-1.62 
(-1.680)** 
0.47 
(-0.158) 
-1.62 
(-0.243) 
6 0.38 
(0.541) 
-1.23 
(-0.776) 
0.38 
(1.152) 
-1.23 
(0.410) 
0.38 
(1.561) 
-1.23 
(0.532) 
0.38 
(0.272) 
-1.23 
(-0.169) 
0.38 
(1.072) 
-1.23 
(0.365) 
 0.38 
(-0.124) 
-1.23 
(-1.673)** 
0.38 
(0.509) 
-1.23 
(-0.140) 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional181 Standardised182 
Standardised cross 
sectional183 
Crude adjustment184 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional185 
  Generalized sign186 Rank187 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
7 0.87 
(1.168) 
-0.36 
(-0.541) 
0.87 
(0.523) 
-0.36 
(0.501) 
0.87 
(0.678) 
-0.36 
(0.620) 
0.87 
(0.626) 
-0.36 
(-0.048) 
0.87 
(0.465) 
-0.36 
(0.426) 
 0.87 
(1.876) 
-0.36 
(-1.288)* 
0.87 
(0.895) 
-0.36 
(0.031) 
8 -1.21 
(-1.707)* 
-1.58 
(-0.849) 
-1.21 
(-1.487) 
-1.58 
(0.216) 
-1.21 
(-2.139)** 
-1.58 
(0.277) 
-1.21 
(-0.869) 
-1.58 
(-0.209) 
-1.21 
(-1.469) 
-1.58 
(0.190) 
 -1.21 
(-2.125)** 
-1.58 
(-1.660)** 
-1.21 
(-1.477)* 
-1.58 
(-0.243) 
9 0.74 
(0.874) 
-0.83 
(-0.675) 
0.74 
(0.759) 
-0.83 
(0.351) 
0.74 
(0.684) 
-0.83 
(0.445) 
0.74 
(0.533) 
-0.83 
(-0.108) 
0.74 
(0.470) 
-0.83 
(0.306) 
 0.74 
(1.876) 
-0.83 
(-1.290)* 
0.74 
(0.636) 
-0.83 
(-0.123) 
10 1.46 
(2.506)** 
0.63 
(-0.214) 
1.46 
(1.371) 
0.63 
(0.592) 
1.46 
(2.598)** 
0.63 
(0.779) 
1.46 
(1.042) 
0.63 
(0.080) 
1.46 
(1.784)* 
0.63 
(0.535) 
 1.46 
(3.878) 
0.63 
(-0.572) 
1.46 
(1.482) 
0.63 
(0.144) 
11 -1.46 
(-2.025)* 
-0.83 
(-0.568) 
-1.46 
(-1.349) 
-0.83 
(0.344) 
-1.46 
(-1.988)* 
-0.83 
(0.435) 
-1.46 
(-1.046) 
-0.83 
(-0.105) 
-1.46 
(-1.365) 
-0.83 
(0.299) 
 -1.46 
(-0.124) 
-0.83 
(-0.585) 
-1.46 
(-0.695) 
-0.83 
(0.019) 
12 0.12 
(0.210) 
-0.71 
(-0.523) 
0.12 
(0.239) 
-0.71 
(0.380) 
0.12 
(0.387) 
-0.71 
(0.486) 
0.12 
(0.087) 
-0.71 
(-0.088) 
0.12 
(0.265) 
-0.71 
(0.334) 
 0.12 
(-1.458)* 
-0.71 
(-0.830) 
0.12 
(-0.270) 
-0.71 
(-0.027) 
13 0.04 
(0.037) 
-0.66 
(-0.509) 
0.04 
(-0.209) 
-0.66 
(0.339) 
0.04 
(-0.257) 
-0.66 
(0.440) 
0.04 
(0.032) 
-0.66 
(-0.081) 
0.04 
(-0.176) 
-0.66 
(0.302) 
 0.04 
(-2.459)*** 
-0.66 
(-1.240) 
0.04 
(-0.444) 
-0.66 
(-0.103) 
14 1.82 
(1.548) 
1.15 
(-0.240) 
1.82 
(2.064)** 
1.15 
(0.683) 
1.82 
(2.048)** 
1.15 
(0.873) 
1.82 
(1.298) 
1.15 
(0.139) 
1.82 
(1.407) 
1.15 
(0.600) 
 1.82 
(3.210) 
1.15 
(-0.679) 
1.82 
(1.713) 
1.15 
(0.187) 
15 0.66 
(0.894) 
1.81 
(-0.087) 
0.66 
(0.429) 
1.81 
(0.745) 
0.66 
(0.455) 
1.81 
(0.925) 
0.66 
(0.474) 
1.81 
(0.216) 
0.66 
(0.312) 
1.81 
(0.635) 
 0.66 
(-0.791) 
1.81 
(-0.802) 
0.66 
(-0.106) 
1.81 
(0.167) 
16 -0.48 
(-0.714) 
1.33 
(-0.204) 
-0.48 
(-0.529) 
1.33 
(0.648) 
-0.48 
(-0.819) 
1.33 
(0.833) 
-0.48 
(-0.344) 
1.33 
(0.156) 
-0.48 
(-0.562) 
1.33 
(0.572) 
 -0.48 
(-0.791) 
1.33 
(-0.921) 
-0.48 
(-0.325) 
1.33 
(0.111) 
17 0.87 
(1.018) 
2.20 
(-0.036) 
0.87 
(0.654) 
2.20 
(0.745) 
0.87 
(0.764) 
2.20 
(0.962) 
0.87 
(0.620) 
2.20 
(0.255) 
0.87 
(0.525) 
2.20 
(0.660) 
 0.87 
(-0.124) 
2.20 
(-0.929) 
0.87 
(0.342) 
2.20 
(0.165) 
18 -1.61 
(-1.846)* 
0.59 
(-0.331) 
-1.61 
(-2.513)** 
0.59 
(0.333) 
-1.61 
(-3.002)*** 
0.59 
(0.427) 
-1.61 
(-1.151) 
0.59 
(0.067) 
-1.61 
(-2.062)** 
0.59 
(0.293) 
 -1.61 
(-2.792)*** 
0.59 
(-1.364)* 
-1.61 
(-1.715)** 
0.59 
(-0.111) 
19 -0.04 
(-0.084) 
0.55 
(-0.340) 
-0.04 
(0.197) 
0.55 
(0.360) 
-0.04 
(0.361) 
0.55 
(0.474) 
-0.04 
(-0.029) 
0.55 
(0.062) 
-0.04 
(0.248) 
0.55 
(0.325) 
 -0.04 
(0.876) 
0.55 
(-1.208) 
-0.04 
(0.057) 
0.55 
(-0.100) 
20 0.64 
(0.632) 
1.20 
(-0.237) 
0.64 
(0.678) 
1.20 
(0.462) 
0.64 
(0.608) 
1.20 
(0.645) 
0.64 
(0.462) 
1.20 
(0.133) 
0.64 
(0.417) 
1.20 
(0.443) 
  
0.64 
(1.543) 
1.20 
(-0.952) 
0.64 
(0.537) 
1.20 
(-0.015) 
 
  
360 
MRRT Coal subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test 
statistics for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The various corresponding t- 
statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction 
with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The coal subsector covers 35 stocks. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the 
basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The 
cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR
represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 
through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null 
hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null 
hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t188 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to 
have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return189. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within period t surrounding the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
188 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. 
189 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
361 
Days relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   
Non- parametric test 
statistic 
Cross 
sectional190 
Standardised191 
Standardised 
cross 
sectional192 
Crude 
adjustment193 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional194 
  
Generalized 
sign195 
Rank196 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
car (-1 +1) 4.51 
(1.874)* 
4.51 
(3.455)*** 
4.51 
(2.429)** 
4.51 
(1.860)* 
4.51 
(1.668) 
 
4.51 
(1.517) 
4.51 
(1.324) 
car ( -2 +2) 2.88 
(0.768) 
2.88 
(1.961)* 
2.88 
(1.707)* 
2.88 
(0.920) 
2.88 
(1.172) 
 
2.88 
(0.169) 
2.88 
(0.573) 
car (-5+5) 1.03 
(-0.436) 
1.03 
(0.709) 
1.03 
(0.714) 
1.03 
(0.223) 
1.03 
(0.490) 
 
1.03 
(-0.412) 
1.03 
(-0.081) 
car(-20+20) 1.20 
(-0.237) 
1.20 
(0.462) 
1.20 
(0.645) 
1.20 
(0.133) 
1.20 
(0.443) 
 
1.20 
(-0.952) 
1.20 
(-0.015) 
car (1+5) 0.11 
(0.132) 
0.11 
(0.716) 
0.11 
(0.749) 
0.11 
(0.035) 
0.11 
(0.514) 
 
0.11 
(-1.173) 
0.11 
(-0.395) 
car (-5 -1) 0.82 
(-0.852) 
0.82 
(0.312) 
0.82 
(0.300) 
0.82 
(0.262) 
0.82 
(0.206) 
 
0.82 
(0.915) 
0.82 
(0.302) 
 
  
                                                 
190 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
191 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
192 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
193 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
194 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
195 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
196 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
362 
RSPT iron & steel subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test statistics for each days’ 
individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day of the RSPT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model 
parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The iron and steel subsector covers 33 
stocks Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal 
return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum 
of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period 
used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation 
period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average excess return on day t relative to the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t197 average abnormal or cumulative average abnormal 
performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return198. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that 
the average or average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
197 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
198 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional199 Standardised200 
Standardised cross 
sectional201 
Crude adjustment202 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional203 
  Generalized sign204 Rank205 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
                
-20 1.99 
(2.603)** 
1.99 
(2.603)** 
1.99 
(2.377)** 
1.99 
(2.377)** 
1.99 
(3.032)*** 
1.99 
(3.032)*** 
1.99 
(1.415) 
1.99 
(1.415) 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
1.99 
(2.200)** 
 
1.99 
(3.249) 
1.99 
(3.249) 
1.99 
(2.028) 
1.99 
(2.028) 
-19 -0.40 
(-0.320) 
1.59 
(1.614) 
-0.40 
(-0.579) 
1.59 
(1.271) 
-0.40 
(-0.785) 
1.59 
(1.915)* 
-0.40 
(-0.286) 
1.59 
(0.798) 
-0.40 
(-0.569) 
1.59 
(1.389) 
 
-0.40 
(-0.603) 
1.59 
(1.870) 
-0.40 
(-0.189) 
1.59 
(1.300) 
-18 0.63 
(0.626) 
2.22 
(1.680) 
0.63 
(0.915) 
2.22 
(1.566) 
0.63 
(0.920) 
2.22 
(2.058)** 
0.63 
(0.451) 
2.22 
(0.912) 
0.63 
(0.667) 
2.22 
(1.493) 
 
0.63 
(0.447) 
2.22 
(1.785) 
0.63 
(0.237) 
2.22 
(1.198) 
-17 0.09 
(0.128) 
2.32 
(1.519) 
0.09 
(0.045) 
2.32 
(1.379) 
0.09 
(0.072) 
2.32 
(2.095)** 
0.09 
(0.067) 
2.32 
(0.823) 
0.09 
(0.052) 
2.32 
(1.520) 
 
0.09 
(-1.303)* 
2.32 
(0.894) 
0.09 
(0.174) 
2.32 
(1.125) 
-16 0.12 
(0.236) 
2.45 
(1.465) 
0.12 
(0.063) 
2.45 
(1.262) 
0.12 
(0.115) 
2.45 
(1.910)* 
0.12 
(0.091) 
2.45 
(0.777) 
0.12 
(0.083) 
2.45 
(1.386) 
 
0.12 
(0.797) 
2.45 
(1.157) 
0.12 
(0.426) 
2.45 
(1.197) 
-15 0.62 
(0.706) 
3.07 
(1.625) 
0.62 
(0.248) 
3.07 
(1.253) 
0.62 
(0.323) 
3.07 
(1.821)* 
0.62 
(0.442) 
3.07 
(0.890) 
0.62 
(0.234) 
3.07 
(1.321) 
 
0.62 
(-2.003)** 
3.07 
(0.238) 
0.62 
(0.020) 
3.07 
(1.101) 
-14 0.64 
(0.880) 
3.72 
(1.837)* 
0.64 
(1.288) 
3.72 
(1.647) 
0.64 
(1.899)* 
3.72 
(2.200)** 
0.64 
(0.459) 
3.72 
(0.998) 
0.64 
(1.378) 
3.72 
(1.596) 
 
0.64 
(1.498) 
3.72 
(0.786) 
0.64 
(1.015) 
3.72 
(1.403) 
-13 0.57 
(0.638) 
4.29 
(1.945)* 
0.57 
(0.447) 
4.29 
(1.699)* 
0.57 
(0.510) 
4.29 
(2.400)** 
0.57 
(0.405) 
4.29 
(1.077) 
0.57 
(0.370) 
4.29 
(1.741)* 
 
0.57 
(1.848) 
4.29 
(1.389) 
0.57 
(0.820) 
4.29 
(1.602) 
-12 -0.39 
(-0.551) 
3.90 
(1.649) 
-0.39 
(-0.362) 
3.90 
(1.481) 
-0.39 
(-0.494) 
3.90 
(2.227)** 
-0.39 
(-0.278) 
3.90 
(0.922) 
-0.39 
(-0.358) 
3.90 
(1.616) 
 
-0.39 
(-0.953) 
3.90 
(0.992) 
-0.39 
(-0.362) 
3.90 
(1.390) 
-11 0.16 
(0.346) 
4.07 
(1.674) 
0.16 
(-0.085) 
4.07 
(1.378) 
0.16 
(-0.153) 
4.07 
(2.235)** 
0.16 
(0.118) 
4.07 
(0.912) 
0.16 
(-0.111) 
4.07 
(1.621) 
 
0.16 
(-0.603) 
4.07 
(0.750) 
0.16 
(0.334) 
4.07 
(1.424) 
-10 -0.85 
(-1.037) 
3.21 
(1.284) 
-0.85 
(-0.997) 
3.21 
(1.013) 
-0.85 
(-1.124) 
3.21 
(1.805)* 
-0.85 
(-0.606) 
3.21 
(0.687) 
-0.85 
(-0.816) 
3.21 
(1.309) 
 
-0.85 
(-1.653)** 
3.21 
(0.217) 
-0.85 
(-0.786) 
3.21 
(1.121) 
                                                 
199 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
200 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
201 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
202 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
203 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
204 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
205 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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-9 -0.07 
(-0.072) 
3.14 
(1.208) 
-0.07 
(-0.301) 
3.14 
(0.883) 
-0.07 
(-0.332) 
3.14 
(1.450) 
-0.07 
(-0.054) 
3.14 
(0.642) 
-0.07 
(-0.241) 
3.14 
(1.052) 
 
-0.07 
(0.797) 
3.14 
(0.438) 
-0.07 
(-0.324) 
3.14 
(0.980) 
-8 0.45 
(0.411) 
3.59 
(1.275) 
0.45 
(1.334) 
3.59 
(1.218) 
0.45 
(1.651) 
3.59 
(1.825)* 
0.45 
(0.320) 
3.59 
(0.706) 
0.45 
(1.198) 
3.59 
(1.324) 
 
0.45 
(1.147) 
3.59 
(0.739) 
0.45 
(1.125) 
3.59 
(1.253) 
-7 1.42 
(1.016) 
5.02 
(1.500) 
1.42 
(0.910) 
5.02 
(1.417) 
1.42 
(0.821) 
5.02 
(1.848)* 
1.42 
(1.011) 
5.02 
(0.950) 
1.42 
(0.596) 
5.02 
(1.341) 
 
1.42 
(-0.252) 
5.02 
(0.644) 
1.42 
(0.349) 
5.02 
(1.301) 
-6 0.83 
(0.515) 
5.85 
(1.582) 
0.83 
(0.171) 
5.85 
(1.414) 
0.83 
(0.128) 
5.85 
(1.678) 
0.83 
(0.593) 
5.85 
(1.071) 
0.83 
(0.093) 
5.85 
(1.217) 
 
0.83 
(-0.252) 
5.85 
(0.557) 
0.83 
(-0.348) 
5.85 
(1.167) 
-5 -0.64 
(-0.628) 
5.21 
(1.375) 
-0.64 
(-0.280) 
5.21 
(1.298) 
-0.64 
(-0.340) 
5.21 
(1.583) 
-0.64 
(-0.457) 
5.21 
(0.923) 
-0.64 
(-0.247) 
5.21 
(1.149) 
 
-0.64 
(0.797) 
5.21 
(0.739) 
-0.64 
(0.341) 
5.21 
(1.216) 
-4 -1.71 
(-1.631) 
3.49 
(0.938) 
-1.71 
(-1.288) 
3.49 
(0.947) 
-1.71 
(-1.400) 
3.49 
(1.292) 
-1.71 
(-1.214) 
3.49 
(0.601) 
-1.71 
(-1.016) 
3.49 
(0.937) 
 
-1.71 
(-1.653)** 
3.49 
(0.316) 
-1.71 
(-0.804) 
3.49 
(0.984) 
-3 -1.29 
(-1.695)* 
2.20 
(0.512) 
-1.29 
(-1.596) 
2.20 
(0.544) 
-1.29 
(-2.706)** 
2.20 
(0.799) 
-1.29 
(-0.916) 
2.20 
(0.368) 
-1.29 
(-1.963)* 
2.20 
(0.580) 
 
-1.29 
(-0.953) 
2.20 
(0.082) 
-1.29 
(-1.069) 
2.20 
(0.704) 
-2 -0.24 
(-0.329) 
1.95 
(0.423) 
-0.24 
(-0.626) 
1.95 
(0.386) 
-0.24 
(-1.007) 
1.95 
(0.546) 
-0.24 
(-0.177) 
1.95 
(0.318) 
-0.24 
(-0.730) 
1.95 
(0.396) 
 
-0.24 
(-0.603) 
1.95 
(-0.058) 
-0.24 
(-0.315) 
1.95 
(0.613) 
-1 -1.87 
(-2.725)** 
0.08 
(-0.196) 
-1.87 
(-2.543)** 
0.08 
(-0.192) 
-1.87 
(-3.876)*** 
0.08 
(-0.295) 
-1.87 
(-1.326) 
0.08 
(0.013) 
-1.87 
(-2.811)*** 
0.08 
(-0.214) 
 
-1.87 
(-2.354)*** 
0.08 
(-0.582) 
-1.87 
(-1.627)* 
0.08 
(0.234) 
0 -3.81 
(-4.196)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.107) 
-3.81 
(-3.637)*** 
-3.73 
(-0.981) 
-3.81 
(-4.222)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.454) 
-3.81 
(-2.706)** 
-3.73 
(-0.577) 
-3.81 
(-3.063)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.055) 
 
-3.81 
(-2.354)*** 
-3.73 
(-1.082) 
-3.81 
(-2.246)** 
-3.73 
(-0.261) 
1 -2.82 
(-3.229)*** 
-6.55 
(-1.770)* 
-2.82 
(-3.811)*** 
-6.55 
(-1.771)* 
-2.82 
(-3.844)*** 
-6.55 
(-2.373)** 
-2.82 
(-1.999)* 
-6.55 
(-0.990) 
-2.82 
(-2.788)*** 
-6.55 
(-1.721)* 
 
-2.82 
(-1.653)** 
-6.55 
(-1.410)* 
-2.82 
(-2.230)** 
-6.55 
(-0.731) 
2 0.25 
(0.222) 
-6.30 
(-1.685) 
0.25 
(1.034) 
-6.30 
(-1.516) 
0.25 
(0.806) 
-6.30 
(-2.084)** 
0.25 
(0.179) 
-6.30 
(-0.931) 
0.25 
(0.585) 
-6.30 
(-1.512) 
 
0.25 
(1.147) 
-6.30 
(-1.139) 
0.25 
(0.373) 
-6.30 
(-0.637) 
3 0.27 
(0.285) 
-6.02 
(-1.591) 
0.27 
(1.215) 
-6.02 
(-1.236) 
0.27 
(1.012) 
-6.02 
(-1.494) 
0.27 
(0.196) 
-6.02 
(-0.871) 
0.27 
(0.734) 
-6.02 
(-1.084) 
 
0.27 
(1.147) 
-6.02 
(-0.881) 
0.27 
(0.846) 
-6.02 
(-0.451) 
4 -0.26 
(-0.242) 
-6.29 
(-1.608) 
-0.26 
(0.446) 
-6.29 
(-1.122) 
-0.26 
(0.458) 
-6.29 
(-1.242) 
-0.26 
(-0.189) 
-6.29 
(-0.891) 
-0.26 
(0.332) 
-6.29 
(-0.901) 
 
-0.26 
(2.198) 
-6.29 
(-0.424) 
-0.26 
(0.625) 
-6.29 
(-0.316) 
5 1.80 
(1.321) 
-4.48 
(-1.317) 
1.80 
(2.168)** 
-4.48 
(-0.675) 
1.80 
(1.564) 
-4.48 
(-0.862) 
1.80 
(1.278) 
-4.48 
(-0.623) 
1.80 
(1.134) 
-4.48 
(-0.625) 
 
1.80 
(1.498) 
-4.48 
(-0.122) 
1.80 
(0.691) 
-4.48 
(-0.175) 
6 -1.05 
(-1.480) 
-5.54 
(-1.578) 
-1.05 
(-1.136) 
-5.54 
(-0.881) 
-1.05 
(-1.705)* 
-5.54 
(-1.112) 
-1.05 
(-0.746) 
-5.54 
(-0.755) 
-1.05 
(-1.237) 
-5.54 
(-0.807) 
 
-1.05 
(0.447) 
-5.54 
(-0.033) 
-1.05 
(-0.568) 
-5.54 
(-0.281) 
7 -0.88 
(-1.260) 
-6.42 
(-1.787)* 
-0.88 
(-0.516) 
-6.42 
(-0.963) 
-0.88 
(-0.839) 
-6.42 
(-1.208) 
-0.88 
(-0.626) 
-6.42 
(-0.860) 
-0.88 
(-0.609) 
-6.42 
(-0.877) 
 
-0.88 
(-0.953) 
-6.42 
(-0.213) 
-0.88 
(-0.508) 
-6.42 
(-0.372) 
8 0.31 
(0.320) 
-6.11 
(-1.697)* 
0.31 
(-0.093) 
-6.11 
(-0.964) 
0.31 
(-0.109) 
-6.11 
(-1.308) 
0.31 
(0.223) 
-6.11 
(-0.804) 
0.31 
(-0.079) 
-6.11 
(-0.949) 
 
0.31 
(-0.252) 
-6.11 
(-0.256) 
0.31 
(-0.216) 
-6.11 
(-0.405) 
9 -0.29 
(-0.400) 
-6.40 
(-1.741)* 
-0.29 
(0.064) 
-6.40 
(-0.936) 
-0.29 
(0.088) 
-6.40 
(-1.301) 
-0.29 
(-0.207) 
-6.40 
(-0.828) 
-0.29 
(0.064) 
-6.40 
(-0.944) 
 
-0.29 
(2.548) 
-6.40 
(0.213) 
-0.29 
(0.481) 
-6.40 
(-0.311) 
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10 -1.41 
(-1.280) 
-7.82 
(-1.943)* 
-1.41 
(-0.973) 
-7.82 
(-1.095) 
-1.41 
(-1.016) 
-7.82 
(-1.389) 
-1.41 
(-1.003) 
-7.82 
(-0.995) 
-1.41 
(-0.737) 
-7.82 
(-1.007) 
 
-1.41 
(0.797) 
-7.82 
(0.352) 
-1.41 
(0.077) 
-7.82 
(-0.292) 
11 -1.63 
(-1.856)* 
-9.45 
(-2.241)** 
-1.63 
(-1.810)* 
-9.45 
(-1.398) 
-1.63 
(-2.382)** 
-9.45 
(-1.844)* 
-1.63 
(-1.155) 
-9.45 
(-1.183) 
-1.63 
(-1.728)* 
-9.45 
(-1.338) 
 
-1.63 
(-2.003)** 
-9.45 
(-0.006) 
-1.63 
(-0.939) 
-9.45 
(-0.453) 
12 -1.39 
(-1.730)* 
-10.84 
(-2.507)** 
-1.39 
(-1.113) 
-10.84 
(-1.570) 
-1.39 
(-1.596) 
-10.84 
(-1.950)* 
-1.39 
(-0.986) 
-10.84 
(-1.337) 
-1.39 
(-1.158) 
-10.84 
(-1.414) 
 
-1.39 
(0.797) 
-10.84 
(0.132) 
-1.39 
(-0.330) 
-10.84 
(-0.504) 
13 -0.95 
(-0.811) 
-11.80 
(-2.609)** 
-0.95 
(-1.667) 
-11.80 
(-1.833)* 
-0.95 
(-1.839)* 
-11.80 
(-2.178)** 
-0.95 
(-0.678) 
-11.80 
(-1.434) 
-0.95 
(-1.334) 
-11.80 
(-1.580) 
 
-0.95 
(0.097) 
-11.80 
(0.146) 
-0.95 
(-0.581) 
-11.80 
(-0.596) 
14 -3.30 
(-2.400)** 
-15.10 
(-2.978)*** 
-3.30 
(-1.827)* 
-15.10 
(-2.116)** 
-3.30 
(-1.544) 
-15.10 
(-2.526)** 
-3.30 
(-2.338)** 
-15.10 
(-1.808)* 
-3.30 
(-1.120) 
-15.10 
(-1.832)* 
 
-3.30 
(-0.252) 
-15.10 
(0.101) 
-3.30 
(-0.608) 
-15.10 
(-0.690) 
15 0.14 
(0.129) 
-14.96 
(-2.914)*** 
0.14 
(-0.608) 
-14.96 
(-2.188)** 
0.14 
(-0.599) 
-14.96 
(-2.837)*** 
0.14 
(0.100) 
-14.96 
(-1.766)* 
0.14 
(-0.434) 
-14.96 
(-2.058)** 
 
0.14 
(-0.953) 
-14.96 
(-0.058) 
0.14 
(-1.075) 
-14.96 
(-0.860) 
16 0.34 
(0.256) 
-14.61 
(-2.833)*** 
0.34 
(0.253) 
-14.61 
(-2.116)** 
0.34 
(0.226) 
-14.61 
(-2.492)** 
0.34 
(0.242) 
-14.61 
(-1.702)* 
0.34 
(0.164) 
-14.61 
(-1.808)* 
 
0.34 
(0.447) 
-14.61 
(0.015) 
0.34 
(0.036) 
-14.61 
(-0.842) 
17 -0.61 
(-0.468) 
-15.22 
(-2.871)*** 
-0.61 
(0.676) 
-15.22 
(-1.978)* 
-0.61 
(0.440) 
-15.22 
(-2.473)** 
-0.61 
(-0.432) 
-15.22 
(-1.750)* 
-0.61 
(0.319) 
-15.22 
(-1.794)* 
 
-0.61 
(0.797) 
-15.22 
(0.145) 
-0.61 
(0.127) 
-15.22 
(-0.810) 
18 1.50 
(1.218) 
-13.72 
(-2.639)** 
1.50 
(1.734)* 
-13.72 
(-1.675) 
1.50 
(1.690) 
-13.72 
(-2.163)** 
1.50 
(1.067) 
-13.72 
(-1.557) 
1.50 
(1.226) 
-13.72 
(-1.569) 
 
1.50 
(0.797) 
-13.72 
(0.271) 
1.50 
(0.532) 
-13.72 
(-0.715) 
19 -0.18 
(-0.170) 
-13.90 
(-2.633)** 
-0.18 
(-0.287) 
-13.90 
(-1.699)* 
-0.18 
(-0.314) 
-13.90 
(-2.294)** 
-0.18 
(-0.128) 
-13.90 
(-1.557) 
-0.18 
(-0.227) 
-13.90 
(-1.664) 
 
-0.18 
(-0.603) 
-13.90 
(0.172) 
-0.18 
(-0.518) 
-13.90 
(-0.787) 
20 0.34 
(0.407) 
-13.55 
(-2.537)** 
0.34 
(0.069) 
-13.55 
(-1.668) 
0.34 
(0.093) 
-13.55 
(-2.242)** 
0.34 
(0.245) 
-13.55 
(-1.500) 
0.34 
(0.067) 
-13.55 
(-1.626) 
  0.34 
(2.198) 
-13.55 
(0.513) 
0.34 
(0.265) 
-13.55 
(-0.736) 
 
 
  
366 
MRRT iron & steel subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test statistics for each 
days’ individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative 
to the announcement day of the MRRT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market 
model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The iron and steel subsector covers 
33 stocks Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6 The equally weighted average 
abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to 
the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded  return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation 
period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. The rank test combines the 
estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average excess return on day t relative to 
the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t206 average abnormal or cumulative average 
abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return207. The null hypothesis for the rank 
test is that the average or average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is equivalent to that of the estimation period 
  
                                                 
206 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. 
207 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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. 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional208 Standardised209 
Standardised cross 
sectional210 
Crude adjustment211 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional212 
  Generalized sign213 Rank214 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
                
-20 -0.32 
(-0.402) 
-0.32 
(-0.402) 
-0.32 
(-0.792) 
-0.32 
(-0.792) 
-0.32 
(-1.061) 
-0.32 
(-1.061) 
-0.32 
(-0.242) 
-0.32 
(-0.242) 
-0.32 
(-0.718) 
-0.32 
(-0.718) 
 
-0.32 
(-0.549) 
-0.32 
(-0.549) 
-0.32 
(-0.790) 
-0.32 
(-0.790) 
-19 -0.61 
(-1.047) 
-0.94 
(-1.025) 
-0.61 
(-0.609) 
-0.94 
(-0.991) 
-0.61 
(-1.057) 
-0.94 
(-2.141)** 
-0.61 
(-0.454) 
-0.94 
(-0.492) 
-0.61 
(-0.716) 
-0.94 
(-1.449) 
 
-0.61 
(0.483) 
-0.94 
(-0.046) 
-0.61 
(-0.012) 
-0.94 
(-0.568) 
-18 1.44 
(2.025)* 
0.49 
(0.332) 
1.44 
(1.452) 
0.49 
(0.029) 
1.44 
(2.093)** 
0.49 
(0.071) 
1.44 
(1.063) 
0.49 
(0.212) 
1.44 
(1.416) 
0.49 
(0.048) 
 
1.44 
(2.892) 
0.49 
(1.632) 
1.44 
(1.411) 
0.49 
(0.351) 
-17 -1.64 
(-3.785)*** 
-1.14 
(-1.605) 
-1.64 
(-2.073)** 
-1.14 
(-1.011) 
-1.64 
(-2.990)*** 
-1.14 
(-1.915)* 
-1.64 
(-1.209) 
-1.14 
(-0.421) 
-1.64 
(-2.024)* 
-1.14 
(-1.296) 
 
-1.64 
(-1.925)** 
-1.14 
(0.450) 
-1.64 
(-1.562)* 
-1.14 
(-0.477) 
-16 -1.32 
(-1.410) 
-2.46 
(-2.066)** 
-1.32 
(-1.540) 
-2.46 
(-1.593) 
-1.32 
(-1.577) 
-2.46 
(-3.315)*** 
-1.32 
(-0.972) 
-2.46 
(-0.811) 
-1.32 
(-1.067) 
-2.46 
(-2.244)** 
 
-1.32 
(-3.646)*** 
-2.46 
(-1.227) 
-1.32 
(-1.309)* 
-2.46 
(-1.012) 
-15 -1.61 
(-2.124)** 
-4.08 
(-2.753)*** 
-1.61 
(-1.757)* 
-4.08 
(-2.172)** 
-1.61 
(-2.639)** 
-4.08 
(-4.295)*** 
-1.61 
(-1.188) 
-4.08 
(-1.225) 
-1.61 
(-1.786)* 
-4.08 
(-2.907)*** 
 
-1.61 
(-1.925)** 
-4.08 
(-1.906)** 
-1.61 
(-0.954) 
-4.08 
(-1.314)* 
-14 -1.60 
(-1.796)* 
-5.68 
(-3.228)*** 
-1.60 
(-1.678) 
-5.68 
(-2.645)** 
-1.60 
(-2.526)** 
-5.68 
(-4.705)*** 
-1.60 
(-1.183) 
-5.68 
(-1.582) 
-1.60 
(-1.709)* 
-5.68 
(-3.184)*** 
 
-1.60 
(-1.925)** 
-5.68 
(-
2.493)*** 
-1.60 
(-1.259) 
-5.68 
(-
1.692)** 
-13 -0.15 
(-0.224) 
-5.83 
(-3.099)*** 
-0.15 
(0.124) 
-5.83 
(-2.430)** 
-0.15 
(0.186) 
-5.83 
(-4.439)*** 
-0.15 
(-0.110) 
-5.83 
(-1.519) 
-0.15 
(0.126) 
-5.83 
(-3.005)*** 
 
-0.15 
(-0.893) 
-5.83 
(-
2.648)*** 
-0.15 
(-0.092) 
-5.83 
(-1.616)* 
-12 0.41 
(0.590) 
-5.42 
(-2.725)** 
0.41 
(1.154) 
-5.42 
(-1.907)* 
0.41 
(1.487) 
-5.42 
(-3.312)*** 
0.41 
(0.305) 
-5.42 
(-1.330) 
0.41 
(1.007) 
-5.42 
(-2.242)** 
 
0.41 
(0.827) 
-5.42 
(-2.220)** 
0.41 
(0.520) 
-5.42 
(-1.350)* 
-11 -0.42 
(-0.570) 
-5.84 
(-2.766)*** 
-0.42 
(0.049) 
-5.84 
(-1.793)* 
-0.42 
(0.066) 
-5.84 
(-3.013)*** 
-0.42 
(-0.312) 
-5.84 
(-1.360) 
-0.42 
(0.045) 
-5.84 
(-2.039)** 
 
-0.42 
(2.204) 
-5.84 
(-1.409)* 
-0.42 
(0.567) 
-5.84 
(-1.101) 
-10 -1.63 
(-2.701)** 
-7.48 
(-3.451)*** 
-1.63 
(-1.831)* 
-7.48 
(-2.262)** 
-1.63 
(-3.348)*** 
-7.48 
(-3.962)*** 
-1.63 
(-1.201) 
-7.48 
(-1.659) 
-1.63 
(-2.266)** 
-7.48 
(-2.682)** 
 
-1.63 
(-1.925)** 
-7.48 
(-1.924)** 
-1.63 
(-1.285)* 
-7.48 
(-1.437)* 
                                                 
208 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
209 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
210 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
211 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
212 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
213 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
214 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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-9 -0.48 
(-0.697) 
-7.96 
(-3.506)*** 
-0.48 
(0.160) 
-7.96 
(-2.119)** 
-0.48 
(0.204) 
-7.96 
(-3.331)*** 
-0.48 
(-0.358) 
-7.96 
(-1.692)* 
-0.48 
(0.138) 
-7.96 
(-2.254)** 
 
-0.48 
(0.827) 
-7.96 
(-1.603)* 
-0.48 
(0.065) 
-7.96 
(-1.357)* 
-8 -0.05 
(-0.056) 
-8.02 
(-3.384)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.171) 
-8.02 
(-2.083)** 
-0.05 
(-0.191) 
-8.02 
(-3.152)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.037) 
-8.02 
(-1.636) 
-0.05 
(-0.129) 
-8.02 
(-2.133)** 
 
-0.05 
(0.827) 
-8.02 
(-1.311)* 
-0.05 
(0.388) 
-8.02 
(-1.196) 
-7 0.86 
(0.961) 
-7.16 
(-3.004)*** 
0.86 
(0.972) 
-7.16 
(-1.748)* 
0.86 
(1.262) 
-7.16 
(-2.630)** 
0.86 
(0.633) 
-7.16 
(-1.407) 
0.86 
(0.854) 
-7.16 
(-1.780)* 
 
0.86 
(2.204) 
-7.16 
(-0.674) 
0.86 
(1.242) 
-7.16 
(-0.821) 
-6 0.86 
(0.870) 
-6.29 
(-2.677)** 
0.86 
(0.407) 
-6.29 
(-1.583) 
0.86 
(0.310) 
-6.29 
(-2.260)** 
0.86 
(0.639) 
-6.29 
(-1.195) 
0.86 
(0.210) 
-6.29 
(-1.530) 
 
0.86 
(0.483) 
-6.29 
(-0.526) 
0.86 
(0.502) 
-6.29 
(-0.663) 
-5 0.51 
(0.437) 
-5.77 
(-2.483)** 
0.51 
(0.576) 
-5.77 
(-1.389) 
0.51 
(0.630) 
-5.77 
(-2.265)** 
0.51 
(0.378) 
-5.77 
(-1.062) 
0.51 
(0.426) 
-5.77 
(-1.533) 
 
0.51 
(1.171) 
-5.77 
(-0.217) 
0.51 
(0.803) 
-5.77 
(-0.441) 
-4 -0.50 
(-0.562) 
-6.28 
(-2.545)** 
-0.50 
(-0.607) 
-6.28 
(-1.495) 
-0.50 
(-0.677) 
-6.28 
(-2.242)** 
-0.50 
(-0.371) 
-6.28 
(-1.120) 
-0.50 
(-0.458) 
-6.28 
(-1.518) 
 
-0.50 
(1.171) 
-6.28 
(0.073) 
-0.50 
(0.321) 
-6.28 
(-0.350) 
-3 -0.38 
(-0.534) 
-6.66 
(-2.599)** 
-0.38 
(-0.365) 
-6.66 
(-1.539) 
-0.38 
(-0.452) 
-6.66 
(-2.358)** 
-0.38 
(-0.281) 
-6.66 
(-1.155) 
-0.38 
(-0.306) 
-6.66 
(-1.596) 
 
-0.38 
(1.860) 
-6.66 
(0.509) 
-0.38 
(0.625) 
-6.66 
(-0.193) 
-2 -1.46 
(-2.081)** 
-8.12 
(-3.008)*** 
-1.46 
(-1.686) 
-8.12 
(-1.885)* 
-1.46 
(-2.246)** 
-8.12 
(-2.975)*** 
-1.46 
(-1.076) 
-8.12 
(-1.371) 
-1.46 
(-1.520) 
-8.12 
(-2.013)* 
 
-1.46 
(-0.893) 
-8.12 
(0.291) 
-1.46 
(-0.989) 
-8.12 
(-0.415) 
-1 1.04 
(1.100) 
-7.07 
(-2.685)** 
1.04 
(1.986)* 
-7.07 
(-1.393) 
1.04 
(3.049)*** 
-7.07 
(-2.253)** 
1.04 
(0.770) 
-7.07 
(-1.164) 
1.04 
(2.064)** 
-7.07 
(-1.525) 
 
1.04 
(3.925) 
-7.07 
(1.161) 
1.04 
(2.171) 
-7.07 
(0.081) 
0 0.21 
(0.341) 
-6.86 
(-2.546)** 
0.21 
(0.262) 
-6.86 
(-1.302) 
0.21 
(0.378) 
-6.86 
(-2.262)** 
0.21 
(0.161) 
-6.86 
(-1.101) 
0.21 
(0.256) 
-6.86 
(-1.531) 
 
0.21 
(0.827) 
-6.86 
(1.314) 
0.21 
(0.475) 
-6.86 
(0.182) 
1 0.31 
(0.529) 
-6.54 
(-2.374)** 
0.31 
(0.182) 
-6.54 
(-1.233) 
0.31 
(0.325) 
-6.54 
(-1.970)* 
0.31 
(0.232) 
-6.54 
(-1.026) 
0.31 
(0.220) 
-6.54 
(-1.333) 
 
0.31 
(1.860) 
-6.54 
(1.680) 
0.31 
(0.623) 
-6.54 
(0.311) 
2 -2.16 
(-3.637)*** 
-8.70 
(-3.081)*** 
-2.16 
(-2.399)** 
-8.70 
(-1.706)* 
-2.16 
(-4.344)*** 
-8.70 
(-2.742)*** 
-2.16 
(-1.589) 
-8.70 
(-1.335) 
-2.16 
(-2.941)*** 
-8.70 
(-1.856)* 
 
-2.16 
(-3.646)*** 
-8.70 
(0.883) 
-2.16 
(-2.200)** 
-8.70 
(-0.154) 
3 -0.32 
(-0.552) 
-9.02 
(-3.129)*** 
-0.32 
(-0.286) 
-9.02 
(-1.729)* 
-0.32 
(-0.501) 
-9.02 
(-2.963)*** 
-0.32 
(-0.238) 
-9.02 
(-1.356) 
-0.32 
(-0.339) 
-9.02 
(-2.005)* 
 
-0.32 
(1.171) 
-9.02 
(1.103) 
-0.32 
(0.106) 
-9.02 
(-0.129) 
4 -2.90 
(-3.912)*** 
-11.93 
(-3.848)*** 
-2.90 
(-3.550)*** 
-11.93 
(-2.404)** 
-2.90 
(-6.259)*** 
-11.93 
(-4.161)*** 
-2.90 
(-2.137)** 
-11.93 
(-1.756)* 
-2.90 
(-4.237)*** 
-11.93 
(-2.816)*** 
 
-2.90 
(-3.990)*** 
-11.93 
(0.283) 
-2.90 
(-2.996)*** 
-11.93 
(-0.725) 
5 -0.48 
(-0.649) 
-12.41 
(-3.901)*** 
-0.48 
(-0.416) 
-12.41 
(-2.439)** 
-0.48 
(-0.723) 
-12.41 
(-4.541)*** 
-0.48 
(-0.353) 
-12.41 
(-1.791)* 
-0.48 
(-0.489) 
-12.41 
(-3.073)*** 
 
-0.48 
(-2.269)** 
-12.41 
(-0.167) 
-0.48 
(-0.608) 
-12.41 
(-0.831) 
6 -0.03 
(-0.078) 
-12.45 
(-3.843)*** 
-0.03 
(0.073) 
-12.45 
(-2.379)** 
-0.03 
(0.100) 
-12.45 
(-4.303)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.028) 
-12.45 
(-1.763)* 
-0.03 
(0.068) 
-12.45 
(-2.912)*** 
 
-0.03 
(-1.581)* 
-12.45 
(-0.468) 
-0.03 
(0.050) 
-12.45 
(-0.805) 
7 -0.17 
(-0.144) 
-12.63 
(-3.801)*** 
-0.17 
(-0.429) 
-12.63 
(-2.418)** 
-0.17 
(-0.399) 
-12.63 
(-4.735)*** 
-0.17 
(-0.131) 
-12.63 
(-1.756)* 
-0.17 
(-0.270) 
-12.63 
(-3.205)*** 
 
-0.17 
(0.139) 
-12.63 
(-0.433) 
-0.17 
(-0.219) 
-12.63 
(-0.832) 
8 0.43 
(0.458) 
-12.19 
(-3.650)*** 
0.43 
(-0.203) 
-12.19 
(-2.413)** 
0.43 
(-0.221) 
-12.19 
(-4.417)*** 
0.43 
(0.322) 
-12.19 
(-1.665) 
0.43 
(-0.149) 
-12.19 
(-2.990)*** 
 
0.43 
(-1.925)** 
-12.19 
(-0.783) 
0.43 
(-0.883) 
-12.19 
(-0.982) 
9 1.01 
(1.154) 
-11.17 
(-3.378)*** 
1.01 
(0.743) 
-11.17 
(-2.237)** 
1.01 
(0.986) 
-11.17 
(-3.971)*** 
1.01 
(0.746) 
-11.17 
(-1.501) 
1.01 
(0.667) 
-11.17 
(-2.688)** 
 
1.01 
(2.548) 
-11.17 
(-0.305) 
1.01 
(0.716) 
-11.17 
(-0.834) 
10 -0.32 
(-0.709) 
-11.50 
(-3.450)*** 
-0.32 
(-0.736) 
-11.50 
(-2.333)** 
-0.32 
(-1.319) 
-11.50 
(-4.130)*** 
-0.32 
(-0.238) 
-11.50 
(-1.520) 
-0.32 
(-0.893) 
-11.50 
(-2.796)*** 
 
-0.32 
(1.171) 
-11.50 
(-0.089) 
-0.32 
(-0.397) 
-11.50 
(-0.892) 
11 0.35 
(0.500) 
-11.15 
(-3.307)*** 
0.35 
(0.661) 
-11.15 
(-2.179)** 
0.35 
(0.930) 
-11.15 
(-3.604)*** 
0.35 
(0.257) 
-11.15 
(-1.450) 
0.35 
(0.629) 
-11.15 
(-2.440)** 
 
0.35 
(2.204) 
-11.15 
(0.301) 
0.35 
(0.950) 
-11.15 
(-0.710) 
12 -1.77 
(-3.440)*** 
-12.92 
(-3.856)*** 
-1.77 
(-1.740)* 
-12.92 
(-2.449)** 
-1.77 
(-3.521)*** 
-12.92 
(-4.000)*** 
-1.77 
(-1.304) 
-12.92 
(-1.655) 
-1.77 
(-2.383)** 
-12.92 
(-2.707)** 
 
-1.77 
(-2.614)*** 
-12.92 
(-0.158) 
-1.77 
(-1.517)* 
-12.92 
(-0.964) 
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13 0.52 
(0.714) 
-12.40 
(-3.676)*** 
0.52 
(0.473) 
-12.40 
(-2.331)** 
0.52 
(0.751) 
-12.40 
(-3.840)*** 
0.52 
(0.387) 
-12.40 
(-1.564) 
0.52 
(0.508) 
-12.40 
(-2.599)** 
 
0.52 
(0.827) 
-12.40 
(-0.014) 
0.52 
(0.716) 
-12.40 
(-0.826) 
14 0.22 
(0.392) 
-12.17 
(-3.557)*** 
0.22 
(1.296) 
-12.17 
(-2.079)** 
0.22 
(1.847)* 
-12.17 
(-3.436)*** 
0.22 
(0.168) 
-12.17 
(-1.513) 
0.22 
(1.250) 
-12.17 
(-2.325)** 
 
0.22 
(3.236) 
-12.17 
(0.533) 
0.22 
(1.367) 
-12.17 
(-0.583) 
15 0.08 
(0.128) 
-12.08 
(-3.486)*** 
0.08 
(0.347) 
-12.08 
(-1.992)* 
0.08 
(0.549) 
-12.08 
(-3.279)*** 
0.08 
(0.060) 
-12.08 
(-1.482) 
0.08 
(0.372) 
-12.08 
(-2.219)** 
 
0.08 
(-0.204) 
-12.08 
(0.491) 
0.08 
(0.076) 
-12.08 
(-0.562) 
16 -0.49 
(-0.921) 
-12.58 
(-3.590)*** 
-0.49 
(-0.130) 
-12.58 
(-1.986)* 
-0.49 
(-0.203) 
-12.58 
(-3.145)*** 
-0.49 
(-0.365) 
-12.58 
(-1.522) 
-0.49 
(-0.137) 
-12.58 
(-2.129)** 
 
-0.49 
(-1.237) 
-12.58 
(0.281) 
-0.49 
(-0.121) 
-12.58 
(-0.575) 
17 0.89 
(0.864) 
-11.69 
(-3.402)*** 
0.89 
(0.808) 
-11.69 
(-1.829)* 
0.89 
(0.888) 
-11.69 
(-2.947)*** 
0.89 
(0.656) 
-11.69 
(-1.395) 
0.89 
(0.601) 
-11.69 
(-1.994)* 
 
0.89 
(-1.925)** 
-11.69 
(-0.034) 
0.89 
(0.102) 
-11.69 
(-0.550) 
18 -0.69 
(-1.400) 
-12.38 
(-3.582)*** 
-0.69 
(-1.071) 
-12.38 
(-1.977)* 
-0.69 
(-1.879)* 
-12.38 
(-3.196)*** 
-0.69 
(-0.508) 
-12.38 
(-1.459) 
-0.69 
(-1.272) 
-12.38 
(-2.163)** 
 
-0.69 
(-2.269)** 
-12.38 
(-0.397) 
-0.69 
(-0.812) 
-12.38 
(-0.673) 
19 -0.96 
(-0.875) 
-13.35 
(-3.676)*** 
-0.96 
(-0.056) 
-13.35 
(-1.961)* 
-0.96 
(-0.088) 
-13.35 
(-3.096)*** 
-0.96 
(-0.711) 
-13.35 
(-1.553) 
-0.96 
(-0.060) 
-13.35 
(-2.095)** 
 
-0.96 
(0.139) 
-13.35 
(-0.370) 
-0.96 
(0.282) 
-13.35 
(-0.620) 
20 1.04 
(1.021) 
-12.30 
(-3.471)*** 
1.04 
(0.866) 
-12.30 
(-1.801)* 
1.04 
(0.990) 
-12.30 
(-2.959)*** 
1.04 
(0.769) 
-12.30 
(-1.414) 
1.04 
(0.670) 
-12.30 
(-2.003)* 
  1.04 
(3.236) 
-12.30 
(0.139) 
1.04 
(0.953) 
-12.30 
(-0.464) 
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RSPT iron & steel subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test 
statistics for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The various corresponding t- 
statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction 
with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The iron and steel subsector covers 33 stocks. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio 
on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The 
cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR
represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 
through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null 
hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null 
hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t215 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to 
have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return216. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within period t surrounding the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
215 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
216 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross 
sectional217 
Standardised218 
Standardised 
cross 
sectional219 
Crude 
adjustment220 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional221 
  
Generalized 
sign222 
Rank223 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
         
car (-1 +1) -8.51 
(-5.861)*** 
-8.51 
(-5.769)*** 
-8.51 
(-6.011)*** 
-8.51 
(-3.482)*** 
-8.51 
(-4.361)*** 
 
-8.51 
(-3.673)*** 
-8.51 
(-3.524)*** 
car ( -2 +2) -8.50 
(-4.587)*** 
-8.50 
(-4.286)*** 
-8.50 
(-5.112)*** 
-8.50 
(-2.696)** 
-8.50 
(-3.708)*** 
 
-8.50 
(-2.601)*** 
-8.50 
(-2.703)*** 
car (-5+5) -10.34 
(-3.874)*** 
-10.34 
(-2.689)** 
-10.34 
(-3.395)*** 
-10.34 
(-2.210)** 
-10.34 
(-2.463)** 
 
-10.34 
(-0.838) 
-10.34 
(-1.632)* 
car(-20+20) -13.55 
(-2.537)** 
-13.55 
(-1.668) 
-13.55 
(-2.242)** 
-13.55 
(-1.500) 
-13.55 
(-1.626) 
 
-13.55 
(0.513) 
-13.55 
(-0.736) 
car (1+5) -0.75 
(-0.734) 
-0.75 
(0.471) 
-0.75 
(0.541) 
-0.75 
(-0.238) 
-0.75 
(0.393) 
 
-0.75 
(1.940) 
-0.75 
(0.136) 
car (-5 -1) -5.77 
(-3.135)*** 
-5.77 
(-2.833)*** 
-5.77 
(-4.288)*** 
-5.77 
(-1.829)* 
-5.77 
(-3.111)*** 
 
-5.77 
(-2.131)** 
-5.77 
(-1.554)* 
  
                                                 
217 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
218 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
219 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27) 
220 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
221 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
222 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
223 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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MRRT iron & steel subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric 
test statistics for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The various corresponding t- 
statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction 
with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The iron and steel subsector covers 33 stocks. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio 
on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The 
cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR
represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 
through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null 
hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null 
hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t224 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to 
have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return225. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within period t surrounding the 
announcement of the proposed MRRT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
224 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. 
225 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   
Non- parametric test 
statistic 
Cross 
sectional226 
Standardised227 
Standardised 
cross sectional228 
Crude 
adjustment229 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional230 
  
Generalized 
sign231 
Rank232 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
         
car (-1 +1) 1.58 
(1.139) 
1.58 
(1.403) 
1.58 
(2.107)** 
1.58 
(0.671) 
1.58 
(1.426) 
 
1.58 
(3.818) 
1.58 
(1.887) 
car ( -2 +2) -2.04 
(-1.675) 
-2.04 
(-0.740) 
-2.04 
(-1.248) 
-2.04 
(-0.671) 
-2.04 
(-0.845) 
 
-2.04 
(0.927) 
-2.04 
(0.035) 
car (-5+5) -6.12 
(-2.870)*** 
-6.12 
(-1.901)* 
-6.12 
(-3.604)*** 
-6.12 
(-1.358) 
-6.12 
(-2.439)** 
 
-6.12 
(0.358) 
-6.12 
(-0.502) 
car(-20+20) -12.30 
(-3.471)*** 
-12.30 
(-1.801)* 
-12.30 
(-2.959)*** 
-12.30 
(-1.414) 
-12.30 
(-2.003)* 
 
-12.30 
(0.139) 
-12.30 
(-0.464) 
car (1+5) -5.55 
(-3.677)*** 
-5.55 
(-2.893)*** 
-5.55 
(-6.799)*** 
-5.55 
(-1.827)* 
-5.55 
(-4.602)*** 
 
-5.55 
(-3.074)*** 
-5.55 
(-2.269)** 
car (-5 -1) -0.78 
(-0.733) 
-0.78 
(-0.043) 
-0.78 
(-0.057) 
-0.78 
(-0.259) 
-0.78 
(-0.038) 
 
-0.78 
(3.235) 
-0.78 
(1.311) 
 
  
                                                 
226 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
227 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
228 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
229 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in in (28), (29) and (30). 
230 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
231 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in ((35), (36) and (37). 
232 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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RSPT exploration and production subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test 
statistics for each days’ individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to 
+20 days relative to the announcement day of the RSPT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using 
equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The exploration 
and production subsector covers 117 stocks Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. 
The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by 
adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on  the S&P/ASX 200 
value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed 
RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average 
excess return on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t233 average 
abnormal or cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return234. 
The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average or average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the 
estimation period. 
  
                                                 
233 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
234 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional235 Standardised236 
Standardised cross 
sectional237 
Crude adjustment238 
Adjusted standardized 
cross sectional239 
  Generalized sign240 Rank241 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
                
-20 0.31 
(0.553) 
0.31 
(0.553) 
0.31 
(1.340) 
0.31 
(1.340) 
0.31 
(1.372) 
0.31 
(1.372) 
0.31 
(0.325) 
0.31 
(0.325) 
0.31 
(0.703) 
0.31 
(0.703) 
 
0.31 
(2.410) 
0.31 
(2.410) 
0.31 
(0.607) 
0.31 
(0.607) 
-19 0.72 
(1.509) 
1.04 
(1.458) 
0.72 
(0.834) 
1.04 
(1.537) 
0.72 
(1.022) 
1.04 
(1.980)** 
0.72 
(0.745) 
1.04 
(0.757) 
0.72 
(0.524) 
1.04 
(1.015) 
 
0.72 
(-0.552) 
1.04 
(1.313) 
0.72 
(0.374) 
1.04 
(0.694) 
-18 1.21 
(2.217)** 
2.26 
(2.471)** 
1.21 
(2.426)** 
2.26 
(2.656)*** 
1.21 
(2.666)*** 
2.26 
(3.468)*** 
1.21 
(1.243) 
2.26 
(1.336) 
1.21 
(1.366) 
2.26 
(1.777)* 
 
1.21 
(2.040) 
2.26 
(2.250) 
1.21 
(1.181) 
2.26 
(1.249) 
-17 0.18 
(0.365) 
2.44 
(2.322)** 
0.18 
(0.502) 
2.44 
(2.551)** 
0.18 
(0.522) 
2.44 
(3.248)*** 
0.18 
(0.187) 
2.44 
(1.250) 
0.18 
(0.267) 
2.44 
(1.664)* 
 
0.18 
(0.002) 
2.44 
(1.950) 
0.18 
(0.200) 
2.44 
(1.182) 
-16 1.47 
(2.192)** 
3.91 
(3.057)*** 
1.47 
(2.809)*** 
3.91 
(3.538)*** 
1.47 
(2.211)** 
3.91 
(3.597)*** 
1.47 
(1.508) 
3.91 
(1.793)* 
1.47 
(1.133) 
3.91 
(1.843)* 
 
1.47 
(2.781) 
3.91 
(2.988) 
1.47 
(1.244) 
3.91 
(1.614) 
-15 0.77 
(1.426) 
4.69 
(3.373)*** 
0.77 
(2.106)** 
4.69 
(4.090)*** 
0.77 
(2.072)** 
4.69 
(4.653)*** 
0.77 
(0.793) 
4.69 
(1.961)* 
0.77 
(1.062) 
4.69 
(2.384)** 
 
0.77 
(2.225) 
4.69 
(3.637) 
0.77 
(1.406) 
4.69 
(2.047) 
-14 -0.11 
(-0.225) 
4.58 
(3.038)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.063) 
4.58 
(3.763)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.069) 
4.58 
(4.243)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.113) 
4.58 
(1.772)* 
-0.11 
(-0.035) 
4.58 
(2.174)** 
 
-0.11 
(-0.367) 
4.58 
(3.228) 
-0.11 
(0.065) 
4.58 
(1.920) 
-13 0.54 
(0.781) 
5.13 
(3.118)*** 
0.54 
(0.342) 
5.13 
(3.641)*** 
0.54 
(0.306) 
5.13 
(4.060)*** 
0.54 
(0.562) 
5.13 
(1.857)* 
0.54 
(0.156) 
5.13 
(2.080)** 
 
0.54 
(0.002) 
5.13 
(3.020) 
0.54 
(-0.153) 
5.13 
(1.742) 
-12 0.17 
(0.290) 
5.30 
(3.037)*** 
0.17 
(-0.518) 
5.30 
(3.260)*** 
0.17 
(-0.577) 
5.30 
(3.690)*** 
0.17 
(0.181) 
5.30 
(1.811)* 
0.17 
(-0.296) 
5.30 
(1.891)* 
 
0.17 
(-1.478)* 
5.30 
(2.355) 
0.17 
(-0.454) 
5.30 
(1.491) 
-11 0.36 
(0.750) 
5.67 
(3.118)*** 
0.36 
(1.068) 
5.67 
(3.430)*** 
0.36 
(1.218) 
5.67 
(4.173)*** 
0.36 
(0.376) 
5.67 
(1.837)* 
0.36 
(0.624) 
5.67 
(2.138)** 
 
0.36 
(0.002) 
5.67 
(2.235) 
0.36 
(0.432) 
5.67 
(1.551) 
                                                 
235 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
236 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
237 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
238 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
239 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
240 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
241 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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-10 0.10 
(0.190) 
5.78 
(3.030)*** 
0.10 
(-0.653) 
5.78 
(3.074)*** 
0.10 
(-0.436) 
5.78 
(3.350)*** 
0.10 
(0.112) 
5.78 
(1.785)* 
0.10 
(-0.223) 
5.78 
(1.716)* 
 
0.10 
(0.373) 
5.78 
(2.243) 
0.10 
(0.330) 
5.78 
(1.579) 
-9 -0.26 
(-0.390) 
5.51 
(2.789)*** 
-0.26 
(-0.103) 
5.51 
(2.913)*** 
-0.26 
(-0.096) 
5.51 
(3.153)*** 
-0.26 
(-0.273) 
5.51 
(1.630) 
-0.26 
(-0.049) 
5.51 
(1.615) 
 
-0.26 
(0.743) 
5.51 
(2.362) 
-0.26 
(0.348) 
5.51 
(1.612) 
-8 0.06 
(0.137) 
5.58 
(2.717)*** 
0.06 
(0.054) 
5.58 
(2.814)*** 
0.06 
(0.064) 
5.58 
(3.041)*** 
0.06 
(0.069) 
5.58 
(1.586) 
0.06 
(0.033) 
5.58 
(1.558) 
 
0.06 
(0.188) 
5.58 
(2.322) 
0.06 
(0.208) 
5.58 
(1.607) 
-7 0.64 
(1.457) 
6.23 
(3.008)*** 
0.64 
(1.617) 
6.23 
(3.144)*** 
0.64 
(2.016)** 
6.23 
(3.542)*** 
0.64 
(0.662) 
6.23 
(1.705)* 
0.64 
(1.033) 
6.23 
(1.815)* 
 
0.64 
(1.299) 
6.23 
(2.585) 
0.64 
(0.887) 
6.23 
(1.785) 
-6 -0.18 
(-0.358) 
6.04 
(2.814)*** 
-0.18 
(-0.057) 
6.04 
(3.022)*** 
-0.18 
(-0.060) 
6.04 
(3.551)*** 
-0.18 
(-0.189) 
6.04 
(1.598) 
-0.18 
(-0.030) 
6.04 
(1.819)* 
 
-0.18 
(1.855) 
6.04 
(2.976) 
-0.18 
(0.505) 
6.04 
(1.855) 
-5 1.67 
(2.623)*** 
7.72 
(3.380)*** 
1.67 
(2.962)*** 
7.72 
(3.667)*** 
1.67 
(2.559)** 
7.72 
(4.574)*** 
1.67 
(1.717)* 
7.72 
(1.977)* 
1.67 
(1.311) 
7.72 
(2.344)** 
 
1.67 
(3.337) 
7.72 
(3.716) 
1.67 
(1.425) 
7.72 
(2.153) 
-4 -0.32 
(-0.783) 
7.40 
(3.089)*** 
-0.32 
(0.121) 
7.40 
(3.587)*** 
-0.32 
(0.152) 
7.40 
(4.273)*** 
-0.32 
(-0.333) 
7.40 
(1.837)* 
-0.32 
(0.078) 
7.40 
(2.189)** 
 
-0.32 
(0.743) 
7.40 
(3.785) 
-0.32 
(-0.004) 
7.40 
(2.088) 
-3 -0.34 
(-0.453) 
7.05 
(2.895)*** 
-0.34 
(-0.606) 
7.05 
(3.343)*** 
-0.34 
(-0.391) 
7.05 
(3.977)*** 
-0.34 
(-0.357) 
7.05 
(1.701)* 
-0.34 
(-0.200) 
7.05 
(2.038)** 
 
-0.34 
(-1.108) 
7.05 
(3.417) 
-0.34 
(-0.731) 
7.05 
(1.856) 
-2 -2.04 
(-2.529)** 
5.00 
(2.238)** 
-2.04 
(-5.038)*** 
5.00 
(2.098)** 
-2.04 
(-2.014)** 
5.00 
(1.803)* 
-2.04 
(-2.091)** 
5.00 
(1.176) 
-2.04 
(-1.032) 
5.00 
(0.924) 
 
-2.04 
(-1.108) 
5.00 
(3.072) 
-2.04 
(-0.852) 
5.00 
(1.611) 
-1 0.07 
(0.151) 
5.08 
(2.215)** 
0.07 
(-0.067) 
5.08 
(2.029)** 
0.07 
(-0.086) 
5.08 
(1.775)* 
0.07 
(0.076) 
5.08 
(1.163) 
0.07 
(-0.044) 
5.08 
(0.909) 
 
0.07 
(-1.478)* 
5.08 
(2.664) 
0.07 
(-0.139) 
5.08 
(1.539) 
0 -0.03 
(-0.081) 
5.04 
(2.144)** 
-0.03 
(-0.344) 
5.04 
(1.905)* 
-0.03 
(-0.415) 
5.04 
(1.694)* 
-0.03 
(-0.040) 
5.04 
(1.126) 
-0.03 
(-0.212) 
5.04 
(0.868) 
 
-0.03 
(0.188) 
5.04 
(2.640) 
-0.03 
(-0.026) 
5.04 
(1.496) 
1 -2.07 
(-3.359)*** 
2.96 
(1.378) 
-2.07 
(-4.233)*** 
2.96 
(0.959) 
-2.07 
(-3.794)*** 
2.96 
(0.836) 
-2.07 
(-2.126)** 
2.96 
(0.647) 
-2.07 
(-1.944)* 
2.96 
(0.428) 
 
-2.07 
(-2.960)*** 
2.96 
(1.948) 
-2.07 
(-1.976)** 
2.96 
(1.041) 
2 -2.05 
(-3.688)*** 
0.91 
(0.579) 
-2.05 
(-3.800)*** 
0.91 
(0.145) 
-2.05 
(-3.844)*** 
0.91 
(0.127) 
-2.05 
(-2.100)** 
0.91 
(0.195) 
-2.05 
(-1.969)* 
0.91 
(0.065) 
 
-2.05 
(-3.701)*** 
0.91 
(1.134) 
-2.05 
(-2.179)** 
0.91 
(0.563) 
3 -0.88 
(-1.481) 
0.03 
(0.264) 
-0.88 
(-0.680) 
0.03 
(0.003) 
-0.88 
(-0.625) 
0.03 
(-0.001) 
-0.88 
(-0.901) 
0.03 
(0.007) 
-0.88 
(-0.320) 
0.03 
(-0.000) 
 
-0.88 
(0.002) 
0.03 
(1.110) 
-0.88 
(-0.257) 
0.03 
(0.499) 
4 -0.98 
(-1.626) 
-0.94 
(-0.066) 
-0.98 
(-1.217) 
-0.94 
(-0.239) 
-0.98 
(-1.151) 
-0.94 
(-0.219) 
-0.98 
(-1.003) 
-0.94 
(-0.193) 
-0.98 
(-0.589) 
-0.94 
(-0.112) 
 
-0.98 
(0.373) 
-0.94 
(1.163) 
-0.98 
(-0.322) 
-0.94 
(0.424) 
5 1.49 
(2.935)*** 
0.55 
(0.510) 
1.49 
(2.429)** 
0.55 
(0.241) 
1.49 
(2.574)** 
0.55 
(0.219) 
1.49 
(1.535) 
0.55 
(0.111) 
1.49 
(1.319) 
0.55 
(0.112) 
 
1.49 
(1.484) 
0.55 
(1.431) 
1.49 
(1.056) 
0.55 
(0.623) 
6 1.73 
(2.942)*** 
2.29 
(1.067) 
1.73 
(3.470)*** 
2.29 
(0.904) 
1.73 
(3.399)*** 
2.29 
(0.823) 
1.73 
(1.778)* 
2.29 
(0.451) 
1.73 
(1.742)* 
2.29 
(0.421) 
 
1.73 
(3.522) 
2.29 
(2.082) 
1.73 
(1.666) 
2.29 
(0.932) 
7 -1.32 
(-2.057)** 
0.96 
(0.659) 
-1.32 
(-2.192)** 
0.96 
(0.474) 
-1.32 
(-2.160)** 
0.96 
(0.424) 
-1.32 
(-1.353) 
0.96 
(0.187) 
-1.32 
(-1.107) 
0.96 
(0.217) 
 
-1.32 
(-2.590)*** 
0.96 
(1.555) 
-1.32 
(-0.842) 
0.96 
(0.756) 
8 -0.67 
(-1.356) 
0.29 
(0.396) 
-0.67 
(-1.149) 
0.29 
(0.252) 
-0.67 
(-1.471) 
0.29 
(0.227) 
-0.67 
(-0.691) 
0.29 
(0.055) 
-0.67 
(-0.754) 
0.29 
(0.116) 
 
-0.67 
(-1.478)* 
0.29 
(1.254) 
-0.67 
(-0.578) 
0.29 
(0.635) 
9 1.92 
(4.100)*** 
2.21 
(1.138) 
1.92 
(3.672)*** 
2.21 
(0.918) 
1.92 
(4.609)*** 
2.21 
(0.819) 
1.92 
(1.967)* 
2.21 
(0.413) 
1.92 
(2.361)** 
2.21 
(0.419) 
 
1.92 
(5.559) 
2.21 
(2.248) 
1.92 
(2.311) 
2.21 
(1.047) 
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10 -0.90 
(-1.271) 
1.30 
(0.891) 
-0.90 
(-1.388) 
1.30 
(0.654) 
-0.90 
(-1.360) 
1.30 
(0.572) 
-0.90 
(-0.930) 
1.30 
(0.240) 
-0.90 
(-0.697) 
1.30 
(0.293) 
 
-0.90 
(-1.849)** 
1.30 
(1.879) 
-0.90 
(-0.948) 
1.30 
(0.859) 
11 -0.09 
(-0.183) 
1.20 
(0.844) 
-0.09 
(-0.732) 
1.20 
(0.514) 
-0.09 
(-0.869) 
1.20 
(0.457) 
-0.09 
(-0.101) 
1.20 
(0.218) 
-0.09 
(-0.445) 
1.20 
(0.234) 
 
-0.09 
(-1.293)* 
1.20 
(1.621) 
-0.09 
(-0.343) 
1.20 
(0.785) 
12 -1.24 
(-2.284)** 
-0.04 
(0.434) 
-1.24 
(-1.389) 
-0.04 
(0.264) 
-1.24 
(-1.029) 
-0.04 
(0.264) 
-1.24 
(-1.277) 
-0.04 
(-0.007) 
-1.24 
(-0.527) 
-0.04 
(0.135) 
 
-1.24 
(-1.664)** 
-0.04 
(1.306) 
-1.24 
(-1.066) 
-0.04 
(0.587) 
13 -1.21 
(-2.277)** 
-1.25 
(0.037) 
-1.21 
(-2.246)** 
-1.25 
(-0.124) 
-1.21 
(-2.659)*** 
-1.25 
(-0.129) 
-1.21 
(-1.242) 
-1.25 
(-0.220) 
-1.21 
(-1.362) 
-1.25 
(-0.066) 
 
-1.21 
(-0.552) 
-1.25 
(1.192) 
-1.21 
(-0.874) 
-1.25 
(0.429) 
14 -2.10 
(-3.755)*** 
-3.35 
(-0.598) 
-2.10 
(-3.758)*** 
-3.35 
(-0.757) 
-2.10 
(-3.623)*** 
-3.35 
(-0.775) 
-2.10 
(-2.153)** 
-3.35 
(-0.581) 
-2.10 
(-1.856)* 
-3.35 
(-0.397) 
 
-2.10 
(-2.405)*** 
-3.35 
(0.768) 
-2.10 
(-1.683)** 
-3.35 
(0.138) 
15 -0.26 
(-0.465) 
-3.62 
(-0.667) 
-0.26 
(-0.470) 
-3.62 
(-0.825) 
-0.26 
(-0.474) 
-3.62 
(-0.850) 
-0.26 
(-0.275) 
-3.62 
(-0.618) 
-0.26 
(-0.243) 
-3.62 
(-0.435) 
 
-0.26 
(0.188) 
-3.62 
(0.789) 
-0.26 
(0.008) 
-3.62 
(0.137) 
16 -0.64 
(-1.336) 
-4.27 
(-0.878) 
-0.64 
(-0.999) 
-4.27 
(-0.978) 
-0.64 
(-1.173) 
-4.27 
(-0.959) 
-0.64 
(-0.658) 
-4.27 
(-0.718) 
-0.64 
(-0.601) 
-4.27 
(-0.491) 
 
-0.64 
(0.373) 
-4.27 
(0.840) 
-0.64 
(-0.242) 
-4.27 
(0.096) 
17 -0.96 
(-1.774)* 
-5.23 
(-1.154) 
-0.96 
(-1.775)* 
-5.23 
(-1.253) 
-0.96 
(-1.806)* 
-5.23 
(-1.243) 
-0.96 
(-0.983) 
-5.23 
(-0.868) 
-0.96 
(-0.925) 
-5.23 
(-0.637) 
 
-0.96 
(-1.293)* 
-5.23 
(0.619) 
-0.96 
(-0.691) 
-5.23 
(-0.017) 
18 -0.01 
(-0.039) 
-5.24 
(-1.145) 
-0.01 
(-0.208) 
-5.24 
(-1.271) 
-0.01 
(-0.255) 
-5.24 
(-1.305) 
-0.01 
(-0.018) 
-5.24 
(-0.860) 
-0.01 
(-0.130) 
-5.24 
(-0.668) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.737) 
-5.24 
(0.492) 
-0.01 
(-0.141) 
-5.24 
(-0.039) 
19 0.62 
(1.299) 
-4.62 
(-0.925) 
0.62 
(1.663)* 
-4.62 
(-0.992) 
0.62 
(1.746)* 
-4.62 
(-1.072) 
0.62 
(0.636) 
-4.62 
(-0.749) 
0.62 
(0.894) 
-4.62 
(-0.549) 
 
0.62 
(1.484) 
-4.62 
(0.721) 
0.62 
(0.926) 
-4.62 
(0.107) 
20 0.23 
(0.382) 
-4.39 
(-0.854) 
0.23 
(0.905) 
-4.39 
(-0.838) 
0.23 
(0.708) 
-4.39 
(-0.971) 
0.23 
(0.240) 
-4.39 
(-0.702) 
0.23 
(0.363) 
-4.39 
(-0.497) 
  0.23 
(1.484) 
-4.39 
(0.944) 
0.23 
(0.487) 
-4.39 
(0.182) 
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MRRT exploration and production subsector alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and non-parametric test 
statistics for each days’ individual average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window. The event window is defined as -20 days through to 
+20 days relative to the announcement day of the MRRT. The various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using 
equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The exploration 
and production covers 35 stocks Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally 
weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted 
index. The estimation period used for the computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. The rank 
test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the average or cumulative average excess return on 
day t relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t242 average abnormal or 
cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return243. The null 
hypothesis for the rank test is that the average or average cumulative rank on day t relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is equivalent to that of the estimation 
period. 
  
                                                 
242 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. 
243 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   Non- parametric test statistic 
Cross sectional244 Standardised245 
Standardised cross 
sectional246 
Crude adjustment247 
Adjusted 
standardized cross 
sectional248 
  Generalized sign249 Rank250 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR   AR  CAR AR  CAR 
                
-20 -0.70 
(-1.257) 
-0.70 
(-1.257) 
-0.70 
(-1.451) 
-0.70 
(-1.451) 
-0.70 
(-1.436) 
-0.70 
(-1.436) 
-0.70 
(-0.721) 
-0.70 
(-0.721) 
-0.70 
(-0.692) 
-0.70 
(-0.692) 
 
-0.70 
(-1.335)* 
-0.70 
(-1.335)* 
-0.70 
(-0.545) 
-0.70 
(-0.545) 
-19 1.04 
(1.824)* 
0.34 
(0.401) 
1.04 
(3.156)*** 
0.34 
(1.205) 
1.04 
(2.752)*** 
0.34 
(1.118) 
1.04 
(1.068) 
0.34 
(0.245) 
1.04 
(1.326) 
0.34 
(0.538) 
 
1.04 
(3.144) 
0.34 
(1.279) 
1.04 
(1.389) 
0.34 
(0.597) 
-18 -0.25 
(-0.493) 
0.09 
(0.043) 
-0.25 
(-0.577) 
0.09 
(0.651) 
-0.25 
(-0.655) 
0.09 
(0.813) 
-0.25 
(-0.254) 
0.09 
(0.053) 
-0.25 
(-0.316) 
0.09 
(0.392) 
 
-0.25 
(0.531) 
0.09 
(1.350) 
-0.25 
(0.098) 
0.09 
(0.544) 
-17 -1.11 
(-2.424)** 
-1.02 
(-1.174) 
-1.11 
(-1.560) 
-1.02 
(-0.216) 
-1.11 
(-1.934)* 
-1.02 
(-0.288) 
-1.11 
(-1.135) 
-1.02 
(-0.521) 
-1.11 
(-0.932) 
-1.02 
(-0.139) 
 
-1.11 
(-1.895)** 
-1.02 
(0.222) 
-1.11 
(-0.828) 
-1.02 
(0.057) 
-16 -0.66 
(-1.286) 
-1.68 
(-1.625) 
-0.66 
(-1.855)* 
-1.68 
(-1.023) 
-0.66 
(-1.947)* 
-1.68 
(-1.469) 
-0.66 
(-0.674) 
-1.68 
(-0.768) 
-0.66 
(-0.938) 
-1.68 
(-0.708) 
 
-0.66 
(-1.895)** 
-1.68 
(-0.648) 
-0.66 
(-0.834) 
-1.68 
(-0.322) 
-15 -0.25 
(-0.675) 
-1.94 
(-1.760)* 
-0.25 
(-0.227) 
-1.94 
(-1.026) 
-0.25 
(-0.270) 
-1.94 
(-1.402) 
-0.25 
(-0.263) 
-1.94 
(-0.808) 
-0.25 
(-0.130) 
-1.94 
(-0.675) 
 
-0.25 
(-1.148) 
-1.94 
(-1.061) 
-0.25 
(-0.229) 
-1.94 
(-0.387) 
-14 -0.64 
(-1.404) 
-2.59 
(-2.160)** 
-0.64 
(-1.473) 
-2.59 
(-1.507) 
-0.64 
(-1.707)* 
-2.59 
(-2.097)** 
-0.64 
(-0.655) 
-2.59 
(-0.996) 
-0.64 
(-0.823) 
-2.59 
(-1.010) 
 
-0.64 
(-1.895)** 
-2.59 
(-1.699)** 
-0.64 
(-0.767) 
-2.59 
(-0.649) 
-13 -0.51 
(-0.975) 
-3.10 
(-2.365)** 
-0.51 
(-1.376) 
-3.10 
(-1.897)* 
-0.51 
(-1.456) 
-3.10 
(-2.657)*** 
-0.51 
(-0.528) 
-3.10 
(-1.119) 
-0.51 
(-0.701) 
-3.10 
(-1.280) 
 
-0.51 
(-0.588) 
-3.10 
(-1.797)** 
-0.51 
(-0.486) 
-3.10 
(-0.779) 
-12 -0.75 
(-1.213) 
-3.86 
(-2.634)*** 
-0.75 
(-1.281) 
-3.86 
(-2.215)** 
-0.75 
(-1.213) 
-3.86 
(-2.791)*** 
-0.75 
(-0.770) 
-3.86 
(-1.311) 
-0.75 
(-0.585) 
-3.86 
(-1.345) 
 
-0.75 
(-2.082)** 
-3.86 
(-2.388)*** 
-0.75 
(-0.650) 
-3.86 
(-0.951) 
-11 0.76 
(1.310) 
-3.10 
(-2.085)** 
0.76 
(2.259)** 
-3.10 
(-1.387) 
0.76 
(1.867)* 
-3.10 
(-1.782)* 
0.76 
(0.777) 
-3.10 
(-0.998) 
0.76 
(0.900) 
-3.10 
(-0.858) 
 
0.76 
(3.704) 
-3.10 
(-1.094) 
0.76 
(1.061) 
-3.10 
(-0.566) 
                                                 
244 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
245 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
246 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
247 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
248 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
249 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
250 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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-10 -0.17 
(-0.362) 
-3.27 
(-2.097)** 
-0.17 
(-0.473) 
-3.27 
(-1.465) 
-0.17 
(-0.501) 
-3.27 
(-1.982)** 
-0.17 
(-0.175) 
-3.27 
(-1.005) 
-0.17 
(-0.241) 
-3.27 
(-0.955) 
 
-0.17 
(-1.895)** 
-3.27 
(-1.615)* 
-0.17 
(-0.339) 
-3.27 
(-0.642) 
-9 -0.92 
(-2.057)** 
-4.19 
(-2.602)** 
-0.92 
(-2.183)** 
-4.19 
(-2.033)** 
-0.92 
(-2.450)** 
-4.19 
(-2.771)*** 
-0.92 
(-0.939) 
-4.19 
(-1.233) 
-0.92 
(-1.181) 
-4.19 
(-1.335) 
 
-0.92 
(-3.015)*** 
-4.19 
(-2.417)*** 
-0.92 
(-1.235) 
-4.19 
(-0.972) 
-8 0.29 
(0.629) 
-3.90 
(-2.325)** 
0.29 
(0.921) 
-3.90 
(-1.697)* 
0.29 
(1.147) 
-3.90 
(-2.301)** 
0.29 
(0.301) 
-3.90 
(-1.101) 
0.29 
(0.553) 
-3.90 
(-1.109) 
 
0.29 
(2.770) 
-3.90 
(-1.553)* 
0.29 
(0.956) 
-3.90 
(-0.668) 
-7 0.37 
(0.764) 
-3.52 
(-2.036)** 
0.37 
(0.905) 
-3.52 
(-1.394) 
0.37 
(1.181) 
-3.52 
(-1.901)* 
0.37 
(0.385) 
-3.52 
(-0.958) 
0.37 
(0.569) 
-3.52 
(-0.916) 
 
0.37 
(2.210) 
-3.52 
(-0.906) 
0.37 
(0.972) 
-3.52 
(-0.384) 
-6 -0.49 
(-0.982) 
-4.01 
(-2.221)** 
-0.49 
(-1.017) 
-4.01 
(-1.609) 
-0.49 
(-1.065) 
-4.01 
(-2.175)** 
-0.49 
(-0.498) 
-4.01 
(-1.054) 
-0.49 
(-0.513) 
-4.01 
(-1.048) 
 
-0.49 
(0.531) 
-4.01 
(-0.738) 
-0.49 
(-0.278) 
-4.01 
(-0.443) 
-5 0.72 
(1.563) 
-3.28 
(-1.759)* 
0.72 
(1.645) 
-3.28 
(-1.147) 
0.72 
(1.862)* 
-3.28 
(-1.510) 
0.72 
(0.738) 
-3.28 
(-0.836) 
0.72 
(0.897) 
-3.28 
(-0.728) 
 
0.72 
(2.957) 
-3.28 
(0.024) 
0.72 
(1.348) 
-3.28 
(-0.092) 
-4 -0.73 
(-1.614) 
-4.01 
(-2.098)** 
-0.73 
(-1.151) 
-4.01 
(-1.392) 
-0.73 
(-1.457) 
-4.01 
(-1.948)* 
-0.73 
(-0.743) 
-4.01 
(-0.992) 
-0.73 
(-0.702) 
-4.01 
(-0.939) 
 
-0.73 
(0.344) 
-4.01 
(0.107) 
-0.73 
(-0.468) 
-4.01 
(-0.202) 
-3 -0.66 
(-1.263) 
-4.68 
(-2.337)** 
-0.66 
(-1.277) 
-4.68 
(-1.654) 
-0.66 
(-1.284) 
-4.68 
(-2.230)** 
-0.66 
(-0.680) 
-4.68 
(-1.124) 
-0.66 
(-0.619) 
-4.68 
(-1.074) 
 
-0.66 
(-0.215) 
-4.68 
(0.053) 
-0.66 
(-0.376) 
-4.68 
(-0.285) 
-2 -1.47 
(-2.836)*** 
-6.16 
(-2.925)*** 
-1.47 
(-2.677)*** 
-6.16 
(-2.224)** 
-1.47 
(-2.646)*** 
-6.16 
(-3.117)*** 
-1.47 
(-1.505) 
-6.16 
(-1.440) 
-1.47 
(-1.275) 
-6.16 
(-1.502) 
 
-1.47 
(-1.522)* 
-6.16 
(-0.297) 
-1.47 
(-1.099) 
-6.16 
(-0.530) 
-1 2.96 
(4.408)*** 
-3.20 
(-1.865)* 
2.96 
(6.772)*** 
-3.20 
(-0.653) 
2.96 
(3.692)*** 
-3.20 
(-0.802) 
2.96 
(3.014)*** 
-3.20 
(-0.729) 
2.96 
(1.779)* 
-3.20 
(-0.386) 
 
2.96 
(4.824) 
-3.20 
(0.789) 
2.96 
(2.509) 
-3.20 
(0.044) 
0 0.88 
(1.632) 
-2.32 
(-1.464) 
0.88 
(1.466) 
-2.32 
(-0.317) 
0.88 
(1.487) 
-2.32 
(-0.384) 
0.88 
(0.897) 
-2.32 
(-0.516) 
0.88 
(0.717) 
-2.32 
(-0.185) 
 
0.88 
(2.210) 
-2.32 
(1.252) 
0.88 
(0.751) 
-2.32 
(0.207) 
1 0.61 
(0.995) 
-1.70 
(-1.218) 
0.61 
(1.475) 
-1.70 
(0.004) 
0.61 
(1.254) 
-1.70 
(0.004) 
0.61 
(0.625) 
-1.70 
(-0.370) 
0.61 
(0.604) 
-1.70 
(0.002) 
 
0.61 
(3.890) 
-1.70 
(2.053) 
0.61 
(1.387) 
-1.70 
(0.498) 
2 -0.83 
(-1.843)* 
-2.54 
(-1.576) 
-0.83 
(-1.721)* 
-2.54 
(-0.354) 
-0.83 
(-2.114)** 
-2.54 
(-0.427) 
-0.83 
(-0.849) 
-2.54 
(-0.539) 
-0.83 
(-1.019) 
-2.54 
(-0.206) 
 
-0.83 
(-2.455)*** 
-2.54 
(1.496) 
-0.83 
(-0.943) 
-2.54 
(0.290) 
3 0.40 
(1.114) 
-2.14 
(-1.315) 
0.40 
(0.296) 
-2.14 
(-0.286) 
0.40 
(0.448) 
-2.14 
(-0.354) 
0.40 
(0.407) 
-2.14 
(-0.445) 
0.40 
(0.216) 
-2.14 
(-0.170) 
 
0.40 
(2.397) 
-2.14 
(1.954) 
0.40 
(0.524) 
-2.14 
(0.391) 
4 -0.54 
(-0.818) 
-2.68 
(-1.452) 
-0.54 
(-2.300)** 
-2.68 
(-0.741) 
-0.54 
(-2.338)** 
-2.68 
(-0.957) 
-0.54 
(-0.552) 
-2.68 
(-0.546) 
-0.54 
(-1.126) 
-2.68 
(-0.461) 
 
-0.54 
(-3.015)*** 
-2.68 
(1.311) 
-0.54 
(-1.311)* 
-2.68 
(0.121) 
5 -0.54 
(-1.038) 
-3.23 
(-1.628) 
-0.54 
(0.556) 
-3.23 
(-0.617) 
-0.54 
(0.515) 
-3.23 
(-0.738) 
-0.54 
(-0.554) 
-3.23 
(-0.645) 
-0.54 
(0.248) 
-3.23 
(-0.355) 
 
-0.54 
(0.157) 
-3.23 
(1.316) 
-0.54 
(0.213) 
-3.23 
(0.160) 
6 0.82 
(1.563) 
-2.40 
(-1.297) 
0.82 
(1.679)* 
-2.40 
(-0.282) 
0.82 
(1.887)* 
-2.40 
(-0.343) 
0.82 
(0.840) 
-2.40 
(-0.471) 
0.82 
(0.909) 
-2.40 
(-0.165) 
 
0.82 
(-0.028) 
-2.40 
(1.286) 
0.82 
(0.450) 
-2.40 
(0.244) 
7 1.34 
(2.864)*** 
-1.05 
(-0.732) 
1.34 
(2.228)** 
-1.05 
(0.143) 
1.34 
(2.597)** 
-1.05 
(0.168) 
1.34 
(1.371) 
-1.05 
(-0.203) 
1.34 
(1.251) 
-1.05 
(0.080) 
 
1.34 
(2.770) 
-1.05 
(1.787) 
1.34 
(1.057) 
-1.05 
(0.439) 
8 -0.02 
(-0.050) 
-1.08 
(-0.728) 
-0.02 
(0.063) 
-1.08 
(0.152) 
-0.02 
(0.055) 
-1.08 
(0.173) 
-0.02 
(-0.026) 
-1.08 
(-0.205) 
-0.02 
(0.026) 
-1.08 
(0.083) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.335)* 
-1.08 
(1.508) 
-0.02 
(-0.267) 
-1.08 
(0.382) 
9 1.14 
(2.127)** 
0.05 
(-0.328) 
1.14 
(2.062)** 
0.05 
(0.526) 
1.14 
(2.153)** 
0.05 
(0.621) 
1.14 
(1.165) 
0.05 
(0.011) 
1.14 
(1.037) 
0.05 
(0.299) 
 
1.14 
(3.144) 
0.05 
(2.056) 
1.14 
(1.026) 
0.05 
(0.563) 
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10 0.90 
(2.356)** 
0.96 
(0.100) 
0.90 
(1.811)* 
0.96 
(0.843) 
0.90 
(2.555)** 
0.96 
(1.008) 
0.90 
(0.919) 
0.96 
(0.175) 
0.90 
(1.231) 
0.96 
(0.485) 
 
0.90 
(4.077) 
0.96 
(2.755) 
0.90 
(1.183) 
0.96 
(0.766) 
11 0.11 
(0.274) 
1.08 
(0.147) 
0.11 
(0.368) 
1.08 
(0.895) 
0.11 
(0.436) 
1.08 
(1.057) 
0.11 
(0.122) 
1.08 
(0.194) 
0.11 
(0.210) 
1.08 
(0.509) 
 
0.11 
(1.091) 
1.08 
(2.905) 
0.11 
(0.522) 
1.08 
(0.847) 
12 -0.60 
(-1.557) 
0.47 
(-0.126) 
-0.60 
(-1.585) 
0.47 
(0.605) 
-0.60 
(-2.174)** 
0.47 
(0.717) 
-0.60 
(-0.614) 
0.47 
(0.084) 
-0.60 
(-1.048) 
0.47 
(0.345) 
 
-0.60 
(-3.202)*** 
0.47 
(2.303) 
-0.60 
(-0.989) 
0.47 
(0.661) 
13 0.44 
(0.777) 
0.91 
(0.009) 
0.44 
(0.965) 
0.91 
(0.762) 
0.44 
(0.851) 
0.91 
(0.859) 
0.44 
(0.448) 
0.91 
(0.160) 
0.44 
(0.410) 
0.91 
(0.414) 
 
0.44 
(-0.588) 
0.91 
(2.168) 
0.44 
(0.177) 
0.91 
(0.682) 
14 1.15 
(2.373)** 
2.07 
(0.410) 
1.15 
(2.728)*** 
2.07 
(1.212) 
1.15 
(3.285)*** 
2.07 
(1.403) 
1.15 
(1.174) 
2.07 
(0.356) 
1.15 
(1.583) 
2.07 
(0.676) 
 
1.15 
(5.010) 
2.07 
(2.984) 
1.15 
(1.837) 
2.07 
(0.983) 
15 -1.68 
(-3.336)*** 
0.39 
(-0.151) 
-1.68 
(-3.293)*** 
0.39 
(0.646) 
-1.68 
(-3.364)*** 
0.39 
(0.748) 
-1.68 
(-1.711)* 
0.39 
(0.066) 
-1.68 
(-1.621) 
0.39 
(0.360) 
 
-1.68 
(-2.455)*** 
0.39 
(2.533) 
-1.68 
(-1.410)* 
0.39 
(0.734) 
16 -0.70 
(-1.208) 
-0.31 
(-0.348) 
-0.70 
(-0.465) 
-0.31 
(0.561) 
-0.70 
(-0.490) 
-0.31 
(0.639) 
-0.70 
(-0.717) 
-0.31 
(-0.052) 
-0.70 
(-0.236) 
-0.31 
(0.308) 
 
-0.70 
(-2.642)*** 
-0.31 
(2.064) 
-0.70 
(-0.533) 
-0.31 
(0.636) 
17 -0.72 
(-1.506) 
-1.04 
(-0.587) 
-0.72 
(-1.611) 
-1.04 
(0.292) 
-0.72 
(-2.032)** 
-1.04 
(0.330) 
-0.72 
(-0.742) 
-1.04 
(-0.172) 
-0.72 
(-0.979) 
-1.04 
(0.159) 
 
-0.72 
(-1.895)** 
-1.04 
(1.729) 
-0.72 
(-0.650) 
-1.04 
(0.522) 
18 -0.49 
(-0.981) 
-1.53 
(-0.737) 
-0.49 
(-1.274) 
-1.53 
(0.084) 
-0.49 
(-1.431) 
-1.53 
(0.093) 
-0.49 
(-0.502) 
-1.53 
(-0.250) 
-0.49 
(-0.689) 
-1.53 
(0.045) 
 
-0.49 
(-3.948)*** 
-1.53 
(1.074) 
-0.49 
(-0.996) 
-1.53 
(0.356) 
19 0.63 
(1.537) 
-0.90 
(-0.485) 
0.63 
(1.105) 
-0.90 
(0.258) 
0.63 
(1.281) 
-0.90 
(0.295) 
0.63 
(0.641) 
-0.90 
(-0.145) 
0.63 
(0.617) 
-0.90 
(0.142) 
 
0.63 
(2.957) 
-0.90 
(1.529) 
0.63 
(0.446) 
-0.90 
(0.422) 
20 1.69 
(2.854)*** 
0.78 
(-0.033) 
1.69 
(2.911)*** 
0.78 
(0.710) 
1.69 
(2.813)*** 
0.78 
(0.834) 
1.69 
(1.720)* 
0.78 
(0.124) 
1.69 
(1.356) 
0.78 
(0.402) 
  1.69 
(4.824) 
0.78 
(2.263) 
1.69 
(1.677) 
0.78 
(0.679) 
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RSPT exploration and production subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric and 
non-parametric test statistics for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The various 
corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS (equation 
(7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The exploration and production subsector covers 117 stocks. Individual firm excess 
returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is computed 
as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess 
return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on  the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the computation of 
all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. The rank test combines the estimation period and event window (i.e. 
[-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed RSPT is 
zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t251 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is equal to the number 
expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return252. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within period t surrounding the 
announcement of the proposed RSPT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
251 Relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT. 
252 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days relative to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   
Non- parametric test 
statistic 
Cross 
sectional253 
Standardised254 
Standardised 
cross 
sectional255 
Crude 
adjustment256 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional257 
  
Generalized 
sign258 
Rank259 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
         
car (-1 +1) -2.04 
(-1.899)* 
-2.04 
(-2.681)*** 
-2.04 
(-2.722)*** 
-2.04 
(-1.206) 
-2.04 
(-1.395) 
 
-2.04 
(-2.454)*** 
-2.04 
(-1.236) 
car ( -2 +2) -6.13 
(-4.252)*** 
-6.13 
(-6.030)*** 
-6.13 
(-4.488)*** 
-6.13 
(-2.809)*** 
-6.13 
(-2.299)** 
 
-6.13 
(-4.052)*** 
-6.13 
(-2.314)** 
car (-5+5) -5.49 
(-2.500)** 
-5.49 
(-3.158)*** 
-5.49 
(-2.894)*** 
-5.49 
(-1.696)* 
-5.49 
(-1.483) 
 
-5.49 
(-1.274) 
-5.49 
(-1.208) 
car(-20+20) -4.39 
(-0.854) 
-4.39 
(-0.838) 
-4.39 
(-0.971) 
-4.39 
(-0.702) 
-4.39 
(-0.497) 
 
-4.39 
(0.944) 
-4.39 
(0.182) 
car (1+5) -4.49 
(-3.229)*** 
-4.49 
(-3.355)*** 
-4.49 
(-4.754)*** 
-4.49 
(-2.055)** 
-4.49 
(-2.436)** 
 
-4.49 
(-2.147)** 
-4.49 
(-1.645)** 
car (-5 -1) -0.96 
(-0.443) 
-0.96 
(-1.175) 
-0.96 
(-0.843) 
-0.96 
(-0.442) 
-0.96 
(-0.431) 
 
-0.96 
(0.172) 
-0.96 
(-0.135) 
                                                 
253 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
254 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in ((24), (25) and (26). 
255 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
256 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in ((28), (29) and (30). 
257 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
258 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
259 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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MRRT exploration and production subsector multi day window alternative statistical tests comparisons: This table reports a set of parametric 
and non-parametric test statistics for various multi day period cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the resource super profit tax. The 
various corresponding t- statistics and Z- scores are reported in brackets. Excess returns are computed using equation (8). Market model parameters are estimated by OLS 
(equation (7)) in conjunction with the Scholes-Williams  technique as described in equation (9). The exploration and production subsector covers 117 stocks. Individual firm 
excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted average abnormal return for day t is 
computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day 
excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The estimation period used for the 
computation of all but the rank test is -272 through -21 trading days relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. The rank test combines the estimation period and 
event window (i.e. [-272 +20]). The null hypothesis for the parametric tests is that the cumulative average excess return within period t surrounding the announcement of the 
proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the number of day t260 cumulative average abnormal performances having a positive sign is 
equal to the number expected to have a positive sign in the absence of abnormal return261. The null hypothesis for the rank test is that the average cumulative rank within 
period t surrounding the announcement of the proposed MRRT is equivalent to that of the estimation period. 
  
                                                 
260 Relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT. 
261 The number expected to have a positive sign is based on the fraction of positive excess performance in the estimation period. 
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Days relative to AD 
Test Statistics 
Parametric test statistic   
Non- parametric test 
statistic 
Cross 
sectional262 
Standardised263 
Standardised 
cross 
sectional264 
Crude 
adjustment265 
Adjusted 
standardized 
cross 
sectional266 
  
Generalized 
sign267 
Rank268 
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR   CAR CAR 
         
car (-1 +1) 4.45 
(4.062)*** 
4.45 
(5.608)*** 
4.45 
(4.008)*** 
4.45 
(2.619)*** 
4.45 
(1.931)* 
 
4.45 
(6.308) 
4.45 
(2.684) 
car ( -2 +2) 2.14 
(1.053) 
2.14 
(2.377)** 
2.14 
(2.177)** 
2.14 
(0.975) 
2.14 
(1.049) 
 
2.14 
(3.107) 
2.14 
(1.165) 
car (-5+5) 0.78 
(0.090) 
0.78 
(0.930) 
0.78 
(1.004) 
0.78 
(0.240) 
0.78 
(0.484) 
 
0.78 
(2.886) 
0.78 
(0.764) 
car(-20+20) 0.78 
(-0.033) 
0.78 
(0.710) 
0.78 
(0.834) 
0.78 
(0.124) 
0.78 
(0.402) 
 
0.78 
(2.263) 
0.78 
(0.679) 
car (1+5) -0.90 
(-0.711) 
-0.90 
(-0.756) 
-0.90 
(-0.836) 
-0.90 
(-0.413) 
-0.90 
(-0.403) 
 
-0.90 
(0.436) 
-0.90 
(-0.057) 
car (-5 -1) 0.80 
(0.115) 
0.80 
(1.480) 
0.80 
(1.380) 
0.80 
(0.367) 
0.80 
(0.665) 
 
0.80 
(2.857) 
0.80 
(0.856) 
 
  
                                                 
262 The cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional standard deviation and is defined as in (22) and (23). 
263 The standardised test statistic for day t is equal to the sum of the day t standardized abnormal returns divided by the squared root of the number of firms. The standardized abnormal return for day t is the ratio of the 
day t excess returns over its estimated estimation period standard deviation with the latter adjusted to account for the forecast error. The standardized test statistic is described in (24), (25) and (26). 
264 The standardized cross sectional test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average standardized excess return divided by its contemporaneous cross sectional variance and is described in (27). 
265 The crude adjustment test statistic for day t is equal to the day t average excess performance divided by the standard deviation of the time series average excess performances over the estimation period and is 
described in (28), (29) and (30). 
266 The adjusted standardized cross sectional test statistic is equal to the standardized cross sectional test statistic multiplied by the square root of the correlation factor as described in (27), (31) and (43). 
267 The numerator of the generalized sign test for day t is equal to the observed number of stocks having a positive abnormal return at day t minus the proportion of the estimation period positive excess performance 
multiplied by the number of stocks.  The generalized sign test is then equal to the ratio of the numerator and the standard deviation of a binomial distribution and is defined in (35), (36) and (37). 
268 The rank test for day t is equal to the day t mean excess rank divided by the time series standard deviation of the average excess performance ranks and is described in (32), (33) and (34). 
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Appendix 3: Chapter 7 - Value weighted portfolio results 
 
Value weighted portfolio market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal 
and cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (8): 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameters estimates from 
the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in (9).  The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement of the proposed resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production 
subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & steel, 3 to 
the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  Individual firm 
excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The value weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any 
subsector on day t is computed as in (20) where 
=
−−=
n
i
ititi MVMVw
1
11 /  and where iMV represents the market capitalisation for firm i . The cumulative average abnormal 
return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously 
compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted 
standardized cross sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the 
event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero 
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. 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 0.25 
(0.939) 
0.25 
(0.939) 
0.85 
(0.356) 
0.85 
(0.356) 
-0.29 
(0.415) 
-0.29 
(0.415) 
2.85 
(1.625) 
2.85 
(1.625) 
0.93 
(0.852) 
0.93 
(0.852) 
-0.45 
(0.849) 
-0.45 
(0.849) 
0.36 
(2.127)** 
0.36 
(2.127)** 
-19 0.86 
(0.426) 
1.11 
(0.972) 
-0.32 
(0.450) 
0.53 
(0.592) 
0.18 
(-0.081) 
-0.10 
(0.234) 
1.52 
(1.385) 
4.38 
(2.122)** 
1.63 
(1.247) 
2.56 
(1.624) 
7.86 
(0.785) 
7.41 
(1.163) 
0.36 
(0.068) 
0.73 
(1.448) 
-18 0.44 
(0.653) 
1.55 
(1.183) 
0.54 
(1.171) 
1.07 
(1.323) 
0.37 
(0.269) 
0.27 
(0.338) 
1.18 
(0.316) 
5.56 
(2.060)** 
1.58 
(0.611) 
4.15 
(1.656) 
-0.12 
(0.599) 
7.28 
(1.384) 
-0.04 
(0.359) 
0.68 
(1.293) 
-17 0.04 
(0.438) 
1.60 
(1.312) 
-0.33 
(0.348) 
0.73 
(1.246) 
-0.07 
(0.512) 
0.19 
(0.563) 
0.87 
(0.156) 
6.44 
(2.293)** 
-0.15 
(0.671) 
3.99 
(2.097)** 
1.07 
(0.298) 
8.36 
(1.392) 
0.11 
(-0.116) 
0.79 
(1.414) 
-16 -0.36 
(0.711) 
1.23 
(1.485) 
-0.08 
(1.372) 
0.64 
(1.573) 
-0.79 
(0.315) 
-0.60 
(0.647) 
-0.45 
(1.394) 
5.99 
(2.560)** 
-0.15 
(0.010) 
3.83 
(2.053)** 
1.34 
(0.785) 
9.70 
(1.699)* 
-0.05 
(-0.254) 
0.74 
(1.210) 
-15 0.28 
(0.793) 
1.52 
(1.689)* 
0.90 
(0.576) 
1.55 
(1.920)* 
-0.08 
(0.638) 
-0.69 
(0.908) 
2.55 
(2.282)** 
8.54 
(3.061)*** 
0.13 
(-0.247) 
3.97 
(1.873)* 
0.33 
(0.688) 
10.04 
(1.596) 
-0.85 
(0.387) 
-0.10 
(1.142) 
-14 0.27 
(0.339) 
1.79 
(1.661)* 
-0.23 
(-0.033) 
1.32 
(1.658)* 
0.41 
(0.587) 
-0.27 
(1.077) 
0.76 
(1.078) 
9.31 
(3.086)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.176) 
3.85 
(1.560) 
-1.53 
(-0.252) 
8.51 
(1.443) 
2.30 
(1.215) 
2.19 
(1.360) 
-13 -0.74 
(-1.134) 
1.04 
(1.310) 
-0.92 
(-0.073) 
0.39 
(1.564) 
-0.55 
(-1.454) 
-0.83 
(0.572) 
-1.17 
(-1.485) 
8.14 
(2.859)*** 
-1.71 
(-0.958) 
2.14 
(1.150) 
-0.81 
(-0.858) 
7.69 
(1.239) 
-0.31 
(0.166) 
1.87 
(1.440) 
-12 -0.66 
(-0.249) 
0.37 
(1.145) 
-0.55 
(-0.357) 
-0.16 
(1.278) 
-0.55 
(0.552) 
-1.38 
(0.705) 
-1.20 
(-1.085) 
6.94 
(2.895)*** 
-1.70 
(-2.051)** 
0.43 
(0.467) 
-0.72 
(-0.139) 
6.97 
(1.132) 
-0.23 
(-0.490) 
1.64 
(1.313) 
-11 -0.21 
(0.037) 
0.15 
(1.137) 
0.23 
(0.199) 
0.06 
(1.377) 
-0.31 
(0.160) 
-1.70 
(0.699) 
-0.33 
(-0.620) 
6.60 
(3.031)*** 
-1.32 
(-0.357) 
-0.89 
(0.362) 
-0.17 
(0.089) 
6.80 
(1.135) 
-0.04 
(-0.100) 
1.59 
(1.297) 
-10 -0.19 
(-0.263) 
-0.04 
(0.997) 
-0.91 
(-0.234) 
-0.84 
(1.232) 
-0.23 
(-0.710) 
-1.94 
(0.444) 
0.55 
(1.002) 
7.15 
(3.077)*** 
-0.20 
(-0.577) 
-1.09 
(0.057) 
1.33 
(0.505) 
8.13 
(1.262) 
-0.58 
(-0.923) 
1.01 
(0.902) 
-9 0.01 
(-0.800) 
-0.02 
(0.690) 
0.01 
(-0.143) 
-0.83 
(1.100) 
0.12 
(-1.535) 
-1.81 
(-0.015) 
0.83 
(0.847) 
7.99 
(2.808)*** 
-0.27 
(0.013) 
-1.36 
(0.053) 
-0.03 
(-1.121) 
8.09 
(0.927) 
-1.59 
(-0.645) 
-0.58 
(0.616) 
-8 0.06 
(0.434) 
0.04 
(0.780) 
0.41 
(0.087) 
-0.41 
(1.126) 
0.02 
(0.914) 
-1.79 
(0.333) 
0.22 
(0.658) 
8.21 
(2.912)*** 
-0.38 
(-0.515) 
-1.75 
(-0.119) 
-1.08 
(-0.610) 
7.01 
(0.762) 
1.26 
(0.524) 
0.68 
(0.735) 
-7 -0.21 
(0.273) 
-0.17 
(0.832) 
0.52 
(0.881) 
0.10 
(1.282) 
-0.71 
(-0.146) 
-2.51 
(0.283) 
0.01 
(0.282) 
8.23 
(2.756)*** 
0.37 
(-0.052) 
-1.37 
(-0.125) 
0.66 
(0.395) 
7.67 
(0.797) 
-0.08 
(0.457) 
0.60 
(0.878) 
-6 -0.03 
(0.040) 
-0.20 
(0.831) 
0.52 
(-0.297) 
0.63 
(1.203) 
-0.11 
(-0.393) 
-2.62 
(0.169) 
0.07 
(0.936) 
8.30 
(2.888)*** 
-0.38 
(0.249) 
-1.76 
(-0.065) 
0.42 
(0.524) 
8.10 
(0.923) 
-1.43 
(-0.199) 
-0.83 
(0.690) 
-5 0.18 
(0.487) 
-0.02 
(0.941) 
-0.19 
(1.375) 
0.44 
(1.711)* 
0.11 
(0.121) 
-2.51 
(0.200) 
0.38 
(0.518) 
8.69 
(2.485)** 
-0.04 
(-0.845) 
-1.81 
(-0.242) 
1.05 
(0.262) 
9.15 
(0.962) 
0.27 
(0.148) 
-0.55 
(0.727) 
388 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-4 0.16 
(-0.009) 
0.14 
(0.907) 
0.36 
(0.162) 
0.80 
(1.583) 
0.16 
(0.069) 
-2.35 
(0.223) 
-0.13 
(-0.202) 
8.55 
(2.509)** 
-0.20 
(0.279) 
-2.01 
(-0.129) 
1.00 
(0.244) 
10.16 
(0.989) 
-1.03 
(-1.712)* 
-1.58 
(0.179) 
-3 -0.55 
(-1.486) 
-0.40 
(0.406) 
-0.26 
(-0.624) 
0.53 
(1.360) 
-0.72 
(-1.625) 
-3.08 
(-0.370) 
-0.54 
(-0.545) 
8.00 
(2.302)** 
-1.38 
(-2.555)** 
-3.40 
(-0.844) 
-0.09 
(-0.437) 
10.07 
(0.873) 
-0.01 
(-1.927)* 
-1.59 
(-0.520) 
-2 -0.47 
(-1.139) 
-0.87 
(0.084) 
-0.23 
(-1.353) 
0.30 
(0.667) 
-0.57 
(-1.396) 
-3.65 
(-0.812) 
-0.11 
(-1.592) 
7.89 
(2.135)** 
-0.54 
(0.138) 
-3.94 
(-0.807) 
-0.48 
(0.029) 
9.58 
(0.889) 
-0.60 
(-0.545) 
-2.20 
(-0.595) 
-1 -0.67 
(-0.705) 
-1.55 
(-0.089) 
0.09 
(-0.019) 
0.39 
(0.636) 
-0.44 
(-0.807) 
-4.09 
(-1.023) 
-1.47 
(-0.026) 
6.41 
(1.986)* 
0.86 
(-0.114) 
-3.08 
(-0.838) 
-1.71 
(-0.654) 
7.87 
(0.740) 
-2.78 
(-2.407)** 
-4.99 
(-1.339) 
0 -2.04 
(-2.389)** 
-3.59 
(-0.756) 
-0.29 
(-0.312) 
0.09 
(0.530) 
-2.60 
(-2.374)** 
-6.69 
(-1.643) 
-3.11 
(-3.252)*** 
3.30 
(1.424) 
-2.24 
(-2.119)** 
-5.32 
(-1.444) 
-2.20 
(-1.600) 
5.67 
(0.284) 
-1.93 
(-2.870)*** 
-6.93 
(-2.360)** 
1 -1.28 
(-3.100)*** 
-4.88 
(-1.655)* 
-0.18 
(-2.362)** 
-0.08 
(-0.095) 
-1.28 
(-3.018)*** 
-7.97 
(-2.564)** 
-1.80 
(-2.618)** 
1.49 
(0.913) 
-1.50 
(-2.646)*** 
-6.83 
(-2.261)** 
-1.19 
(-1.843)* 
4.47 
(-0.301) 
-3.84 
(-2.008)* 
-10.78 
(-2.660)** 
2 1.44 
(-2.300)** 
-3.44 
(-2.297)** 
-0.03 
(-2.144)** 
-0.11 
(-0.646) 
2.09 
(-3.172)*** 
-5.88 
(-3.539)*** 
-0.67 
(-0.121) 
0.82 
(0.755) 
0.43 
(-1.430) 
-6.40 
(-2.620)** 
-0.06 
(-0.902) 
4.40 
(-0.551) 
4.95 
(-0.113) 
-5.82 
(-2.626)** 
3 0.99 
(-0.248) 
-2.44 
(-2.204)** 
1.37 
(-0.594) 
1.25 
(-0.760) 
-0.21 
(-0.351) 
-6.09 
(-3.392)*** 
3.55 
(0.714) 
4.38 
(0.928) 
1.40 
(-0.693) 
-5.00 
(-2.767)*** 
3.38 
(-0.052) 
7.79 
(-0.525) 
2.42 
(0.226) 
-3.40 
(-2.163)** 
4 1.70 
(-0.975) 
-0.73 
(-2.409)** 
0.43 
(-1.199) 
1.69 
(-1.109) 
2.07 
(-1.325) 
-4.01 
(-3.621)*** 
0.32 
(-0.936) 
4.70 
(0.785) 
1.41 
(-1.107) 
-3.58 
(-3.203)*** 
2.88 
(0.296) 
10.68 
(-0.425) 
2.17 
(-0.315) 
-1.22 
(-2.013)* 
5 -0.02 
(0.225) 
-0.76 
(-2.436)** 
-1.20 
(1.326) 
0.48 
(-0.803) 
0.73 
(0.126) 
-3.28 
(-3.756)*** 
-0.96 
(-0.238) 
3.73 
(0.806) 
1.18 
(0.187) 
-2.39 
(-3.170)*** 
-1.69 
(-0.674) 
8.98 
(-0.627) 
0.04 
(1.340) 
-1.18 
(-1.797)* 
6 -0.41 
(0.813) 
-1.17 
(-2.169)** 
0.07 
(1.175) 
0.56 
(-0.491) 
-0.55 
(0.975) 
-3.84 
(-3.590)*** 
-0.85 
(0.765) 
2.87 
(0.875) 
0.60 
(0.286) 
-1.79 
(-3.069)*** 
0.58 
(0.609) 
9.57 
(-0.455) 
-1.90 
(-1.651) 
-3.08 
(-1.982)* 
7 0.19 
(0.553) 
-0.97 
(-1.927)* 
0.56 
(-0.736) 
1.12 
(-0.630) 
-0.47 
(0.330) 
-4.31 
(-3.186)*** 
-0.16 
(-1.995)* 
2.71 
(0.619) 
0.05 
(0.449) 
-1.73 
(-2.853)*** 
3.94 
(2.047)** 
13.51 
(0.237) 
-0.15 
(-0.918) 
-3.24 
(-2.039)** 
8 -0.14 
(0.300) 
-1.12 
(-1.889)* 
0.32 
(-0.437) 
1.45 
(-0.715) 
-0.50 
(0.195) 
-4.81 
(-3.120)*** 
0.12 
(-0.071) 
2.84 
(0.673) 
0.21 
(0.386) 
-1.51 
(-2.838)*** 
0.61 
(1.079) 
14.13 
(0.459) 
-0.17 
(-0.086) 
-3.41 
(-2.203)** 
9 0.83 
(1.203) 
-0.29 
(-1.581) 
0.97 
(2.232)** 
2.43 
(-0.312) 
0.80 
(1.036) 
-4.00 
(-2.778)*** 
1.33 
(0.088) 
4.17 
(0.730) 
0.22 
(0.754) 
-1.29 
(-2.590)** 
0.71 
(0.775) 
14.84 
(0.621) 
0.21 
(-0.172) 
-3.20 
(-2.225)** 
10 -0.09 
(-0.353) 
-0.39 
(-1.559) 
-0.03 
(-0.074) 
2.39 
(-0.310) 
-0.76 
(-1.044) 
-4.77 
(-2.903)*** 
-0.23 
(-1.218) 
3.94 
(0.420) 
-0.53 
(-0.991) 
-1.82 
(-2.815)*** 
3.22 
(1.351) 
18.07 
(0.885) 
-0.10 
(-0.663) 
-3.31 
(-2.137)** 
11 -0.38 
(-2.312)** 
-0.77 
(-2.129)** 
-0.25 
(-0.594) 
2.14 
(-0.418) 
0.21 
(-2.445)** 
-4.55 
(-3.483)*** 
-2.91 
(-1.947)* 
1.03 
(-0.314) 
-0.88 
(-1.926)* 
-2.71 
(-3.356)*** 
-1.61 
(-2.068)** 
16.46 
(0.507) 
-0.58 
(-1.473) 
-3.89 
(-2.497)** 
389 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
12 0.51 
(-1.796)* 
-0.25 
(-2.493)** 
0.11 
(-1.509) 
2.25 
(-0.707) 
1.28 
(-1.757)* 
-3.27 
(-3.829)*** 
-0.72 
(-1.352) 
0.30 
(-0.650) 
0.09 
(-0.123) 
-2.61 
(-3.206)*** 
-0.50 
(-1.364) 
15.95 
(0.211) 
-0.69 
(-1.432) 
-4.59 
(-2.496)** 
13 0.06 
(-2.063)** 
-0.19 
(-2.838)*** 
-0.46 
(-1.274) 
1.78 
(-0.879) 
1.19 
(-2.222)** 
-2.07 
(-4.134)*** 
-1.90 
(-1.885)* 
-1.59 
(-1.176) 
-0.11 
(-1.043) 
-2.73 
(-3.106)*** 
-1.57 
(-1.809)* 
14.37 
(-0.302) 
-2.53 
(-0.992) 
-7.12 
(-2.537)** 
14 -0.00 
(-3.052)*** 
-0.19 
(-3.470)*** 
0.15 
(-1.933)* 
1.94 
(-1.338) 
0.08 
(-3.102)*** 
-1.99 
(-4.733)*** 
-0.23 
(-1.272) 
-1.83 
(-1.335) 
-0.72 
(-2.983)*** 
-3.45 
(-4.067)*** 
-2.64 
(-2.144)** 
11.73 
(-0.665) 
2.93 
(-1.532) 
-4.19 
(-2.914)*** 
15 -0.16 
(-0.081) 
-0.36 
(-3.512)*** 
0.73 
(-0.150) 
2.68 
(-1.394) 
0.17 
(-0.061) 
-1.81 
(-4.719)*** 
-1.15 
(-0.395) 
-2.98 
(-1.450) 
-1.45 
(0.468) 
-4.90 
(-4.033)*** 
0.63 
(0.118) 
12.37 
(-0.629) 
-3.06 
(-0.745) 
-7.25 
(-3.242)*** 
16 0.07 
(-0.723) 
-0.28 
(-3.520)*** 
-0.45 
(-0.709) 
2.22 
(-1.486) 
-0.04 
(-1.451) 
-1.85 
(-4.869)*** 
0.51 
(0.071) 
-2.46 
(-1.265) 
1.03 
(-0.055) 
-3.86 
(-4.130)*** 
1.33 
(0.295) 
13.70 
(-0.557) 
-1.04 
(-0.009) 
-8.29 
(-2.889)*** 
17 1.43 
(-0.571) 
1.14 
(-3.575)*** 
0.61 
(-0.957) 
2.84 
(-1.685)* 
1.40 
(-0.825) 
-0.44 
(-4.960)*** 
1.52 
(1.580) 
-0.94 
(-0.823) 
0.41 
(-0.234) 
-3.45 
(-4.157)*** 
1.44 
(-0.527) 
15.15 
(-0.631) 
4.39 
(0.289) 
-3.89 
(-2.906)*** 
18 0.93 
(-0.373) 
2.07 
(-3.693)*** 
-0.19 
(-0.402) 
2.65 
(-1.778)* 
1.81 
(-0.041) 
1.36 
(-5.003)*** 
-1.23 
(-1.323) 
-2.18 
(-1.124) 
0.59 
(-0.783) 
-2.86 
(-4.186)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.258) 
15.07 
(-0.707) 
1.15 
(0.428) 
-2.74 
(-2.831)*** 
19 -1.04 
(0.398) 
1.03 
(-3.738)*** 
-0.00 
(0.807) 
2.65 
(-1.670)* 
-1.51 
(0.408) 
-0.15 
(-5.051)*** 
0.45 
(0.460) 
-1.73 
(-1.119) 
0.20 
(0.874) 
-2.66 
(-4.001)*** 
-2.49 
(-0.243) 
12.57 
(-0.792) 
0.13 
(0.049) 
-2.61 
(-2.910)*** 
20 -0.32 
(-0.070) 
0.71 
(-3.612)*** 
-0.02 
(-0.122) 
2.63 
(-1.591) 
-0.76 
(-0.018) 
-0.92 
(-4.902)*** 
1.71 
(1.813)* 
-0.01 
(-0.789) 
-0.40 
(-0.316) 
-3.06 
(-3.950)*** 
0.54 
(-0.374) 
13.12 
(-0.830) 
-0.83 
(0.146) 
-3.44 
(-2.853)*** 
 
  
390 
Value weighted portfolio market reaction to the announcement of the proposed MRRT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal 
and cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of the mineral resource rent tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in 
(8): 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and iˆ
correspond to firm i OLS parameters estimates from 
the estimation period and are computed using the Scholes William method as defined in (9).  The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement of the proposed resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production 
subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & steel, 3 to 
the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  Individual firm 
excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6.The value weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any 
subsector on day t is computed as in (20) where 
=
−−=
n
i
ititi MVMVw
1
11 /  and where iMV represents the market capitalisation for firm i . The cumulative average abnormal 
return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously 
compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted 
standardized cross sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the 
event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 -0.23 
(-1.708)* 
-0.23 
(-1.708)* 
-0.00 
(-0.868) 
-0.00 
(-0.868) 
-0.30 
(-2.014)** 
-0.30 
(-2.014)** 
0.60 
(-0.906) 
0.60 
(-0.906) 
-0.16 
(-0.577) 
-0.16 
(-0.577) 
-0.93 
(-1.937)* 
-0.93 
(-1.937)* 
0.13 
(-0.896) 
0.13 
(-0.896) 
-19 -0.49 
(0.507) 
-0.73 
(-0.979) 
0.93 
(1.559) 
0.93 
(0.484) 
-1.14 
(0.276) 
-1.45 
(-1.275) 
0.45 
(-0.022) 
1.06 
(-0.818) 
-0.88 
(-1.451) 
-1.05 
(-1.373) 
0.34 
(1.182) 
-0.59 
(-0.888) 
-0.90 
(-0.690) 
-0.76 
(-1.704)* 
-18 0.09 
(0.360) 
-0.63 
(-0.584) 
-0.38 
(-0.287) 
0.54 
(0.258) 
-0.06 
(-0.282) 
-1.51 
(-1.218) 
-0.26 
(-0.266) 
0.79 
(-0.803) 
1.02 
(0.661) 
-0.02 
(-0.866) 
2.11 
(1.119) 
1.52 
(0.235) 
-0.58 
(1.696)* 
-1.34 
(0.088) 
-17 -0.15 
(-1.146) 
-0.79 
(-1.246) 
0.24 
(-0.866) 
0.79 
(-0.395) 
-0.20 
(-1.607) 
-1.72 
(-2.050)** 
-1.10 
(-0.729) 
-0.30 
(-1.371) 
-1.08 
(-0.564) 
-1.11 
(-0.997) 
1.26 
(-0.106) 
2.79 
(0.129) 
-0.69 
(-2.431)** 
-2.04 
(-1.453) 
-16 -0.28 
(-0.813) 
-1.07 
(-1.577) 
-0.66 
(-1.102) 
0.12 
(-1.096) 
-0.12 
(-0.573) 
-1.84 
(-2.173)** 
-0.26 
(-0.670) 
-0.57 
(-1.669) 
-0.73 
(-0.111) 
-1.85 
(-0.960) 
0.92 
(-0.386) 
3.71 
(-0.090) 
-1.57 
(-1.021) 
-3.61 
(-2.136)** 
-15 0.07 
(-0.817) 
-0.99 
(-1.790)* 
1.36 
(-0.081) 
1.48 
(-1.052) 
-0.00 
(-1.501) 
-1.84 
(-2.700)*** 
-0.76 
(-0.613) 
-1.34 
(-1.801)* 
-0.82 
(-0.447) 
-2.68 
(-1.033) 
-0.02 
(-0.128) 
3.69 
(-0.143) 
-0.66 
(-1.734)* 
-4.27 
(-2.661)** 
-14 0.14 
(-1.333) 
-0.85 
(-2.519)** 
0.79 
(-0.996) 
2.28 
(-1.437) 
0.34 
(-1.097) 
-1.50 
(-3.259)*** 
-0.52 
(-0.909) 
-1.87 
(-2.032)** 
0.51 
(-0.621) 
-2.16 
(-1.860)* 
-0.86 
(-1.882)* 
2.83 
(-1.140) 
-0.08 
(-1.352) 
-4.36 
(-2.604)** 
-13 -0.15 
(-0.987) 
-1.00 
(-2.854)*** 
-0.69 
(-0.720) 
1.58 
(-1.685)* 
-0.17 
(-0.965) 
-1.68 
(-3.499)*** 
0.39 
(-0.359) 
-1.48 
(-2.027)* 
0.59 
(-1.031) 
-1.57 
(-2.394)** 
-0.19 
(-0.751) 
2.64 
(-1.420) 
0.31 
(-0.297) 
-4.04 
(-2.838)*** 
-12 0.51 
(-1.050) 
-0.48 
(-3.056)*** 
-0.26 
(-0.914) 
1.31 
(-1.777)* 
0.89 
(-1.375) 
-0.79 
(-3.863)*** 
0.95 
(1.029) 
-0.52 
(-1.366) 
0.82 
(-0.456) 
-0.74 
(-2.168)** 
-1.15 
(-1.250) 
1.48 
(-1.760)* 
1.41 
(0.649) 
-2.62 
(-2.374)** 
-11 0.22 
(0.570) 
-0.26 
(-2.694)*** 
0.26 
(0.573) 
1.58 
(-1.343) 
-0.28 
(0.178) 
-1.07 
(-3.811)*** 
0.76 
(1.572) 
0.24 
(-0.932) 
0.63 
(0.342) 
-0.11 
(-2.017)** 
1.88 
(0.829) 
3.37 
(-1.169) 
0.81 
(-0.220) 
-1.81 
(-2.336)** 
-10 0.38 
(0.133) 
0.11 
(-2.488)** 
-0.69 
(-0.419) 
0.88 
(-1.451) 
0.29 
(-0.137) 
-0.78 
(-3.612)*** 
2.02 
(0.321) 
2.26 
(-0.738) 
0.05 
(-0.635) 
-0.05 
(-2.469)** 
1.66 
(1.140) 
5.03 
(-0.463) 
0.03 
(-2.257)** 
-1.77 
(-2.853)*** 
-9 0.37 
(-0.614) 
0.49 
(-2.582)** 
0.16 
(-1.308) 
1.05 
(-1.841)* 
0.47 
(-0.241) 
-0.30 
(-3.225)*** 
-0.63 
(-0.120) 
1.63 
(-0.770) 
-0.22 
(-0.985) 
-0.28 
(-2.672)*** 
0.22 
(-0.605) 
5.26 
(-0.698) 
1.56 
(-0.099) 
-0.21 
(-2.505)** 
-8 0.38 
(-0.222) 
0.88 
(-2.672)*** 
0.10 
(0.347) 
1.15 
(-1.696)* 
0.67 
(-0.428) 
0.37 
(-3.498)*** 
0.66 
(-0.237) 
2.30 
(-0.834) 
-0.21 
(0.336) 
-0.49 
(-2.518)** 
-0.67 
(-0.170) 
4.58 
(-0.737) 
0.39 
(0.029) 
0.17 
(-2.424)** 
-7 0.31 
(0.303) 
1.19 
(-2.488)** 
-0.21 
(0.984) 
0.94 
(-1.404) 
0.25 
(-0.088) 
0.62 
(-3.514)*** 
-0.38 
(-0.935) 
1.91 
(-1.086) 
-0.51 
(-0.205) 
-1.01 
(-2.732)*** 
1.83 
(0.775) 
6.42 
(-0.472) 
0.77 
(0.660) 
0.94 
(-2.091)** 
-6 0.86 
(-0.233) 
2.05 
(-2.513)** 
-0.35 
(-0.134) 
0.58 
(-1.471) 
1.26 
(-0.441) 
1.88 
(-3.479)*** 
1.59 
(1.233) 
3.50 
(-0.567) 
0.66 
(0.001) 
-0.34 
(-2.667)*** 
0.38 
(-0.518) 
6.80 
(-0.635) 
1.11 
(0.307) 
2.06 
(-1.875)* 
-5 -0.05 
(0.437) 
1.99 
(-2.189)** 
-0.54 
(0.451) 
0.04 
(-0.957) 
-0.33 
(0.455) 
1.54 
(-3.172)*** 
-0.11 
(-0.763) 
3.39 
(-0.715) 
0.66 
(-0.108) 
0.32 
(-2.470)** 
2.16 
(0.589) 
8.97 
(-0.440) 
-0.38 
(0.317) 
1.67 
(-1.862)* 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-4 0.01 
(-0.659) 
2.01 
(-2.260)** 
0.33 
(-1.175) 
0.38 
(-1.210) 
-0.21 
(-0.524) 
1.33 
(-3.110)*** 
0.15 
(-0.007) 
3.54 
(-0.642) 
-1.55 
(-1.383) 
-1.22 
(-2.938)*** 
0.20 
(0.014) 
9.18 
(-0.418) 
0.63 
(-0.586) 
2.30 
(-1.871)* 
-3 -0.14 
(-0.786) 
1.86 
(-2.511)** 
-0.50 
(-0.405) 
-0.12 
(-1.441) 
0.24 
(-0.744) 
1.58 
(-3.210)*** 
-0.50 
(-1.495) 
3.04 
(-1.193) 
0.26 
(-0.478) 
-0.96 
(-3.154)*** 
-1.23 
(-0.665) 
7.94 
(-0.601) 
-0.23 
(-0.163) 
2.07 
(-1.961)* 
-2 -0.33 
(-1.641) 
1.53 
(-2.978)*** 
-0.12 
(-1.038) 
-0.24 
(-1.655) 
-0.47 
(-1.986)** 
1.11 
(-3.933)*** 
0.12 
(-0.337) 
3.16 
(-1.383) 
0.94 
(-1.378) 
-0.01 
(-3.193)*** 
0.56 
(-0.501) 
8.50 
(-0.710) 
-1.65 
(-1.689) 
0.42 
(-2.416)** 
-1 0.69 
(2.311)** 
2.23 
(-2.043)** 
1.13 
(1.716)* 
0.88 
(-0.814) 
0.37 
(2.826)*** 
1.49 
(-2.917)*** 
0.35 
(1.146) 
3.52 
(-0.750) 
1.97 
(2.557)** 
1.95 
(-2.159)** 
1.47 
(0.818) 
9.98 
(-0.495) 
0.76 
(1.005) 
1.18 
(-2.000)* 
0 -0.47 
(-0.013) 
1.75 
(-2.094)** 
-1.53 
(0.629) 
-0.64 
(-0.657) 
0.07 
(0.100) 
1.56 
(-3.049)*** 
-0.59 
(-0.709) 
2.93 
(-0.885) 
1.34 
(0.907) 
3.30 
(-1.813)* 
-2.83 
(-1.387) 
7.14 
(-0.841) 
0.31 
(0.222) 
1.49 
(-2.129)** 
1 0.66 
(0.518) 
2.41 
(-1.731)* 
0.75 
(0.103) 
0.10 
(-0.561) 
0.35 
(0.421) 
1.92 
(-2.835)*** 
3.20 
(0.664) 
6.14 
(-0.311) 
-0.14 
(-0.239) 
3.16 
(-1.682)* 
0.85 
(0.829) 
8.00 
(-0.570) 
0.07 
(0.807) 
1.57 
(-1.835)* 
2 -0.88 
(-1.334) 
1.53 
(-2.163)** 
0.41 
(-1.349) 
0.52 
(-0.835) 
-1.16 
(-1.217) 
0.75 
(-3.207)*** 
-0.25 
(-0.325) 
5.88 
(-0.373) 
-1.67 
(-0.628) 
1.48 
(-1.863)* 
-1.41 
(-1.198) 
6.58 
(-0.852) 
-0.83 
(-3.105)*** 
0.74 
(-2.438)** 
3 0.45 
(0.067) 
1.98 
(-2.148)** 
-0.41 
(0.211) 
0.10 
(-0.817) 
1.29 
(0.331) 
2.04 
(-3.010)*** 
-0.66 
(0.335) 
5.21 
(-0.309) 
0.17 
(-0.127) 
1.66 
(-1.991)* 
-1.58 
(-0.400) 
5.00 
(-0.977) 
0.59 
(-0.952) 
1.33 
(-2.608)** 
4 -0.87 
(-1.497) 
1.11 
(-2.557)** 
-0.35 
(-1.214) 
-0.24 
(-1.125) 
-0.92 
(-1.126) 
1.12 
(-3.217)*** 
-0.72 
(-1.633) 
4.49 
(-0.649) 
-1.31 
(-2.272)** 
0.34 
(-2.400)** 
-0.45 
(-1.582) 
4.54 
(-1.383) 
-1.06 
(-3.421)*** 
0.26 
(-3.548)*** 
5 0.25 
(-0.284) 
1.36 
(-2.511)** 
1.88 
(0.040) 
1.63 
(-1.045) 
-0.11 
(-0.140) 
1.00 
(-3.171)*** 
0.56 
(-0.013) 
5.06 
(-0.633) 
1.02 
(0.616) 
1.37 
(-2.361)** 
-0.94 
(-0.953) 
3.60 
(-1.593) 
-0.06 
(-0.981) 
0.19 
(-3.566)*** 
6 0.60 
(0.577) 
1.97 
(-2.358)** 
0.30 
(0.343) 
1.93 
(-0.926) 
0.37 
(0.923) 
1.37 
(-2.956)*** 
1.22 
(0.654) 
6.28 
(-0.524) 
1.27 
(0.360) 
2.65 
(-2.267)** 
2.00 
(0.446) 
5.60 
(-1.415) 
0.54 
(-0.272) 
0.74 
(-3.395)*** 
7 -1.12 
(0.650) 
0.84 
(-2.141)** 
-0.26 
(0.956) 
1.66 
(-0.673) 
-1.67 
(0.556) 
-0.30 
(-2.761)*** 
-0.31 
(0.158) 
5.96 
(-0.468) 
0.02 
(0.976) 
2.68 
(-1.751)* 
-0.06 
(0.211) 
5.54 
(-1.399) 
-2.23 
(-0.646) 
-1.48 
(-3.851)*** 
8 -0.59 
(-0.957) 
0.24 
(-2.287)** 
-0.23 
(-0.312) 
1.42 
(-0.677) 
-0.50 
(-0.902) 
-0.80 
(-2.802)*** 
-0.97 
(-1.846)* 
4.99 
(-0.770) 
-1.57 
(-0.982) 
1.10 
(-1.983)* 
-0.54 
(-1.348) 
4.99 
(-1.685)* 
-0.96 
(-0.149) 
-2.45 
(-3.602)*** 
9 -0.19 
(0.551) 
0.04 
(-2.201)** 
0.23 
(0.868) 
1.65 
(-0.538) 
-0.11 
(0.359) 
-0.91 
(-2.752)*** 
-0.45 
(0.461) 
4.53 
(-0.667) 
0.05 
(1.067) 
1.16 
(-1.736)* 
-0.16 
(-0.032) 
4.83 
(-1.658) 
-1.31 
(0.804) 
-3.76 
(-3.266)*** 
10 -0.07 
(0.959) 
-0.02 
(-1.959)* 
-0.00 
(0.876) 
1.65 
(-0.373) 
0.31 
(0.695) 
-0.60 
(-2.577)** 
0.30 
(1.569) 
4.84 
(-0.397) 
1.08 
(1.528) 
2.24 
(-1.394) 
-1.28 
(0.879) 
3.54 
(-1.390) 
-2.14 
(-0.555) 
-5.91 
(-3.326)*** 
11 0.16 
(0.013) 
0.13 
(-1.875)* 
0.14 
(0.243) 
1.79 
(-0.328) 
0.60 
(0.320) 
0.00 
(-2.432)** 
-0.69 
(-1.537) 
4.14 
(-0.643) 
-0.33 
(0.562) 
1.90 
(-1.205) 
-0.53 
(-0.751) 
3.00 
(-1.549) 
1.28 
(0.589) 
-4.62 
(-2.844)*** 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
12 0.04 
(-1.112) 
0.18 
(-2.041)** 
-0.58 
(-0.933) 
1.21 
(-0.458) 
0.37 
(-0.734) 
0.37 
(-2.549)** 
0.48 
(0.504) 
4.63 
(-0.549) 
-1.02 
(-1.521) 
0.88 
(-1.494) 
-1.04 
(-1.763)* 
1.95 
(-1.823)* 
-0.05 
(-2.426)** 
-4.67 
(-3.136)*** 
13 0.38 
(0.213) 
0.56 
(-1.901)* 
-0.90 
(0.159) 
0.31 
(-0.399) 
1.02 
(0.039) 
1.40 
(-2.499)** 
0.38 
(0.056) 
5.01 
(-0.526) 
-0.27 
(0.051) 
0.61 
(-1.419) 
-0.26 
(0.379) 
1.69 
(-1.436) 
0.03 
(0.206) 
-4.64 
(-3.128)*** 
14 1.22 
(1.222) 
1.78 
(-1.648)* 
0.73 
(0.918) 
1.05 
(-0.256) 
1.49 
(1.105) 
2.89 
(-2.212)** 
0.76 
(1.556) 
5.77 
(-0.307) 
2.57 
(1.585) 
3.18 
(-0.802) 
0.20 
(0.483) 
1.89 
(-1.374) 
1.74 
(0.773) 
-2.89 
(-2.927)*** 
15 -0.15 
(-0.467) 
1.63 
(-1.718)* 
0.07 
(-1.400) 
1.12 
(-0.590) 
-0.19 
(-0.017) 
2.70 
(-2.165)** 
-0.14 
(0.430) 
5.62 
(-0.220) 
0.26 
(-0.584) 
3.44 
(-0.940) 
-0.94 
(-0.104) 
0.95 
(-1.256) 
0.61 
(-0.089) 
-2.28 
(-2.847)*** 
16 -0.04 
(-0.020) 
1.58 
(-1.686)* 
-0.29 
(-0.792) 
0.83 
(-0.689) 
-0.18 
(0.427) 
2.51 
(-2.054)** 
-0.04 
(-0.206) 
5.58 
(-0.248) 
0.17 
(0.115) 
3.61 
(-0.841) 
-0.32 
(-0.172) 
0.62 
(-1.292) 
1.37 
(-0.258) 
-0.90 
(-2.733)*** 
17 -0.55 
(-0.907) 
1.03 
(-1.851)* 
-0.45 
(-0.977) 
0.38 
(-0.876) 
-0.46 
(-1.046) 
2.04 
(-2.178)** 
-0.36 
(-0.219) 
5.21 
(-0.275) 
0.82 
(0.866) 
4.44 
(-0.648) 
-1.33 
(-1.322) 
-0.71 
(-1.620) 
-1.44 
(0.406) 
-2.35 
(-2.592)** 
18 -0.33 
(-0.950) 
0.69 
(-2.053)** 
-0.36 
(-0.632) 
0.01 
(-1.005) 
0.11 
(-0.405) 
2.16 
(-2.294)** 
-1.22 
(-2.049)** 
3.99 
(-0.588) 
0.75 
(0.223) 
5.20 
(-0.565) 
-1.98 
(-1.989)** 
-2.69 
(-2.092)** 
-0.89 
(-1.309) 
-3.25 
(-2.761)*** 
19 0.35 
(0.548) 
1.05 
(-1.785)* 
-0.70 
(0.408) 
-0.69 
(-0.889) 
0.79 
(0.479) 
2.95 
(-2.147)** 
-0.40 
(0.287) 
3.59 
(-0.562) 
-0.34 
(-0.135) 
4.86 
(-0.549) 
0.34 
(0.831) 
-2.35 
(-1.800)* 
0.67 
(-0.153) 
-2.57 
(-2.636)** 
20 -0.02 
(0.993) 
1.02 
(-1.560) 
0.00 
(1.293) 
-0.68 
(-0.666) 
0.04 
(1.370) 
3.00 
(-1.748)* 
-0.54 
(-0.293) 
3.05 
(-0.673) 
-0.56 
(-0.437) 
4.29 
(-0.640) 
0.61 
(0.388) 
-1.74 
(-1.746)* 
-0.21 
(0.775) 
-2.79 
(-2.551)** 
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Appendix 4: Chapter 7 Alternative Model for measuring expected returns results 
 
Fowler Rorke model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (8): 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and i
ˆ correspond to firm i OLS parameters estimates from 
the estimation period and are computed using the Fowler and Rorke methods described  in (15).  The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement of the proposed resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production 
subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & steel, 3 to 
the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  Individual firm 
excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average abnormal return for 
any subsector on day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to 
the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics 
for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis 
for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null 
hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
0.68 
(1.111) 
0.68 
(1.111) 
0.31 
(0.708) 
0.31 
(0.708) 
0.25 
(0.638) 
0.25 
(0.638) 
2.39 
(1.597) 
2.39 
(1.597) 
0.58 
(0.845) 
0.58 
(0.845) 
1.03 
(0.891) 
1.03 
(0.891) 
2.00 
(2.212)** 
2.00 
(2.212)** 
-19 
0.64 
(0.606) 
1.33 
(1.243) 
0.74 
(0.556) 
1.06 
(1.044) 
0.08 
(0.055) 
0.34 
(0.517) 
1.53 
(1.824)* 
3.92 
(2.214)** 
1.94 
(1.183) 
2.52 
(1.524) 
1.78 
(0.889) 
2.82 
(1.240) 
-0.36 
(-0.528) 
1.63 
(1.435) 
-18 
0.64 
(0.865) 
1.97 
(1.540) 
1.23 
(1.402) 
2.29 
(1.828)* 
0.39 
(0.589) 
0.73 
(0.742) 
-0.11 
(0.360) 
3.81 
(2.108)** 
0.50 
(0.762) 
3.02 
(1.698)* 
0.94 
(0.424) 
3.76 
(1.411) 
0.67 
(0.710) 
2.31 
(1.560) 
-17 0.33 
(0.705) 
2.31 
(1.767)* 
0.19 
(0.286) 
2.49 
(1.717)* 
0.34 
(0.688) 
1.08 
(1.031) 
-0.19 
(0.307) 
3.61 
(2.319)** 
1.90 
(1.376) 
4.93 
(2.382)** 
-0.29 
(0.457) 
3.46 
(1.507) 
0.12 
(0.093) 
2.43 
(1.593) 
-16 
0.73 
(0.842) 
3.04 
(1.946)* 
1.47 
(1.142) 
3.96 
(1.884)* 
0.30 
(0.435) 
1.38 
(1.157) 
2.26 
(1.226) 
5.88 
(2.485)** 
0.51 
(0.329) 
5.44 
(2.383)** 
1.46 
(0.968) 
4.93 
(1.833)* 
0.14 
(0.110) 
2.57 
(1.454) 
-15 0.68 
(0.979) 
3.72 
(2.252)** 
0.78 
(1.083) 
4.75 
(2.434)** 
0.65 
(0.956) 
2.03 
(1.559) 
2.25 
(2.206)** 
8.13 
(2.902)*** 
0.09 
(0.069) 
5.54 
(2.294)** 
1.07 
(0.452) 
6.00 
(1.855)* 
0.65 
(0.268) 
3.22 
(1.396) 
-14 
0.15 
(0.341) 
3.88 
(2.216)** 
-0.09 
(-0.004) 
4.66 
(2.229)** 
0.41 
(0.472) 
2.45 
(1.639) 
1.37 
(1.590) 
9.51 
(3.164)*** 
-0.72 
(-0.462) 
4.81 
(2.076)** 
-0.30 
(-0.015) 
5.70 
(1.699)* 
0.68 
(1.432) 
3.91 
(1.673) 
-13 
-0.44 
(-0.637) 
3.44 
(1.958)* 
0.55 
(0.163) 
5.21 
(2.133)** 
-0.69 
(-0.904) 
1.76 
(1.326) 
-0.89 
(-1.740)* 
8.61 
(2.928)*** 
-0.46 
(-0.602) 
4.35 
(1.751)* 
-0.69 
(-0.494) 
5.00 
(1.572) 
0.58 
(0.381) 
4.49 
(1.821)* 
-12 
0.04 
(-0.215) 
3.48 
(1.803)* 
0.19 
(-0.265) 
5.40 
(1.954)* 
0.62 
(0.764) 
2.38 
(1.516) 
-0.73 
(-1.412) 
7.88 
(2.800)*** 
-1.63 
(-2.226)** 
2.71 
(1.079) 
-0.14 
(-0.229) 
4.86 
(1.438) 
-0.35 
(-0.307) 
4.14 
(1.712)* 
-11 
0.38 
(0.489) 
3.87 
(1.983)** 
0.37 
(0.648) 
5.78 
(2.214)** 
0.45 
(0.554) 
2.83 
(1.663)* 
0.45 
(0.489) 
8.33 
(3.306)*** 
-0.06 
(-0.485) 
2.64 
(0.998) 
1.04 
(0.427) 
5.90 
(1.536) 
0.19 
(-0.067) 
4.33 
(1.734)* 
-10 
-0.00 
(-0.172) 
3.86 
(1.806)* 
0.11 
(-0.216) 
5.90 
(1.787)* 
-0.50 
(-0.803) 
2.33 
(1.359) 
0.73 
(0.574) 
9.07 
(3.269)*** 
-0.81 
(-0.465) 
1.82 
(0.721) 
1.19 
(0.831) 
7.09 
(1.783)* 
-0.84 
(-0.804) 
3.49 
(1.441) 
-9 
-0.55 
(-0.560) 
3.31 
(1.536) 
-0.27 
(-0.053) 
5.63 
(1.678)* 
-0.83 
(-1.141) 
1.50 
(0.946) 
0.64 
(0.762) 
9.72 
(3.026)*** 
-0.04 
(-0.128) 
1.77 
(0.634) 
-1.14 
(-0.909) 
5.95 
(1.471) 
-0.08 
(-0.246) 
3.41 
(1.164) 
-8 
0.35 
(0.356) 
3.66 
(1.551) 
0.07 
(0.057) 
5.71 
(1.625) 
0.86 
(0.875) 
2.36 
(1.157) 
0.96 
(0.633) 
10.68 
(2.978)*** 
-0.38 
(-0.630) 
1.39 
(0.433) 
-0.55 
(-0.701) 
5.39 
(1.308) 
0.47 
(1.234) 
3.89 
(1.431) 
-7 0.12 
(0.365) 
3.79 
(1.604) 
0.66 
(1.064) 
6.37 
(1.888)* 
-0.05 
(0.007) 
2.30 
(1.120) 
0.47 
(0.284) 
11.16 
(2.858)*** 
0.02 
(0.063) 
1.41 
(0.418) 
-0.27 
(0.202) 
5.11 
(1.282) 
1.46 
(0.626) 
5.35 
(1.437) 
-6 
0.23 
(0.433) 
4.03 
(1.712)* 
-0.18 
(-0.029) 
6.19 
(1.893)* 
0.03 
(0.201) 
2.34 
(1.166) 
1.13 
(0.940) 
12.30 
(3.088)*** 
0.57 
(0.634) 
1.99 
(0.583) 
0.73 
(0.808) 
5.84 
(1.422) 
0.84 
(0.096) 
6.19 
(1.307) 
-5 
0.57 
(0.543) 
4.61 
(1.825)* 
1.68 
(1.321) 
7.87 
(2.420)** 
0.27 
(0.347) 
2.61 
(1.237) 
-0.86 
(-0.329) 
11.43 
(2.272)** 
-0.44 
(-0.531) 
1.55 
(0.504) 
1.05 
(0.422) 
6.90 
(1.504) 
-0.63 
(-0.232) 
5.56 
(1.238) 
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Days 
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to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-4 
-0.03 
(0.125) 
4.57 
(1.794)* 
-0.31 
(0.099) 
7.55 
(2.263)** 
0.33 
(0.299) 
2.95 
(1.313) 
0.12 
(-0.039) 
11.55 
(2.232)** 
0.06 
(0.000) 
1.62 
(0.469) 
0.14 
(0.246) 
7.04 
(1.507) 
-1.69 
(-0.996) 
3.87 
(1.042) 
-3 
-1.09 
(-1.250) 
3.47 
(1.361) 
-0.35 
(-0.201) 
7.20 
(2.109)** 
-1.65 
(-2.055)** 
1.29 
(0.673) 
-0.66 
(-0.825) 
10.89 
(2.124)** 
-2.42 
(-2.579)** 
-0.80 
(-0.202) 
-0.16 
(-0.108) 
6.87 
(1.420) 
-1.29 
(-1.972)* 
2.57 
(0.695) 
-2 
-0.69 
(-0.797) 
2.77 
(0.975) 
-2.04 
(-1.031) 
5.16 
(0.978) 
-0.68 
(-1.002) 
0.61 
(0.399) 
-1.76 
(-1.113) 
9.13 
(1.925)* 
0.29 
(0.040) 
-0.50 
(-0.186) 
0.28 
(0.191) 
7.16 
(1.453) 
-0.24 
(-0.722) 
2.33 
(0.509) 
-1 
-0.32 
(-0.613) 
2.44 
(0.817) 
0.08 
(-0.015) 
5.25 
(0.969) 
-0.55 
(-0.588) 
0.05 
(0.209) 
0.94 
(-0.106) 
10.07 
(1.746)* 
0.24 
(0.094) 
-0.26 
(-0.157) 
-0.65 
(-0.982) 
6.50 
(1.271) 
-1.84 
(-2.776)*** 
0.49 
(-0.077) 
0 
-1.77 
(-2.277)** 
0.67 
(0.298) 
-0.03 
(-0.201) 
5.22 
(0.929) 
-1.83 
(-2.381)** 
-1.77 
(-0.437) 
-3.02 
(-3.404)*** 
7.04 
(1.220) 
-2.21 
(-2.155)** 
-2.47 
(-0.681) 
-2.51 
(-1.615) 
3.99 
(0.892) 
-3.80 
(-3.057)*** 
-3.31 
(-0.911) 
1 
-2.24 
(-2.780)*** 
-1.57 
(-0.390) 
-2.07 
(-1.946)* 
3.14 
(0.486) 
-2.14 
(-2.657)*** 
-3.91 
(-1.216) 
-2.62 
(-3.536)*** 
4.41 
(0.788) 
-2.58 
(-2.472)** 
-5.06 
(-1.276) 
-2.29 
(-1.458) 
1.70 
(0.448) 
-2.81 
(-2.795)*** 
-6.13 
(-1.585) 
2 
-2.09 
(-2.260)** 
-3.67 
(-0.915) 
-2.05 
(-1.977)* 
1.08 
(0.121) 
-3.01 
(-3.325)*** 
-6.93 
(-2.159)** 
-1.26 
(-1.108) 
3.15 
(0.565) 
-1.57 
(-1.441) 
-6.63 
(-1.592) 
-0.63 
(-0.567) 
1.06 
(0.295) 
0.25 
(0.584) 
-5.88 
(-1.374) 
3 
-0.58 
(0.024) 
-4.26 
(-0.857) 
-0.88 
(-0.333) 
0.20 
(0.050) 
-0.58 
(-0.153) 
-7.52 
(-2.041)** 
1.11 
(1.141) 
4.27 
(0.932) 
-0.97 
(-0.684) 
-7.61 
(-1.722)* 
-0.09 
(0.302) 
0.97 
(0.345) 
0.25 
(0.725) 
-5.62 
(-0.972) 
4 
-0.78 
(-0.472) 
-5.04 
(-0.957) 
-0.98 
(-0.603) 
-0.78 
(-0.063) 
-0.92 
(-0.814) 
-8.44 
(-2.238)** 
-1.34 
(-0.807) 
2.93 
(0.824) 
-1.25 
(-0.819) 
-8.86 
(-1.954)* 
0.06 
(0.513) 
1.03 
(0.477) 
-0.28 
(0.318) 
-5.90 
(-0.806) 
5 
0.40 
(0.409) 
-4.64 
(-0.881) 
1.53 
(1.388) 
0.74 
(0.172) 
0.17 
(0.189) 
-8.27 
(-2.285)** 
0.58 
(0.191) 
3.52 
(0.881) 
0.22 
(0.502) 
-8.64 
(-1.846)* 
-0.14 
(-0.354) 
0.89 
(0.387) 
1.88 
(1.192) 
-4.02 
(-0.501) 
6 
0.85 
(1.030) 
-3.79 
(-0.643) 
1.73 
(1.744)* 
2.48 
(0.480) 
0.85 
(0.949) 
-7.42 
(-2.003)** 
0.65 
(0.291) 
4.18 
(0.932) 
0.35 
(0.352) 
-8.28 
(-1.743)* 
0.93 
(0.827) 
1.82 
(0.602) 
-1.05 
(-1.240) 
-5.07 
(-0.682) 
7 
0.24 
(0.498) 
-3.54 
(-0.505) 
-1.30 
(-1.082) 
1.17 
(0.277) 
0.08 
(0.272) 
-7.33 
(-1.845)* 
-1.75 
(-1.862)* 
2.43 
(0.753) 
0.36 
(0.137) 
-7.91 
(-1.643) 
3.03 
(2.195)** 
4.86 
(1.178) 
-0.85 
(-0.561) 
-5.93 
(-0.746) 
8 
0.34 
(0.366) 
-3.20 
(-0.430) 
-0.64 
(-0.705) 
0.52 
(0.183) 
0.48 
(0.351) 
-6.85 
(-1.744)* 
0.57 
(0.523) 
3.00 
(0.837) 
0.65 
(0.627) 
-7.26 
(-1.492) 
0.96 
(1.031) 
5.82 
(1.377) 
0.37 
(-0.018) 
-5.55 
(-0.797) 
9 
1.07 
(1.512) 
-2.12 
(-0.133) 
1.92 
(2.369)** 
2.44 
(0.485) 
0.85 
(1.236) 
-5.99 
(-1.397) 
0.05 
(0.465) 
3.06 
(0.927) 
1.34 
(1.187) 
-5.91 
(-1.190) 
1.52 
(0.913) 
7.35 
(1.567) 
-0.28 
(0.070) 
-5.84 
(-0.789) 
10 
-0.55 
(-0.357) 
-2.67 
(-0.205) 
-0.92 
(-0.727) 
1.51 
(0.351) 
-0.93 
(-0.896) 
-6.93 
(-1.570) 
-2.54 
(-1.526) 
0.51 
(0.598) 
-0.71 
(-0.516) 
-6.62 
(-1.322) 
1.77 
(1.496) 
9.13 
(1.803)* 
-1.45 
(-0.779) 
-7.29 
(-0.874) 
11 
-1.45 
(-1.957)* 
-4.13 
(-0.563) 
-0.08 
(-0.425) 
1.43 
(0.296) 
-1.45 
(-1.764)* 
-8.39 
(-1.976)** 
-2.49 
(-2.149)** 
-1.98 
(0.161) 
-1.83 
(-1.733)* 
-8.45 
(-1.744)* 
-2.28 
(-2.050)** 
6.84 
(1.493) 
-1.60 
(-1.699)* 
-8.90 
(-1.185) 
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General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
12 
-1.31 
(-1.284) 
-5.44 
(-0.851) 
-1.25 
(-0.536) 
0.17 
(0.202) 
-1.60 
(-1.468) 
-9.99 
(-2.286)** 
-1.35 
(-1.227) 
-3.33 
(-0.070) 
0.03 
(-0.053) 
-8.42 
(-1.713)* 
-1.34 
(-1.170) 
5.50 
(1.271) 
-1.40 
(-1.183) 
-10.31 
(-1.274) 
13 
-1.64 
(-2.034)** 
-7.09 
(-1.201) 
-1.21 
(-1.374) 
-1.04 
(-0.003) 
-1.83 
(-2.125)** 
-11.83 
(-2.637)*** 
-1.05 
(-1.513) 
-4.38 
(-0.300) 
-1.21 
(-0.781) 
-9.63 
(-1.791)* 
-2.47 
(-2.035)** 
3.02 
(0.824) 
-0.96 
(-1.350) 
-11.27 
(-1.445) 
14 
-3.20 
(-2.925)*** 
-10.29 
(-1.837)* 
-2.09 
(-1.848)* 
-3.13 
(-0.330) 
-3.16 
(-2.908)*** 
-14.99 
(-3.339)*** 
-2.68 
(-1.862)* 
-7.07 
(-0.582) 
-6.07 
(-2.863)*** 
-15.71 
(-2.785)*** 
-2.68 
(-2.229)** 
0.34 
(0.386) 
-3.28 
(-1.109) 
-14.56 
(-1.689) 
15 
0.40 
(0.118) 
-9.89 
(-1.814)* 
-0.24 
(-0.197) 
-3.38 
(-0.361) 
0.55 
(0.209) 
-14.44 
(-3.304)*** 
-0.45 
(-0.743) 
-7.53 
(-0.682) 
1.32 
(0.554) 
-14.38 
(-2.639)** 
0.47 
(0.253) 
0.82 
(0.440) 
0.20 
(-0.379) 
-14.35 
(-1.883)* 
16 
-0.61 
(-0.427) 
-10.51 
(-1.828)* 
-0.66 
(-0.635) 
-4.04 
(-0.426) 
-1.12 
(-1.073) 
-15.57 
(-3.433)*** 
-0.37 
(-0.138) 
-7.90 
(-0.668) 
0.21 
(0.344) 
-14.17 
(-2.656)*** 
0.05 
(0.440) 
0.87 
(0.530) 
0.30 
(0.135) 
-14.05 
(-1.664) 
17 
-0.64 
(-0.468) 
-11.15 
(-1.904)* 
-0.94 
(-0.897) 
-4.98 
(-0.567) 
-0.83 
(-0.814) 
-16.40 
(-3.569)*** 
1.49 
(1.573) 
-6.41 
(-0.398) 
-0.15 
(0.135) 
-14.33 
(-2.643)** 
-0.79 
(-0.399) 
0.08 
(0.453) 
-0.56 
(0.347) 
-14.62 
(-1.634) 
18 
-0.25 
(-0.245) 
-11.40 
(-1.956)* 
0.00 
(-0.081) 
-4.97 
(-0.590) 
-0.38 
(-0.296) 
-16.79 
(-3.607)*** 
-0.93 
(-1.227) 
-7.34 
(-0.565) 
-0.79 
(-0.550) 
-15.12 
(-2.658)*** 
-0.07 
(-0.042) 
0.00 
(0.459) 
1.56 
(1.290) 
-13.05 
(-1.401) 
19 
0.69 
(0.536) 
-10.70 
(-1.901)* 
0.64 
(0.943) 
-4.32 
(-0.461) 
0.92 
(0.862) 
-15.86 
(-3.494)*** 
0.87 
(0.871) 
-6.47 
(-0.474) 
1.09 
(0.711) 
-14.03 
(-2.450)** 
0.47 
(-0.373) 
0.47 
(0.388) 
-0.12 
(-0.169) 
-13.18 
(-1.474) 
20 
0.09 
(0.158) 
-10.61 
(-1.844)* 
0.23 
(0.369) 
-4.08 
(-0.403) 
0.19 
(0.136) 
-15.67 
(-3.369)*** 
0.68 
(1.863)* 
-5.78 
(-0.268) 
-0.49 
(-0.377) 
-14.52 
(-2.478)** 
-0.12 
(-0.000) 
0.35 
(0.372) 
0.35 
(0.080) 
-12.82 
(-1.438) 
  
398 
Market adjusted model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (6): 
tMititit RReAR ,−==  
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days 
relative to the announcement of the proposed resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and 
production subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & 
steel, 3 to the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  
Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average 
abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted 
index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). 
The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is 
zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
1.00 
(1.350) 
1.00 
(1.350) 
0.51 
(0.755) 
0.51 
(0.755) 
0.70 
(1.040) 
0.70 
(1.040) 
2.61 
(1.769)* 
2.61 
(1.769)* 
0.77 
(0.925) 
0.77 
(0.925) 
1.23 
(1.107) 
1.23 
(1.107) 
2.22 
(2.306)** 
2.22 
(2.306)** 
-19 
0.60 
(0.574) 
1.61 
(1.370) 
0.61 
(0.414) 
1.12 
(0.988) 
0.03 
(0.045) 
0.74 
(0.794) 
1.63 
(1.915)* 
4.25 
(2.350)** 
1.98 
(1.247) 
2.76 
(1.643) 
1.74 
(0.880) 
2.98 
(1.331) 
-0.14 
(-0.228) 
2.07 
(1.684) 
-18 
0.55 
(0.769) 
2.16 
(1.587) 
1.04 
(1.222) 
2.16 
(1.669)* 
0.26 
(0.452) 
1.00 
(0.888) 
-0.03 
(0.445) 
4.21 
(2.220)** 
0.52 
(0.814) 
3.28 
(1.823)* 
0.84 
(0.371) 
3.83 
(1.446) 
0.89 
(0.986) 
2.97 
(1.939)* 
-17 
0.42 
(0.765) 
2.58 
(1.850)* 
0.17 
(0.228) 
2.34 
(1.543) 
0.46 
(0.798) 
1.46 
(1.226) 
-0.05 
(0.378) 
4.15 
(2.511)** 
2.00 
(1.470) 
5.28 
(2.567)** 
-0.25 
(0.486) 
3.58 
(1.558) 
0.34 
(0.349) 
3.31 
(2.085)** 
-16 
0.96 
(0.998) 
3.54 
(2.105)** 
1.59 
(1.130) 
3.93 
(1.752)* 
0.62 
(0.719) 
2.09 
(1.487) 
2.45 
(1.397) 
6.61 
(2.707)** 
0.67 
(0.400) 
5.95 
(2.613)** 
1.60 
(1.095) 
5.18 
(1.949)* 
0.36 
(0.277) 
3.68 
(2.016)* 
-15 
0.75 
(1.021) 
4.29 
(2.423)** 
0.75 
(1.010) 
4.69 
(2.275)** 
0.75 
(1.020) 
2.85 
(1.911)* 
2.39 
(2.284)** 
9.00 
(3.109)*** 
0.19 
(0.161) 
6.14 
(2.555)** 
1.10 
(0.476) 
6.29 
(1.957)* 
0.87 
(0.512) 
4.55 
(1.988)* 
-14 
0.10 
(0.307) 
4.40 
(2.346)** 
-0.24 
(-0.129) 
4.45 
(2.034)** 
0.34 
(0.401) 
3.20 
(1.912)* 
1.46 
(1.674) 
10.47 
(3.371)*** 
-0.68 
(-0.377) 
5.46 
(2.330)** 
-0.35 
(-0.059) 
5.93 
(1.776)* 
0.90 
(1.670) 
5.46 
(2.249)** 
-13 
-0.16 
(-0.348) 
4.23 
(2.212)** 
0.70 
(0.194) 
5.16 
(1.981)** 
-0.30 
(-0.409) 
2.89 
(1.825)* 
-0.68 
(-1.354) 
9.79 
(3.232)*** 
-0.28 
(-0.538) 
5.17 
(2.029)** 
-0.52 
(-0.334) 
5.41 
(1.715)* 
0.80 
(0.430) 
6.26 
(2.477)** 
-12 
-0.03 
(-0.241) 
4.19 
(2.024)** 
0.01 
(-0.400) 
5.17 
(1.758)* 
0.51 
(0.643) 
3.40 
(1.934)* 
-0.65 
(-1.225) 
9.13 
(3.112)*** 
-1.61 
(-2.110)** 
3.56 
(1.337) 
-0.22 
(-0.310) 
5.18 
(1.535) 
-0.13 
(0.014) 
6.13 
(2.483)** 
-11 
0.47 
(0.577) 
4.67 
(2.247)** 
0.35 
(0.584) 
5.53 
(2.011)** 
0.57 
(0.682) 
3.98 
(2.131)** 
0.59 
(0.642) 
9.73 
(3.739)*** 
0.02 
(-0.387) 
3.59 
(1.284) 
1.08 
(0.461) 
6.27 
(1.648) 
0.41 
(0.241) 
6.54 
(2.587)** 
-10 
0.19 
(0.004) 
4.87 
(2.125)** 
0.20 
(-0.203) 
5.74 
(1.613) 
-0.22 
(-0.417) 
3.76 
(1.954)* 
0.91 
(0.738) 
10.65 
(3.646)*** 
-0.67 
(-0.408) 
2.91 
(1.004) 
1.31 
(0.950) 
7.58 
(1.949)* 
-0.61 
(-0.698) 
5.93 
(2.364)** 
-9 
-0.10 
(-0.156) 
4.76 
(1.991)** 
0.04 
(0.055) 
5.79 
(1.552) 
-0.20 
(-0.333) 
3.56 
(1.802)* 
0.91 
(0.919) 
11.57 
(3.512)*** 
0.19 
(-0.069) 
3.11 
(0.927) 
-0.84 
(-0.674) 
6.74 
(1.721)* 
0.14 
(-0.289) 
6.07 
(1.999)* 
-8 
0.42 
(0.423) 
5.18 
(1.991)** 
0.04 
(-0.006) 
5.83 
(1.484) 
0.96 
(0.928) 
4.52 
(1.938)* 
1.10 
(0.737) 
12.67 
(3.441)*** 
-0.29 
(-0.561) 
2.81 
(0.731) 
-0.52 
(-0.683) 
6.21 
(1.550) 
0.70 
(1.440) 
6.77 
(2.243)** 
-7 
0.11 
(0.363) 
5.30 
(2.020)** 
0.54 
(0.920) 
6.38 
(1.711)* 
-0.07 
(0.023) 
4.44 
(1.866)* 
0.58 
(0.372) 
13.25 
(3.325)*** 
0.07 
(0.142) 
2.89 
(0.713) 
-0.31 
(0.173) 
5.90 
(1.493) 
1.68 
(0.856) 
8.45 
(2.234)** 
-6 
0.58 
(0.694) 
5.88 
(2.233)** 
0.03 
(0.039) 
6.42 
(1.747)* 
0.52 
(0.612) 
4.97 
(2.088)** 
1.36 
(1.086) 
14.62 
(3.608)*** 
0.78 
(0.726) 
3.67 
(0.913) 
0.96 
(1.039) 
6.86 
(1.708)* 
1.06 
(0.109) 
9.52 
(2.026)* 
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-5 
0.82 
(0.709) 
6.70 
(2.394)** 
1.81 
(1.312) 
8.23 
(2.270)** 
0.61 
(0.674) 
5.58 
(2.251)** 
-0.66 
(-0.263) 
13.95 
(2.661)** 
-0.27 
(-0.459) 
3.39 
(0.862) 
1.20 
(0.568) 
8.07 
(1.834)* 
-0.40 
(-0.174) 
9.11 
(1.950)* 
-4 
0.08 
(0.241) 
6.79 
(2.379)** 
-0.29 
(0.060) 
7.93 
(2.107)** 
0.51 
(0.468) 
6.10 
(2.378)** 
0.27 
(0.152) 
14.23 
(2.649)** 
0.18 
(0.063) 
3.57 
(0.816) 
0.21 
(0.295) 
8.29 
(1.837)* 
-1.46 
(-0.869) 
7.64 
(1.897)* 
-3 
-0.70 
(-0.902) 
6.09 
(2.044)** 
-0.08 
(-0.141) 
7.85 
(2.008)** 
-1.10 
(-1.347) 
4.99 
(1.897)* 
-0.41 
(-0.563) 
13.82 
(2.590)** 
-2.19 
(-2.521)** 
1.38 
(0.127) 
0.09 
(0.065) 
8.38 
(1.811)* 
-1.06 
(-1.920)* 
6.58 
(1.585) 
-2 
-0.39 
(-0.572) 
5.70 
(1.660)* 
-1.85 
(-1.000) 
5.99 
(0.913) 
-0.25 
(-0.454) 
4.74 
(1.741)* 
-1.54 
(-0.873) 
12.27 
(2.411)** 
0.48 
(0.127) 
1.86 
(0.150) 
0.48 
(0.424) 
8.87 
(1.908)* 
-0.01 
(-0.657) 
6.56 
(1.340) 
-1 
-0.31 
(-0.546) 
5.38 
(1.500) 
0.00 
(-0.125) 
5.99 
(0.883) 
-0.53 
(-0.495) 
4.21 
(1.540) 
1.06 
(0.012) 
13.34 
(2.248)** 
0.31 
(0.170) 
2.17 
(0.204) 
-0.66 
(-0.999) 
8.20 
(1.691)* 
-1.62 
(-2.514)** 
4.94 
(0.818) 
0 
-1.55 
(-1.957)* 
3.83 
(1.026) 
0.07 
(-0.185) 
6.07 
(0.843) 
-1.51 
(-1.869)* 
2.69 
(0.953) 
-2.83 
(-3.145)*** 
10.50 
(1.736)* 
-2.05 
(-2.091)** 
0.11 
(-0.319) 
-2.37 
(-1.512) 
5.83 
(1.329) 
-3.58 
(-3.075)*** 
1.36 
(-0.118) 
1 
-1.88 
(-2.362)** 
1.94 
(0.391) 
-1.84 
(-1.830)* 
4.23 
(0.419) 
-1.64 
(-2.042)** 
1.05 
(0.284) 
-2.39 
(-3.396)*** 
8.11 
(1.321) 
-2.38 
(-2.358)** 
-2.26 
(-0.912) 
-2.05 
(-1.290) 
3.77 
(0.907) 
-2.59 
(-2.757)*** 
-1.23 
(-0.948) 
2 
-1.66 
(-1.898)* 
0.28 
(-0.059) 
-1.75 
(-1.825)* 
2.48 
(0.078) 
-2.40 
(-2.641)*** 
-1.35 
(-0.490) 
-0.99 
(-0.895) 
7.11 
(1.078) 
-1.33 
(-1.481) 
-3.60 
(-1.252) 
-0.34 
(-0.351) 
3.43 
(0.827) 
0.47 
(0.586) 
-0.75 
(-0.782) 
3 
0.01 
(0.426) 
0.30 
(0.056) 
-0.42 
(-0.161) 
2.05 
(0.042) 
0.25 
(0.492) 
-1.09 
(-0.295) 
1.44 
(1.342) 
8.55 
(1.570) 
-0.66 
(-0.664) 
-4.26 
(-1.382) 
0.32 
(0.654) 
3.75 
(0.951) 
0.49 
(0.706) 
-0.26 
(-0.510) 
4 
-0.17 
(-0.034) 
0.12 
(0.048) 
-0.53 
(-0.435) 
1.52 
(-0.037) 
-0.08 
(-0.086) 
-1.17 
(-0.326) 
-1.01 
(-0.470) 
7.53 
(1.468) 
-0.94 
(-0.893) 
-5.21 
(-1.732)* 
0.47 
(0.794) 
4.23 
(1.183) 
-0.05 
(0.188) 
-0.31 
(-0.427) 
5 
-0.10 
(0.088) 
0.02 
(0.075) 
0.96 
(1.032) 
2.49 
(0.141) 
-0.52 
(-0.318) 
-1.70 
(-0.449) 
0.52 
(0.228) 
8.06 
(1.528) 
0.07 
(0.572) 
-5.13 
(-1.619) 
-0.53 
(-0.590) 
3.69 
(1.040) 
2.09 
(1.494) 
1.77 
(0.190) 
6 
1.23 
(1.289) 
1.25 
(0.383) 
1.99 
(1.795)* 
4.48 
(0.470) 
1.39 
(1.360) 
-0.31 
(-0.035) 
0.90 
(0.521) 
8.96 
(1.631) 
0.57 
(0.415) 
-4.55 
(-1.511) 
1.19 
(1.006) 
4.89 
(1.326) 
-0.82 
(-1.209) 
0.94 
(-0.064) 
7 
0.23 
(0.500) 
1.49 
(0.488) 
-1.41 
(-1.132) 
3.07 
(0.250) 
0.07 
(0.286) 
-0.23 
(0.046) 
-1.64 
(-1.695)* 
7.32 
(1.480) 
0.42 
(0.223) 
-4.13 
(-1.349) 
3.00 
(2.202)** 
7.90 
(1.901)* 
-0.63 
(-0.230) 
0.31 
(-0.103) 
8 
0.06 
(0.164) 
1.55 
(0.520) 
-1.01 
(-0.961) 
2.06 
(0.116) 
0.08 
(0.040) 
-0.14 
(0.057) 
0.58 
(0.592) 
7.91 
(1.569) 
0.60 
(0.732) 
-3.53 
(-1.092) 
0.73 
(0.814) 
8.63 
(2.086)** 
0.58 
(0.445) 
0.90 
(0.000) 
9 
1.41 
(1.743)* 
2.96 
(0.870) 
2.13 
(2.411)** 
4.19 
(0.434) 
1.32 
(1.587) 
1.17 
(0.464) 
0.28 
(0.672) 
8.19 
(1.706)* 
1.54 
(1.289) 
-1.98 
(-0.780) 
1.74 
(1.099) 
10.38 
(2.352)** 
-0.06 
(0.091) 
0.83 
(0.021) 
10 
0.26 
(0.226) 
3.22 
(0.888) 
-0.26 
(-0.448) 
3.92 
(0.345) 
0.21 
(0.102) 
1.38 
(0.477) 
-2.14 
(-1.411) 
6.04 
(1.411) 
-0.31 
(-0.484) 
-2.30 
(-0.928) 
2.34 
(1.925)* 
12.73 
(2.703)*** 
-1.21 
(-1.106) 
-0.37 
(-0.256) 
11 
-1.35 
(-1.765)* 
1.87 
(0.556) 
-0.09 
(-0.457) 
3.83 
(0.281) 
-1.31 
(-1.475) 
0.07 
(0.133) 
-2.34 
(-2.064)** 
3.69 
(1.005) 
-1.72 
(-1.685)* 
-4.02 
(-1.347) 
-2.23 
(-2.045)** 
10.50 
(2.417)** 
-1.38 
(-1.512) 
-1.76 
(-0.585) 
12 
-0.74 
(-0.843) 
1.12 
(0.369) 
-0.83 
(-0.415) 
3.00 
(0.216) 
-0.81 
(-0.751) 
-0.74 
(-0.082) 
-1.04 
(-1.032) 
2.65 
(0.771) 
0.32 
(0.001) 
-3.69 
(-1.318) 
-0.95 
(-0.854) 
9.54 
(2.271)** 
-1.17 
(-1.331) 
-2.94 
(-0.785) 
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13 
-1.14 
(-1.558) 
-0.01 
(0.027) 
-0.85 
(-1.182) 
2.15 
(0.030) 
-1.13 
(-1.357) 
-1.87 
(-0.413) 
-0.76 
(-1.196) 
1.89 
(0.576) 
-0.94 
(-0.784) 
-4.64 
(-1.476) 
-2.13 
(-1.834)* 
7.40 
(1.803)* 
-0.73 
(-1.447) 
-3.67 
(-1.044) 
14 
-3.02 
(-2.684)*** 
-3.04 
(-0.649) 
-2.02 
(-1.809)* 
0.12 
(-0.301) 
-2.91 
(-2.498)** 
-4.78 
(-1.145) 
-2.51 
(-1.729)* 
-0.61 
(0.263) 
-5.94 
(-2.898)*** 
-10.59 
(-2.709)*** 
-2.57 
(-2.197)** 
4.83 
(1.268) 
-3.06 
(-1.128) 
-6.73 
(-1.474) 
15 
0.04 
(-0.079) 
-2.99 
(-0.660) 
-0.67 
(-0.440) 
-0.55 
(-0.374) 
0.04 
(-0.121) 
-4.74 
(-1.171) 
-0.47 
(-0.712) 
-1.09 
(0.166) 
1.24 
(0.653) 
-9.34 
(-2.423)** 
0.19 
(0.084) 
5.02 
(1.224) 
0.41 
(0.069) 
-6.32 
(-1.516) 
16 
0.20 
(0.210) 
-2.78 
(-0.596) 
0.00 
(-0.302) 
-0.54 
(-0.395) 
0.02 
(-0.032) 
-4.71 
(-1.157) 
0.02 
(0.168) 
-1.06 
(0.182) 
0.61 
(0.349) 
-8.73 
(-2.428)** 
0.62 
(0.834) 
5.65 
(1.431) 
0.54 
(-0.087) 
-5.78 
(-1.341) 
17 
-0.75 
(-0.504) 
-3.54 
(-0.704) 
-1.14 
(-1.043) 
-1.69 
(-0.561) 
-0.99 
(-0.841) 
-5.70 
(-1.364) 
1.56 
(1.634) 
0.50 
(0.445) 
-0.14 
(0.205) 
-8.87 
(-2.353)** 
-0.89 
(-0.514) 
4.75 
(1.292) 
-0.35 
(0.487) 
-6.13 
(-1.264) 
18 
-0.52 
(-0.400) 
-4.06 
(-0.797) 
-0.34 
(-0.330) 
-2.03 
(-0.620) 
-0.76 
(-0.542) 
-6.46 
(-1.477) 
-0.91 
(-1.127) 
-0.41 
(0.282) 
-0.84 
(-0.484) 
-9.71 
(-2.564)** 
-0.28 
(-0.209) 
4.46 
(1.291) 
1.77 
(1.713)* 
-4.35 
(-0.887) 
19 
0.39 
(0.336) 
-3.66 
(-0.741) 
0.27 
(0.691) 
-1.76 
(-0.527) 
0.51 
(0.489) 
-5.94 
(-1.394) 
0.88 
(1.023) 
0.46 
(0.418) 
1.03 
(0.796) 
-8.68 
(-2.229)** 
0.23 
(-0.532) 
4.70 
(1.186) 
0.09 
(0.218) 
-4.26 
(-0.852) 
20 
0.35 
(0.361) 
-3.30 
(-0.653) 
0.38 
(0.387) 
-1.37 
(-0.472) 
0.56 
(0.482) 
-5.37 
(-1.231) 
0.89 
(2.119)** 
1.35 
(0.642) 
-0.32 
(-0.302) 
-9.00 
(-2.236)** 
0.05 
(0.093) 
4.75 
(1.166) 
0.58 
(0.162) 
-3.68 
(-0.826) 
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Mean adjusted model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed RSPT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (4): 
tMititit RReAR ,−==  
Where itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t and where iR  is the average continuously compounded past 
performance return for firm i during the estimation period. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the announcement of the proposed 
resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general 
mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & steel, 3 to the aluminium, 7 to the 
platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  Individual firm excess returns are 
aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day 
t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous 
day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and 
CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in ((27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis for the AARS test 
statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed RSPT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs 
test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=117) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=35) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=106) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=33) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
-0.05 
(-0.069) 
-0.05 
(-0.069) 
-0.43 
(-0.214) 
-0.43 
(-0.214) 
-0.40 
(-0.312) 
-0.40 
(-0.312) 
1.49 
(0.639) 
1.49 
(0.639) 
-0.31 
(-0.291) 
-0.31 
(-0.291) 
0.23 
(0.054) 
0.23 
(0.054) 
1.02 
(0.801) 
1.02 
(0.801) 
-19 
1.04 
(0.767) 
0.99 
(0.604) 
1.16 
(0.855) 
0.72 
(0.438) 
0.44 
(0.405) 
0.04 
(0.108) 
2.02 
(1.693)* 
3.52 
(1.491) 
2.41 
(1.207) 
2.09 
(0.925) 
2.24 
(0.946) 
2.47 
(0.932) 
0.15 
(0.089) 
1.17 
(0.731) 
-18 
1.26 
(1.191) 
2.25 
(1.207) 
1.86 
(1.542) 
2.58 
(1.438) 
0.93 
(1.052) 
0.97 
(0.683) 
0.62 
(0.880) 
4.14 
(1.679) 
1.21 
(1.115) 
3.31 
(1.427) 
1.61 
(0.690) 
4.08 
(1.298) 
1.46 
(1.133) 
2.64 
(1.374) 
-17 
0.34 
(0.508) 
2.59 
(1.356) 
0.20 
(0.216) 
2.79 
(1.339) 
0.34 
(0.520) 
1.32 
(0.889) 
-0.18 
(0.263) 
3.95 
(1.817)* 
1.90 
(1.093) 
5.21 
(1.940)* 
-0.27 
(0.401) 
3.81 
(1.380) 
0.12 
(0.066) 
2.77 
(1.396) 
-16 
0.27 
(0.143) 
2.87 
(1.262) 
1.01 
(0.486) 
3.81 
(1.247) 
-0.09 
(-0.110) 
1.22 
(0.755) 
1.71 
(0.585) 
5.67 
(1.764)* 
-0.03 
(-0.168) 
5.17 
(1.729)* 
0.97 
(0.479) 
4.79 
(1.519) 
-0.45 
(-0.742) 
2.31 
(0.989) 
-15 
0.73 
(0.740) 
3.60 
(1.505) 
0.84 
(0.788) 
4.66 
(1.638) 
0.70 
(0.775) 
1.92 
(1.089) 
2.32 
(1.691)* 
7.99 
(2.113)** 
0.15 
(0.113) 
5.32 
(1.686)* 
1.14 
(0.429) 
5.94 
(1.553) 
0.71 
(0.337) 
3.03 
(1.014) 
-14 
0.61 
(0.705) 
4.22 
(1.658)* 
0.37 
(0.457) 
5.03 
(1.664)* 
0.81 
(0.760) 
2.74 
(1.340) 
1.92 
(1.610) 
9.92 
(2.434)** 
-0.20 
(0.151) 
5.12 
(1.688)* 
0.20 
(0.304) 
6.14 
(1.539) 
1.27 
(1.581) 
4.30 
(1.421) 
-13 
-1.04 
(-1.121) 
3.17 
(1.247) 
-0.06 
(-0.336) 
4.97 
(1.396) 
-1.22 
(-1.352) 
1.51 
(0.849) 
-1.62 
(-1.987)* 
8.30 
(2.101)** 
-1.18 
(-1.176) 
3.93 
(1.204) 
-1.34 
(-0.999) 
4.80 
(1.278) 
-0.21 
(-0.334) 
4.09 
(1.295) 
-12 
0.60 
(0.578) 
3.78 
(1.362) 
0.77 
(0.391) 
5.75 
(1.464) 
1.11 
(1.243) 
2.63 
(1.236) 
-0.06 
(-0.336) 
8.23 
(2.154)** 
-0.98 
(-0.871) 
2.94 
(0.900) 
0.47 
(0.314) 
5.27 
(1.307) 
0.36 
(0.554) 
4.46 
(1.468) 
-11 
0.39 
(0.360) 
4.17 
(1.494) 
0.39 
(0.465) 
6.14 
(1.653) 
0.45 
(0.428) 
3.08 
(1.346) 
0.46 
(0.386) 
8.70 
(2.541)** 
-0.06 
(-0.364) 
2.87 
(0.847) 
1.06 
(0.386) 
6.34 
(1.396) 
0.19 
(-0.041) 
4.66 
(1.502) 
-10 
-0.37 
(-0.470) 
3.80 
(1.237) 
-0.25 
(-0.354) 
5.88 
(1.240) 
-0.82 
(-1.016) 
2.26 
(0.977) 
0.29 
(0.095) 
9.00 
(2.445)** 
-1.26 
(-0.720) 
1.61 
(0.494) 
0.80 
(0.415) 
7.14 
(1.518) 
-1.32 
(-0.980) 
3.33 
(1.097) 
-9 
-1.73 
(-1.675)* 
2.06 
(0.634) 
-1.46 
(-0.998) 
4.42 
(0.838) 
-1.86 
(-2.237)** 
0.39 
(0.213) 
-0.76 
(-0.188) 
8.23 
(1.952)* 
-1.45 
(-1.482) 
0.16 
(0.038) 
-2.41 
(-1.656) 
4.73 
(0.974) 
-1.62 
(-1.328) 
1.71 
(0.347) 
-8 
0.42 
(0.319) 
2.49 
(0.687) 
0.14 
(0.094) 
4.57 
(0.829) 
0.91 
(0.718) 
1.31 
(0.441) 
1.04 
(0.522) 
9.28 
(1.940)* 
-0.32 
(-0.426) 
-0.16 
(-0.076) 
-0.47 
(-0.501) 
4.25 
(0.850) 
0.55 
(0.974) 
2.27 
(0.627) 
-7 
0.46 
(0.597) 
2.95 
(0.849) 
1.01 
(1.110) 
5.58 
(1.104) 
0.24 
(0.334) 
1.55 
(0.543) 
0.88 
(0.478) 
10.16 
(1.933)* 
0.40 
(0.381) 
0.24 
(0.038) 
0.09 
(0.418) 
4.35 
(0.921) 
1.89 
(0.820) 
4.16 
(0.833) 
-6 
-0.59 
(-0.557) 
2.36 
(0.667) 
-1.02 
(-0.814) 
4.55 
(0.880) 
-0.69 
(-0.607) 
0.86 
(0.309) 
0.13 
(-0.015) 
10.30 
(1.924)* 
-0.41 
(-0.495) 
-0.16 
(-0.083) 
-0.15 
(-0.089) 
4.19 
(0.871) 
-0.24 
(-0.463) 
3.92 
(0.531) 
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-5 
0.07 
(-0.121) 
2.44 
(0.608) 
1.17 
(0.535) 
5.72 
(1.099) 
-0.17 
(-0.246) 
0.68 
(0.221) 
-1.47 
(-0.489) 
8.83 
(1.273) 
-1.04 
(-1.370) 
-1.21 
(-0.323) 
0.51 
(-0.054) 
4.71 
(0.845) 
-1.29 
(-0.841) 
2.62 
(0.327) 
-4 
-0.16 
(-0.051) 
2.27 
(0.571) 
-0.43 
(-0.075) 
5.28 
(1.003) 
0.22 
(0.100) 
0.91 
(0.250) 
-0.02 
(-0.202) 
8.80 
(1.224) 
-0.09 
(-0.150) 
-1.30 
(-0.343) 
0.02 
(0.118) 
4.73 
(0.842) 
-1.86 
(-0.921) 
0.76 
(0.083) 
-3 
-2.09 
(-1.775)* 
0.17 
(-0.002) 
-1.36 
(-0.691) 
3.91 
(0.662) 
-2.54 
(-2.569)** 
-1.62 
(-0.506) 
-1.86 
(-1.950)* 
6.94 
(0.961) 
-3.61 
(-2.991)*** 
-4.92 
(-1.141) 
-1.24 
(-0.726) 
3.48 
(0.583) 
-2.60 
(-2.809)*** 
-1.83 
(-0.533) 
-2 
-1.38 
(-1.094) 
-1.21 
(-0.365) 
-2.74 
(-0.958) 
1.17 
(-0.011) 
-1.29 
(-1.508) 
-2.92 
(-0.888) 
-2.59 
(-1.916)* 
4.35 
(0.704) 
-0.53 
(-0.807) 
-5.46 
(-1.275) 
-0.45 
(-0.597) 
3.03 
(0.473) 
-1.15 
(-1.514) 
-2.99 
(-0.800) 
-1 
-0.08 
(-0.134) 
-1.29 
(-0.388) 
0.34 
(0.269) 
1.51 
(0.028) 
-0.34 
(-0.188) 
-3.26 
(-0.918) 
1.24 
(0.158) 
5.59 
(0.672) 
0.52 
(0.306) 
-4.93 
(-1.167) 
-0.38 
(-0.548) 
2.65 
(0.362) 
-1.52 
(-1.775)* 
-4.51 
(-1.191) 
0 
-2.22 
(-2.072)** 
-3.52 
(-0.836) 
-0.48 
(-0.591) 
1.02 
(-0.065) 
-2.22 
(-2.204)** 
-5.48 
(-1.465) 
-3.56 
(-2.938)*** 
2.02 
(0.216) 
-2.75 
(-2.179)** 
-7.69 
(-1.687)* 
-2.99 
(-1.723)* 
-0.33 
(-0.074) 
-4.39 
(-2.903)*** 
-8.91 
(-1.871)* 
1 
-3.12 
(-2.764)*** 
-6.64 
(-1.482) 
-2.97 
(-2.040)** 
-1.94 
(-0.479) 
-2.92 
(-2.742)*** 
-8.41 
(-2.230)** 
-3.68 
(-3.804)*** 
-1.65 
(-0.230) 
-3.64 
(-2.774)*** 
-11.33 
(-2.326)** 
-3.23 
(-1.799)* 
-3.57 
(-0.631) 
-3.97 
(-2.852)*** 
-12.88 
(-2.393)** 
2 
-3.21 
(-2.918)*** 
-9.86 
(-2.117)** 
-3.19 
(-2.375)** 
-5.13 
(-0.910) 
-4.00 
(-3.793)*** 
-12.41 
(-3.267)*** 
-2.61 
(-2.066)** 
-4.26 
(-0.483) 
-2.91 
(-2.495)** 
-14.24 
(-2.835)*** 
-1.84 
(-1.403) 
-5.41 
(-0.996) 
-1.21 
(-0.592) 
-14.10 
(-2.577)** 
3 
-2.26 
(-1.599) 
-12.12 
(-2.418)** 
-2.59 
(-1.696)* 
-7.73 
(-1.159) 
-2.06 
(-1.513) 
-14.47 
(-3.488)*** 
-0.88 
(-0.091) 
-5.15 
(-0.555) 
-2.96 
(-2.634)** 
-17.21 
(-3.349)*** 
-1.90 
(-1.125) 
-7.32 
(-1.217) 
-1.92 
(-1.130) 
-16.03 
(-2.593)** 
4 
-2.44 
(-2.065)** 
-14.57 
(-2.891)*** 
-2.68 
(-1.886)* 
-10.42 
(-1.515) 
-2.38 
(-2.222)** 
-16.86 
(-4.080)*** 
-3.33 
(-2.377)** 
-8.49 
(-0.884) 
-3.23 
(-2.217)** 
-20.44 
(-4.071)*** 
-1.73 
(-0.744) 
-9.05 
(-1.454) 
-2.46 
(-1.651) 
-18.49 
(-2.697)** 
5 
2.32 
(1.971)** 
-12.24 
(-2.461)** 
3.50 
(2.760)*** 
-6.91 
(-1.074) 
1.86 
(1.737)* 
-15.00 
(-3.746)*** 
2.90 
(2.353)** 
-5.59 
(-0.558) 
2.48 
(1.955)* 
-17.95 
(-3.632)*** 
1.95 
(0.905) 
-7.10 
(-1.178) 
4.38 
(2.156)** 
-14.10 
(-2.341)** 
6 
-0.11 
(-0.282) 
-12.36 
(-2.473)** 
0.75 
(0.370) 
-6.16 
(-0.972) 
-0.00 
(-0.215) 
-15.00 
(-3.743)*** 
-0.50 
(-0.796) 
-6.09 
(-0.680) 
-0.79 
(-0.819) 
-18.75 
(-3.820)*** 
-0.10 
(0.018) 
-7.20 
(-1.170) 
-2.32 
(-2.186)** 
-16.42 
(-2.591)** 
7 
0.55 
(0.655) 
-11.80 
(-2.227)** 
-0.97 
(-0.475) 
-7.14 
(-1.028) 
0.36 
(0.515) 
-14.63 
(-3.439)*** 
-1.37 
(-0.941) 
-7.46 
(-0.817) 
0.72 
(0.431) 
-18.03 
(-3.497)*** 
3.38 
(2.007)** 
-3.81 
(-0.406) 
-0.44 
(0.052) 
-16.87 
(-2.528)** 
8 
1.56 
(1.551) 
-10.23 
(-1.896)* 
0.60 
(0.852) 
-6.53 
(-0.914) 
1.55 
(1.398) 
-13.08 
(-3.040)*** 
2.04 
(1.607) 
-5.42 
(-0.546) 
2.08 
(1.509) 
-15.94 
(-3.077)*** 
2.29 
(1.909)* 
-1.51 
(0.008) 
1.95 
(1.502) 
-14.91 
(-2.355)** 
9 
0.29 
(0.155) 
-9.94 
(-1.830)* 
1.12 
(0.751) 
-5.41 
(-0.787) 
0.16 
(0.117) 
-12.91 
(-2.911)*** 
-0.88 
(-0.613) 
-6.31 
(-0.656) 
0.40 
(0.101) 
-15.53 
(-3.050)*** 
0.68 
(0.191) 
-0.83 
(0.055) 
-1.32 
(-0.979) 
-16.23 
(-2.491)** 
10 
-2.93 
(-2.456)** 
-12.87 
(-2.308)** 
-3.35 
(-2.437)** 
-8.77 
(-1.167) 
-3.02 
(-2.717)*** 
-15.94 
(-3.502)*** 
-5.40 
(-3.315)*** 
-11.71 
(-1.340) 
-3.53 
(-2.537)** 
-19.07 
(-3.677)*** 
-0.79 
(-0.277) 
-1.62 
(-0.020) 
-4.55 
(-3.049)*** 
-20.79 
(-2.874)*** 
11 
-1.49 
(-1.411) 
-14.37 
(-2.582)** 
-0.12 
(-0.327) 
-8.89 
(-1.208) 
-1.49 
(-1.361) 
-17.44 
(-3.824)*** 
-2.54 
(-1.697)* 
-14.25 
(-1.665) 
-1.89 
(-1.383) 
-20.96 
(-3.980)*** 
-2.31 
(-1.752)* 
-3.94 
(-0.380) 
-1.66 
(-1.390) 
-22.46 
(-3.211)*** 
12 
-2.85 
(-2.375)** 
-17.23 
(-3.152)*** 
-2.83 
(-1.409) 
-11.72 
(-1.680)* 
-2.96 
(-2.479)** 
-20.41 
(-4.371)*** 
-3.20 
(-2.249)** 
-17.46 
(-1.989)* 
-1.80 
(-2.102)** 
-22.76 
(-4.209)*** 
-3.00 
(-2.153)** 
-6.95 
(-0.894) 
-3.42 
(-2.808)*** 
-25.89 
(-3.369)*** 
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13 
-2.98 
(-2.838)*** 
-20.21 
(-3.562)*** 
-2.58 
(-2.276)** 
-14.31 
(-1.904)* 
-3.01 
(-2.935)*** 
-23.42 
(-4.802)*** 
-2.66 
(-2.193)** 
-20.12 
(-2.303)** 
-2.81 
(-1.840)* 
-25.58 
(-4.446)*** 
-3.92 
(-2.753)*** 
-10.88 
(-1.506) 
-2.72 
(-2.373)** 
-28.61 
(-3.567)*** 
14 
-3.50 
(-2.370)** 
-23.72 
(-4.113)*** 
-2.39 
(-1.579) 
-16.71 
(-2.213)** 
-3.42 
(-2.477)** 
-26.85 
(-5.473)*** 
-3.04 
(-1.781)* 
-23.16 
(-2.523)** 
-6.44 
(-2.450)** 
-32.02 
(-5.432)*** 
-2.99 
(-2.111)** 
-13.87 
(-1.880)* 
-3.67 
(-1.335) 
-32.28 
(-4.065)*** 
15 
1.88 
(1.429) 
-21.83 
(-3.763)*** 
1.27 
(1.132) 
-15.43 
(-2.028)** 
1.85 
(1.368) 
-25.00 
(-5.097)*** 
1.31 
(1.237) 
-21.85 
(-2.364)** 
3.06 
(1.584) 
-28.96 
(-4.866)*** 
2.09 
(1.079) 
-11.78 
(-1.479) 
2.12 
(1.434) 
-30.16 
(-3.924)*** 
16 
-3.01 
(-2.700)*** 
-24.85 
(-4.151)*** 
-3.10 
(-2.703)*** 
-18.54 
(-2.274)** 
-3.23 
(-2.994)*** 
-28.24 
(-5.625)*** 
-3.25 
(-2.714)** 
-25.10 
(-2.622)** 
-2.63 
(-1.976)* 
-31.59 
(-5.441)*** 
-2.54 
(-1.326) 
-14.32 
(-1.837)* 
-2.82 
(-1.773)* 
-32.99 
(-3.830)*** 
17 
0.01 
(0.273) 
-24.83 
(-4.097)*** 
-0.26 
(-0.027) 
-18.80 
(-2.279)** 
-0.25 
(-0.037) 
-28.50 
(-5.617)*** 
2.28 
(1.725)* 
-22.81 
(-2.256)** 
0.61 
(0.597) 
-30.98 
(-5.414)*** 
-0.06 
(0.217) 
-14.39 
(-1.743)* 
0.28 
(0.594) 
-32.70 
(-4.072)*** 
18 
0.91 
(0.986) 
-23.92 
(-3.938)*** 
1.20 
(1.178) 
-17.60 
(-2.190)** 
0.63 
(0.814) 
-27.86 
(-5.401)*** 
0.46 
(0.286) 
-22.35 
(-2.205)** 
0.57 
(0.421) 
-30.41 
(-5.236)*** 
1.20 
(0.841) 
-13.18 
(-1.602) 
3.07 
(2.127)** 
-29.63 
(-3.685)*** 
19 
1.94 
(1.666)* 
-21.97 
(-3.692)*** 
1.93 
(1.765)* 
-15.66 
(-2.003)** 
2.02 
(1.970)** 
-25.83 
(-5.064)*** 
2.37 
(2.217)** 
-19.97 
(-2.013)* 
2.56 
(1.445) 
-27.85 
(-4.777)*** 
1.84 
(0.577) 
-11.34 
(-1.465) 
1.50 
(1.103) 
-28.13 
(-3.658)*** 
20 
-0.48 
(-0.451) 
-22.46 
(-3.741)*** 
-0.35 
(-0.151) 
-16.01 
(-2.161)** 
-0.31 
(-0.450) 
-26.15 
(-4.986)*** 
-0.01 
(0.605) 
-19.98 
(-1.958)* 
-1.19 
(-1.002) 
-29.04 
(-4.876)*** 
-0.74 
(-0.315) 
-12.08 
(-1.480) 
-0.40 
(-0.719) 
-28.53 
(-3.685)*** 
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Fowler Rorke model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed MRRT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each given day within the event window surrounding the announcement of mineral resource rent tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in 
(8): 
tMiiititit RReAR ,
ˆˆ  −−==
 
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. iˆ and i
ˆ correspond to firm i OLS parameters estimates from 
the estimation period and are computed using the Fowler and Rorke methods described  in (15).The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the 
announcement day. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 115 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general mining 
subsector, 36 to the coal subsector, 105 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 34 to the iron & steel, 3 to the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & 
precious metals and 9 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark. Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into 
portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed 
as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess 
return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in 
parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the 
average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that 
the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
  
407 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
-1.18 
(-1.553) 
-1.18 
(-1.553) 
-0.67 
(-0.656) 
-0.67 
(-0.656) 
-1.54 
(-2.186)** 
-1.54 
(-2.186)** 
-0.79 
(-0.623) 
-0.79 
(-0.623) 
-0.63 
(-0.396) 
-0.63 
(-0.396) 
-1.78 
(-1.723)* 
-1.78 
(-1.723)* 
-0.27 
(-0.663) 
-0.27 
(-0.663) 
-19 
0.34 
(0.505) 
-0.83 
(-0.765) 
1.05 
(1.332) 
0.37 
(0.569) 
0.30 
(0.413) 
-1.24 
(-1.267) 
-0.80 
(-0.473) 
-1.60 
(-0.814) 
-1.29 
(-1.277) 
-1.93 
(-1.149) 
1.28 
(1.098) 
-0.50 
(-0.661) 
-0.61 
(-0.714) 
-0.89 
(-1.390) 
-18 
0.34 
(0.491) 
-0.48 
(-0.362) 
-0.27 
(-0.345) 
0.10 
(0.405) 
-0.21 
(-0.104) 
-1.45 
(-1.098) 
0.41 
(0.494) 
-1.18 
(-0.417) 
0.70 
(0.806) 
-1.22 
(-0.534) 
2.09 
(1.764)* 
1.58 
(0.628) 
1.41 
(1.381) 
0.52 
(0.071) 
-17 
-1.08 
(-1.122) 
-1.56 
(-1.032) 
-1.09 
(-0.903) 
-0.99 
(-0.111) 
-1.32 
(-1.330) 
-2.78 
(-1.843)* 
-0.70 
(-0.801) 
-1.89 
(-1.004) 
-1.48 
(-1.083) 
-2.70 
(-1.150) 
-0.23 
(0.016) 
1.35 
(0.526) 
-1.61 
(-1.993)* 
-1.08 
(-1.259) 
-16 
-0.37 
(-0.661) 
-1.94 
(-1.302) 
-0.65 
(-0.928) 
-1.64 
(-0.675) 
-0.04 
(-0.274) 
-2.83 
(-1.873)* 
-0.68 
(-0.979) 
-2.57 
(-1.465) 
0.14 
(-0.055) 
-2.56 
(-1.051) 
-0.76 
(-0.422) 
0.58 
(0.213) 
-1.30 
(-1.056) 
-2.39 
(-2.190)** 
-15 
-0.53 
(-0.890) 
-2.48 
(-1.590) 
-0.23 
(-0.101) 
-1.88 
(-0.633) 
-0.82 
(-1.459) 
-3.65 
(-2.410)** 
-0.88 
(-1.253) 
-3.46 
(-1.990)* 
0.15 
(-0.238) 
-2.40 
(-1.110) 
-0.24 
(-0.095) 
0.34 
(0.146) 
-1.58 
(-1.757)* 
-3.97 
(-2.851)*** 
-14 
-1.01 
(-1.155) 
-3.49 
(-2.178)** 
-0.61 
(-0.791) 
-2.50 
(-0.957) 
-0.70 
(-0.741) 
-4.36 
(-2.872)*** 
-0.20 
(-0.608) 
-3.66 
(-2.050)** 
-1.59 
(-0.793) 
-4.00 
(-1.670)* 
-2.11 
(-1.508) 
-1.76 
(-0.664) 
-1.57 
(-1.663) 
-5.54 
(-3.118)*** 
-13 
-0.93 
(-0.886) 
-4.42 
(-2.524)** 
-0.51 
(-0.693) 
-3.01 
(-1.228) 
-0.90 
(-0.903) 
-5.27 
(-3.099)*** 
-0.67 
(-0.046) 
-4.34 
(-2.004)* 
-1.08 
(-0.458) 
-5.08 
(-2.097)** 
-1.53 
(-1.023) 
-3.30 
(-1.091) 
-0.13 
(0.144) 
-5.68 
(-2.931)*** 
-12 
-0.78 
(-0.765) 
-5.20 
(-2.679)*** 
-0.73 
(-0.564) 
-3.74 
(-1.293) 
-1.07 
(-1.139) 
-6.34 
(-3.547)*** 
0.88 
(1.137) 
-3.46 
(-1.423) 
-0.55 
(-0.277) 
-5.64 
(-1.833)* 
-0.98 
(-0.999) 
-4.28 
(-1.423) 
0.44 
(1.047) 
-5.23 
(-2.151)** 
-11 
0.44 
(0.620) 
-4.76 
(-2.259)** 
0.76 
(0.904) 
-2.98 
(-0.804) 
-0.09 
(-0.127) 
-6.44 
(-3.430)*** 
1.38 
(1.515) 
-2.08 
(-0.687) 
0.61 
(0.361) 
-5.03 
(-1.650) 
1.41 
(1.078) 
-2.87 
(-0.814) 
-0.42 
(0.048) 
-5.65 
(-1.951)* 
-10 
0.17 
(0.335) 
-4.58 
(-2.030)** 
-0.15 
(-0.223) 
-3.14 
(-0.894) 
-0.04 
(0.156) 
-6.48 
(-3.194)*** 
0.64 
(0.981) 
-1.43 
(-0.170) 
-0.41 
(-0.725) 
-5.44 
(-1.930)* 
2.23 
(1.445) 
-0.64 
(-0.095) 
-1.61 
(-2.243)** 
-7.26 
(-2.588)** 
-9 
-0.73 
(-0.461) 
-5.31 
(-2.078)** 
-0.90 
(-1.155) 
-4.04 
(-1.269) 
-0.51 
(-0.174) 
-7.00 
(-2.824)*** 
0.43 
(-0.136) 
-1.00 
(-0.215) 
-0.72 
(-0.475) 
-6.16 
(-2.018)** 
-1.92 
(-0.651) 
-2.57 
(-0.364) 
-0.45 
(0.178) 
-7.72 
(-2.157)** 
-8 
-0.14 
(0.024) 
-5.46 
(-2.056)** 
0.29 
(0.549) 
-3.75 
(-1.044) 
-0.02 
(0.073) 
-7.03 
(-2.867)*** 
-1.09 
(-0.509) 
-2.09 
(-0.408) 
-0.67 
(-0.123) 
-6.84 
(-2.032)** 
-0.07 
(-0.040) 
-2.64 
(-0.370) 
-0.05 
(-0.136) 
-7.77 
(-2.045)** 
-7 
0.16 
(0.323) 
-5.29 
(-1.924)* 
0.37 
(0.558) 
-3.38 
(-0.856) 
-0.02 
(0.095) 
-7.06 
(-2.906)*** 
-0.94 
(-0.840) 
-3.03 
(-0.726) 
0.09 
(-0.125) 
-6.74 
(-2.124)** 
0.51 
(0.645) 
-2.13 
(-0.144) 
0.84 
(0.842) 
-6.92 
(-1.702)* 
-6 
-0.05 
(-0.129) 
-5.35 
(-1.911)* 
-0.48 
(-0.504) 
-3.86 
(-0.986) 
-0.22 
(-0.247) 
-7.29 
(-2.851)*** 
0.60 
(1.003) 
-2.43 
(-0.338) 
-0.06 
(0.155) 
-6.80 
(-2.110)** 
0.62 
(-0.045) 
-1.51 
(-0.160) 
0.88 
(0.220) 
-6.04 
(-1.456) 
-5 
0.17 
(0.549) 
-5.17 
(-1.664)* 
0.71 
(0.890) 
-3.14 
(-0.671) 
0.25 
(0.617) 
-7.03 
(-2.546)** 
-0.91 
(-0.740) 
-3.35 
(-0.513) 
-0.51 
(-0.102) 
-7.32 
(-1.998)** 
0.16 
(0.419) 
-1.35 
(-0.003) 
0.50 
(0.417) 
-5.53 
(-1.454) 
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-4 
-0.51 
(-0.580) 
-5.68 
(-1.778)* 
-0.72 
(-0.701) 
-3.87 
(-0.878) 
-0.47 
(-0.702) 
-7.51 
(-2.598)*** 
1.24 
(0.518) 
-2.10 
(-0.058) 
-0.48 
(-1.246) 
-7.81 
(-2.380)** 
-0.71 
(-0.211) 
-2.06 
(-0.086) 
-0.50 
(-0.458) 
-6.04 
(-1.448) 
-3 
-0.62 
(-0.612) 
-6.31 
(-1.946)* 
-0.66 
(-0.621) 
-4.54 
(-1.017) 
-1.14 
(-0.873) 
-8.65 
(-2.789)*** 
-1.60 
(-1.531) 
-3.71 
(-0.519) 
0.54 
(0.289) 
-7.26 
(-2.245)** 
0.16 
(-0.335) 
-1.89 
(-0.214) 
-0.38 
(-0.309) 
-6.42 
(-1.528) 
-2 
-1.57 
(-1.542) 
-7.89 
(-2.448)** 
-1.48 
(-1.282) 
-6.02 
(-1.445) 
-2.11 
(-1.889)* 
-10.77 
(-3.492)*** 
-1.59 
(-0.912) 
-5.30 
(-0.849) 
-1.39 
(-0.746) 
-8.66 
(-2.237)** 
-0.27 
(-0.317) 
-2.17 
(-0.287) 
-1.46 
(-1.530) 
-7.88 
(-1.947)* 
-1 
2.92 
(2.770)*** 
-4.97 
(-1.294) 
2.95 
(1.780)* 
-3.07 
(-0.340) 
3.40 
(3.606)*** 
-7.36 
(-2.243)** 
3.68 
(1.316) 
-1.62 
(-0.099) 
2.76 
(2.627)** 
-5.90 
(-1.138) 
1.36 
(1.239) 
-0.81 
(0.090) 
1.03 
(2.058)** 
-6.85 
(-1.458) 
0 
0.52 
(0.618) 
-4.45 
(-1.133) 
0.89 
(0.730) 
-2.18 
(-0.137) 
0.58 
(0.790) 
-6.78 
(-2.077)** 
0.11 
(0.062) 
-1.50 
(-0.080) 
1.13 
(1.359) 
-4.76 
(-0.745) 
-0.78 
(-1.135) 
-1.59 
(-0.189) 
0.23 
(0.275) 
-6.61 
(-1.454) 
1 
0.49 
(0.802) 
-3.95 
(-0.791) 
0.61 
(0.610) 
-1.56 
(0.047) 
0.56 
(0.902) 
-6.21 
(-1.706)* 
0.73 
(1.037) 
-0.77 
(0.464) 
-0.64 
(-0.126) 
-5.41 
(-0.716) 
0.88 
(0.837) 
-0.71 
(0.065) 
0.32 
(0.232) 
-6.29 
(-1.263) 
2 
-1.14 
(-1.528) 
-5.09 
(-1.222) 
-0.81 
(-0.990) 
-2.37 
(-0.153) 
-1.35 
(-1.716)* 
-7.56 
(-2.253)** 
-0.01 
(-0.131) 
-0.78 
(0.416) 
0.26 
(-0.392) 
-5.15 
(-0.836) 
-1.78 
(-1.063) 
-2.49 
(-0.318) 
-2.12 
(-2.897)*** 
-8.42 
(-1.776)* 
3 
0.44 
(0.403) 
-4.65 
(-1.108) 
0.40 
(0.223) 
-1.97 
(-0.116) 
0.34 
(0.608) 
-7.22 
(-2.023)** 
0.56 
(0.247) 
-0.22 
(0.458) 
0.48 
(0.159) 
-4.66 
(-0.799) 
0.74 
(-0.005) 
-1.74 
(-0.326) 
-0.31 
(-0.332) 
-8.74 
(-1.920)* 
4 
-1.14 
(-1.830)* 
-5.79 
(-1.583) 
-0.51 
(-1.094) 
-2.48 
(-0.396) 
-0.80 
(-1.314) 
-8.02 
(-2.416)** 
-1.54 
(-1.238) 
-1.77 
(0.191) 
-1.85 
(-2.118)** 
-6.51 
(-1.245) 
-1.61 
(-1.628) 
-3.35 
(-0.736) 
-2.85 
(-4.189)*** 
-11.59 
(-2.720)** 
5 
-0.24 
(-0.069) 
-6.04 
(-1.552) 
-0.52 
(0.268) 
-3.00 
(-0.291) 
0.07 
(0.102) 
-7.94 
(-2.338)** 
0.49 
(0.243) 
-1.28 
(0.240) 
0.45 
(0.847) 
-6.05 
(-1.133) 
-1.90 
(-0.979) 
-5.26 
(-1.073) 
-0.45 
(-0.449) 
-12.04 
(-2.966)*** 
6 
0.69 
(1.018) 
-5.34 
(-1.266) 
0.83 
(0.928) 
-2.17 
(-0.098) 
0.99 
(1.159) 
-6.95 
(-1.954)* 
0.39 
(1.096) 
-0.88 
(0.446) 
0.73 
(1.206) 
-5.32 
(-0.819) 
-0.09 
(0.211) 
-5.35 
(-0.967) 
-0.02 
(0.091) 
-12.06 
(-2.802)*** 
7 
1.03 
(0.949) 
-4.31 
(-0.999) 
1.34 
(1.257) 
-0.82 
(0.148) 
0.74 
(0.810) 
-6.21 
(-1.734)* 
0.88 
(0.470) 
-0.00 
(0.502) 
1.53 
(0.985) 
-3.79 
(-0.394) 
1.34 
(0.631) 
-4.00 
(-0.786) 
-0.17 
(-0.270) 
-12.24 
(-3.090)*** 
8 
-0.93 
(-0.830) 
-5.24 
(-1.225) 
0.00 
(0.056) 
-0.82 
(0.155) 
-0.99 
(-0.833) 
-7.20 
(-1.922)* 
-1.18 
(-1.428) 
-1.18 
(0.277) 
-1.45 
(-0.829) 
-5.24 
(-0.651) 
-2.05 
(-1.231) 
-6.06 
(-1.158) 
0.48 
(-0.109) 
-11.76 
(-2.881)*** 
9 
0.85 
(0.860) 
-4.39 
(-0.993) 
1.14 
(1.045) 
0.32 
(0.372) 
0.46 
(0.736) 
-6.73 
(-1.769)* 
0.75 
(0.476) 
-0.42 
(0.391) 
2.27 
(1.614) 
-2.97 
(-0.187) 
0.96 
(0.242) 
-5.10 
(-1.011) 
1.02 
(0.677) 
-10.73 
(-2.578)** 
10 
0.96 
(1.210) 
-3.43 
(-0.730) 
0.90 
(1.241) 
1.23 
(0.559) 
0.90 
(0.994) 
-5.83 
(-1.513) 
1.46 
(1.799)* 
1.04 
(0.623) 
1.60 
(1.557) 
-1.36 
(0.180) 
1.35 
(1.059) 
-3.74 
(-0.729) 
-0.31 
(-0.885) 
-11.05 
(-2.683)** 
11 
0.24 
(0.200) 
-3.18 
(-0.655) 
0.11 
(0.200) 
1.34 
(0.579) 
0.69 
(0.833) 
-5.13 
(-1.243) 
-1.47 
(-1.379) 
-0.43 
(0.380) 
0.57 
(0.464) 
-0.79 
(0.284) 
-0.70 
(-0.849) 
-4.45 
(-0.893) 
0.34 
(0.619) 
-10.71 
(-2.338)** 
12 
-0.85 
(-0.933) 
-4.03 
(-0.860) 
-0.58 
(-1.020) 
0.75 
(0.419) 
-0.65 
(-0.584) 
-5.78 
(-1.362) 
0.14 
(0.306) 
-0.28 
(0.420) 
-1.18 
(-1.350) 
-1.97 
(-0.015) 
-2.15 
(-1.179) 
-6.60 
(-1.244) 
-1.74 
(-2.331)** 
-12.45 
(-2.600)** 
13 
0.52 
(0.467) 
-3.51 
(-0.727) 
0.45 
(0.422) 
1.21 
(0.485) 
0.38 
(0.401) 
-5.40 
(-1.249) 
0.06 
(-0.160) 
-0.22 
(0.392) 
-0.17 
(-0.122) 
-2.15 
(-0.039) 
1.65 
(0.610) 
-4.94 
(-0.979) 
0.54 
(0.535) 
-11.91 
(-2.490)** 
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14 
1.05 
(1.564) 
-2.46 
(-0.365) 
1.15 
(1.588) 
2.36 
(0.748) 
0.52 
(1.187) 
-4.87 
(-0.967) 
1.82 
(1.410) 
1.60 
(0.687) 
3.55 
(1.849)* 
1.40 
(0.657) 
0.58 
(0.748) 
-4.36 
(-0.815) 
0.22 
(1.256) 
-11.68 
(-2.215)** 
15 
-0.32 
(-0.497) 
-2.79 
(-0.460) 
-1.65 
(-1.596) 
0.70 
(0.439) 
0.12 
(0.013) 
-4.75 
(-0.931) 
0.70 
(0.350) 
2.30 
(0.726) 
-0.41 
(-0.562) 
0.98 
(0.579) 
-0.38 
(-0.424) 
-4.74 
(-0.878) 
0.12 
(0.437) 
-11.56 
(-2.104)** 
16 
0.06 
(0.243) 
-2.73 
(-0.402) 
-0.69 
(-0.217) 
0.01 
(0.388) 
0.47 
(0.582) 
-4.28 
(-0.781) 
-0.46 
(-0.535) 
1.84 
(0.669) 
-0.36 
(0.036) 
0.62 
(0.557) 
0.40 
(0.189) 
-4.34 
(-0.848) 
-0.47 
(-0.105) 
-12.03 
(-2.015)* 
17 
-0.43 
(-0.527) 
-3.16 
(-0.491) 
-0.71 
(-0.965) 
-0.69 
(0.240) 
-0.69 
(-0.807) 
-4.97 
(-0.915) 
0.88 
(0.543) 
2.72 
(0.760) 
0.66 
(1.035) 
1.29 
(0.744) 
-0.73 
(-1.074) 
-5.08 
(-1.057) 
0.90 
(0.620) 
-11.12 
(-1.871)* 
18 
-0.38 
(-0.764) 
-3.55 
(-0.644) 
-0.47 
(-0.671) 
-1.17 
(0.131) 
0.04 
(-0.158) 
-4.92 
(-0.943) 
-1.59 
(-2.047)** 
1.13 
(0.395) 
0.29 
(0.302) 
1.58 
(0.789) 
-2.20 
(-2.032)** 
-7.28 
(-1.490) 
-0.66 
(-1.238) 
-11.79 
(-2.035)** 
19 
0.43 
(0.641) 
-3.12 
(-0.515) 
0.63 
(0.630) 
-0.53 
(0.227) 
0.41 
(0.646) 
-4.51 
(-0.801) 
-0.03 
(0.266) 
1.10 
(0.430) 
0.06 
(-0.013) 
1.64 
(0.765) 
0.29 
(0.473) 
-6.99 
(-1.370) 
-0.95 
(-0.044) 
-12.74 
(-1.968)* 
20 
1.09 
(1.169) 
-2.02 
(-0.277) 
1.69 
(1.361) 
1.15 
(0.488) 
1.43 
(1.521) 
-3.07 
(-0.458) 
0.65 
(0.421) 
1.76 
(0.554) 
-0.46 
(-0.515) 
1.18 
(0.677) 
0.72 
(0.727) 
-6.26 
(-1.221) 
1.04 
(0.675) 
-11.69 
(-1.866)* 
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Market adjusted model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed MRRT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (6): 
tMititit RReAR ,−==  
Where 
itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days 
relative to the announcement of the proposed resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and 
production subsector, 330 to the general mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & 
steel, 3 to the aluminium, 7 to the platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  
Individual firm excess returns are aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average 
abnormal return for any subsector on day t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t 
abnormal return to the sum of the previous day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted 
index. The t-statistics for the AARs and CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in (27), (31) and (43). 
The null hypothesis for the AARS test statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is 
zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
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Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
-1.23 
(-1.442) 
-1.23 
(-1.442) 
-0.86 
(-0.650) 
-0.86 
(-0.650) 
-1.71 
(-2.190)** 
-1.71 
(-2.190)** 
-0.80 
(-0.586) 
-0.80 
(-0.586) 
-0.46 
(-0.048) 
-0.46 
(-0.048) 
-1.62 
(-1.724)* 
-1.62 
(-1.724)* 
0.36 
(0.368) 
0.36 
(0.368) 
-19 
0.34 
(0.442) 
-0.88 
(-0.725) 
0.99 
(1.230) 
0.12 
(0.484) 
0.36 
(0.451) 
-1.34 
(-1.231) 
-0.78 
(-0.461) 
-1.59 
(-0.749) 
-1.43 
(-1.591) 
-1.90 
(-1.121) 
1.24 
(1.067) 
-0.37 
(-0.588) 
-0.64 
(-0.962) 
-0.28 
(-0.425) 
-18 
0.38 
(0.255) 
-0.49 
(-0.490) 
-0.23 
(-0.674) 
-0.11 
(0.102) 
0.02 
(-0.053) 
-1.32 
(-1.066) 
0.45 
(0.465) 
-1.14 
(-0.378) 
0.35 
(0.188) 
-1.54 
(-0.968) 
1.91 
(1.729)* 
1.53 
(0.609) 
0.90 
(0.231) 
0.62 
(-0.092) 
-17 
-1.11 
(-1.072) 
-1.61 
(-1.106) 
-1.23 
(-0.966) 
-1.34 
(-0.424) 
-1.40 
(-1.332) 
-2.73 
(-1.797)* 
-0.70 
(-0.694) 
-1.84 
(-0.890) 
-1.42 
(-1.025) 
-2.97 
(-1.400) 
-0.13 
(0.084) 
1.40 
(0.568) 
-1.21 
(-1.319) 
-0.58 
(-0.999) 
-16 
-0.39 
(-0.694) 
-2.00 
(-1.390) 
-0.74 
(-1.069) 
-2.09 
(-1.085) 
-0.04 
(-0.256) 
-2.77 
(-1.832)* 
-0.67 
(-0.957) 
-2.51 
(-1.335) 
0.08 
(-0.108) 
-2.88 
(-1.307) 
-0.75 
(-0.406) 
0.64 
(0.255) 
-1.16 
(-1.009) 
-1.75 
(-1.841)* 
-15 
-0.56 
(-0.838) 
-2.56 
(-1.651)* 
-0.37 
(-0.161) 
-2.47 
(-1.014) 
-0.89 
(-1.477) 
-3.67 
(-2.370)** 
-0.88 
(-1.162) 
-3.40 
(-1.787)* 
0.19 
(-0.073) 
-2.69 
(-1.305) 
-0.15 
(-0.012) 
0.49 
(0.222) 
-1.21 
(-1.217) 
-2.97 
(-2.308)** 
-14 
-1.05 
(-1.110) 
-3.61 
(-2.224)** 
-0.77 
(-0.834) 
-3.24 
(-1.318) 
-0.81 
(-0.774) 
-4.48 
(-2.861)*** 
-0.19 
(-0.551) 
-3.60 
(-1.833)* 
-1.50 
(-0.687) 
-4.19 
(-1.840)* 
-1.99 
(-1.450) 
-1.50 
(-0.553) 
-1.10 
(-0.838) 
-4.07 
(-2.330)** 
-13 
-0.94 
(-0.939) 
-4.55 
(-2.570)** 
-0.59 
(-0.815) 
-3.84 
(-1.604) 
-0.89 
(-0.893) 
-5.37 
(-3.063)*** 
-0.66 
(-0.004) 
-4.26 
(-1.790)* 
-1.15 
(-0.638) 
-5.35 
(-2.305)** 
-1.53 
(-1.015) 
-3.03 
(-0.978) 
-0.02 
(0.251) 
-4.10 
(-2.180)** 
-12 
-0.81 
(-0.708) 
-5.36 
(-2.671)*** 
-0.87 
(-0.630) 
-4.72 
(-1.642) 
-1.15 
(-1.129) 
-6.53 
(-3.465)*** 
0.88 
(1.169) 
-3.38 
(-1.127) 
-0.50 
(-0.127) 
-5.86 
(-1.917)* 
-0.89 
(-0.943) 
-3.93 
(-1.300) 
0.82 
(1.538) 
-3.27 
(-1.102) 
-11 
0.44 
(0.556) 
-4.92 
(-2.277)** 
0.70 
(0.784) 
-4.01 
(-1.222) 
-0.02 
(-0.100) 
-6.55 
(-3.293)*** 
1.40 
(1.510) 
-1.98 
(-0.451) 
0.47 
(0.170) 
-5.38 
(-1.829)* 
1.37 
(1.079) 
-2.55 
(-0.704) 
-0.46 
(-0.145) 
-3.73 
(-1.080) 
-10 
0.15 
(0.353) 
-4.76 
(-2.044)** 
-0.27 
(-0.326) 
-4.28 
(-1.350) 
-0.07 
(0.157) 
-6.63 
(-3.077)*** 
0.64 
(1.067) 
-1.33 
(0.031) 
-0.42 
(-0.737) 
-5.81 
(-2.072)** 
2.28 
(1.489) 
-0.27 
(0.034) 
-1.37 
(-1.829)* 
-5.10 
(-1.585) 
-9 
-0.76 
(-0.411) 
-5.53 
(-2.054)** 
-1.04 
(-1.221) 
-5.33 
(-1.726)* 
-0.60 
(-0.187) 
-7.23 
(-2.753)*** 
0.44 
(0.023) 
-0.89 
(0.038) 
-0.66 
(-0.336) 
-6.47 
(-2.070)** 
-1.83 
(-0.582) 
-2.10 
(-0.208) 
-0.04 
(0.682) 
-5.15 
(-1.004) 
-8 
-0.13 
(-0.092) 
-5.66 
(-2.085)** 
0.25 
(0.336) 
-5.07 
(-1.554) 
0.07 
(0.102) 
-7.15 
(-2.800)*** 
-1.07 
(-0.535) 
-1.96 
(-0.178) 
-0.86 
(-0.413) 
-7.34 
(-2.221)** 
-0.14 
(-0.091) 
-2.25 
(-0.236) 
-0.20 
(-0.468) 
-5.35 
(-1.112) 
-7 
0.18 
(0.152) 
-5.47 
(-2.017)** 
0.35 
(0.284) 
-4.72 
(-1.425) 
0.10 
(0.125) 
-7.05 
(-2.829)*** 
-0.91 
(-0.868) 
-2.88 
(-0.533) 
-0.13 
(-0.625) 
-7.47 
(-2.499)** 
0.41 
(0.585) 
-1.84 
(-0.040) 
0.61 
(0.280) 
-4.74 
(-1.035) 
-6 
-0.06 
(-0.165) 
-5.54 
(-2.009)** 
-0.56 
(-0.643) 
-5.29 
(-1.580) 
-0.21 
(-0.235) 
-7.26 
(-2.772)*** 
0.61 
(1.027) 
-2.26 
(-0.137) 
-0.13 
(0.010) 
-7.60 
(-2.508)** 
0.63 
(-0.032) 
-1.21 
(-0.051) 
0.99 
(0.264) 
-3.74 
(-0.812) 
-5 
0.19 
(0.394) 
-5.35 
(-1.815)* 
0.69 
(0.671) 
-4.60 
(-1.282) 
0.38 
(0.650) 
-6.87 
(-2.485)** 
-0.89 
(-0.773) 
-3.16 
(-0.306) 
-0.73 
(-0.748) 
-8.34 
(-2.562)** 
0.07 
(0.364) 
-1.13 
(0.080) 
0.28 
(-0.010) 
-3.45 
(-0.943) 
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-4 
-0.50 
(-0.665) 
-5.86 
(-1.948)* 
-0.78 
(-0.917) 
-5.38 
(-1.571) 
-0.41 
(-0.686) 
-7.28 
(-2.539)** 
1.26 
(0.523) 
-1.89 
(0.079) 
-0.62 
(-1.627) 
-8.96 
(-3.010)*** 
-0.74 
(-0.225) 
-1.88 
(-0.013) 
-0.52 
(-0.615) 
-3.98 
(-1.070) 
-3 
-0.62 
(-0.729) 
-6.48 
(-2.167)** 
-0.71 
(-0.817) 
-6.10 
(-1.747)* 
-1.06 
(-0.857) 
-8.35 
(-2.720)*** 
-1.59 
(-1.564) 
-3.49 
(-0.359) 
0.38 
(0.069) 
-8.58 
(-3.111)*** 
0.11 
(-0.375) 
-1.76 
(-0.153) 
-0.46 
(-0.583) 
-4.44 
(-1.236) 
-2 
-1.57 
(-1.665)* 
-8.05 
(-2.697)*** 
-1.52 
(-1.446) 
-7.63 
(-2.228)** 
-2.01 
(-1.861)* 
-10.36 
(-3.381)*** 
-1.57 
(-0.923) 
-5.06 
(-0.659) 
-1.57 
(-1.050) 
-10.15 
(-3.242)*** 
-0.33 
(-0.370) 
-2.10 
(-0.246) 
-1.57 
(-1.880)* 
-6.02 
(-1.771)* 
-1 
2.93 
(2.769)*** 
-5.11 
(-1.603) 
2.93 
(1.710)* 
-4.70 
(-1.100) 
3.53 
(3.747)*** 
-6.83 
(-2.208)** 
3.71 
(1.349) 
-1.35 
(0.045) 
2.54 
(2.470)** 
-7.60 
(-2.195)** 
1.27 
(1.204) 
-0.83 
(0.123) 
0.82 
(1.558) 
-5.19 
(-1.445) 
0 
0.51 
(0.616) 
-4.60 
(-1.466) 
0.80 
(0.623) 
-3.90 
(-0.890) 
0.59 
(0.811) 
-6.24 
(-2.071)** 
0.12 
(0.102) 
-1.22 
(0.070) 
1.06 
(1.364) 
-6.53 
(-1.793)* 
-0.77 
(-1.134) 
-1.61 
(-0.163) 
0.35 
(0.394) 
-4.84 
(-1.371) 
1 
0.49 
(0.767) 
-4.11 
(-1.110) 
0.54 
(0.494) 
-3.35 
(-0.696) 
0.61 
(0.916) 
-5.62 
(-1.716)* 
0.74 
(1.067) 
-0.47 
(0.583) 
-0.75 
(-0.258) 
-7.29 
(-1.709)* 
0.86 
(0.828) 
-0.74 
(0.099) 
0.35 
(0.115) 
-4.49 
(-1.198) 
2 
-1.17 
(-1.513) 
-5.28 
(-1.539) 
-0.95 
(-1.102) 
-4.31 
(-0.940) 
-1.43 
(-1.725)* 
-7.06 
(-2.274)** 
-0.01 
(-0.057) 
-0.48 
(0.552) 
0.31 
(-0.228) 
-6.97 
(-1.776)* 
-1.68 
(-1.038) 
-2.42 
(-0.278) 
-1.72 
(-2.164)** 
-6.22 
(-1.551) 
3 
0.44 
(0.346) 
-4.84 
(-1.451) 
0.33 
(0.008) 
-3.97 
(-0.938) 
0.40 
(0.626) 
-6.66 
(-2.052)** 
0.57 
(0.281) 
0.08 
(0.601) 
0.36 
(-0.074) 
-6.61 
(-1.851)* 
0.72 
(-0.022) 
-1.70 
(-0.294) 
-0.31 
(-0.519) 
-6.53 
(-1.772)* 
4 
-1.19 
(-1.750)* 
-6.04 
(-1.885)* 
-0.70 
(-1.174) 
-4.67 
(-1.251) 
-0.96 
(-1.342) 
-7.63 
(-2.426)** 
-1.55 
(-1.160) 
-1.46 
(0.358) 
-1.68 
(-1.811)* 
-8.29 
(-2.126)** 
-1.44 
(-1.441) 
-3.15 
(-0.677) 
-2.21 
(-2.585)** 
-8.74 
(-2.286)** 
5 
-0.26 
(-0.032) 
-6.31 
(-1.842)* 
-0.65 
(0.198) 
-5.33 
(-1.092) 
0.01 
(0.104) 
-7.61 
(-2.340)** 
0.50 
(0.319) 
-0.96 
(0.420) 
0.47 
(1.032) 
-7.82 
(-2.010)** 
-1.83 
(-0.962) 
-4.98 
(-1.015) 
-0.13 
(0.170) 
-8.88 
(-2.415)** 
6 
0.67 
(1.039) 
-5.63 
(-1.552) 
0.73 
(0.832) 
-4.59 
(-0.915) 
0.98 
(1.167) 
-6.62 
(-1.959)* 
0.40 
(1.153) 
-0.55 
(0.634) 
0.69 
(1.232) 
-7.12 
(-1.747)* 
-0.06 
(0.240) 
-5.05 
(-0.883) 
0.16 
(0.349) 
-8.71 
(-2.279)** 
7 
1.03 
(0.895) 
-4.59 
(-1.296) 
1.28 
(1.101) 
-3.30 
(-0.674) 
0.81 
(0.839) 
-5.81 
(-1.742)* 
0.89 
(0.476) 
0.34 
(0.691) 
1.39 
(0.867) 
-5.72 
(-1.308) 
1.31 
(0.622) 
-3.73 
(-0.713) 
-0.20 
(-0.398) 
-8.92 
(-2.616)** 
8 
-0.97 
(-0.766) 
-5.57 
(-1.509) 
-0.16 
(0.026) 
-3.47 
(-0.638) 
-1.12 
(-0.833) 
-6.93 
(-1.964)* 
-1.18 
(-1.387) 
-0.83 
(0.495) 
-1.34 
(-0.640) 
-7.07 
(-1.510) 
-1.92 
(-1.169) 
-5.66 
(-1.061) 
1.00 
(0.698) 
-7.91 
(-2.243)** 
9 
0.84 
(0.827) 
-4.72 
(-1.278) 
1.07 
(0.906) 
-2.39 
(-0.433) 
0.51 
(0.759) 
-6.41 
(-1.811)* 
0.77 
(0.496) 
-0.06 
(0.617) 
2.16 
(1.517) 
-4.91 
(-1.040) 
0.93 
(0.240) 
-4.72 
(-0.929) 
1.03 
(0.625) 
-6.87 
(-1.969)* 
10 
0.96 
(1.171) 
-3.76 
(-1.005) 
0.83 
(1.051) 
-1.55 
(-0.254) 
0.95 
(1.012) 
-5.46 
(-1.540) 
1.48 
(1.891)* 
1.41 
(0.868) 
1.49 
(1.440) 
-3.41 
(-0.676) 
1.33 
(1.064) 
-3.38 
(-0.651) 
-0.30 
(-0.960) 
-7.18 
(-2.101)** 
11 
0.26 
(0.071) 
-3.50 
(-0.949) 
0.08 
(-0.041) 
-1.46 
(-0.257) 
0.82 
(0.892) 
-4.64 
(-1.259) 
-1.45 
(-1.452) 
-0.03 
(0.611) 
0.35 
(0.007) 
-3.06 
(-0.677) 
-0.79 
(-0.937) 
-4.18 
(-0.839) 
0.13 
(0.075) 
-7.04 
(-1.880)* 
12 
-0.87 
(-0.913) 
-4.37 
(-1.164) 
-0.71 
(-1.133) 
-2.18 
(-0.436) 
-0.72 
(-0.591) 
-5.36 
(-1.391) 
0.15 
(0.401) 
0.11 
(0.661) 
-1.14 
(-1.286) 
-4.21 
(-0.997) 
-2.07 
(-1.160) 
-6.25 
(-1.194) 
-1.39 
(-1.412) 
-8.44 
(-2.056)** 
13 
0.50 
(0.465) 
-3.87 
(-1.019) 
0.35 
(0.326) 
-1.83 
(-0.335) 
0.38 
(0.405) 
-4.98 
(-1.271) 
0.07 
(-0.114) 
0.19 
(0.633) 
-0.22 
(-0.209) 
-4.44 
(-1.019) 
1.68 
(0.633) 
-4.57 
(-0.919) 
0.70 
(0.804) 
-7.74 
(-1.961)* 
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14 
1.05 
(1.525) 
-2.81 
(-0.639) 
1.10 
(1.430) 
-0.73 
(-0.087) 
0.61 
(1.219) 
-4.36 
(-0.968) 
1.84 
(1.516) 
2.03 
(0.967) 
3.39 
(1.782)* 
-1.04 
(-0.180) 
0.53 
(0.711) 
-4.04 
(-0.755) 
0.15 
(1.116) 
-7.58 
(-1.786)* 
15 
-0.36 
(-0.388) 
-3.18 
(-0.712) 
-1.82 
(-1.707)* 
-2.55 
(-0.434) 
-0.00 
(0.010) 
-4.37 
(-0.931) 
0.70 
(0.457) 
2.73 
(1.010) 
-0.29 
(-0.193) 
-1.33 
(-0.221) 
-0.24 
(-0.321) 
-4.28 
(-0.797) 
0.66 
(1.459) 
-6.92 
(-1.477) 
16 
0.04 
(0.264) 
-3.14 
(-0.645) 
-0.80 
(-0.322) 
-3.35 
(-0.491) 
0.44 
(0.586) 
-3.93 
(-0.768) 
-0.45 
(-0.461) 
2.28 
(0.956) 
-0.37 
(0.054) 
-1.70 
(-0.193) 
0.45 
(0.237) 
-3.83 
(-0.780) 
-0.22 
(0.293) 
-7.14 
(-1.349) 
17 
-0.45 
(-0.548) 
-3.59 
(-0.750) 
-0.81 
(-1.113) 
-4.17 
(-0.670) 
-0.69 
(-0.797) 
-4.63 
(-0.921) 
0.89 
(0.597) 
3.17 
(1.090) 
0.62 
(1.045) 
-1.08 
(0.048) 
-0.71 
(-1.064) 
-4.54 
(-1.007) 
1.08 
(0.844) 
-6.06 
(-1.144) 
18 
-0.40 
(-0.756) 
-4.00 
(-0.918) 
-0.59 
(-0.775) 
-4.77 
(-0.829) 
0.00 
(-0.148) 
-4.62 
(-0.956) 
-1.58 
(-2.071)** 
1.59 
(0.693) 
0.29 
(0.370) 
-0.79 
(0.135) 
-2.15 
(-2.031)** 
-6.69 
(-1.471) 
-0.39 
(-0.738) 
-6.45 
(-1.243) 
19 
0.42 
(0.609) 
-3.57 
(-0.778) 
0.55 
(0.488) 
-4.21 
(-0.726) 
0.44 
(0.657) 
-4.18 
(-0.801) 
-0.01 
(0.347) 
1.57 
(0.749) 
-0.02 
(-0.181) 
-0.81 
(0.097) 
0.29 
(0.484) 
-6.39 
(-1.328) 
-0.86 
(-0.038) 
-7.32 
(-1.189) 
20 
1.09 
(1.113) 
-2.48 
(-0.522) 
1.63 
(1.232) 
-2.58 
(-0.456) 
1.50 
(1.530) 
-2.68 
(-0.414) 
0.67 
(0.438) 
2.24 
(0.930) 
-0.60 
(-0.814) 
-1.41 
(-0.070) 
0.69 
(0.693) 
-5.70 
(-1.172) 
1.01 
(0.541) 
-6.30 
(-1.096) 
 
  
414 
Mean adjusted model market reaction to the announcement of the proposed MRRT: This table shows the different subsectors average abnormal and 
cumulative returns for each day within the event window surrounding the announcement of resource super profit tax. The abnormal return for firm i is computed as in (4): 
tMititit RReAR ,−==  
Where itAR  and itR are respectively the excess performance and observed returns on firm i for time period t and where iR  is the average continuously compounded past 
performance return for firm i during the estimation period. The event window is defined as -20 days through to +20 days relative to the announcement of the proposed 
resource super profit tax. The sample size consists of 714 firms listed on the ASX, of which 117 belong to the exploration and production subsector, 330 to the general 
mining subsector, 35 to the coal subsector, 106 to the gold mining subsector, 75 to the nonferrous metals subsector, 33 to the iron & steel, 3 to the aluminium, 7 to the 
platinum & precious metals and 8 to the diamonds & gemstones subsector as classified by the Industry classification benchmark.  Individual firm excess returns are 
aggregated into portfolio on the basis of their subsector of belonging as defined in chapter 6. The equally weighted portfolio average abnormal return for any subsector on day 
t is computed as in (20) where Nwi /1= . The cumulative average abnormal return for period t is calculated by adding the day t abnormal return to the sum of the previous 
day excess return as defined in (21).
MR represents the continuously compounded return on the S&P/ASX 200 value weighted index. The t-statistics for the AARs and 
CAARs shown in parentheses are computed using the adjusted standardized cross-sectional methods as defined in ((27), (31) and (43). The null hypothesis for the AARS test 
statistic is that the average excess return on day t (within the event window) relative to the announcement of the proposed MRRT is zero. The null hypothesis for the CAARs 
test statistic is that the cumulative mean excess return is zero. 
  
415 
Days 
relative 
to AD 
All Sector 
 (N=714) 
Exploration & 
Production  
(N=115) 
General Mining  
(N=330) 
Coal  
(N=36) 
Nonferrous Metals 
(N=75) 
Gold Mining  
(N=105) 
Iron & Steel  
(N=34) 
 AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR AR  CAR 
-20 
1.09 
(1.125) 
1.09 
(1.125) 
1.53 
(1.217) 
1.53 
(1.217) 
0.58 
(0.661) 
0.58 
(0.661) 
1.49 
(1.609) 
1.49 
(1.609) 
1.91 
(1.416) 
1.91 
(1.416) 
0.68 
(0.671) 
0.68 
(0.671) 
2.53 
(1.953)* 
2.53 
(1.953)* 
-19 
-0.36 
(-0.338) 
0.73 
(0.591) 
0.36 
(0.391) 
1.89 
(1.122) 
-0.36 
(-0.352) 
0.22 
(0.214) 
-1.51 
(-1.094) 
-0.01 
(0.480) 
-2.09 
(-1.560) 
-0.18 
(0.101) 
0.51 
(0.143) 
1.19 
(0.647) 
-1.50 
(-1.555) 
1.03 
(1.023) 
-18 
-2.47 
(-2.285)** 
-1.73 
(-1.036) 
-3.01 
(-2.514)** 
-1.11 
(-0.481) 
-2.85 
(-2.531)** 
-2.62 
(-1.492) 
-2.42 
(-2.211)** 
-2.44 
(-1.230) 
-2.44 
(-1.747)* 
-2.62 
(-1.184) 
-0.96 
(-1.263) 
0.23 
(-0.279) 
-2.09 
(-1.826)* 
-1.05 
(-1.077) 
-17 
0.11 
(0.285) 
-1.62 
(-0.705) 
0.07 
(0.484) 
-1.04 
(-0.151) 
-0.20 
(0.024) 
-2.82 
(-1.311) 
0.50 
(0.594) 
-1.94 
(-0.799) 
-0.14 
(-0.006) 
-2.76 
(-0.883) 
1.06 
(0.735) 
1.30 
(0.376) 
-0.13 
(-0.049) 
-1.19 
(-0.990) 
-16 
-0.32 
(-0.349) 
-1.95 
(-0.839) 
-0.60 
(-0.570) 
-1.64 
(-0.493) 
-0.00 
(-0.109) 
-2.83 
(-1.300) 
-0.63 
(-0.699) 
-2.58 
(-1.116) 
0.20 
(0.048) 
-2.56 
(-0.762) 
-0.71 
(-0.309) 
0.59 
(0.149) 
-1.25 
(-0.668) 
-2.44 
(-1.620) 
-15 
0.53 
(0.567) 
-1.42 
(-0.523) 
0.79 
(0.870) 
-0.85 
(-0.017) 
0.17 
(0.156) 
-2.65 
(-1.174) 
0.18 
(0.060) 
-2.39 
(-0.929) 
1.34 
(0.940) 
-1.22 
(-0.384) 
0.91 
(0.741) 
1.50 
(0.490) 
-0.27 
(0.043) 
-2.71 
(-1.391) 
-14 
0.47 
(0.538) 
-0.94 
(-0.224) 
0.83 
(0.809) 
-0.01 
(0.336) 
0.69 
(0.711) 
-1.96 
(-0.784) 
1.30 
(1.072) 
-1.09 
(-0.330) 
0.07 
(0.326) 
-1.15 
(-0.187) 
-0.49 
(-0.182) 
1.01 
(0.357) 
0.27 
(0.582) 
-2.44 
(-0.821) 
-13 
-0.98 
(-0.649) 
-1.93 
(-0.529) 
-0.56 
(-0.516) 
-0.58 
(0.085) 
-0.96 
(-0.694) 
-2.92 
(-1.078) 
-0.73 
(-0.097) 
-1.82 
(-0.356) 
-1.15 
(-0.477) 
-2.30 
(-0.443) 
-1.60 
(-0.848) 
-0.59 
(-0.042) 
-0.21 
(0.016) 
-2.66 
(-0.778) 
-12 
0.33 
(0.537) 
-1.59 
(-0.256) 
0.35 
(0.415) 
-0.23 
(0.249) 
-0.02 
(0.200) 
-2.95 
(-0.942) 
2.01 
(1.867)* 
0.18 
(0.484) 
0.69 
(0.793) 
-1.61 
(-0.055) 
0.23 
(0.254) 
-0.35 
(0.047) 
1.82 
(1.758)* 
-0.83 
(0.144) 
-11 
-0.29 
(-0.239) 
-1.88 
(-0.348) 
0.04 
(0.133) 
-0.18 
(0.306) 
-0.78 
(-0.786) 
-3.73 
(-1.220) 
0.64 
(0.453) 
0.82 
(0.690) 
-0.20 
(-0.231) 
-1.81 
(-0.178) 
0.61 
(0.342) 
0.25 
(0.187) 
-1.34 
(-0.855) 
-2.17 
(-0.164) 
-10 
0.67 
(0.622) 
-1.21 
(-0.066) 
0.31 
(0.273) 
0.13 
(0.403) 
0.41 
(0.479) 
-3.32 
(-0.929) 
1.13 
(1.140) 
1.96 
(1.131) 
0.13 
(0.043) 
-1.67 
(-0.167) 
2.76 
(1.378) 
3.02 
(0.800) 
-1.00 
(-0.938) 
-3.18 
(-0.413) 
-9 
0.51 
(0.611) 
-0.70 
(0.211) 
0.31 
(0.299) 
0.45 
(0.481) 
0.65 
(0.630) 
-2.66 
(-0.464) 
1.70 
(1.705)* 
3.66 
(1.629) 
0.67 
(0.587) 
-1.00 
(0.108) 
-0.57 
(0.267) 
2.45 
(0.885) 
1.09 
(1.190) 
-2.09 
(0.073) 
-8 
-1.35 
(-1.066) 
-2.06 
(-0.183) 
-0.88 
(-0.812) 
-0.43 
(0.236) 
-1.16 
(-0.980) 
-3.82 
(-0.855) 
-2.31 
(-1.622) 
1.34 
(0.908) 
-2.03 
(-0.883) 
-3.04 
(-0.339) 
-1.39 
(-0.884) 
1.06 
(0.562) 
-1.57 
(-1.236) 
-3.67 
(-0.350) 
-7 
-1.45 
(-1.406) 
-3.51 
(-0.657) 
-1.20 
(-1.199) 
-1.64 
(-0.106) 
-1.55 
(-1.484) 
-5.38 
(-1.415) 
-2.57 
(-1.850)* 
-1.23 
(0.022) 
-1.71 
(-1.533) 
-4.75 
(-0.953) 
-1.24 
(-0.779) 
-0.18 
(0.300) 
-1.17 
(-1.036) 
-4.84 
(-0.707) 
-6 
-0.10 
(-0.152) 
-3.61 
(-0.691) 
-0.53 
(-0.377) 
-2.17 
(-0.224) 
-0.27 
(-0.247) 
-5.65 
(-1.434) 
0.55 
(0.669) 
-0.68 
(0.263) 
-0.12 
(0.022) 
-4.88 
(-0.958) 
0.56 
(-0.070) 
0.38 
(0.283) 
0.81 
(0.111) 
-4.03 
(-0.616) 
-5 
-1.34 
(-1.205) 
-4.96 
(-1.052) 
-0.76 
(-0.738) 
-2.94 
(-0.429) 
-1.17 
(-1.106) 
-6.83 
(-1.747)* 
-2.45 
(-2.713)** 
-3.13 
(-0.390) 
-2.21 
(-2.073)** 
-7.09 
(-1.460) 
-1.48 
(-0.703) 
-1.10 
(0.024) 
-1.39 
(-1.029) 
-5.43 
(-1.127) 
416 
-4 
-1.19 
(-0.918) 
-6.16 
(-1.338) 
-1.39 
(-1.176) 
-4.33 
(-0.761) 
-1.12 
(-1.022) 
-7.95 
(-1.992)** 
0.55 
(0.122) 
-2.58 
(-0.207) 
-1.25 
(-1.673)* 
-8.35 
(-1.983)* 
-1.45 
(-0.537) 
-2.56 
(-0.195) 
-1.36 
(-0.964) 
-6.79 
(-1.347) 
-3 
-1.55 
(-1.196) 
-7.71 
(-1.730)* 
-1.57 
(-1.169) 
-5.91 
(-1.089) 
-2.01 
(-1.509) 
-9.96 
(-2.410)** 
-2.54 
(-1.951)* 
-5.13 
(-0.815) 
-0.49 
(-0.401) 
-8.85 
(-2.229)** 
-0.83 
(-0.812) 
-3.40 
(-0.517) 
-1.54 
(-1.255) 
-8.34 
(-1.689) 
-2 
-2.63 
(-1.779)* 
-10.35 
(-2.362)** 
-2.50 
(-1.681)* 
-8.41 
(-1.679)* 
-3.10 
(-1.979)** 
-13.07 
(-3.195)*** 
-2.65 
(-1.477) 
-7.78 
(-1.364) 
-2.57 
(-1.218) 
-11.43 
(-2.523)** 
-1.42 
(-1.128) 
-4.82 
(-0.808) 
-2.78 
(-2.255)** 
-11.12 
(-2.338)** 
-1 
1.39 
(0.690) 
-8.95 
(-1.992)** 
1.46 
(0.564) 
-6.95 
(-1.148) 
1.96 
(1.226) 
-11.10 
(-2.711)*** 
2.14 
(0.285) 
-5.64 
(-1.215) 
1.05 
(0.740) 
-10.37 
(-2.112)** 
-0.29 
(-0.128) 
-5.11 
(-0.856) 
-0.86 
(-0.526) 
-11.99 
(-2.487)** 
0 
0.49 
(0.394) 
-8.45 
(-1.908)* 
0.86 
(0.513) 
-6.08 
(-0.964) 
0.56 
(0.527) 
-10.53 
(-2.672)*** 
0.09 
(0.039) 
-5.54 
(-1.154) 
1.11 
(1.018) 
-9.26 
(-1.757)* 
-0.80 
(-0.874) 
-5.92 
(-1.105) 
0.19 
(0.227) 
-11.79 
(-2.536)** 
1 
0.06 
(0.164) 
-8.39 
(-1.747)* 
0.19 
(0.111) 
-5.88 
(-0.874) 
0.15 
(0.246) 
-10.37 
(-2.513)** 
0.28 
(0.588) 
-5.25 
(-0.686) 
-1.13 
(-0.365) 
-10.40 
(-1.738)* 
0.41 
(0.326) 
-5.51 
(-0.994) 
-0.22 
(-0.572) 
-12.02 
(-2.401)** 
2 
0.05 
(0.048) 
-8.34 
(-1.675)* 
0.35 
(0.468) 
-5.53 
(-0.783) 
-0.22 
(-0.246) 
-10.60 
(-2.516)** 
1.19 
(0.922) 
-4.06 
(-0.418) 
1.60 
(0.929) 
-8.80 
(-1.503) 
-0.47 
(-0.119) 
-5.99 
(-0.952) 
-0.64 
(-0.227) 
-12.67 
(-2.368)** 
3 
-0.10 
(-0.210) 
-8.44 
(-1.741)* 
-0.12 
(-0.451) 
-5.66 
(-0.863) 
-0.16 
(-0.014) 
-10.76 
(-2.510)** 
0.01 
(-0.278) 
-4.05 
(-0.467) 
-0.12 
(-0.387) 
-8.92 
(-1.623) 
0.15 
(-0.276) 
-5.83 
(-1.067) 
-1.00 
(-1.062) 
-13.68 
(-2.698)** 
4 
1.13 
(1.064) 
-7.30 
(-1.445) 
1.71 
(1.131) 
-3.94 
(-0.594) 
1.34 
(1.224) 
-9.42 
(-2.138)** 
0.75 
(1.059) 
-3.29 
(-0.212) 
0.70 
(0.854) 
-8.22 
(-1.347) 
0.86 
(0.681) 
-4.96 
(-0.906) 
-0.02 
(0.254) 
-13.70 
(-2.582)** 
5 
0.59 
(0.651) 
-6.71 
(-1.209) 
0.28 
(0.747) 
-3.66 
(-0.359) 
0.85 
(0.744) 
-8.56 
(-1.847)* 
1.33 
(0.859) 
-1.95 
(0.001) 
1.39 
(1.702)* 
-6.83 
(-1.067) 
-0.99 
(-0.316) 
-5.96 
(-0.971) 
0.57 
(0.912) 
-13.13 
(-2.514)** 
6 
0.94 
(0.875) 
-5.76 
(-0.962) 
1.08 
(0.849) 
-2.58 
(-0.176) 
1.23 
(1.016) 
-7.33 
(-1.512) 
0.65 
(1.047) 
-1.30 
(0.202) 
1.01 
(1.075) 
-5.81 
(-0.786) 
0.18 
(0.324) 
-5.78 
(-0.839) 
0.28 
(0.294) 
-12.84 
(-2.297)** 
7 
0.32 
(-0.002) 
-5.44 
(-0.946) 
0.65 
(0.229) 
-1.92 
(-0.129) 
0.07 
(-0.156) 
-7.25 
(-1.524) 
0.16 
(-0.289) 
-1.13 
(0.133) 
0.73 
(0.313) 
-5.07 
(-0.616) 
0.57 
(0.050) 
-5.20 
(-0.840) 
-1.07 
(-0.679) 
-13.92 
(-2.720)** 
8 
0.83 
(0.632) 
-4.60 
(-0.677) 
1.72 
(1.272) 
-0.19 
(0.189) 
0.67 
(0.368) 
-6.58 
(-1.223) 
0.61 
(0.906) 
-0.52 
(0.284) 
0.52 
(0.655) 
-4.55 
(-0.396) 
-0.12 
(0.151) 
-5.33 
(-0.782) 
2.67 
(1.814)* 
-11.24 
(-1.983)* 
9 
0.36 
(0.155) 
-4.24 
(-0.635) 
0.67 
(0.309) 
0.47 
(0.256) 
0.00 
(0.041) 
-6.57 
(-1.230) 
0.26 
(0.036) 
-0.26 
(0.283) 
1.72 
(0.839) 
-2.82 
(-0.156) 
0.42 
(-0.025) 
-4.90 
(-0.762) 
0.40 
(-0.038) 
-10.83 
(-1.910)* 
10 
0.47 
(0.280) 
-3.77 
(-0.568) 
0.42 
(0.311) 
0.90 
(0.301) 
0.44 
(0.237) 
-6.13 
(-1.160) 
0.97 
(0.641) 
0.70 
(0.370) 
1.05 
(0.696) 
-1.76 
(0.008) 
0.82 
(0.430) 
-4.07 
(-0.628) 
-0.93 
(-1.282) 
-11.77 
(-2.111)** 
11 
-1.24 
(-1.214) 
-5.01 
(-0.829) 
-1.34 
(-1.233) 
-0.43 
(0.067) 
-0.70 
(-0.736) 
-6.83 
(-1.292) 
-2.98 
(-2.664)** 
-2.27 
(-0.061) 
-1.10 
(-1.050) 
-2.86 
(-0.243) 
-2.32 
(-1.949)* 
-6.40 
(-1.022) 
-1.52 
(-1.300) 
-13.30 
(-2.201)** 
12 
0.11 
(0.249) 
-4.90 
(-0.759) 
0.35 
(0.377) 
-0.08 
(0.122) 
0.25 
(0.354) 
-6.58 
(-1.163) 
1.12 
(1.387) 
-1.15 
(0.135) 
-0.10 
(-0.047) 
-2.97 
(-0.251) 
-1.10 
(-0.346) 
-7.51 
(-1.123) 
-0.55 
(-0.129) 
-13.85 
(-2.179)** 
13 
0.67 
(0.423) 
-4.23 
(-0.638) 
0.59 
(0.406) 
0.51 
(0.204) 
0.52 
(0.397) 
-6.06 
(-1.050) 
0.21 
(0.000) 
-0.93 
(0.136) 
-0.00 
(0.053) 
-2.97 
(-0.233) 
1.82 
(0.554) 
-5.68 
(-0.878) 
0.72 
(0.590) 
-13.13 
(-2.061)** 
417 
14 
0.14 
(0.173) 
-4.08 
(-0.585) 
0.27 
(0.213) 
0.78 
(0.242) 
-0.31 
(-0.113) 
-6.37 
(-1.040) 
0.91 
(0.375) 
-0.02 
(0.214) 
2.54 
(0.870) 
-0.43 
(0.117) 
-0.39 
(-0.122) 
-6.08 
(-0.905) 
-0.90 
(-0.448) 
-14.03 
(-2.119)** 
15 
1.48 
(1.351) 
-2.59 
(-0.290) 
0.11 
(0.345) 
0.89 
(0.305) 
1.82 
(1.540) 
-4.55 
(-0.649) 
2.53 
(1.728)* 
2.50 
(0.537) 
1.61 
(1.591) 
1.17 
(0.400) 
1.58 
(1.064) 
-4.49 
(-0.648) 
2.36 
(2.400)** 
-11.66 
(-1.593) 
16 
0.62 
(0.626) 
-1.97 
(-0.148) 
-0.14 
(0.287) 
0.75 
(0.349) 
0.99 
(0.828) 
-3.55 
(-0.441) 
0.10 
(0.244) 
2.61 
(0.582) 
0.26 
(0.426) 
1.44 
(0.484) 
1.01 
(0.557) 
-3.48 
(-0.527) 
0.21 
(0.600) 
-11.45 
(-1.395) 
17 
-0.24 
(-0.129) 
-2.22 
(-0.169) 
-0.52 
(-0.457) 
0.22 
(0.274) 
-0.50 
(-0.357) 
-4.06 
(-0.496) 
1.08 
(0.593) 
3.69 
(0.682) 
0.88 
(0.932) 
2.32 
(0.650) 
-0.52 
(-0.640) 
-4.01 
(-0.653) 
1.14 
(0.703) 
-10.31 
(-1.239) 
18 
0.27 
(0.100) 
-1.95 
(-0.146) 
0.16 
(0.132) 
0.38 
(0.302) 
0.66 
(0.438) 
-3.39 
(-0.395) 
-0.92 
(-0.949) 
2.76 
(0.515) 
1.03 
(0.772) 
3.35 
(0.789) 
-1.49 
(-1.139) 
-5.50 
(-0.895) 
0.14 
(0.108) 
-10.17 
(-1.205) 
19 
0.25 
(0.222) 
-1.69 
(-0.104) 
0.46 
(0.283) 
0.85 
(0.338) 
0.24 
(0.264) 
-3.14 
(-0.338) 
-0.21 
(-0.046) 
2.55 
(0.516) 
-0.14 
(-0.205) 
3.21 
(0.734) 
0.10 
(0.201) 
-5.39 
(-0.835) 
-1.18 
(-0.373) 
-11.35 
(-1.221) 
20 
0.37 
(0.146) 
-1.31 
(-0.074) 
0.99 
(0.413) 
1.84 
(0.420) 
0.76 
(0.497) 
-2.38 
(-0.225) 
-0.07 
(-0.167) 
2.48 
(0.503) 
-1.26 
(-1.046) 
1.94 
(0.555) 
-0.04 
(-0.070) 
-5.44 
(-0.829) 
0.14 
(-0.128) 
-11.20 
(-1.293) 
 
